Negotiating Power between Civil Society and the State: the Formulation of Asylum Policies in Italy and in the United Kingdom by Polese, C
1 
 
Negotiating Power between Civil Society and the State: 










Thesis submitted for the 














DECLARATION OF AUTHORSHIP 
 
I, Cinzia Polese confirm that the work presented in this thesis is my own. Where 
information has been derived from other sources, I confirm that this has been indicated 























First and foremost, I would like to express my sincere gratitude to my supervisors, Dr. Alan 
Ingram and Professor John Salt, for their insights, advice, and great support.  
 I would also like to thank my fellow PhD students, Ben, whose invaluable help to 
‘brillianteering’ the final stages of the thesis has been extremely appreciated, Hang, Kezia, 
Lauren, Lea, Leo, and Valerie. I am happy and grateful for having made these important friends. 
It was an emotional rollercoaster filled with many cherished memories, including weddings and 
babies. Thank you!  
 Special thanks go also to all my interviewees without which the analysis of the topic would 
not have been possible. Thank you for your availability and trust. 
 I am also grateful for the + 3 Postgraduate Studentship given to me by the Economic and 
Social Research Council (ESRC), PTA-031-2006-00526 from 2006 to 2009. 
 Finally, I would like to thank my husband Mike whose support, patience and love have 
















The research focuses on the formulation of asylum policies in two contrasting countries, the 
United Kingdom and Italy. The overall aim of the thesis is to account for the pattern of 
similarities and differences between asylum legislation in the two countries via an examination 
of the context and processes of policy making. 
The hypothesis is twofold. Firstly, that differences in the nature of the state result in dissimilar 
policy outcomes and legislation. States vary according to their political and welfare systems and 
may be categorised on such bases. Although the EU Commission is strongly advocating the 
harmonization of asylum policies, member states still retain the power to decide who enters 
their territory and how to best deal with asylum claims, refugees and migrants. 
Secondly, that policy is the product of interactions between governments and a range of 
stakeholders, in which each actor has a vested interested in the result and is able to deploy a 
particular kind, level and direction of power and influence. The effect is that asylum policy in 
one country may be dissimilar to that of another because of the interests and power of each 
state’s stakeholders and the nature of the interaction between them and the government.  
The stakeholders include governments and their local and national officials, social partners, 
local and community organisations, migrant organisations, Non-governmental Organisations 
(NGOs) and other institutions and groups such as employers, trade unions, religious groups, etc. 
The research aims to identify how stakeholders in the two countries interact with each other in 
creating asylum policy and how the nature of the interaction varies between different types of 
state.  
The methods employed are mainly qualitative. They include documentary evidence on 
parliamentary debates, NGOs reports, newspapers’ articles analysis and in-depth interviews 
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1.1 AIMS AND OBJECTIVES  
This thesis is about asylum policy-making and its formulation in two countries, the United 
Kingdom and Italy, where both the nature of government and the perception of asylum as a 
difficult issue are different. It analyses and compares asylum legislation passed in 2002 in the two 
countries: the Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act for the United Kingdom and Law 30
th
 
July 2002, no. 189 – the so-called ‘Bossi-Fini’1 – for Italy. Although different in essence, the two 
laws represent an important shift in the asylum system especially in the Italian case but also for the 
political thinking of the Labour government in the UK. The decision to look at these two 
particular Acts is therefore dictated by the fact that they were both passed in the same year and 
that they represented a change of direction for asylum legislation in both countries. The overall 
aim is to show how policy proposals with regard to asylum become policy decisions.  
 The thesis is based on four hypotheses. The first hypothesis is that the issue of asylum may 
be perceived as a threat to states’ interests and sovereignty. The threat can be understood in terms 
of national security, economy and national identity. As such, it generates very different emotions 
as well as anxieties whereby the tabloid media and public opinion on one side, and interest groups 
on the other, play an important role. Freeman (2006, 238) states that asylum “is thrashed out in a 
complex, rapidly changing, multi-level arena” while at “[n]ational-level asylum politics is 
characterised by agitated publics, mobilised interest groups, partisan conflict, and, in some 
instances, activist national courts”. As a result, nation-states demand a more central role and 
respond to public pressure by legitimising strict entry rules, detention, deportation and limiting 
welfare entitlements. Because of the two countries under analysis, however, it is impracticable to 
speak only about the issue of asylum. This is because Italy has only immigration legislation that 
covers asylum partially. Asylum is mainly regulated by the European Directives on minimum 
standards. While asylum was very high on the UK political agenda in 2002, in Italy the debate 
                                                     
1
 From the name of the two main legislators: Umberto Bossi, former leader of the Northern League,  and 
Gianfranco Fini, former leader of National Alliance. 
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focused on illegal labour migration but was extended to include asylum in the hope of stopping 
false asylum claims.  
 Secondly, it is hypothesised that differences in the nature of government in the two countries, 
in particular with reference to their welfare and political systems, may result in dissimilar policy 
outcomes and legislation. In terms of their welfare systems, the UK and Italy also present 
considerable differences, with the latter displaying characteristics reflective of conservative states 
and Southern European states (Esping-Andersen 1990). Conservative states tend to have non-
interventionist governments with the Church playing a vital role in society. Southern European 
states tend to be characterised by the important role played by the family, by the difficulty in 
carrying out reforms due to the weakness of institutions and widespread irregular labour markets. 
On the other hand, the UK shows features that are typical of liberal states with their generous but 
means-assisted welfare systems. The two countries, however, share one similar trait in that they 
may be described as having unitary and centralised governments (Lijpart 1999). The British state 
though is characterised (according to the ‘Westminster model’) by parliamentary sovereignty and 
“strong and stable single-party cohesive cabinets” (Baldini 2012, n.p.). The Italian state has been 
considered as a “consensual (yet polarized) country, with a rigid constitution and unstable 
coalition governments” (ibid). Both aspects – the political and welfare systems – may have an 
impact on the types of policies that the states create.  
 The third hypothesis relates to the countries’ governance systems. It is that governments have 
shared some of their powers by delegating services and competencies to other stakeholders
2
. This 
has resulted in a shift from ‘government’ to ‘governance’, meaning a “non-hierarchical mode of 
governing, where non-state, private corporate actors (formal organizations) participate in the 
formulation and implementation of public policy” (Mayntz 1998, 1). This shift has turned the 
strong, unitary state into a weaker, disunited state where different stakeholders exercise power 
over the policy-making process. However, the situation changes when it comes to immigration 
and asylum because of the difficulties faced by governments dealing with these issues (welfare 
                                                     
2
 The terms ‘stakeholder’ and ‘actor’ will be used interchangeably. Stakeholders include governments and 
their local officials, social partners, local and community organisations, migrant organisations, Non-
governmental Organisations (NGOs), and other institutions and groups such as employers, trade unions, 
religious groups, etc. 
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benefits, illegal labour migration, ethnicity etc.). As such, these domains are still very much in the 
hands of nation-states, which are constantly trying to reassert their sovereignty and boundaries 
towards three different elements: ‘illegal’ immigrants, and both supranational and national non-
state actors. On the other hand, as governments need information on asylum, they have come to 
rely on some of the services provided by NGOs and pro-asylum organisations, thus surrendering 
part of their power to these other agencies.  
 The fourth hypothesis relates to the relationship between government, governance and 
networks. It is hypothesised that policy is the product of interactions between governments and a 
range of stakeholders, in which each actor is able to deploy a particular kind, level and direction of 
power and influence. The result is that asylum policy in one country may be different to that in 
another because of the vested interests and power of each state’s stakeholders and the nature of the 
interaction between them and the government. Networks can develop within and across central 
government, among political parties, private companies and within civil society. Furthermore, 
these networks can be both formal and informal. Informal networks are likely to form around a 
particular issue such as asylum in this context. In addition, different political systems show a 
different degree of openness and cooperation between the government and other stakeholders. For 
example, the UK government was fairly open to consultations while the Italian one was not. In 
both cases, there were issue networks because of the large number of participants, unstable and 
fluctuating relationships, unequal powers, different levels of access and, in some instances, 
conflicts.  
 The overall model for the thesis is therefore that asylum policy formation in the two 
countries has been shaped by the following features: 
1) The nature of asylum as a particularly difficult issue for governments that perceive it as 
a threat to their sovereignty. 
2) The nature of the state which is largely instrumental in policy outcomes. 
3) The degree to which there has been a shift from ‘government’ to ‘governance’, in which 
decisions involve networks of interest at national and international levels. 
4) The manner in which power is unevenly held and exercised within networks. 
17 
 
  In 2002, the most contentious migration issue for the UK was asylum, while for Italy it was 
illegal labour migration. The two governments reacted to the perceived threats accordingly as 
hypothesis 1 suggests.  
 In the UK, despite the devolution of competencies to other partners and regions in many areas, 
Westminster showed itself to be in control, with some nuanced flexibility especially during the 
bargaining process in the House of Lords. Following pressure from the tabloid media and public 
opinion, No.10 and the Home Office took charge of the situation, showing that the shift from 
‘government’ to ‘governance’ on the asylum front was muted as per hypothesis 3. Although 
consultations through formal and informal meetings with refugee-assisting groups were 
widespread, the analysis of the parliamentary debates shows only limited bargaining. This 
happened in the House of Lords as the Conservative party, then in opposition, fought against some 
of the measures brought in by the bill.  
 In Italy, some devolution of responsibility also happened but again the government was firm 
and resolute over the idea of preventing illegal migration. Contrary to the UK, the unstable 
alliance between the parties that formed the majority turned out to be the real concern for the 
government. There were in fact many significant disagreements between four ideologically very 
different political parties (the liberal ‘Go Italy’3, the populist Northern League4, the Catholic 
CCD-UDC
5
 and the right-wing and post-fascist party National Alliance
6
). The opposition, which 
was also very fragmented, did not have any power due to the government’s majority in both 
chambers of the government. They could only delay the process of the bill by obstructing its 
course through continuous requests for vote counting. A further discrepancy in the way the Italian 
government dealt with pro-migrant associations
7
 compared to the UK government, was the fact 
that the latter were completely excluded from the policy process as the government refused to 
enter in discussion with them. However, some groups were still able to exert some influence, 
                                                     
3
 Forza Italia whose leader was Silvio Berlusconi. 
4
 Lega Nord. 
5
 Centro Cristiano Democratico (CCD) and Cristiani Democratici Uniti (CDU). 
6
 Alleanza Nazionale (AN). 
7
 These include associations working to improve the rights of migrants (labour migrants as well as asylum 
seekers). For the purpose of this thesis, those considered were: intergovernmental organisations ( such as the 
UNHCR); international organisations (Amnesty International); national NGOs (British and Italian Refugee 
Council, International Consortium of Solidarity, Joint Council for the Welfare of Immigrants, Justice, 
Liberty, Save the Children etc); community organisations; employers groups; and trade unions. 
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showing an uneven power distribution as hypothesis 4 suggests. Although the way in which the 
two governments dealt with pro-migrant groups was very different, the networks that formed in 
both countries can be considered issue networks. Furthermore, the influence of certain individuals 
within the networks varied according to the issue they were confronting at a given moment. 
 
1.2 CONTRIBUTION TO THE CURRENT COMPARATIVE LITERATURE ON 
ASYLUM POLICY-MAKING 
What is new about this research is the fact that it compares the asylum policy-making process – 
and, in particular, the formulation aspect of this process – of two countries that have experienced 
very different political, historical and economic developments. Given their different nature, their 
attitudes and behaviours towards asylum, and the resulting asylum policies, reflect these 
differences.  
 From a theoretical point of view, although asylum and migration policy-making have 
received a lot of attention, little literature exists on the process leading to the creation of asylum 
policies. Where the process has been addressed, there is rarely a specific focus on asylum and 
different countries are not compared (Joppke 1997 and 1998; Zincone 2006a and 2006b; Zincone 
and Caponio 2004 and 2005; Statham and Geddes 2006; Lahav and Guiraudon 2007; Balch 
2009; Somerville and Wallace Goodman 2010; and Balch 2010a and 2010b
8
).  
In particular, “the study of policy networks does not permeate the literature on migration policy” 
as “the vast majority of commentators on UK migration policy barely mention the possibility 
that interest groups, or policy networks inclusive of non-state actors, have influenced policy” 
(Somerville and Wallace Goodman 2010, 954-956).  
 Zincone (2006b) has looked at Italian migration policy-making through the relationships of 
formal and informal actors within policy networks. In doing so, she has analysed two pieces of 
Italian immigration legislation to sustain the thesis that regardless of the political stand of the 
government in power, immigration policies only change to a certain extent. This indicates a 
                                                     
8
 The authors compare the UK and Spain in terms of how ideas and knowledge may shape policy. 
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continuation of policies between right and left, and that politicians’ rhetoric is different from their 
actions because of external pressures.  
 Colombo and Sciortino (2003), in their detailed analysis of the Bossi-Fini law, capture the 
bitter conflicts between the ruling parties but they focus only on the policy-makers within 
government and do not consider the involvement of other actors at different levels of the process. 
In an increasingly multi-level policy-making arena it is important to consider all the various 
aspects of the policy-making process, adopting both a top-down and bottom-up perspective. 
Looking at the interactions between formal and informal actors at different levels gives rise to 
further insight useful for a comparative analysis. 
 The literature on policy networks is quite rich, but there have been few studies (Somerville 
and Wallace Goodman 2010) of how they might be relevant to asylum and immigration in the 
UK. This thesis represents a step forward as it concentrates on specific asylum legislation rather 
than taking into consideration asylum legislation generally over a period of time. Furthermore, 
the thesis compares the legislation to the asylum situation in the two countries in the same year.  
  
1.3 KEY QUESTIONS 
The key research questions for the thesis follow from the hypotheses outlined at the beginning of 
this chapter. The first question asks:  
1) Why is asylum perceived as a difficult issue and a threat for nation-states? 
 The second hypothesis focuses on the nature of the state and because this is a comparative 
study, the central questions here are:  
2) How do different kinds of states respond to the politics of asylum? If the way asylum 
policy-making is managed depends on the nature of the state, the extent of similarity or 
difference between nation-states in treating similar issues needs to be compared. 
3) Why is asylum perceived differently from other types of migration? This is an 
important question not only because asylum stimulates very different and contrasting 




 The third and fourth hypotheses are closely related because they deal with actors other than 
the government. One part of the background to the research is the idea that in an increasingly 
globalised world, the nation-state is allegedly losing its powers nationally and internationally and 
that the notion of ‘government’ has consequently shifted to ‘governance’. The primary focus 
therefore is on the power struggle between key state and non-state actors involved in asylum 
policy-making, whilst considering pressures from civil society and the demands to harmonize 
policies in line with the other EU member states. The resulting questions therefore assess the 
types of networks involved in asylum policy-making and how power is held and exercised 
within them: 
4)   What kinds of policy networks are in evidence in the UK and Italy? In particular, what 
issue networks were formed and who belonged to them? 
5) How do networks operate in the case of asylum policy formulation in terms of formal 
and informal relationships between members? 
6) Where is the locus of power within networks with asylum policy?  
7) What is the relationship between government and wider networks? Are there closer 
relations with some organisations than others and, if so, why? 
 With the aims and objectives of the research outlined above, the next two sections explore 
the historical context in which the thesis is placed. These sections provide a framework for 
understanding the general dynamics of asylum policies in Western states in response to increasing 
levels of international mobility and growing numbers of asylum claims. The last part outlines the 
variations in the asylum policy decisions of two countries under study. 
 
1.4 HISTORICAL CONTEXT: MIGRATION MOVEMENTS AND STATES’ 
RESPONSES 
Migration has occurred for centuries. From slavery during colonial occupation to more recent 
times, European states have been involved in, and responded to, the phenomenon in different 
ways. For example, Western European governments willingly accepted refugees fleeing from 
persecution in the 1930’s during the rise of fascism, through the two world wars and in particular 
in the aftermath of the Second World War. During these years, refugees became “an inherent 
21 
 
ideological value for the Western block in the discrediting of the communist model” (Joly 2001, 
2). These were the years of humanitarian solidarity that led to the creation of the 1951 Geneva 
Convention relating to the Status of Refugees. However, the humanitarian feelings that 
characterised Europe in the post-war period were soon to pass. Post-war economic expansion 
played a vital role throughout Western Europe. Here “the growing labour and population 
requirements of nation-building states … eased the dilemma of huge numbers of post-war 
refugees by creating a range of resettlement opportunities” (Gibney 2004, 3). In the following 
years, refugees, asylum seekers, and economic migrants became an essential source of cheap 
labour to be used temporarily in periods of economic growth, up to the 1973 oil crisis. In these 
years and throughout the 1980s, economic recession and restructuring corresponded to the closing 
down of opportunities for labour migrants.  
 Finally, in the 1990s, important geopolitical changes like the end of the Cold War and 
various conflicts (for example, former Yugoslavia, Iraq and Somalia) occurred and generated new 
flows of international migrants The majority of these movements have had their origins outside 
Europe, due to internal ethnic conflicts, rather than inside Europe, as was the case between the two 
World Wars (Gibney 2004). Over the years, there has been a change in refugee movements 
ranging from and due to: “postwar resettlement, ethnic migrations, guestworkers, family reunion, 
asylum seeking, the collapse of the Iron Curtain, Balkan crises and the EU enlargement each of 
which has created and is still creating new movements” (Salt 2007, 470). These movements are 
extremely varied in numbers, nature and length, as people have different reasons as well as ways 
to move according to their personal and national contexts. They may be “fleeing persecution” or 
they may be “migrants trying to escape the hardships and uncertainties of life in developing 
countries” (UNCHR 2007a, 6). 
 As a result of changes in migration flows and the increased numbers of asylum seekers and 
economic migrants in the 1980s and 1990s, European countries started creating, sometimes on an 
ad hoc basis, stricter policies tightening controls on their borders (such as visa restrictions, carrier 
sanctions and lists of safe third countries and safe countries of origin). In turn, migration issues 
have become increasingly politicised. Asylum has become a “touchstone issue on political 
agendas across the industrialised world” (Koser 2007, 234), while, at the same time, there have 
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been tensions between a requirement for “the mobility of labour” (Nagel 2002, 975) and a desire 
to control mobility and access to territory in order “to maintain sovereignty over national territory” 
(ibid). According to Nagel (2002, 976), this tension has 
[t]hroughout the history of the modern nation-state system … given rise periodically to 
panics about ‘floods’ of immigrants and the ‘threats’ they pose to national cohesion and 
to citizenship. While these panics often erupt during times of economic downturn, they 
just as often appear when national economies are visibly thriving on the labour of 
newcomers. 
 
 Restrictive migration policies have led to the channelling of migrants and people fleeing from 
persecution into the asylum process as the only available route of access into the country. As a 
result, significant numbers of asylum applications came to be lodged by people who were not “in 
genuine need of protection” (Koser 2007, 234) but rather seeking economic opportunities. 
Important factors such as increasing North-South inequalities, globalisation, poverty and human 
rights abuses have produced the so-called “migration-asylum nexus” (Castles 2004, 211; see also 
Turton 2003), wherein it is hard to separate economic and forced migration. In turn, this blurring 
creates an opportunity for the media to talk about ‘hordes’ of ‘bogus’ asylum seekers ‘swamping’ 
the country and for politicians to create stricter asylum policies. 
 As different states have realised that they face similar problems, they have increasingly 
collaborated, resulting in the harmonization of policies. The EU is the main vehicle for this, 
introducing a regional dimension to this process. As Joly (2001, 3-4) states, it looks as if  
regimes in distinct regions in the world are more interdependent and interconnected so 
that one can speak of a convergence towards a single regime […] regionalisation has 
become a strategy and a policy explicitly stated by industrialised countries, which aims 
to keep refugees in their region of origin, out of Western Europe.  
 
However, despite this apparent convergence and increasing similarity, differences in the nature of 
welfare states, of policy processes and of the range of stakeholders mean that nation-states may be 
more or less liberal in terms of the specifics of asylum policies. As Freeman (2006, 227) 
recognises, there are still “nationally distinct approaches to managing migration flows and their 
political consequences” because states continue to be influenced by their history and therefore 
create policy differently.  
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 Kunz (1981) was one of the first scholars to consider why states’ policies towards refugees 
differ. He argued that under-populated countries will welcome refugees to increase their 
population and provide manpower. A different approach will be adopted by “overpopulated and 
demographically self-sufficient countries”, which will be less keen to accept a large number of 
refugees. However, being “more mature and self-assured” (Kunz 1981, 48) they will be more 
sympathetic, offering refugees a safe haven. The United Kingdom is amongst those countries that 
historically might be said to belong to this second group of multiethnic and pluralistic societies. 
“Monistic societies” i.e. monoethnic as opposed to multiethnic and pluralistic societies, however, 
will be likely “to give significant preference to sib-arrivals from countries of affinity, but keep 
only the servant door open to peoples of other races and traditions” (ibid, 49). An example of the 
idea that societies conceived as ‘monoethnic’ are more hostile to receiving culturally different 
people can be discerned during the making of the ‘Bossi-Fini’ law. During one parliamentary 
question time, an MP from the Catholic party Union of Italian Democrats, pointed out that a 
“criterion of cultural homogeneity” (1.1) (Volontè MP9, Chamber of Deputies Deb 14 November 
2001, sitting 62, 67) was important and that “particular attention shall be given to those citizens 
coming from countries that hold stronger links with European culture and that therefore, can 
integrate more easily in our society” (1.2) (Fini MP, ibid, 68). 
 Kunz’s analysis, if it was ever true, is now well out of date. Many European countries have a 
similar attitude of mistrust towards asylum seekers and migrants in general, especially in the 
aftermath of 9/11, regardless of their population size, economic stability and ethnic composition. 
So although the United Kingdom is expected to be sympathetic on the basis of Kunz’s argument, 
in reality it has become increasingly strict whilst the numbers of deportations of failed asylum 
seekers has risen, partly in response to an effort to dispel the perceived idea that the country has 
been a ‘soft touch’, as it was described by Shadow Home Secretary Ann Widdecombe (BBC 
2001a). This belief has been endorsed by many tabloids as well as right wing politicians believing 
that the UK was “being exploited” by “bogus asylum-seekers and illegal immigrants … in order to 
benefit from the generosity of [its] welfare state” (Hastilow 2007, n.p.).  
 
                                                     
9
 Member and spokesperson of the Catholic political party UDC (Unione dei Democratici Italiani ). 
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1.4.1 Italy and the United Kingdom 
Italy and the UK make for a potentially revealing comparison because despite certain similarities 
(growing number of migrants and asylum claims), they have different historical, political and 
migration trajectories and have subsequently developed different asylum/immigration policies in 
different ways.  
 The United Kingdom has a long history of immigration and of immigration legislation, with 
the first Aliens Act dated 1905, and the first modern immigration legislation adopted in 1962. In 
terms of asylum, the first legislation dates back to 1993 (1993 Asylum and Immigration Appeals 
Act; 1996 Asylum and Immigration Act; 1999 Immigration and Asylum Act; 2002 Nationality, 
Immigration and Asylum Act; 2004 Asylum and Immigration (Treatment of Claimants, etc.) 
Act; 2006 Immigration, Asylum and Nationality Act ). This corresponded with the end of the 
Soviet bloc and a subsequent increase in the number of asylum applications. Since then, there have 
been eight subsequent Acts. As Sales (2007, 147) explains, 
each new piece of legislation has created a different system of support alongside 
previous arrangements … The trend has been to separate asylum seekers from society 
on arrival, with the presumption that most applications will fail. Another aspect of the 
legislation has been to make status more temporary.  
 
 Italy has only recently become a country of immigration. In the decade 1989-1999, Italy's 
foreign population increased considerably, from 490,000 to 1,500,000 (Bertozzi, 2002). Foreign 
nationals with a regular residence permit
10
 have increased in numbers, “estimated at 2.6 million 
in 2004 (approx. 4.2% of the total resident population)” (European Foundation for the 
Improvement of Living and Working Conditions 2007, 18). This number, according to data 
available from the Ministry of Interior, has further increased to 3 million, which is double the 
number compared to five years earlier (Ministero dell’Interno 2007a, 1). The rise of 
immigration in Italy has been therefore rather swift when compared to other EU countries and to 
the UK in particular (Schuster 2000; Vincenzi 2000). It has taken the country by surprise, and it 
has been argued that Italy has been unable to manage and understand it (Sigona 2005). 
Furthermore, Italy does not have specific asylum legislation. This is due to the fact that article 10 
                                                     
10 “As of 31 December 2010 the total resident population of Italy was 60,626,442, with an increase of 
286,114 (+0.5%) due exclusively to migration from abroad”. Total immigration was 458,856 (Istat 2011).  
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of the Italian Constitution and EU Directives
11
 approved in agreement with member states to aid 
in the process of creating a common asylum system have been deemed to be sufficient by the 
various Italian governments. 
 In the UK, asylum is still high on the agenda although numbers have decreased 
considerably since 2002, while in Italy asylum has never been a priority because of the low 
numbers of asylum claims
12
 compared to other EU member states, the different ways Italy has 
devised to give protection
13
 instead of granting asylum and, finally, because of party-political 
interests. Nevertheless, some of the outcomes of the two pieces of legislation analysed here are 
similar in nature, namely, those aimed at deterring the entrance of unwanted migrants, who have 
been seen as a potential threat to the nation-state’s unity, security and cohesion. As such, both 
countries have adopted and implemented measures to discourage asylum seekers from coming 
and claiming asylum in the first place with the enforcement of border security; bilateral 
agreements; and juxtaposed controls (UK) or the use of the Navy to stop migrant boats at sea 
(Italy). In-country, they both use administrative detention and fast-track measures (including 
deportation) where possible. This is, however, a general trend that has been happening 
throughout the EU for the past twenty years or so. It is important to ascertain what elements 
constitute the key differences in the policies’ development and why these elements are different. 
Two specific pieces of legislation have been studied and analysed. For the Italian case, this thesis 
focuses on Law 189/2002
14
 also known as the ‘Bossi-Fini’. It entered into force in 2002 but was 
implemented only in 2005 with “Implementing Regulation 303/04” (European Council on 
Refugees and Exiles 2005, 173). The relevant UK legislation is the 2002 Nationality Immigration 
                                                     
11
 Main EU Directives on asylum that have been transposed into national law by Italy and the UK: Council 
Directive 2001/55/EC of 20 July 2001 on minimum standards for giving temporary protection in the event 
of a mass influx of displaced persons and on measures promoting a balance of efforts between Member 
States in receiving such persons and bearing the consequences thereof; Council Directive 2003/9/EC of 27 
January 2003 laying down minimum standards for the reception of asylum seekers; Council Directive 
2004/83/EC of 29 April 2004 on minimum standards for the qualification and status of third country 
nationals or stateless persons as refugees or as persons who otherwise need international protection and the 
content of the protection granted; Council Directive 2005/85/EC of 1 December 2005 on minimum 
standards on procedures in Member States for granting and withdrawing refugee status. 
12
 For example, throughout the 1990s Italy accepted a high number of Albanians after the breakdown of 
their communist regime. However, Italy did not recognise them as asylum seekers. Rather, they were issued 
a two year residence permit, if they could prove they had left the country prior to 1998 (Istat 2006; Barjaba 
2004). 
13 
Humanitarian and subsidiary protection set by the EU Directives. 
14




and Asylum (NIA) Act. The two laws were passed in the same year, 2002, thus representing a 
good device for comparison. But they also correspond to a shift in the asylum regime.  According 
to UNHCR (2006, 1), the Bossi-Fini is deemed 
a landmark albeit controversial Immigration Law […] with two - out of a total of 
thirty-eight - articles on asylum
15
. The provisions on asylum included in the Law 
were initially intended primarily to avoid actual or perceived abuse of the asylum 
procedures, but in fact, the two articles effectively resulted in redesigning the asylum 
procedure.  
 
 The NIA Act marks the separation from previous Acts towards building “a seamless 
management system, along with strong enforcement powers” (ibid, 22). The Act was seen as a 
deterrent for people not in real need of refuge.  
 
1.5 THESIS STRUCTURE 
The thesis is structured as follows: 
Chapter 2 outlines the main theoretical approaches relevant to the four hypotheses dealing with 
asylum issues, the nature of the state, governance and networks. The focus on these particular 
aspects is due to the fact that, first and foremost, refugees and migrants, although facing different 
problems, are often viewed as being part of the same category, thus, creating an asylum/migration 
nexus. This nexus, plus the lack of refugee theories, may be manipulated at decision- and policy-
making level thus creating an asylum issue to which governments respond as if it were a threat to 
their sovereignty. It is at this point that the role and nature of the nation-state is evaluated. States 
with different welfare and political systems create different types of policies. Furthermore, 
although EU member states retain the power to decide who enters their territory and how best to 
deal with asylum claims, refugees and migrants, they are also subjected to the EU Commission’s 
strong advocacy for harmonization of asylum policies. But to what extent do states retain their 
decision-making powers? Have they partially lost their powers by devolving decisions to both 
regions and provinces at the national level as well as to supranational institutions? Does multilevel 
governance undermine member states authority? The focus at this point switches to theories of 
policy networks. Policy networks may be understood as a threat to national sovereignty as they 
                                                     
15 
Articles 31 (Permesso di soggiorno per i richiedenti asilo – residence permit for asylum seekers)  and 32 
(Procedura semplificata – simplified procedure). 
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may constrain government’s power. This final part considers the nature and interaction of various 
stakeholders at state and non-state level who have a specific interest in asylum and migration, 
thus, affecting certain aspects of the policy-making process. Policy networks consist of 
interactions at government and parliamentary level, tertiary and private sectors and some parts 
of the public. Through the analysis of these networks, findings have further established the 
existence of issue networks that have limited power and as such were not seen as posing a real 
threat to the governments’ decisions in terms of asylum policy-making. 
 Chapter 3 discusses the methodology adopted in this study. This chapter details the sources 
and evidence that were used to answer the research questions. Statistical data on asylum available 
for Italy and the United Kingdom (asylum applications, total initial decisions and granted refugee 
status) were used to compare the differences between the two countries in terms of asylum 
perceived as a threat and the consequent response by the states. Parliamentary debates (Hansard 
for the UK and its equivalent for Italy), committee reports, NGO reports and media articles were 
examined to investigate how legislation came about. They specify in which part of the process the 
legislation was formed and, in particular, the tendencies of different political parties in the making 
of the legislation, including influences and relative power. The key issues contained in the two 
pieces of legislation and the stakeholders at national and local level are also identified. Interviews 
with the stakeholders show how they interacted with each other and perceived their degree of 
power in influencing the decision-making process.  
 Chapters 4 and 5 examine the history, trends and developments of asylum and migration 
legislation in the UK and Italy. This examination matters because it provides the context to 
understand why asylum was perceived as a threat through the comparison of the two countries. 
The UK has a long tradition of immigration legislation. On the other hand, Italy is the only 
country in the European Union not to have specific asylum legislation and the first immigration 
legislation goes back only as far as 1990 (Martelli Law). In context, the United Kingdom has a 
string of pieces of asylum legislation, with the first (The Immigration and Asylum Appeals Act) 
dating back to 1993 and the eighth and latest one dating 2009 (Borders, Citizenship and 
Immigration Act).  
28 
 
 Chapters 6 and 7 focus on the United Kingdom and Italy respectively and include the 
analysis of the parliamentary debates, committee reports, NGOs’ reports and media articles. The 
aim of these two chapters is to use the theoretical framework to explore where the decision-
making process is centred, relative to multiple stakeholders from local communities to national 
government. Each stakeholder has aims, objectives and approaches which are singular and strictly 
related to their views. Results in the two countries were contrasting. I argue that in the UK, despite 
consultation with charities and NGOs, the government remained the real power holder. The 
legislation therefore reflects a top-down approach, although some flexibility can be identified with 
regard to a few issues linked to the establishment of accommodation centres. In this case, there 
was limited bargaining in the House of Lords. In Italy, consultation on asylum policy was limited 
to the UNHCR and with regard to immigration, the employers’ organisations and a few other 
bodies (such as the Navy for example) were engaged. Bargaining in the Italian case was much 
more to the forefront. It occurred within the ruling coalition and only on aspects related to the 
immigration side of the law. While many important concessions were made on immigration, 
asylum was not the object of contention, although some bottom-up influence happened indirectly 
through the involvement of the local mayors and their cooperation with the National Association 
of Municipalities. 
 Chapter 8 provides a summary analysis and comparison of the two countries, drawing on 
interviews and the theoretical framework. The chapter clarifies the similarities and differences of 
the two countries in terms of their decision-making process on asylum and immigration policies. 
In particular, it emphasises the approach different stakeholders have towards each other and 
towards these policies according to their power as well as personal and national interests.  
 Chapter 9 provides an overview of the most important findings of the research and details the 










This chapter reviews relevant theoretical approaches from political science, public policy, 
public administration and migration, with particular attention to conceptualising the nature of 
the state, government systems and political parties as well as governance and networks. These 
aspects will be utilised to produce a framework for testing the hypothesis that states with 
different political systems deal with the issue of asylum differently. As suggested in Chapter 1, 
states may deal with asylum in distinct ways because it may or may not be perceived as a threat 
and may be seen differently from other types of migration. Furthermore, states are caught 
between their duties towards their citizens and the ethos related to giving refuge to people 
seeking asylum in line with the international conventions and treaties they have ratified. As 
such, governments may be constrained by supranational as well as national organisations 
concerned with the well-being of displaced people. 
 The first part of the chapter concentrates on asylum and immigration theories. This is 
related to the first hypothesis which suggests that asylum is an important and complex issue for 
governments due to the perceived threat it represents. Asylum and migration theories focus on 
these complexities and their relevance for asylum policy, dealing with a range of issues from the 
entry of asylum seekers and the reasons behind their movement to the decision-making process 
that produces policy. The perception of the nature of asylum may thus have an effect on policy-
making. Asylum theories are often considered as a subset of migration theories, leading to the 
possible misconception that asylum seekers, economic migrants and illegal immigrants belong 
to the same group without any formal distinction. There is also a lot of misunderstanding around 
asylum and migration issues due to superficial and sometimes sensationalist press coverage 
which can create confusion and possible resentment in public opinion. The public, in turn, may 
voice their discontent through voting, opinion polls, or even protest. Moses (2006, 139) argues 
that “in democratic states, public policy should reflect public opinion, and public opinion in the 




 The second section of this chapter considers the nature of the nation-state. It aims to 
examine how different states respond to the asylum issue in order to make asylum policies. 
States are called to provide assistance to asylum seekers but in the case in which asylum is 
perceived as threat, a state’s duty is, first and foremost, towards its citizens. Furthermore, states 
vary according to their “historical circumstances” (Badie and Birnbaum 1983, 4) as well as their 
political and welfare systems and may be categorised on such bases. To carry out this 
investigation, Esping-Andersen’s (1990) influential typology of welfare states is discussed.  
The thesis also connects with geographic themes by engaging with questions of scale. In recent 
years there has been much discussion of rescaling or unbundling of the state and its functions 
in geography (Smith 1992; Brenner 2004; Marston et al 2005; see also Money 1999 who 
compares immigration policy from a political and geographical point of view). For example, in 
relation to state power, Gill (2010) examines alternative approaches to state theories put forward 
by geographers and sociologists studying various aspects of forced migration. He emphasises 
that often studies in this field still point “towards a widespread tendency to reify the state in 
asylum and refugee research” (ibid, 627) marking a sharp separation between state and society. 
The consequence of this view, the author continues  
include a tendency to downplay the agency of social forces in the governance of 
asylum communities, a tendency to overlook the importance of political struggles 
between competing public sector factions, a tendency to underemphasize the agency 
of state actors themselves within state bureaucracies, and a tendency to overestimate 
the ease by which state policies are translated into outcomes regardless of social and 
cultural circumstances (ibid 639). 
 
In practice, the state still appears as the prominent actor when it comes to border controls and 
states’ response to asylum seekers. On the other hand, more recently geographers and sociologists 
have distanced themselves from this essentialist view of the state. Rather, they have offered an 
anti-essentialist and poststructuralist vision of the state. This perspective comprises the increasing 
presence of actors within the asylum sector thus blurring the boundaries between state and social 
actors.  
On the other hand, the thesis suggests persistence of a three key scales (national, regional and 




 The third and fourth parts of this chapter focus on the concepts of ‘governance’ and ‘policy 
networks’ respectively. These two concepts are used in the context of this thesis to show that 
although different actors co-exist in the asylum realm, they do not bear the same weight on the 
asylum policy process. More specifically, with regards to ‘governance’, in recent years and in 
many fields there has been a shift from ‘government’, referring to the decision-making process 
of a highly centralized state with vertical interactions, to ‘governance’, a term used to underline 
the horizontal relations of different networks formed by state and non-state actors to influence 
policies. Several scholars have demonstrated that there has been a delegation of competencies in 
several fields and possibly a loss of power or, in Rhodes’ (1994, 1996) terms, a ‘hollowing-out’ 
of the state to other stakeholders, such as transnational bodies, regions and sub-regions, and 
private and public sectors (Rhodes 1994, 1996, 2007; Sassen 1996; Hollifield 2000; Holliday 
2000; Guiraudon 2001; Bevir and Rhodes 2010). This is also known as multi-level governance 
whereby different levels of government and private and public actors exercise their power and 
influence.  
Governance implies the existence of different actors at state and non-state level who have vested 
interests in a given issue. Having different values, priorities and perspectives, these actors may 
influence each other’s views throughout the decision-making process in order to reach a desired 
end result. On the other hand, network members have different levels of power and their 
influence therefore varies. The study of networks allows an analysis of their role, how they 
operate, power relations between different members and relationships between central 
government and other actors.    
 
2.1 ASYLUM AS AN ISSUE: ASYLUM AND MIGRATION THEORIES  
Policy decisions are usually taken when issues become urgent. Asylum in many countries is 
considered a pressing issue because of the objective difficulties linked to it. While asylum 
movements are part of the most generic migration movements, which also include flows such as 
refugee resettlement, family reunification, economic and student migration, it is not always easy 
to differentiate them. Furthermore, the unplanned arrival of asylum seekers at borders and the 
scale of movement affect perceptions of the nature of their movements. Hence, asylum is often 
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perceived by governments, the tabloid media and public opinion as a threat to national security, 
national identity and cohesion, and the economy. 
 Numerous disciplines have sought to come to terms with migration’s complex and 
multifaceted nature, creating very different theoretical frameworks. However, “accumulated 
scholarship remains unable to explain key features of current migratory reality” (Sciortino 2000, 
213). This is because the majority of theories have focused on specific aspects of migration due 
to the intrinsic interests of the various disciplines. As such, due to the diverse nature of 
migration, there is no single, theory of international migration, “only a fragmented set of 
theories that have developed largely in isolation from one another” (Messina and Lahav 2006, 
31; see also Massey et al. 1993; Teitelbaum 2002; Arango 2004; Brettell and Hollifield 2008). 
Most theories occupy themselves with labour migration and with voluntary movement. Until 
relatively recently, refugees and asylum seekers not strictly entering into the voluntary 
migration process are either left out of the more generic discourse or have become a subset of it 
(Kunz 1973; Zolberg et al. 1989a; Arango 2004; Healey 2006). The result is that policy makers 
do not have a coherent theory of forced migration.  
 The earliest acknowledged asylum theory is that of Kunz (1973). It explicitly dealt with 
refugee movements and the many different reasons and ways these may happen. His choice of the 
term ‘kinetics’ was due to the fact that asylum movement is controlled by inertia and the “friction 
and the vectors of outside forces applied” (ibid, 131) on refugees. This theory was created at a 
time – the 1970s – when much of the world experienced a general economic recession that led to a 
decrease in the demand for external labour (Koser 2001; Gibney 2004). Increasing numbers of 
refugees for both political and economic reasons created concerns about being ‘swamped’ in many 
receiving states. The increase in refugee flows since then has been mainly due to the insurgence of 
wars in states like Vietnam and Ethiopia in the 1970’s, Pakistan, Iran16 and Sri Lanka in the 
1980’s, Somalia and the Former Yugoslavia in the 1990’s, Iraq and Afghanistan more recently. 
Even more recently, many people have fled social unrest in Egypt, Libya and Tunisia, and these 
have mainly be young men moving for economic reasons. Many have tried to reach the tiny Italian 
                                                     
16
 Iran-Iraq war 1980-1988. 
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island of Lampedusa, causing distress, worry and resentment in Italy, the government and the rest 
of Europe (see Chapter 5). 
 In developing his theoretical framework, Kunz emphasised that the urgency of refugee 
movements required a quick response from policy makers. Secondly, he assumed that when the 
refugee is re-settled and no longer in a ‘midway-to-nowhere’ situation, he/she becomes similar 
to the voluntary migrant. This blurring of the destination is still current nowadays and affects 
the policy-making process as policy-makers are often unable to distinguish between asylum 
seekers, refugees and voluntary migrants. As Kunz (1973, 128) argues, 
once the refugee is re-settled he is more often than not equated by administrators and 
general public alike with the voluntary migrants around him. First of all, the re-
settled refugee ceases to be a problem demanding international solution. For the 
refugee administrator he becomes a closed case for whom solution has been found. 
Secondly, once refugees arrive in a place of settlement they tend to merge statistically 
with voluntary migrants. 
 
This means that what begins as unplanned entry merges into a settled adventitious population. 
The challenge of distinguishing between voluntary migrants and asylum seekers/refugees was 
taken up by Richmond (1993) in his duality of ‘proactive’ and ‘reactive’ migrants. The former, 
like professionals, contracted temporary workers and retirees, consciously take the decision to 
leave but only after having carefully considered the factors for or against their move. On the 
other hand, reactive migrants include UN Convention refugees or those escaping from other 
adversities or calamities and whose freedom is instead very limited due to a sudden crisis 
“which leaves few alternatives but escape from intolerable threats” (ibid, 9).  
 The next major step was that of Zolberg, Suhrke and Aguayo (1989b) who regarded Kunz’s 
‘kinetic theory’ as too “formalistic and very abstract” (ibid, vi). They developed an 
interdisciplinary theoretical framework for crisis situations in various parts of the world. They 
argued first that refugee movements are themselves “patterned by identifiable social forces and 
hence can be viewed as structured events” (ibid, vi) just like any other type of migration. Second, 
they asserted that the root causes of refugee movements are to be found not only in internal 
struggles within the country of origin but also in the outside world that is other nation-states. 
Furthermore, the authors use as their foundation the fact that the term ‘refugee’ was originally 
coined in the receiving countries: 
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Defining refugees for purposes of policy implementation requires a political choice 
and an ethical judgement … For a refugee flow to begin, certain conditions must be 
met in one or more of the states of destination as well as in the state of origin … 
Should a government be bent on persecuting some target group, the asylum policies 
of other countries may well determine whether the persecution will lead to a refugee 
flow or to some other outcome (Zolberg et al. 1989b, 4-6). 
 
Receiving countries, therefore, are not passive entities but have a responsibility both to asylum 
seekers and their own population.  
 Finally, Koser (2001) and Castles (2004) introduced the asylum/migration nexus to explain 
how asylum and labour migration have become almost indistinct over time. Until the 1970s 
there were three routes to arrive on European shores: through labour recruitment programmes, 
through refugee resettlement programmes, and through family reunion or marriage (Gibney 
2004; Van Hear 2007). The 1973 oil crisis led to a recession and difficulties in employing 
European citizens. As a result, overseas labour recruitment severely decreased. Simultaneously, 
refugee resettlement programmes were reduced. One of the consequences was the “convergence 
of political refugees and economic migrants in a single migration route, namely asylum 
seeking” (Koser 2001, 88; Koser 2007). From here comes the erroneous assumption that all or a 
majority of asylum seekers are not in search of protection but of work. They are, therefore, 
considered economic migrants or ‘bogus’ asylum seekers, hence creating the asylum/migration 
nexus and an “economic versus political” dichotomy (Zolberg et al, 1989b, 31). This overlap 
between asylum and immigration is a characteristic of those immigrants whose aim is to look 
for a better chance in life. So we are in the presence of two possible situations. The first relates 
to an economic situation when immigrants enter a country claiming asylum, although they are 
not in need of protection. The second relates to a political situation that, conversely, occurs 
when individuals seeking asylum enter a country illegally because they do not have documents, 
whilst hoping to stay or move on to a different country. As Cornelius and Rosenblum (2005, 
102) argue, 
forced migrants confront decision-making challenges similar to those of voluntary 
migrants, and structural pushes, pulls, and transborder social networks exert a strong 
influence on migration decisions when humanitarian ‘push factors’ are controlled for 




Consequently, governments may be confronted with migration plans which do not sit easily 
within migration management systems. 
 The degree of familiarity in terms of politics, language and culture may attract an 
individual to go to one country or another. Furthermore, migrants’ plans to travel from their 
country of origin to the host country depend on certain factors such as: lack of opportunities; 
porous borders coupled with inadequate control and deficient migration policies; informal 
labour market; and family reunion (Papadopoulou 2005). What is important to stress here is that 
the lack of knowledge and understanding by policy makers about the above issues could 
potentially bear serious consequences for asylum policy outcomes whilst also generating 
resentment in the wider public.  
 Boswell (2009) talks about “legitimising knowledge” (ibid, 167), that is, the legitimisation 
of politics through knowledge. This is because a) “knowledge can lend authority to political 
actors” and b) “[s]cientifically based empirical or analytical claims can substantiate and thereby 
enlist public support for particular policy positions” (ibid, 167). In order to increase knowledge 
and understanding, research and policy should be more connected so to give policy makers “a 
solid base of knowledge” and counteract “some of the pitfalls of internal decision-making” 
(Iredale et al. 2004, 115). Theories may become valuable for those involved in generating 
policies as they can “carry very different implications for policy formulation” (Massey et al. 
1993, 463). However, linking research and policy may present some obstacles. First of all, the 
length of time required to carry out rigorous research can be an issue. Migration is frequently 
considered by policy makers as a short-term cycle or process and there is usually a sense of 
urgency which does not allow enough time for discussion of research and its assimilation 
(Freeman 1995; Castles 2004; Iredale et al. 2004). Secondly, Gibney (2004, 17) argues of 
theorists, that “in concentrating on what is ethically desirable, and ignoring the question of what 
is politically possible, … will simply talk past rather than engage with the claims, interests and 
agendas of governments “. Furthermore, theories can sometimes be abstract and not easily 
empirically testable and therefore not applicable to real political issues.  
 In conclusion, asylum is an important and difficult issue for many governments. The 
complexity of asylum derives from the fact that people move for several reasons so that asylum 
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seekers may be confused with voluntary migrants and vice-versa. Although research into the 
asylum and refugee phenomenon has grown (Black 2001), no single theory of refugee migration 
exists. This is problematic for politicians who need to act fast when making policies as popular 
media often turns the matter into sensationalist headlines. In these circumstances, asylum 
seekers become the scapegoat and are perceived and treated as a threat. Nation-states react by 
trying to play a bigger central role in dealing with the issue and by reaffirming their sovereignty 
through the imposition of strict policies. Following from this, the next section looks more 
closely into the nature of the state and in particular, the notions of nation-state and sovereignty 
and what kinds of constraint governments face at national, international and supranational 
levels. 
 
2.2 NATURE OF THE STATE 
The second part of this chapter is in line with the second hypothesis that proposes that the nature 
of the state determines how the issue of asylum is handled. In this respect, the behaviour of 
states is influenced by their historical and political characteristics and their perception of asylum 
as a problem. Furthermore, a state’s first and foremost commitment is generally considered to 
be the protection of its own citizens, which may leave little space for non-citizens. This 
particular aspect – and what this means for asylum seekers and refugees – is considered in the 
next section. The chapter then continues by analysing one other important variable in terms of 
the nature of the state: its approach to welfare. 
 
2.2.1 The state  
The works and ideas of Jean-Jacques Rousseau, Thomas Hobbes, Jean Bodin, and John Locke 
have a common thread: that the state was created by the demos (population) for the demos itself. 
However, whereas Hobbes and Bodin talked about the alienation of the state for the greater 
good of its citizens, Locke’s idea of the state was that it “emerged as a concentrated form of 
power and authority that, while connected to the human population that originally brought it 
into being, was not reducible to that population” (Gibney 2004, 199). Later, Marx and others did 
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not see the state as an observer but as an active entity with conflicting interests, a sort of broker 
(Gibney 2004; see also Boswell 2007).  
 Although the nation-state has changed enormously over the centuries, it still retains its 
initial scope, that of the protection of its citizens. For example, Gibney (2004) in The Ethics and 
Politics of Asylum, examines immigration policies in four different countries (Australia, 
Germany, United Kingdom and United States) and comes to the conclusion that although very 
different in nature 
none [of these countries] considered the needs of outsiders as at all approaching a 
par with those of its own citizenry. Everywhere entrance policies were different, 
and yet everywhere such policies were constructed, implemented and maintained 
by states through a deliberative logic that attached priority to the interests of their 
own citizenries (ibid, 197). 
 
Nevertheless, the nation-state is called to provide not only for its own people but also for people 
such as refugees and asylum seekers, who are not catered for by their own states. Gibney asks 
what kind of responsibilities liberal democratic states have towards refugees and economic 
migrants. He is especially concerned with asylum seekers who ‘knock on the doors’ of these 
states at a time when asylum has become a highly politicized and controversial issue and not 
merely a selfless call to help those less fortunate:  
A kind of schizophrenia seems to pervade Western responses to asylum seekers and 
refugees; great importance is attached to the principle of asylum but enormous efforts 
are made to ensure that refugees (and others with less pressing claims) never reach 
the territory of the state where they could receive their protection (ibid, 2). 
 
 Gibney analyses two theoretical positions in stark contrast to each other. The impartialists 
hold “global liberal and utilitarian approaches” (ibid, 20) and believe in the rights of the human 
community. Based on this perspective, states should be able to make a judgment on entrance 
based on this factor, that is, “to take into equal account the interests (utilitarianism) or rights 
(global liberalism) of the human community in its entirety in decisions on entry” (ibid, 194). 
The partialists, in contrast, include groups like communitarians, conservatives and nationalists 
who believe in the strength of nation-states as sovereign, i.e. free to decide who can enter their 
territory according to standards they have set. For example, ways of reasserting control have 
been identified in stricter rules of entry, detention including that of children, removal, non-
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suspensive appeals in those cases when asylum claims are rejected, carrier sanctions and stricter 
rules for family reunion. Also the reinforcement of border control especially offshore border 
controls and detention centres on remote islands are part of the “tactic of migration control” 
(Mountz 2011, 118; see also Mountz 2010) and a way to re-organise nation states’ geographical 
landscape boundaries for their own benefits. The reason behind the detention of asylum seekers 
in remote islands is because “states and third parties” aim “to hide asylum seekers from view of 
media, human rights monitors, and publics at large” (ibid).   Sovereignty also includes the “right 
to construct policies that preserve a society’s national culture” (Gibney 2004, 18).  
 Several scholars have discussed the concept, meaning and consequences of sovereignty 
in a climate of increased suspicion towards foreigners, in particular in terms of security after 
9/11 (Kolinsky 1981; Soysal 1994; Freeman 1995; Sassen 1996; Joppke 1997, 1998; Zolberg 
1989; Guiraudon 2001; Guiraudon and Joppke 2002; Koslowsky 2001; Dauvergne 2004; 
Hollifield 2000). At the same time, they have tried to ascertain the willingness of politicians and 
bureaucrats to reassert and display state power. This is sovereignty’s dual nature: “a tool for the 
renationalizing of political discourse and … the object of government policy and practice” 
(Sassen 1996, 60). 
 It could be argued that states have a moral duty to help those in need but are tested on a daily 
basis by international human rights regime constraints, according to which signatory member 
states have a responsibility towards asylum seekers, especially under the principle of non-
refoulement contained in the 1951 Geneva Convention (Sassen 1996; Gibney 2004). According to 
the non-refoulement principle, people cannot be returned or repatriated to countries where their 
lives may be “threatened on account of … race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular 
social group or political opinion” (UNHCR 1951, 32). Hyndman and Mountz (2011) argue that 
nation states in order to re-assert their sovereignty, have been using a new strategy to keep at bay 
unwanted arrivals through the use of what the authors call ‘neo-refoulement’ as a “geographically 
based strategy of preventing the possibility of asylum through a new form of forced return 
different from non-refoulement” (ibid, 250). ‘Neo-refoulement’ means that states have sought 
“legal and extra-legal geographies of exclusion” to stop asylum seekers as well as other unwanted 
migrants” to transit countries or regions of origin before they reach the sovereign territory in 
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which they could make a claim” (ibid). However, the recent (October 2013) catastrophe off the 
coast of Lampedusa vividly demonstrates the limitations of this approach. 
 The degree of sympathy, coupled with a moral obligation of a nation-state towards a targeted 
group, may facilitate the creation of asylum policies to receive and welcome refugees (Zolberg et 
al. 1989b; Gibney 2004). This happened in the aftermath of World War II as the Geneva 
Convention was drawn up, in the atmosphere of the Cold War. This positive behaviour towards 
refugees symbolised an anti-communist campaign from Western European countries against the 
ex-Soviet bloc as well as a humanitarian call. On the other hand, leaving the Eastern Bloc states 
was not an easy task, at least until the Soviet Union collapsed (Schuster 2000). Ideally, states 
should be willing and able to unite impartialist and partialist approaches into one so as to combine 
theory and practice. This ideal blend, according to Gibney, should be ethical and practical at the 
same time and would give rise to ‘humanitarianism’ or a ‘humanitarian principle’ (Gibney 2004, 
259) which cares for the human community. The humanitarian principle would only provide for 
those individuals with greater needs, therefore maintaining low costs “as a way of keeping the 
sacrifices required of citizens at a minimum to reduce the likelihood of backlash” (ibid, 234). In 
practice, the low costs will reduce the chances of criticism. In contrast, elevated costs are 
associated with lengthy asylum procedure or the resettlement of refugees that involves housing, 
education, social security and health provision. Therefore, humanitarianism, although “viewed as 
the core virtue in immigration and refugee law” (Dauvergne 1999, 620), is not necessarily a 
synonym for equality and justice at all costs. It simply “provides a stand-in for justice while 
reinforcing the boundary between an ‘us’ group and a ‘them’ group”. In contrast to justice, it is  
grounded in inequality … [it] is not a standard of obligation, as justice would be, but 
rather of charity. Humanitarianism defines us as good when we are able to meet the 
standard, and justifiable when we are not … it does not provide principled guidance 
about whom to admit when (ibid 620). 
 
In an ideal world, the choice between being humanitarian and being just would not exist. States 
would be selflessly and simultaneously humanitarian and just, thus allowing asylum seekers to 
enter their territories without questioning even if they are economic migrants in disguise who, 
nevertheless, are trying to escape poverty and seek a better life. In the real world, the 
humanitarian principle is not entirely just but it is the closest thing to justice. Many Western 
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liberal states pride themselves on being humanitarian but “[d]epending on subjective 
perceptions of state capacity, the obligation is minimal, entailing actions that can be taken with 
no risk or loss” (ibid, 620). So the reception of asylum seekers is determined by a state’s 
perception of the asylum issue in terms of capability, that is, as long as they are not a burden on 
the state economy – and arguably a threat to domestic stability as theorised by the first 
hypothesis. 
 In summary, this section has highlighted how nation-states are concerned firstly with the 
wellbeing of their own citizens but are also called to provide protection for asylum seekers. 
This behaviour is because of the conventions and treaties they have signed and ratified and 
possibly also a moral duty. Simultaneously however, there has been a race to the bottom in 
terms of right of entry at least since the end of the Cold War. Most states have become so 
anxious about the arrival of new asylum seekers that they have endeavoured to stop them before 
they reach safety or have provided them with refuge but with minimal economic and public 
support. However, states display different behaviours in the way they treat refugees and asylum 
seekers.  
 The next section analyses in greater depth the possible reasons behind the seemingly 
different behaviours of states and the creation of different asylum policies. One way to look at 
this is to consider the literature on the welfare state.  
 
2.2.2 The welfare state 
Generally, welfare states decide who their members are and, based on some important criteria 
such as citizenship, nationality and residency, determine who will gain access to welfare 
benefits. Depending on the nature of nation-states and their welfare systems, welfare provisions 
are available to refugees and asylum seekers but generally, to a lesser extent than the state’s 
citizens (Bloch and Schuster 2002). Asylum seekers can be perceived as a threat to states’ 
economic systems and citizens’ standard of living (Richmond 1993; Bloch 2000; Bloch and 
Schuster 2002).  
 In order to understand how welfare arrangements may affect states’ asylum policies, a 
typology of the nature of welfare states is required. A good starting point is Esping-Andersen’s 
41 
 
The Three Worlds of Welfare Capitalism (1990) – considered to be the first and most useful 
typology of welfare states. The author affirms that factors determining the nature of welfare-
state regimes are: the “nature of class mobilization; class-political coalition structures; historical 
legacy of regime institutionalisation” (ibid 29). The basis of Esping-Andersen’s work is that 
different types of state have different types of welfare. Differences between welfare systems are 
based on diverse basic principles on which welfare states’ policies are originated. In other 
words, according to a country’s historical and welfare development, policies will be created 
through “their peculiar public-private sector mix” (Esping-Andersen 1990, 3). The author 
distinguished three major types of welfare state, which he then associated with differences in 





 or corporatist and social democratic
19
. Only the first two will be discussed here as 
they can be applied in turn to the United Kingdom and Italy. In reality, the author considers the 
UK neither completely social democratic nor liberal (together with New Zealand and Ireland) 
and uses as main examples the USA and Germany. However, to aid understanding and for the 
relevance of this thesis, the UK has been aligned to liberal states. In the liberal welfare state the 
market assumes a very important role and there is means-tested assistance so that the state helps 
only the “certifiably needy without leading the rest (the workers) to choose welfare instead of 
work” (Esping-Andersen 1990, 43). The situation is complicated in the case of asylum seekers. 
With the aim of deterring their entry, the UK has implemented a series of asylum policies, 
passed by both Conservative and Labour governments, with strict rules with regard to asylum 
seekers’ rights to benefits (Bloch and Schuster 2002; Sales, 2002; Morris 2007). There has been 
a restriction of welfare provisions available to them, including access to the labour market, in 
order to discourage their entry in the first place but also as a means to control them (Düvell and 
Jordan 2002; Morris 2007). In practice, it would seem the UK is not so liberal when it comes to 
asylum seekers. 
                                                     
17
 Examples of liberal states in Esping Andersen’s work (1990, 74) are: US, Canada, Switzerland, Australia 
and Japan. 
18 
Examples of conservative states (ibid) are: Italy, France, Austria, Germany and Belgium. 
19 
The social democratic country used as the main example is Sweden (although the author extends the 
concept  to Norway, Denmark, Finland and the Netherlands) where the welfare state is stretched out to 
include the new middle classes as there is “equality of the highest standards, not an equality of minimal 





 The conservative welfare state, exemplified by Italy is primarily concerned with the 
safeguarding of class and status, and it is non-interventionist with underdeveloped family 
services. The position of the Catholic Church is very important with respect to the preservation 
of family unity and values. Italy has a poor welfare system generally and especially in terms of 
family policies so that Italian families themselves have a key role “for most welfare matters” 
(Sciortino 2004, 115). This lack of state-sponsored welfare for Italians explains why the demand 
for migrant labour to look after elderly people and children in Italy is very high (ibid; Barone 
and Mocetti 2010). Lacking welfare provided by their families, asylum seekers are mainly 
looked after by the Church and other charitable organisations (Sigona 2005b).  
 The work of Esping-Andersen has been studied by many scholars who have both accepted 
and criticised his typology. For instance, some critics
20
 point to the author’s overlooking of 
Mediterranean countries and gender roles but also the misclassification of countries. For 
example, some authors believe the UK should fit into an ‘Anglo-Saxon’ system whereby the 
welfare state is seen as a “work-enforcing mechanism” (Leibfried 1992, 127; Ferrera 1993 
quoted by Arts and Gelissen 2002). Bonoli (1997) for example, breaks with Esping-Andersen’s 
classification because he prefers to distinguish between ‘who’ gets welfare and ‘how’ much the 
welfare state gives. In Bonoli’s ‘universalist welfare states classification’, the UK figures 
among the mixed states where emphasis is “on government tax-financed provision” (ibid). 
 In the case of Mediterranean countries, some scholars believe it was a mistake to 
incorporate Italy within the Conservative countries where in fact it should be incorporated 
together with Spain, Greece and Portugal in a ‘Southern’ or ‘Latin Rim’ (Katrougalos -1996- 
cited by Arts and Gelissen 2002). For Bonoli (1997), Italy instead displays characteristics of 
both Southern European welfare systems (for example the dependence on family) and “high 
expenditure on contributory earnings-related pensions” (ibid, 362). Therefore, Italy is not set 
into one category but it is in between pure and mixed occupational welfare states that are 
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 See Ferragina and Seeleib-Kaiser (2011) for a detailed contribution to Esping-Andersen’s work. They 
took into consideration 23 different studies on the welfare state based on Esping-Andersen explanation. 
According to these studies, Italy has been characterised either as Christian-democratic (12 different 
classifications), liberal (cited by Scruggs and Allan 2006), or Mediterranean (cited by Bonoli 1997; Gallie 
and Paugam 2000; Obinger and Wagschal 2001; Saint-Arnaud and Bernard 2003; Soede et al, 2004; Castles 
and Obinger 2008). The UK has been typified as social-democratic (cited by Bambra 2005), Christian-
democratic (cited by Bambra 2004), Liberal (18 classifications), radical (cited by Castles and Mitchell 1992) 
and finally as a hybrid (cited by Ragin 1994; Obinger and Wagschal 1998) (ibid 589-590). 
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“related to contributory social insurance which is the main form of welfare provision in 
continental European countries” (ibid, 356).  
 Based on a continuum of three criteria
21
, Ferragina and Seeleib-Kaiser (2011) believe that 
Italy should belong to the Christian-democratic type, as Esping-Andersen suggested, together 
with what they call a “secondary Mediterranean component” (ibid, 595). The UK is placed 
among the liberal states.  
 Geddes et al. (2004) placed Italy in a fourth group called the Southern European group 
together with Portugal, Spain and Greece and connected it to migration policy. The main 
characteristics of the Southern European group include “irregular labour market; weakness of 
state institutions; importance of informal institutions; the importance of family and family ties 
as a social assistance mechanism” (Geddes et al. 2004, 8). The authors came to the conclusion 
that irregular immigration in Italy and the employment of illegal immigrants were fairly 
accepted. Furthermore, the government was more concerned with the “regularisation of the 
illegal workforce. The focus of Italian migration policies therefore is on questions concerning 
stay and labour conditions of the foreigner who is already in the host country, i.e. topics of 
integration, legalisation, equal treatment, etc” (Geddes et al 2004, 4; see also Boswell 2007). 
Geddes et al. (2004) deal with immigration mainly from an economic point of view and do not 
factor in asylum. However, their work and that of other scholars inform this investigation by 
showing that societies, although influenced by their historical and political background, are not 
fixed entities but change over time. This is due to the fact that “typologies are based on data 
collected at different points in time” (Ferragina and Seeleib-Keiser 2011, 587). This is the 
natural response to other changes that happen nationally and internationally over time. For 
example, this can be seen in the change in state attitudes towards asylum seekers and refugees 
between the pre- and post-Cold War eras as pointed out in the section dedicated to the nature of 
the state.  
 Despite the fact that the agencies of the state make policies governing the entry and stay of 
asylum seekers and decide on the welfare benefits available to them, scholars have pointed out 
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 The criteria are: “(1) the number of times each country has been classified in the same 
group; (2) the positioning of the seven pure countries; and (3) the presence of countries with a high 
secondary component” (Ferragina and Seeleib-Kaiser 2011, 594). 
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that states have experienced a loss of power due to both international (e.g. international human 
rights law) and domestic (e.g. party politics and the increasing influence of other actors) 
constraints (Hollifield 2000; Joppke 1998). On the other hand, Sassen (1996) points out that 
state sovereignty (‘government’) has not been eroded by globalisation and supranational 
organisations but has been transformed and decentred (‘governance’) so that “it is now located 
in a multiplicity of institutional arenas: the new emergent transnational private legal regimes, 
new supranational organizations, and the various international human rights codes” (ibid, 29; 
see also Guiraudon 2001).  
 The next section focuses on the state’s tendency to devolve powers to other actors who 
have vested interests in many different fields and actively engage with governments. This 
interaction broadens the decision-making process potentially leading to a weakening of the 
power of central government thus causing a shift from ‘government’ to ‘governance’. This part 
is related to the third hypothesis. 
 
2.3 GOVERNANCE  
In recent years there has been growing interest in ‘governance’, including ‘multi-level 
governance’ (especially in relation to EU studies), as opposed to ‘government’. There are 
several definitions of governance, most of them agreeing that it is the involvement of different 
actors in the policy-making process. The most comprehensive description is the one used by 
UNESCAP (United Nations Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific 2008). 
Their definition underlines that governance is “the process of decision-making” and that “formal 
and informal actors” are involved in this process through “formal and informal structures” 
(ibid).  
 There is now an extensive literature on governance that encompasses a wide range of 
definitions and applications, across all domains of policy making. For example, one of the 
earliest attempts to define governance is that by Rosenau and Czempiel (1992). Governance, 
they write,  
refers to activities backed by shared goals that may or may not derive from 
legal and formally prescribed responsibilities and that do not necessarily rely 




In practice, while governments still exist and still exercise sovereignty in different ways, they 
have deferred authority “to subnational collectivities” (ibid, 3) that perform activities instead of 
governments. However, their definition is generic and “has relatively little to say about who or 
what makes decisions” (Biersteker 2009, 439).  
The notion of governance has been deeply criticised by some authors. For example, Jessop 
(1998) defines governance from a political economy point of view. He talks about ‘heterarchic 
(self-organisation) governance’ and analyses why there has been a newly found interest in the 
concept of governance and if there is “a link between conceptual interest in governance and 
social change” (ibid, 4). The rise of governance, therefore, is due to “secular shifts in political 
economy which have made heterarchy more significant than markets or hierarchies for 
economic, political, and social coordination” (ibid, 6). However, contrary to a market that has 
“has a procedural rationality” and a government that “has a substantive rationality”, heterarchic 
governance is based on “reflexive rationality” (ibid, 9). This means that in order to be successful 
it relies on continued “dialogue to generate and exchange more information” (ibid). So 
governance can be seen “as a solution to market and/or state failure” (ibid, 12). On the other 
hand, governance can also due to the “same complexity [of social life] that generates the 
demand for new governance mechanisms” (Jessop 2003, 2). A similar view is that of McGrew 
(2000, 142) who emphasises how “the infrastructure of global governance has evolved into a 
complex and multi-layered system which has no single centre of authority’. Power is now 
shared among public and private organizations at local, national and international level. Finally, 
Walters (2004) in his critique of the notion of governance, highlights its “conceptual ambiguity” 
(ibid, 42) and antipolitical nature. He suggests the use of other narratives that may complete the 
generic use of the term.  
 While there is a range of perspectives on governance, a common theme across studies of 
governance is the issue of alliances, arrangements or networks between state, international and 
non-state actors towards the realisation of particular policy goals. This consideration guides the 
approach adopted here in relation to asylum policy. In particular, how relevant might such 
alliances or networks be in a field where 'the state' is expected to exercise its sovereignty? 
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 Because of the involvement of different actors in the policy arena, governance also entails 
“a change in the meaning of government, referring to a new process of governing; or a changed 
condition of ordered rule; or the new method by which society is governed” (Rhodes 1996, 652-
653). Rhodes’ definition highlights the changing nature of the “hierarchical, centralized state” 
(Greenaway et al. 2007, 717; see also Jessop 2003) into a more fragmented one. The 
‘government’, intended as a hierarchical establishment, has ceded space to ‘governance’, a web 
of networks made up of state and non-state actors working together. This means that local, 
regional, national, international and supranational bodies and institutions belonging to both the 
public and private sectors come together to tackle a specific issue. They might share the same 
ideas and beliefs or have completely different opinions and each one will exert influence on the 
others. This new type of organisation is characterised by “interdependence, a segmented 
executive, policy networks, governance and hollowing out” (Rhodes 1997) and can be termed as 
‘differentiated polity’. So the new state is pulled in different directions by “several 
interdependent actors” (Rhodes 1996, 658) going beyond the state and blurring the boundaries 
between state and civil society. As such, the state is perceived to be no longer separated from 
civil society. The end result is a new way of making policy through the creation of “self 
organising, interorganisational networks” (ibid, 652) which are alternate governing structures 
not accountable to the state. This tendency has developed across several and very different 
sectors of society as well as policy: “international relations (global governance), development 
policy (good governance), European Union studies (multilevel or European governance), 
finance and management (corporate governance), and at many levels of public policy (e.g., 
urban governance)” (Walters 2004, 28; Jessop 1998; Greenaway et al. 2007; Căluşer and 
Sălăgean, 2007).  
 The case of migration and asylum policy-making is different from other policy sectors 
because of the perceived threat that asylum represents for governments, as specified in the 
previous sections of this chapter. Certainly, nation-states may be subject to domestic and 
external constraints. However, there are two schools of thought: those who believe that a state’s 
sovereignty is lost because of the delegation of powers upwards to transnational bodies, 
downwards to regions and sub-regions and finally outwards to the private sector (Guiraudon 
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2001); and those who instead believe that although power has been delegated, nation-states still 
maintain control over certain matters, including asylum and migration. Furthermore, being a 
relatively new subject, little literature exists about the interests of actors in multilevel 
governance related to immigration (Geddes et al. 2004) and especially asylum. As Lahav and 
Guiraudon (2007, 8) argue, “[l]ittle attention has been given … to the variety of actors and 
venues where immigration policy is shaped, elaborated and implemented” (see also Somerville 
and Wallace Goodman 2010). This is due to an irregular development of multi-level governance 
in Europe because of disparities that “seem to mirror aspects of the national policy-making 
structure or machinery” (Zincone and Caponio 2004, 2). This multi-level governance may 
constrain states in making decisions about asylum and broader migration policy. The next two 
sections analyse the extent of these constraints. 
 
2.3.1 Domestic constraints: federalism and clientelistic politics 
States may face the strong lobbying of highly organised interest groups that Freeman (1995, 
2001) calls ‘clientelistic politics’ (see also Sassen 1996; Joppke 1998; Cornelius and Tsuda 
2004; Boswell 2007; Hollifield 2000). As much as receiving countries can still decide who and 
how many individuals can enter their territory, the simple presence of a growing number of pro-
immigrant and pro-human rights lobbies means that the state is restrained in its decisions.  
Sassen (1996, 98) argues that the presence of other actors “reduce the autonomy of the state in 
immigration policy making and multiply the sectors within the state that are addressing 
immigration policy, thereby multiplying the opportunities for conflicts within the state”. Joppke 
(1997) seems to share the same concerns as he writes about “the rule of law, divided powers, 
federalism, or the autonomous functioning of societal subsystems” (ibid, 292), all factors that 
hinder sovereignty. This last point is particularly relevant in the case of employers and 
businesses which increasingly request foreign workers and highly skilled migrants and families 
that rely greatly on immigrants as carers and domestic helpers. They create a ‘clientelistic 
politics’, which Freeman (1995, 886) describes as “a form of bilateral influence in which small 
and well organized groups intensely interested in a policy develop close working relationships 
with those officials responsible for it … Client politics is strongly oriented toward expansive 
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immigration policies”. Lahav and Guiraudon (2007) have highlighted a weakness in Freeman’s 
model. They believe that client politics is not really representative of the European system of 
policy-making. In Europe, contrary to the United States, “immigration becomes a salient issue 
in public opinion and partisan politics, and no longer a matter for bureaucrats and employers to 
discuss discreetly” (ibid, 13). Furthermore, Dwyer (2005) stresses that even though nation-states 
might have lost power because of the delegation to other stakeholders, they still retain influence 
and authority when it comes to policies related to the entry and welfare of asylum seekers and 
refugees as well as decision-making procedures (Souter
22
 2011). We can see more and more 
collaboration between local authorities (for health, housing or education issues) and wider civil 
society including employers’ associations, trade unions, NGOs, community groups, faith based  
organisations, advocacy groups. This collaboration does translate into networking but 
governments still retain much of their power in the coordination of these networks and in the 
making of asylum policies. 
 By signing the Refugee Convention, states perform a sovereign act, but the Convention 
itself is not a limit to state sovereignty. This is because state policy makers are the ones who 
decide who and how many ‘deserve’ their protection through quotas, safe third countries lists, 
transit processing centres and also bilateral agreements with sending countries. There is a 
paradox: whereas on one side, states require and admit the free flow of people (mainly highly 
skilled economic migrants) and goods through their respective borders, on the other hand they 
close the borders to unskilled migrants and refugees as they wish, arrogating to themselves “the 
right to refuse entry … as inherent in the concept of sovereignty” (Richmond 1993, 15; see also 
Boswell 2007). This paradox highlights or creates another problem, what authors have called 
the ‘gap hypotheses’. Castles (2003), for example, argues that policy aims may differ from 
policy outcomes. This is because politicians do not always admit their real intentions and their 
policy objectives. There is, therefore, a ‘gap’ between what restrictionist migration policies say 
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 The author focuses on the ‘culture of disbelief’ showed by the Home Office in the UK and exposed by 
British refugee organisations. The issue with this exposure is that it lacks objectivity while work by 
academics lacks in depth. Souter therefore aims at strengthening the view of refugee agencies by adding an 
extra dimension, that of a ‘culture of denial’. This denial is understood as “prior refusal to engage with the 
facts of the case” and “refusal despite belief” (ibid. 55-56). In brief, Home Office case workers may be 
influenced by the culture permeating the Home Office as often they deny claims despite belief in the stories 
told by asylum seekers. 
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and their outcome as migrants “rights to leave, to entry or to stay in a country depend 
preponderantly on their economic usefulness according to market rules” (Oliveri, 2012, 796; see 
also Sassen 1996; Joppke 1998; Cornelius and Tsuda 2004
23
; Cornelius and Rosenblum 2005; 
Zincone 2006a). According to Geddes (2008) this ‘gap’ is considered the norm across Europe 
and liberal states generally. Boswell takes this notion a step forward by looking at the 
constraints that liberal welfare states face and in particular “which interests and norms the state 
feels compelled to take into account in formulating policy” (Boswell 2007, 95). One of the 
criteria she analyses is that the state may even “tolerate or discretely introduce liberal policies” 
when these produce “wealth accumulation” thus creating “legitimacy through its positive 
economic impact” (ibid, 90). It is like a “‘malintegration’ or gap between proclaimed, restrictive 
migration policy and the de facto toleration or covert implementation of more liberal measures” 
(ibid, 93). ‘Malintegration’ becomes a sort of planned tactic whereby a state gives the 
impression of agreeing and dealing with interest groups’ conflicting demands without being 
accused of taking sides (Held, D. and Krieger, J., 1984, cited by Boswell 2007, 17-18).  
 In conclusion, domestic constraints may restrict the power of governments with regard to 
asylum and migration policy-making. This is due to the pressure exercised by the interests 
represented of employers and families. However, it was also pointed out (Marsh et al 2003; 
Lavenex 2006) that increasing cooperation between government and civil society has 
strengthened government in its task of coordinating other stakeholders. In practice, the state still 
has the power to decide who enters its territory. This highlights another issue, that of the 
existence of a ‘gap’ between politicians’ rhetoric and policies’ outcome. The gap can be part of 
a government’s tactics to deal with the demands of interest groups. 
 
2.3.2 External constraints 
The European Union has been considered a “new order of multi-layered governance” 
(Greenaway et al. 2007, 717) involving local, national and supra-national governments, actors 
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 The authors identify other possible gaps: a gap between the numbers of immigrants entering the country 
and the number expected with quotas; a gap round the time migrants are allowed to stay (overstayers); a gap 
due to the types of immigrants that are different from those expected; a gap in statistics on illegal 
immigrants; a gap in public opinion surveys due to the fact that the public is not homogeneous but it is 




and interests interacting with each other (Daly 2003). Marsh et al. (2003) claim that the 
delegation of powers to Brussels is not synonymous with the loss of power for the nation-state. 
The authors argue that EU membership has in fact increased states’ autonomy. For example, 
Lavenex (2006) argues that the control of immigration first shifted “upwards to the 
intergovernmental sphere… then to supranational governance” and finally “outwards towards 
the realm of EU foreign relations” (ibid 329). She explains that these shifts have been made 
purposefully in an effort to extend the state’s borders, security and control. In short, she believes 
this represents a way for officials to avoid all the domestic obstacles and constraints presented 
by organised interests within the state itself. Furthermore, she concludes that this foreign policy 
is not something new but “the continuation of the established policy frame in an altered 
geopolitical context” (ibid 330). So, although states are becoming progressively more resolute 
in wanting to maintain their sovereignty, especially in terms of entry and expulsion, it could also 
be argued that external delegation of powers is not a problem per se. On the contrary, it is 
described as a necessity due to changes in the outside world and a solution to internal struggles 
and challenges. Indeed, an increased “visibility at the border” (Guiraudon and Joppke 2001, 12) 
is obvious. States have constructed fences, invested in security forces at the borders, and 
delegated control – also called “remote control” (ibid, 12) or ‘policing at a distance’ (Bigo and 
Guild 2003) – to other transnational parties like airline companies24 and security experts. States 
have also signed bilateral agreements with sending countries. Finally, they have surrendered 
“some of [their] authority to local actors25 only to increase their capacity to control movement” 
(Guiraudon and Joppke 2001, 15).  
 In conclusion, governance entails the existence of several actors from various sectors. They 
may exert influence on the policy-making process from a national and international point of 
view, potentially limiting the government’s power to create policy freely but also potentially 
allowing state actors to be insulated from certain internal political pressures. Nevertheless, 
“politicians, civil servants, trade union leaders” have nevertheless an “impact in designing 
policy” (Hudson and Lowe 2004, 8). As such, they form the micro-level of the policy process as 
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 As per the Immigration and Asylum Act 1999 (c. 33) and NIA Act 2002, Schedule 8. 
25
 For example, private companies and/or charities that operate removal and detention centres. 
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will be seen in Chapters 6 and 7. Furthermore, “how policies come to be made, who puts them 
on the policy agenda, and the structure of the institutional arrangements in which policy is 
defined” (ibid, 9) form the meso-level of the policy process. The micro- and especially the 
meso-levels are relevant for the next part of the chapter, which focuses on the formal or 
informal interactions developed by actors. The next section concentrates on the fourth 
hypothesis and explains the role of policy networks and their impact on the policy-making 
process, how they operate and their power balance. In short: “who rules?, how do they rule?, in 
whose interest do they rule?” (Rhodes 1997, 10). 
 
2.4 POLICY NETWORKS 
As with governance, 'network' has become a key word for social, economic and political 
analysis over the course of the last 30 years, as globalisation has increasingly been debated (see 
for example Castells on ‘network society’ 1996). The term is also central to the 'actor-network 
theory' developed by Bruno Latour (1996, 2005) and others (Law 1992) who see an actor-
network as comprising a mix of human and non-human elements from which agency emerges, 
and Peck (2004, 397) who explains that due to the recent developments in terms of expansion of 
multilateral and global networking, the 
understandings of state spatiality, as the clean lines that were once imagined to exist 
between, say, the national state and the offshore world, bureaucracy and civil society, 
and the local and the global have become increasingly blurred and porous. 
 
Here, the focus is on networks as a feature of governance arrangements, that is a set “of formal 
and informal institutional linkages between governmental and other actors structured around 
shared interests in public policymaking and implementation” (Rhodes 2007, 1244). Policy 
networks are relevant to this analysis because they illustrate the increasingly pluralistic world of 
policy-making due to the growing number of actors allowed in the policy arena (Smith 1997). In 
practice, these networks bring together two different worlds: that of the formal structures where 
power is believed to lie, such as the parliament, the political parties and the core executive, and 
that of more informal structures such as civil society.  
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 The aim of this section is to develop a conceptual framework to answer the research 
questions in subsequent chapters related to the role of policy networks, the distribution of power 
and influence within the networks and, finally, the relationship between central government and 
other stakeholders.  
 The literature on the meso-level of policy-making grew in the 1990s starting with Rhodes 
(1990; see also Marsh and Rhodes 1992). They felt the need to contrast macro-level theories 
that pay “little attention to mediating processes” (Evans and Davies 1999, 363) and micro-level 
theories that instead “tend to ignore the impact of broader structural factors” (ibid). Studying the 
meso-level of policy making as a midpoint allows an examination of how different interests 
influence each other to create policy and, at the same time, it connects the micro and macro 
levels. The meso-level specifically takes into consideration policy networks. Policy networks 
are important because they reveal the deployment of power between groups in a given policy 
sector. Rhodes (2007), for example, speaks of the ‘power potential’ of people as well as 
organisations, and argues that policy-making may be explained through the investigation of 
‘who is in what position’. Furthermore, policy network theory states that “relationships between 
groups and government vary between policy areas” (Marsh and Rhodes1992, 4).  
 Described as a “fashionable catch-word” (Börzel 1998, 253) the concept of policy 
networks dates back to the 1970s and was used interchangeably with ‘policy communities’. 
Richardson and Jordan (1979) were the first scholars to introduce these two terms into British 
politics and “fractured the standard evaluation of pressure group/government relations as a 
bilateral bargain, extending analysis into domains where the state/society distinction is not so 
hard-edged” (Dowding 1994, 59). However, studies on the topic thrived in the 1990s especially 
thanks to the work of Rhodes and Marsh who presented it as an alternative to the ‘Westminster 
model’. This model is characterised by a “unitary state, parliamentary sovereignty, strong 
cabinet government, ministerial accountability, majority party control of the executive, and 
institutionalized opposition” (Rhodes 2007, 1249).  
 Although policy networks have become “the dominant ‘model’ for analysing the policy 
process in Western Europe” (Richardson, 1996, 4), there is “no single policy network approach 
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in public policy” (Skogstad 2005, 2) 26. Marsh and Rhodes (1992) state that “literature on policy 
networks has varied disciplinary origins, proliferating terminology, mutually exclusive 
definitions and, especially, varying levels of analysis” (ibid, 19). Nevertheless, it is possible to 
distinguish between two main approaches or schools: a German-Dutch school
27
 that emphasises 
horizontal interpersonal relationships and an Anglo-American school that instead believes in 
both structural linkages between public and private actors and personal relations. This second 
approach is the one that informs this thesis as it looks at the meso- and micro-levels in terms of 
power relations between public and private actors in the process of policy-making. 
 The Anglo-American perspective, or what Börzel (1998) calls the ‘interest intermediation 
school’, is characterized by non-hierarchical interactions between public and private actors 
(Dowding 1995; Heclo 1978; Marsh and Rhodes 1992; Rhodes 1992, 1994, 1996, 1997, 2007; 
Richardson 1996)
28
. This position has a micro- and a meso- viewpoint with two further 
approaches: one that highlights structural and sectoral relationships between organizations (see 
for example Rhodes 1990, 1992, 1994, 1996, 1997, and 2007) and one that emphasises more 
personal interaction between individual participants (Wilks and Wright 1987)
29
. 
 Marsh and Rhodes (1992) make a further distinction between the American and the British 
literature. With the first, the notion of sub-government emerges, highlighting “a few privileged 
groups with close relations with governments” (ibid, 6) that exclude any other group from the 
policy-making process. The emphasis is on the micro-level as the actors’ personal relationships 
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 There exists a vast and disparate literature on policy networks in different countries and across different 
disciplines (from sociology to economy, from technology to political science and organisational studies and 
these are just a few examples). Different terminology is also used: policy networks (Marsh and Rhodes 
1992), which can be used interchangeably with policy communities (Skogstad 2005), issue networks (Heclo 
1978), governance networks (Klijn and Skelcher 2007), epistemic communities (Haas 1989), advocacy 
coalition framework (Sabatier 1999; Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith 1993). They all have one feature in 
common: the actors’ interactions to influence policy-making and/or policy outcome. 
27
 The German-Dutch literature (Börzel 1998; Kljin and Skelcher 2007; Mayntz 1993) focuses on the 
meso- and macro- levels. What matters in this approach is the non-hierarchical coordination between the 
two parts that Börzel (1998) calls the ‘governance school’ as opposed to the ‘interest intermediation 
school’. In generic terms, the ‘governance school’ relates to “all kinds of relations between public and 
private actors” (Börzel 1998, 255).  
28
 This list of names belonging to the two schools does not intend to be inclusive of all the authors who have 
contributed to the literature but only those that are widely recognised and quoted more often and that 
consequently, have been studied for the purpose of this thesis. 
29
 The authors distinguish three different types of networks: 1) the ‘policy universe’ formed by a “large 
population of actors and potential actors [who] share a common interest in industrial policy, and may 
contribute to the policy process on a regular basis (Wilks and Wright 1987, 296); 2) ‘policy 
communities’, in which actors and potential actors “exchange resources in order to balance and optimize 
their mutual relationships” (ibid, 296); and 3) ‘policy networks’ that are the ‘linking process, the outcome 
of those exchanges, within a policy community or between a number of policy communities” (ibid, 297). 
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are the key and not the institutions’ structural linkages. Within the British literature, there are 
two main approaches: a micro-level analysis (as with the American school) and the Rhodes’ 
meso-level analysis that takes into consideration structural relationships between the 
government and interest groups rather than interpersonal ones and focuses on the analysis of 
intergovernmental linkages “structured around shared interests” (Rhodes 2007, 1244). 
  One of the main characteristics of policy networks is self-organisation. They are 
independent from the state but at the same time they are interdependent as they rely on each 
other’s resources (Smith 1997). The fact that they are not accountable to the state weakens the 
state’s core executive potentially causing the ‘hollowing-out’ of the state (Rhodes 1997, 2007). 
This is because the executive comes to rely more and more on other actors and agencies to 
provide information and, especially, deliver services such as those provided by NGOs, such as 
the Refugee Council and Caritas. The unitary state has therefore become fragmented and limited 
in its scope
30. Policy networks can be considered as “a third governing structure” (Rhodes 1997, 
665) which adds to the markets and hierarchies and where “power is structured in a few 
competing élites” (Rhodes 2007, 1250).  
 There are three major issues arising from the self-organisation of policy networks: 
fragmentation and steering are the first two as there are now different organizations involved in 
providing the same services, thus weakening “coordination” (Rhodes 1994, 147). 
Accountability is the third because networks “restrict who contributes to policy-making” 
causing their work to be “invisible to the parliamentary and public eye” (ibid, 147). 
Furthermore, the power of these few selected groups lies in the fact that they specialize in 
different areas while the state, in order to function, becomes dependent on their specialized 
knowledge. However, if the government is the dominant leader within the partnership, i.e. it 
creates and controls the network’s access, there will be an asymmetric relationship (Smith 
1997).  
 Summing up, networks vary according to five key dimensions: the constellation of interests 
based on service, economic function, territory or client group; membership i.e. whether 
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 For example, the reform of the health care system in Britain brought growing competition between 




members belong to private or public groups; vertical interdependence, that is the dependency of 
the policy network on actors that are above or below it; horizontal interdependence in terms of 
interconnections; and finally the distribution of resources – if any – that members can exchange 
(Rhodes 1992b). Following on from this, Rhodes identifies a continuum of five different types 
of policy networks in order of integration and power dependency. This ranges from highly 
integrated policy communities characterized by stable relationships, restricted membership, and 
high interdependence to loosely integrated issue networks with less stable relationships, open 
fluctuating membership and limited interdependence. According to the model, the more 
integrated the network will be less approachable but more successful in shaping policies. These 
types can be seen in table 2.2 below. 
Table 2.2 
Type of network Characteristics of network 
 
Policy community/territorial community Stability, highly restricted membership, 
 vertical interdependence, limited  
 horizontal articulation 
 
Professional network Stability, highly restricted membership, 
 vertical interdependence, limited  
 horizontal articulation, serves interest  
 of profession 
 
Intergovernmental network Limited membership, limited vertical 
 interdependence, extensive horizontal 
 articulation 
 
Producer network Fluctuating membership, limited  
 vertical interdependence, serves  
 interest of producer 
 
Issue network Unstable, large number of members, 
 limited vertical interdependence 




At one end of the continuum, are the highly integrated ‘policy communities’ that have stable 
relationships and are independent from other policy networks. Examples of this type of network 
are the fire service and education (Rhodes 1997) while at the lower end of the continuum there 
are the loosely integrated ‘issue networks’. The two authors later realised that “while it is easy 
to see why the policy community and issue network are at the ends of the continuum, the 
locations of other types of network are less obvious” (Marsh and Rhodes 1992, 21). As such, a 
new and simpler typology was suggested. This new typology, shown in table 2.3 below, focuses 
only on the “distinction between policy communities and issue networks … at the end points on 
a continuum” (ibid, 186). 
 
Table 2.3 Policy Community and Issue network 
Dimension Policy community  Issue network 
Membership: 
a) Participants 
Very limited number, some 
groups consciously excluded 
Large number 
a) Type of interest Economic and/or professional 
interests dominate 
Encompasses a large range of 
affected interests 
Integration 
a) Frequency of interaction 
Frequent, high-quality, 
interaction of all groups on all 
matters related to policy issue 
Contacts fluctuate in intensity 
and quality 
b) Continuity Membership, values and 
outcomes persistent over time 
Access fluctuates over time 
c) Consensus All participants share basic 
values and accept the legitimacy 
of the outcome 
A measure of agreement 
exists, but conflict is ever-
present 
Resources: 
a) Distribution of 
resources – within network 
All participants have resources, 
basic relationship is an exchange 
relationship 
Some participants may have 
resources, but they are 
limited, and basic relationship 
is consultative 
b) Distribution of 
resources – within 
participating organisations 
Hierarchical; leaders can deliver 
members 
Varied and variable 
distribution  and capacity to 
regulate members 
Power There is a balance of power 
among members; Although one 
group may dominate, it must be 
a positive-sum game if 
community is to exist 
Unequal powers, reflecting 
unequal resources and 
unequal access. It is a zero-
sum game 
Source: Marsh and Rhodes (1992, 187). 
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2.4.1 Issue networks 
Issue networks apply to asylum policy-making because networks have formed around the 
difficult issue of asylum. They highlight structural differences between NGOs and the 
government on the issue and the unequal powers displayed by the actors within the networks.  
 The notion of issue networks was first developed and introduced by Heclo in 1978 in 
response to the ‘iron triangle’ notion formed by “a stable set of participants coalesced to control 
fairly narrow public programs which are in the direct economic interests of each party to the 
alliance” (ibid, 102). However, in an increasingly pluralistic society, as more public policies 
were created as a consequence of great political changes within American society and more 
groups with an issue at stake organised to address these changes, Heclo’s interests converged 
upon a web of people whose “influence provokes and guides the exercise of power” (ibid). He 
argues that the main characteristics of an issue network are as follows: 
1) The number of participants is very large and they have “quite variable degrees of 
mutual commitment or of dependence on others in their environment” (ibid, 102); 
2) They are “a shared knowledge group” (ibid, 103) as they have similar knowledge of a 
particular policy issue. However, sharing the same information does not automatically 
mean having the same aim or indeed agreeing on the issue. As such, they may not be a 
group with a “shared-action” or a “shared-belief” (ibid, 104). Issue networks are built 
and formed around a specific issue, like asylum. 
 Following Heclo’s theory, issue networks in Rhodes’ continuum “are characterised by a 
large number of participants with a limited degree of interdependence” (Marsh and Rhodes 
1992, 19). They also have very little and unequal power due to poor resources and possibly 
knowledge. This lack of resources in turn results in unstable, fluctuating membership both in 
terms of frequency and intensity, as well as permanent conflict that limit their interaction to 
mere consultation rather than real negotiations (Rhodes 1997). Finally, their raison d’être seems 
to be open criticism of government policies. Hence, they normally operate in a highly 
conflictual environment and are consequently less likely to be able to have a bearing on the 




2.4.2 Strengths and weaknesses of the Rhodes’ model  
Rhodes’ model of policy networks is significant because it proposes a new interpretation of the 
‘Westminster model’ which has been substituted by the governance of a differentiated polity.  
As with any theoretical model, it has been subjected to criticisms by various authors. Amongst 
the principal critics of policy networks in general is Dowding (1994; see also 1995 and 2001). 
He frames the policy networks concept as no more than a mere metaphorical description due to 
its failure to explain policy outcomes and the functioning of networks. He also questions and 
actually defines as “simply otiose” (ibid, 64) the debate on the levels of analysis. He believes 
that too much emphasis is given to the micro- and meso-levels to the detriment of “a much 
higher plane of abstraction” (ibid) which would add further generalization to the model. Finally, 
Dowding suggests that putting more emphasis on the role of the agents rather than 
conceptualising networks from a largely structural viewpoint, would be more beneficial in terms 
of explaining actions.  
 Marsh and Rhodes (1992) acknowledge that policy change is due to the work of policy 
networks, together with other factors and components and, in particular, four exogenous 
changes: economic, ideological, knowledge and institutional. But they also recognise that 
“actors in the network shape and construct their ‘world’, choosing whether or not and how to 
respond” and that “consensus within networks is the product not of one-off negotiations but of a 
continuing process of re-negotiation” (ibid, 259). In a later work, Rhodes (2007) underlines that 
policy network analysis does not explain either change over time or “the role of ideas in 
change” (ibid, 1251) due to the limits to participation in the policy process. He in practice 
recognizes that actors do indeed have a bigger role in policy change and policy outcomes than 
he had originally suggested.  
 This thesis in not concerned with policy outcomes per se. Rather, what is relevant here is 
how networks constrained the work of the government in creating asylum policy. The findings 
show that in the UK and Italian cases, the government was the dominant leader. The core 
executive was found to be strong and in control despite the need, at times, of specialised 
knowledge. In the UK the government sought information from the Refugee Council on the 
establishment of accommodation centres and in Italy, the Ministry of Interior cooperated very 
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closely with the UNHCR on the two asylum articles. The findings therefore, agree with and 
corroborate some of the criticisms of Rhodes’s thesis that the British state is hollowing-out and 
that the Westminster model has been replaced by a differentiated polity. There is fragmentation 
but coordination is strong and this is not equivalent to a loss of power.  
 Holliday (2000) believes that although ‘core actors’ (or the core executive and the Ministry 
of Interior) may depend on the resources and power offered by ‘non-core actors’ (such as NGOs 
and other pro-asylum and immigration organisations), they can still enforce a “considerable 
‘steer’” (ibid, 172) on networks. Holliday emphasises that this steering should not be interpreted 
as ‘control’ but as ‘coordination’. Finally, he concludes that although the core executive may 
not be in control of every single phase of a certain domestic policy at all times, it can account 
for “many successes alongside the failures” (ibid, 172).  
 Another key point is that the model devised by Rhodes is not empirical. As such, the issue 
networks identified in the two countries presented different characteristics from each other. For 
example, the Italian issue network, in contrast to that in the UK, was characterised by instability 
and differences of views on some aspects of the law.  
 Finally, Rhodes underestimates the importance of how actors interact with each other 
within the network. Because the Italian government was not interested in the consultation 
process with NGOs and charities, these bodies came to rely heavily on the UNHCR as the 
principle interlocutor of the Ministry of Interior on all aspects of asylum and their political 
intermediaries on all aspects related to labour migration. In other words, the UNHCR became 
the key link between the groups and the Ministry. On the other hand, Rhodes’ approach 
recognises the influence of non-state actors represented by the private and voluntary sector. This 
has been key especially in the case of the Italian legislation, the aim of which was to regulate 
labour migration before asylum. As such, the presence of private employers and businesses was 
relevant during the policy-making process.  
One implication of investigating policy networks in this way that is mainly from a ‘top-down’ 
perspective is that it focuses attention on individuals, groups and organisations that are already 
active in the policy arena and thus already relatively privileged. This can have the effect of 
overlooking and understating the experiences and agency of migrants and asylum seekers 
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themselves, agency that they exercise in a variety of ways such as hunger strikes, 
demonstrations and riots. Oliveri (2012, 798) argues that migrants may also have an important 
role in shaping legislation. Their mobilisations through riots, hunger and workers strikes, 
marches can be understood as an act of “unexpected rupture of the established political patterns, 
through acts of self-identification, self-organization and self-representation”. These 
mobilisations have turned migrants seen as “‘strangers’ (stranieri), ‘non-EU people’ (extra-
comunitari) or ‘illegals’ (clandestini)” (ibid, 799) into activist citizens who become political. 
They are therefore a step closer to citizenship and as such more likely to influence policy 
outcomes. On the other hand, the author also clarifies that despite rallies and workers strikes 
“nothing really changed” (ibid, 798) in Italy in terms of policy outcomes even when the centre-
left was in power. The reason why migrants and asylum seekers were not included in the sample 
of people to be interviewed for this thesis therefore was due to the limited power migrants and 
asylum seekers currently have at parliamentary level and because the aim of the thesis was to 
understand the policy process rather than policy outcomes.  
  But who are the actors in these case studies? What is their role? How do they interact? 
The next section seeks to address these questions. 
 
2.4.3 Actors 
Previous sections in the thesis have dealt with the state from the point of view of welfare and its 
role in relation to asylum seekers. This part of the thesis is concerned with actors within the 
state and beyond it. In an increasingly pluralistic society, the state has become a heterogeneous 
and multi-levelled entity. It “is no longer the sovereign authority. It becomes just one participant 
among others in the pluralistic guidance system and contributes its own distinctive resources to 
the negotiation process” (Jessop 2003, 6). More specifically, for the purpose of this research, 
state actors consist of the government (that also includes the Ministry of Interior for the Italian 
case and the Home Office in the UK case) and the political parties. Scholars have devoted little 
attention to the influence of political parties on migration policy. Triadafilopoulos and Zaslove 
(2006, 171) argue that this is “a curious development, given parties’ central role in representing 
competing societal preferences and […] translating programs into public policy”. The reason for 
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this choice might be due to a ‘hidden consensus’ as moderate right and left wing parties prefer 
not to talk about migration as a political issue in order to avoid tension. The hidden consensus 
can be linked to what Rancière (1999) and Žižek (1999) refer to as post-politics, that is, the lack 
of debate on important political matters, a depoliticisation of society. There may be debates as 
Gill et al. (2012, 509) explains, on effective border control “but without ever opening the debate 
to whether any border controls at all are desirable”. Furthermore, Mouffe (2005) observes that 
one of the consequences of the suppression of political conflict is the emergence of right-wing 
groups and right-wing populist discourse. Their success is due to the fact that they communicate 
“real democratic demands which are not taken into account by traditional parties” (ibid, 71). 
Radical right wing parties for example, constantly voice their discontent against the immigration 
policy of a given country but they seldom get many votes (Freeman 2006; Triadafilopoulos and 
Zaslove 2006). The British National Party (BNP) in the United Kingdom is evidently an 
example of this. The Italian equivalent of the BNP, the Lega Nord31  is a different matter 
because, from a secessionist movement, it became one of the main allies of the centre-right 
government. 
 Non-state actors can be agglomerated under the term ‘civil society’, referred to as the 
“arena of uncoerced collective action around shared interests, purposes and values” 
encompassing “a diversity of spaces, actors and institutional forms, varying in their degree of 
formality, autonomy and power” (London School of Economics 2004). They include NGOs, 
charities and pro-asylum/immigration groups, the UNHCR, the Church, trade unions and 
professional and business associations. Non-state actors have also been described as both 
“heroes and villains” (Josselin and Wallace 2001, 1) according to different political views. 
Idealists see NGOs as challenging the state’s authority while globalization enthusiasts believe 
that NGOs are there to “build networks across borders” (ibid, 1). Finally, the hard-line realists 
think NGOs are potential revolutionaries or conceal the interests of the states. Both realists and 
                                                     
31
 The Northern League’s members are well known for their propaganda against immigrants, especially 
those of Islamic faith. There have been several regrettable occurrences where former Mayors in the North 
have inflamed the masses with their racist comments. For example, the public prosecutor’s office of Venice 
opened an investigation into the former Mayor of Treviso, Giancarlo Gentilini, for instigation of racist 
hatred. However, on other occasions the NL have claimed not to be racist. It is a fact though that they have 
used migration as bait to obtain votes in the North. 
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idealists, although holding different positions, agree that non-state actors may influence the 
state’s decisions. This influence usually happens through networks that comprise non-state 
actors which lobby politicians in order to achieve a certain result.  
 Generally, stakeholders have interests not only in implementing the decisions but also in 
helping to shape them in order to protect their own or their party’s or group’s interests. As such, 
policies often come to be made through the interaction of actors who, in order to protect their 
interests, look for the most cost-effective means (i.e. maximising their benefits and minimising 
their costs) to accomplish their specific target without reflecting on the possible outcomes 
(Zincone and Caponio 2004). An example is the Council Directive 2001/55/EC on minimum 
standards to give temporary protection in case of a mass influx of displaced persons that 
coincidentally the Italian and Maltese governments are particularly interested in and are urging 
the European Commission to make it active (World Socialist Web Site 2011; see also ECRE’s 
website). The recent decision of the Italian government to give temporary protection permits to 
Tunisian migrants is part of their efforts to involve the other European member states to help 
out with this “human tsunami” (Corriere della Sera 2011). However, this is a way of shifting the 





This chapter has developed a theoretical framework based on the first four hypotheses laid out 
in the introductory chapter of the thesis. Firstly, the chapter focused on asylum and migration 
theories in view of the fact that migration is a complex and multifaceted issue. It has been 
shown that asylum is often regarded as a subset of migration, making the issue blurred, more 
contentious and difficult to understand. Governments have to deal with these difficulties in 
order to create asylum policies. However, they may have different attitudes and behaviours 
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 Besides, the government is fully aware that the aim of most of these migrants is to reach France and to 
a lesser extent Germany where they already have family and friends. France has closed its southern 
borders to prevent entry by train while Germany threatened to do the same (Frenzen 2011) breaching the 
Schengen Treaty while accusing Italy of being in violation of EU law. Italy has a very strict visa policy 
contrary to Germany whose more liberal policy on visas is seen as the “soft underbelly of the Fortress 
Europe” (Finotelli and Sciortino 2009, 131). As such, in Italy, many overstayers have actually come into 
the Schengen area thanks to visas issued by the German state. 
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towards asylum seekers compared with other migrants, especially if under the influence of the 
tabloid media and public opinion. Policies will therefore differ. 
 Secondly, the analysis has reviewed the nature of the state. Liberal theorists argue that 
states, created by the demos for the demos, have a duty towards their citizens but also have a 
moral duty towards asylum seekers. However, nation-states consider asylum as a threat to their 
economy as they could represent a drain on public expenditure, but also to their national identity 
and even security, especially after 9/11. States have, therefore, implemented stricter policies and 
security measures in an effort to control migration and to deter unwanted arrivals.  
 The third aspect is that ‘government’ – perceived as a strong, unitary element – has become 
‘governance’ through a delegation of powers to other state and also non-state actors. Some 
authors have interpreted this as a fragmentation or a ‘hollowing-out’ of the state. Others believe 
that the state is still powerful or that this fragmentation has not weakened the state but simply 
changed it. Furthermore, states may face constraints from an international perspective because 
of the EU and other transnational and supranational actors and, on the domestic front, from the 
growing number of pro-asylum, pro-immigration and pro-human rights pressure groups. When 
it comes to asylum and migration policies though, states display their power in determining who 
stays and who has to go. Governance has been described as a new way of making policy 
because of a whole new dimension: that of policy and issue networks. This is the last part of the 
theoretical model. These networks represent the so called meso-level of the policy process, i.e. 
the level that connects the macro- and micro-levels of policy-making. In other words, 
understanding these networks reveals how policies come to be made through the formal and 
informal interactions between state and non-state actors. Issue networks are particularly relevant 
to understanding how asylum policy is made and how they reflect the power relations between 
the different actors.  
 This chapter has introduced the core theoretical approaches that will inform the empirical 
chapters that follow. In particular, Chapters 4 and 5 present the context in which asylum and 
migration policies were shaped in Italy and the UK. Chapters 6 and 7 present an analysis of 
parliamentary debates and interviews held with key actors to understand how policy was 
formed. Chapter 8 compares the two countries in terms of the nature of the state, issue networks 
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and the different levels of policy-making. Finally, the last chapter concludes the thesis by 
































This chapter outlines the methods used to validate the research problem and test its hypotheses. 
To understand how asylum policy proposals become policy decisions in different states – that 
may perceive asylum differently – four hypotheses and consequent research questions were 
outlined in Chapter 1. In order to answer the research questions, different types of material and 
sources were collected and analysed. Although the thesis has followed mainly a qualitative 
approach, multiple or mixed strategies (Burgess 1984; Douglas 1976) were also relevant. For 
example, asylum statistics provided details of trends in the two countries (asylum applications, 
decisions, outcomes of the applications and top 5 sending countries). In 2002, asylum was one 
of the most important issues for the UK government but it was not for the Italian one. The 
statistical data are used to compare the differences in scale between the two countries and to 
inform the first two hypotheses: asylum as an issue because perceived as a threat; and the 
consequent manner in which it is dealt with by states.  
 This chapter is divided into two main sections. The first part relates to data collection and 
contains information on the documents used to carry out the analysis and the interviews made 
(such as the location and the selection of the participants). The second part concentrates on the 
analysis. The focus is the relevance of comparative analysis for this thesis, how the analysis of 
the documents was carried out and why and, finally, the difficulties encountered during the 
analysis of the documents and the fieldwork and how they were dealt with. 
  
3.1 DATA COLLECTION  
The analysis of the documentary sources and interviews may be divided in three parts. The first 
step involved content analysis of media articles of the time and reports written by NGOs and 
charities to identify the main issues of the two laws under study. The thorough examination of 
parts within the parliamentary debates concerned with these issues followed. This analysis was 
particularly time consuming especially in the case of the very detailed Hansard records. 
However, it was important not only to understand how the process evolved over a few months, 
66 
 
but also to identify key actors who could be interviewed. Thirdly, in-depth interviews followed 
to allow the build-up of a narrative account of the policy-making process, while considering the 
perspectives and interests of different actors. The strategy behind the analysis of the 
parliamentary debates therefore was not to carry out discourse analysis. The interest of the 
thesis did not lie in understanding how a particular MP or political party would treat the issue of 
asylum or how their ideas or behaviour evolved over time. The aim was to expand the 
understanding of the policy process and the involvement of networks within this process. 
Finally, all data was evaluated via in-depth analysis.  
 
3.1.1 Documents 
The most important collection of documents related directly to the legislations under analysis 
(the 2002 Nationality, Asylum and Immigration Act and law 189/2002 also known as ‘Bossi-
Fini’) and comprised the UK and Italian official reports in the form of printed transcripts of 
parliamentary debates. The Official Report in the UK is also referred to as Hansard. It is the 
nearest to a word-by-word account. As the Official Report website states  
though not strictly verbatim, [it] is substantially the verbatim report, with repetitions 
and redundancies omitted and with obvious mistakes corrected, but which on the 
other hand leaves out nothing that adds to the meaning of the speech or illustrates the 
argument (UK Parliament n.d.). 
 
It is a detailed and independent record of the proceedings. Although the House of Commons 
and House of Lords have separate reports, the rules regarding the way in which they are 
transcribed are the same. 
 In Italy the official reports are referred to as Resoconti Parlamentari. As in the UK they are 
cleaned of repetitions and mistakes. Differently from the UK though, some of the reports exist 
only in form of a summary (resoconto sommario) while others are available in full (resoconto 
stenografico). Verbatim reports of parliamentary debates are available online (including 
Standing Committees and Select Committees for both countries).  
 Other documents included the main EU Directives (2000/596/EC; 2001/55/EC; 2003/9/EC; 
2003/86/EC; 2004/83/EC; 2005/85/EC) and other governmental documents, briefings by NGOs 
and charities, journals, newspapers, surveys and blogs. In particular, journals, used to identify 
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the main literature in both countries were mostly available online; newspapers
33
 and online 
blogs were used to read politicians statements and citizens’ comments. With regard to people’s 
feelings towards migration and asylum, polls and surveys were also collected and analysed. This 
information was available online at the Istituto Nazionale di Statistica (ISTAT) and Ipsos Italia 
for Italy and Ipsos MORI for the UK.  
 Although all of the above documents were important, it was the parliamentary debates in 
both countries that embodied the main source of the study. Firstly, they represented an 
important step in understanding all the different stages of the parliamentary process and the 
steps in the asylum policy process. Secondly, the debates specify the political party affiliation 
and the way MPs vote on a certain issue. This detail was important because often an MP would 
criticise the government’s line but ultimately would vote along party lines. Finally and most 
importantly, the debates were employed extensively to identify the names of those actors 
essential in the making of the two legislations as well as the details of the arguments. They 
indicated informal interactions, people’s attitudes and change of attitudes and could be used to 
identify the key issues for governments and the political parties. To identify stakeholder roles 
was necessary because of their importance to issue networks and their roles in influencing 
policy. 
The identification of key actors was also obtained through the analysis of media articles of the 
time and during the course of the interviews when suggestions were made for other potential 
interviewees.  
 
3.1.2 Interviews: objectives, sampling and location 
The interviews to the main stakeholders were a key aspect in the development of the analysis
34
. 
They enabled deeper insight into the role of the existing networks in the making of the policy 
and therefore relate particularly to hypotheses 3 (the ‘governance’ of policy networks) and 4 
(networks have different levels of power). The interviews sought to understand policy-makers’ 
attitudes towards asylum and towards pro-asylum advocacy groups (and vice-versa), how 
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 The main sources for media articles in the UK were the BBC website and The Guardian; in Italy they 
were La Repubblica, Il Corriere della Sera, La Padania, and La Stampa. 
34
 See Appendices 1, 2, 3 and 4 for the list of interviewees in Italy and in the UK. 
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individual parts of the network interacted with each other, their influence and power, 
relationships, and lobbying.  
 The participants were politicians, civil servants and representatives from the most 
influential national and international non-governmental organisations, including the UNHCR, 
charities, trade unions, employers’ organisations and Think Tanks, all of which played a role in 
the making of the legislations under examination. They did not constitute a random sample but a 
deliberate or ‘purposeful selection’ of individuals or ‘élites35’ who had considerable influence 
on the policy process at parliamentary level and policies outcomes and might be more “at ease 
and talk freely with the researcher such that a great deal can be learned about the research 
question” (Baxter and Eyles 1997, 513; see also Maxwell 2005). The main goals were to 
achieve: “representativeness or typicality of the settings, individuals or activities selected” and 
“to illuminate the reasons for differences between settings and individuals” (Baxter and Eyles 
1997, 89-90). Because the main setting in this case was the parliament, it made sense to 
interview the most representative actors in the arena, those who had the most direct knowledge 
of the policy making process. 
 In total, 41 people were interviewed in two separate interview rounds. During the first 
round in 2008, 12 people were able to participate in the UK
36
 (mainly from NGOs but also two 
civil servants and one MP) and 13 in Italy
37
 (from NGOs and two civil servants). In the second 
round in 2011, 7 people took part in the interviews in the UK
38
 and 9 in Italy
39
 (in both cases 
these were policy-makers, civil servants, and one Italian charity worker).  
 The majority of the interviews in the UK were held in London in October 2008 and then 
again between January and March 2011. In Italy most interviews were held in Rome, seat of the 
government and many NGO offices. There were two exceptions. One was the interview held 
with Gianfranco Schiavone, responsible of the refugee office of the Italian Consortium of 
Solidarity (ICS) based in Trieste, Northern Italy. Mr Schiavone was interviewed the first time in 
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 Politicians are defined as ‘élite’ a) because they have a certain degree of control on migration policies 
due to an interest (stake) or their background; and b) “by their exclusivity” (Desmond 2004, 264).  
36
 In total, 23 people were contacted. 
37
 In total, 27 people were contacted. 
38
 In total, 19 people were contacted. 
39
 In total, 20 people were contacted. 
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December 2008 and a second time to clarify some aspects which emerged during the analysis of 
some documents in February 2012. In both occasions the interviews happened over the 
telephone due to the impracticality of a trip to Trieste. The second exception was in the case of 
migration expert Sergio Briguglio who works and lives in Frascati, not far from Rome. The 
interview was face-to-face. 
 The interviews were semi-structured as they allow more flexibility for the respondents 
increasing “validity of the responses” (Aberbach and Rockman 2002, 674; Peabody et al. 1990).  
 Overall, dates for meetings were set usually within one or two days in Italy and two to 
three weeks in the UK. In the UK people replied on both occasions either directly or through 
their secretary. Refusals were mainly due to lack of time or detailed knowledge. One MP in the 
UK declined on account of his retirement while another one thought he did not have much to 
say despite his repeated interventions as recorded in Hansard. In Italy instead, not all the 
potential interviewees replied while those who did, were mostly able to meet up.  
 On average, a good rapport with the interviewees was established. This enabled more depth 
in the questioning and also resulted in the participants giving access to other interviewees, 
creating the so called snowballing effect (Richards 1996). The interviewees were asked at the 
beginning of the interview whether they would prefer to remain anonymous. Five interviewees 
(two in Italy and three in the UK) out of 41 preferred not to be named. Finally, one of my 
anonymous informants asked to see the transcripts before including anything in the thesis. 
Unfortunately, this interviewee was not at the given e-mail address anymore and could not be 
traced. Nevertheless, parts of the interview were included because they were informative and I 
felt they would not rebound on the person. Furthermore, anonymity was maintained. 
 The aim of the interviews was to uncover the role played by state and non-state actors in 
influencing the policy process.  
 
3.1.2.1 Interviews in 2008 
In the first round of interviews in 2008, a discussion guide for pro-asylum/immigration groups 
and one for MPs and civil servants were developed. As piloting was not possible, great care was 
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taken in developing the survey. As such, the discussion guide was bespoke to the agencies being 
interviewed and no issues were encountered when using it.  
 For the first group of interviewees, the initial questions were of a more generic nature and 
related to the following key themes: interests and concerns for the laws then under discussion, 
existing networks and the nature of their interactions, compromise, power, lobbying and 
influence of the mass-media and of the EU on the government.  
 For the second group of interviewees (MPs and civil servants), the rationale for the 
discussion was slightly different. Starting again with broad questions about their interest and 
basis of the legislation, the interviews then moved to the type of sources they used to gather 
their information, and the networks they belonged to. The third part related to their influence, 
power and compromise. Finally, as in the first case, questions on the influence of the mass-
media and the EU were asked. 
 The interviewees belonging to NGOs and charities were contacted in the first instance by e-
mail. Generic or person’s specific e-mail addresses are available on the contacts pages of the 
organisations. Some answered readily and provided the e-mail address of the right individual to 
contact or their telephone numbers, others did not. In this case a second e-mail was necessary as 
a follow-up.  
 
3.1.2.2 Interviews in 2011 
The second set of interviews in 2011 was to include policy-makers who were not contacted in 
the first instance. This second round was delayed because it was first necessary to have a good 
knowledge of the key issues confronted and how they were dealt with and to identify the key 
politicians who took part in the debates. Only after a thorough examination, interviews followed. 
The politicians were chosen according to their role during the debates of the two laws. As such, 
some specific questions were asked towards the end of the interviews.  
 A second round of interviews was also necessary in the case of Italy. First the 
parliamentary debates were analysed and then the key issues and the key politicians and other 
significant actors were identified. The interviews in this case however, were over the phone and 
happened between January and February 2011.  
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 No question was asked about the politician’s personal take on migration as this was clear 
by reading the parliamentary debates and the media articles. 
 The approach employed to contact the ‘élite’ policy-makers in this second round of 
interviews was different from that used to contact people in 2008. Several issues have been 
recognised while conducting interviews with élites. One of these is the accessibility of people 
who hold a privileged position in society. To gain access is not an impossible task but there are 
some precautions and expedients to take. First, an official letter
40
 with the logo of the university 
was sent to the ‘gate keepers’ (Peabody et al. 1990) followed by phone calls. To the Italian 
policy-makers an e-mail containing a brief presentation and the official letter sent as an 
attachment were sent. The reason for these two different methods (letters in the UK and e-mails 
in Italy) was due to logistics: to avoid letters arriving too late or being lost in the process. The 
letters did not include detailed information but only the “general purpose” (Aberbach and 
Rockman 2002) of the study. They underlined at the same time, the importance of the selected 
individuals in bringing “unique and even essential expertise to the topic” (Delaney 2007, 212; 
Richards 1996; Lilleker 2003). The importance of keeping the letter interesting but general was 
mainly due to the fact that asylum and immigration may be considered sensitive topics. 
 
3.2 DATA ANALYSIS 
3.2.1 Comparative analysis 
The importance of comparative analysis is well-known in policy studies: it is “an instrument to 
verify or falsify relationships between two phenomena” (Pennings et al. 2006) or “among 
variables” (Lijphart 1971). Comparing two (or more) countries and their political system 
maximises understanding in the way they have developed and why.  
 In the case of this thesis, asylum policy is used as the mean to understand the policy 
process of the Italian and UK governments. The policy process depends on the location, history, 
and political developments of the UK and Italy but also the existence of networks and the way 
in which they interact to create policy.  
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 Examples of the letters sent are contained in Appendices 8, 9 and 10. 
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 Finally, in order to establish and compare the scale of the asylum population in the two 
countries and how it might affect the governments’ views, a brief analysis of the statistical 
information on the asylum trends available for Italy and the United Kingdom from 1995 to the 
time of writing was included. The main sources were the UNHCR Statistical Yearbook and the 
OECD SOPEMI annual reports for Italy and the UK (Salt, 2009). These were used to establish 
the main differences between Italy and the UK with regard to asylum applications, refugee 
status determination, granted exceptional leave, humanitarian protection, or discretionary leave 
and countries of origin. The statistical information is in Chapters 4 and 5. 
 
3.2.2 Document analysis 
In the analysis of the UK and Italian parliamentary debates, the first step was to identify the 
names of policy makers and associations that had an input in the discussion of the bill. The 
people and associations who appeared more often because of their interventions and interests 
were then contacted for the interviews. The second step was to detect the issues that had a major 
impact during the discussion, thus showing the relevance of a particular topic for the 
government and the political parties in the majority and the opposition. An example is the 
discussion on the establishment of accommodation centres in the UK that took up most of the 
time devoted to the debates, and the regularisation of illegal migrants in Italy that caused 
frictions within the majority.  
 
3.2.3 Analysis of interviews 
A software package called Transana was used to code the interviews. It allows the researcher to 
analyse audio data, assign keywords and explore relationships between applied keywords. The 
applied keywords related to hypotheses three and four that deal with network analysis and 
especially policy networks. The keywords centred on topics such as alliances, compromise, 
influence (of the associations, the Church, the mass-media, and the EU), lobby, nature of 
interaction and networks. The resulting keywords were then compared to establish similarities 
and differences in the role of the networks, their modus operandi, the power balance and the 
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relationship between central government and the pro-asylum/immigration groups but also the 
interactions within the groups. This was done for both countries. 
 
3.3 ISSUES WITH THE ANALYSIS OF THE DOCUMENTS AND THE FIELDWORK 
The main problems were encountered with the Italian parliamentary debates. Whereas Hansard 
in the UK was clear and complete, some Italian official reports only exist in summary form for 
both chambers, thus making the investigation more difficult. In the Senate they are divided into 
three main categories: debates within the first standing Committee for Constitutional Affairs 
(Trattazione in Commissione), debates within different standing committees that consider points 
in common to a particular bill (Trattazione in Consultiva) and finally, debates on the Floor of 
the House (Trattazione in Assemblea). In the first two instances – Trattazione in Commissione 
and Trattazione in Consultiva – debates are only available in a form of summary (resoconto 
sommario), that is a synthesis of the speakers’ speeches. In the last case instead – Trattazione in 
Assemblea – debates are normally recorded word by word because it is a public session. The full 
stenographic reports (resoconti stenografici) therefore, exist only in the last case. At this stage 
there is not much debate going on because the available time is mainly dedicated to voting on 
the amendments. The initial proposals to the bill as a whole are discussed in the earlier stages in 
the Cabinet, before the official presentation in one of the two Chambers. This means that it is 
not possible to access the debates from beginning to end, making impossible the task of 
knowing exactly when and why each amendment was proposed and the consequent reactions. 
This has the effect of making the Italian policy-making process non-transparent. This problem 
was overcome as far as possible through the analysis of other material and sources. These were 
the media articles of the time reporting the discussion in Parliament, briefings and e-mail 
exchange
41
 between charities, NGOs, and experts, and finally the interviews. The latter in 
particular, served the purpose to triangulate and confirm the evidence found and also to clarify 
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 The access to the e-mails and briefings was possible thanks to the efforts made by Sergio Briguglio – one 
of the interviewees and external expert on most migration matters including asylum – to maintain a website 
dating back to 1992. This website contains articles and e-mail messages on everything related to 
immigration and asylum. It also contains information on the legislation. 
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some other aspects missing from the debates. These rules are included in article 33 of the Senate 
Rules (Senato 1971).  
 The Chamber of Deputies follows roughly the same formula. There are debates within the 
first standing Committee for Constitutional Affairs, debates within different Committees and 
finally, debates within the Assembly. As for the Senate, only the debates on the Floor of the 
House are public according to article 63.1 of the Chamber of Deputies Rules (Camera dei 
Deputati 1971) and as such, exist in full. The others only exist as a summary. The debates were 
nevertheless still a useful starting point to understand the differences and the dynamics at work 
between the majority and the opposition.  
 The availability of interviewees varied. Some policy-makers did not respond to the 
requests sent or refused to take part because of their current positions in government or because 
of the difficult situation of the government at the time of contact. However, this last point is 
only relevant for the Italian case. At the time, there were some important issues the Berlusconi 
government was dealing with. These were the imminent trial of the Prime Minister
42
 and other 
political disagreements that caused some friction within the ruling coalition and lead some of 
the Prime Minister’s closest supporters to leave the coalition; and finally the dire economic 
situation of the country that ultimately led to the resignation of Berlusconi and the fall of the 
government. On average, however, the participants were ready and happy to take part to the 
interviews both in person and over the phone despite the fact that they needed to recollect 
information dating back to 2002. Some interviewees just needed reminding of crucial points 
about the law to juggle their memory. Asking people to recollect what has happened years 
before poses both a challenge because they may not remember but also the benefit of having 
time for reflection. In terms of memory, Richards (1996) mentions that at times, the memory of 
ex-politicians can be problematic as they “often encounter pathological difficulties in 
distinguishing the truth, so set have their minds become by long experience of partisan thought” 
(Seldon 1988 quoted in Richards 1996, 201). In some cases on the other hand, the passage of 
time gave respondents time to reflect on what had transpired then and since. This may have 
provided a more thoughtful response but it might also mean that an attempt was made to justify 
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 In relation to the so-called ‘Rubygate scandal’. 
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actions taken in light of subsequent circumstances. Mediation was therefore central and not only 
because part of the sample was constituted by politicians experienced in the art of interviewing. 
For example, when interviewing David Blunkett I felt at times that he was rehearsing a part (e.g. 
repeating something he had said many times before – as former Home Secretary – about the 
situation of asylum in 2002). Only towards the end of the interview, when he was asked if he 
would have done something differently, his expression changed as he perhaps realised that some 
things could have been done in other ways. The interview with Lord Dubbs had instead a whole 
different feel. As a former refugee himself and former head of the Refugee Council, he seemed 
to be speaking from a personal point of view and out of personal experience. Each interviewee 
had a story to tell which was either influenced by their current or previous position or personal 
circumstances. One way to deal with this issue of mediation is reflexivity (Baxter and Eyles 
1997; Rice 2009). Reflexivity is important “to recognise the different power relationships that 
exist between” interviewer and interviewees (Flowerdrew and Martin 2005, 113) especially in 
the case of elite interviewing. As a result, several people who held different positions and 
perspectives were interviewed about the same set of events, it is possible to evaluate and weight 
their accounts against each other and documentary sources. Furthermore, discussion guides 
were created in Italian and English and reflected the research questions. They were tailored 
according to the interviewees’ expertise and the part they played in the making of the policy.  
Consent to record interviews was obtained in all cases. 
 Civil servants could be a good alternative if politicians cannot remember or are not 
available. In the UK, the issue was that “the Home Office has no institutional memory” 
(interview with Home Office official
43
) as civil servants tend to move to new positions often. In 
fact, only three civil servants who were working at the time were reached. As they are deemed 
to be good observers, they were able to recollect the general atmosphere within the Home Office 
as the NIA bill was under way, including the gossips. For example, there were rumours that the 
locations of accommodation centres were not chosen randomly or based on availability but 
purposefully in wealthy, conservative areas. This was perhaps a party political reaction to the 
dispersal system implemented with the 1999 Act. According to this, asylum seekers were 
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 Interview date: 9
th
 October 2008. 
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dispersed in poor and disadvantaged areas of the countries, mainly in Labour constituencies. 
This caused resentment and violence in the local communities. 
 For the Italian case, the prefects were an essential source of knowledge and information as 
they followed very closely the development of the Bossi-Fini. 
   
3.4 CONCLUSION 
The chapter has highlighted the methodological framework adopted that has allowed the 
analysis to be carried out. As such, a mix of methods – quantitative data as a background to the 
research, collection of different sources of data, comparative analysis and coding of interviews – 
was key to the thesis and helped frame the research questions.  
 The methodology proved thorough despite some difficulties. These were mainly related to 
working on two countries with different political systems and historical trajectories as well as 
ethics and consequent governments’ behaviour towards asylum. 
 The following two chapters concentrate on the two countries’ historical and political 




















HISTORICAL AND CONTEXTUAL BACKGROUND IN THE 
UNITED KINGDOM 
The aim of this chapter is to set the historical and political context that led to the creation of the 
2002 Nationality Immigration and Asylum (NIA) Act. As a “very hot button” issue (interview 
with Dr Metcalfe
44
), asylum has been subjected to a huge campaign of politicisation as well as 
de-politicisation through the years (interview with Professor Guild
45
). The topic has been used 
to win votes as both Labour and Tory have seen an “electoral advantage in taking a particularly 
strong line against asylum seekers” (interview with Dr Metcalfe) depicted as a threat to the 
state’s unity and its welfare system. It has also been put in a corner when it was becoming too 
uncomfortable to talk about it (Freeman 1995; Perlmutter 2000) and the subject was switched to 
the economic benefits of highly-skilled migration.  
 The chapter concentrates firstly on the historical developments in terms of immigration and 
asylum legislation
46
 following a chronological order culminating in the 2002 NIA Act. The 
inclusion of the legislation history is important to understand, firstly, the then climate 
surrounding asylum and how it was perceived to be a threat to the nation-state’s identity, 
interests and sovereignty by politicians. Secondly, it provides a context to compare the attitude 
of the two countries under study towards asylum. The nature of the state to a considerable extent 
determines how asylum is dealt with by the government. 
 The second part discusses the difficulties of UK governments in dealing with asylum 
(hence the need to create new asylum legislation every three years) and their relationship to the 
nature of the welfare state. The rise in numbers, the huge backlog of claims never dealt with by 
the Tories and a more than hostile right-wing media – whose harsh criticism against the new 
government’s inability to deal with ‘bogus’ asylum seekers fuelled public opinion fears – urged 
the Labour government to pass new legislation in 1999. However, because the situation in the 
eyes of the government did not improve, it promised to overhaul the asylum system with a new 
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 See Appendix 11 for the list of main asylum legislation developments in the UK. 
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White Paper in 2001 followed by new legislation in 2002, the NIA Act. Furthermore, the then 
Prime Minister Tony Blair vowed to take asylum matters into his own hands in order to reduce 
radically the number of asylum claims. This part of the chapter contains also the examination of 
the most controversial issues
47
 within the NIA Act and denounced by NGOs and charities but 
also by those local communities that felt ‘threatened’ by the government’s plans to build 
accommodation centres in their small urban and rural (but often wealthy) areas. This section 
concludes with a brief comparison of the 1996, 1999 and 2002 Acts, showing a continuity of 
restrictive policies between Conservatives and Labour.  
 The third part of the chapter discusses the political aspects related to the development of 
the asylum debate. It examines factors that shaped the policy of those years, such as the role of 
the media in influencing public opinion and possibly policy, and the gap between politicians’ 
rhetoric which favoured restrictions and actions which accepted asylum seekers anyway. This 
discrepancy shows a tension between domestic policies on the one hand – geared towards the 
preservation of the British nation-state and the protection of its citizens – and on the other hand 
the duty to safeguard asylum seekers according to the conventions and treaties signed and 
ratified by the UK.  
 
4.1 HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENTS IN LEGISLATION: A CONVERGENCE OF 
TRADITIONS 
From the 1905 Aliens Act to the 2009 Borders, Citizenship and Immigration Act, the aim of 
immigration legislation has been to constrain the stay of immigrants and especially the entry of 
asylum seekers. The focus of these bills was on immigration, given the colonial links with the 
Commonwealth countries. The UK had already become an immigration country after the Second 
World War with the first immigration legislation dating 1962. The Commonwealth Immigrants 
Act was brought in mainly to reduce immigration from the Commonwealth (Bloch 2000; 
Coleman, Compton and Salt 2002).  
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 It was in the 1950s that “immigration for permanent settlement” (Coleman, Compton and 
Salt 2002, 501) became high on the government’s political agenda due to the arrival of West 
Indians. In 1964 the issue became a key electoral point (Bloch 2000) as Asians became the main 
settlers (Coleman, Compton and Salt 2002). By the late 1970s migration became the subject of 
political rhetoric against migrants (Boswell 2005a) due to the significant increase of net 
immigration in the early 1970s (Hatton 2005; Dobson et al. 2009).  
 In the 1980s, public concern grew due to the rising unemployment and also partly to the 
“political and economic decline and the drastic economic restructuring and welfare state reforms” 
that Britain was then experiencing (Boswell 2005, 57). As the numbers of asylum seekers 
increased towards the end of the 1980s
48
 and throughout the 1990s
49
, they became an “obvious 
target for anti-immigrant sentiment” (ibid; Bloch 2000; Menz 2008) especially on the part of right-
wing tabloids. Consequently, the policy agenda shifted from immigration to asylum. Asylum 
seekers were represented as a new threat to the unity and welfare of the nation state. The most 
important migration issue by far for the then Conservative government was to stop the perceived 
abuse of the asylum system by claimants accused of using the UK’s generous welfare provisions. 
As a result, the first ever asylum legislation – the 1993 Asylum and Immigration Appeals Act – 
was passed. The aim of this Act was, on one side, to increase the use of pre-entry controls such as 
taking fingerprints and introducing carrier sanctions and, on the other, to speed up the asylum 
application process for ‘manifestly unfounded’ asylum claims. Three years down the line the 1996 
Asylum and Immigration Act introduced the ‘white list’ concept and, more controversially, it 
withdrew the right to claim benefits for people who claimed asylum in-country rather than at port 
of entry. Both acts were passed by a Conservative government. Throughout their 18 years in 
opposition, the Labour party had criticised harshly their rival’s asylum policy but with the 1996 
Act, their stance against the Conservatives became more moderate. They agreed with the Tory 
government that it was important to differentiate between ‘good’ and ‘bad’, between genuine and 
bogus asylum seekers (Bloch 2000). As a result, the 1999 Immigration and Asylum Act passed by 
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Labour built upon the previous two acts both in the field of pre-entry controls and welfare support. 
The Act introduced food vouchers in an effort to take asylum seekers out “of the social security 
system completely” (ibid, 39) and a compulsory dispersal system was implemented50.  
 Somerville (2007) divides the first ten years of Labour government into two main asylum and 
immigration phases. The first, between 1997 and 2001 was “reactive”, as the aim was “to reduce 
asylum flows and clear asylum backlogs” (ibid, 20). Labour had inherited a huge backlog of 
asylum applications that at one point – in January 2000 – reached the peak of 100,000 claims 
(Travis 2000). The second phase, from 2001 and 2007, was ‘proactive’. Labour’s strategy changed 
during their second term in power due to four factors: the backlog; the racial attacks against 
asylum seekers in poor parts of the North of England after the implementation of the dispersal 
system under the 1999 Act; the repeated criticisms on the part of the tabloid media; and finally the 
steep increase in asylum applications. The number of asylum seekers had reached new heights, 
with 71,160 applications in 1999 and 80,135 the following year “13 per cent more than in 1999” 
(Home Office 2002, 50) as showed in table 4.1 below (Information Centre about Asylum and 
Refugees 2009; Salt 2011).  
 In 2002 there was a new record of 84,132 applications. However, the number almost halved 
the following year. The sharp fall of asylum applications had already started in October 2002 and 
it intensified at the beginning of the following year (National Audit Office 2004). The Home 
Office ascribed it to a series of new measures implemented between 2002 and 2003
51
 including 
some of the 2002 NIA Act procedures. The introduction of non-suspensive appeals as well as of a 
list of safe countries, and the implementation in January 2003 of section 55, further restricted 
access to support for those asylum seekers who did not apply “as soon as reasonably practicable”. 
On the other hand, this decline in numbers was also recorded in other 13 countries in Western 
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 This is still running. Many asylum seekers have been sent to parts of England according to house 
availability. Most of these parts (mainly in North West and North East of England) are deprived, poor 
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widespread. Asylum agencies have criticised the scheme as it exposes vulnerable people to abuse while 
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2001b; Burnett 2011). 
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use of new technologies to detect people hidden in lorries and freights and finally the extension for Direct 
Airside Transit Visas
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 (National Audit Office 2004). 
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Europe suggesting a common trend (although the fall of applications in the other states was not as 
big as that registered in the UK) (ibid).  
Figure 4.1  
 
Source: Salt 2011 (115-119). 
 
Notes: 
(1) The applications, initial decisions and grants exclude dependants. 
(2) The total grants include applicants recognised as refugees and granted asylum and applicants not recognised as 
refugees but granted exceptional leave, humanitarian protection, or discretionary leave. 
   
 The government, afraid that they would lose support, had to be seen to react proactively to 
tackle public concerns related to the increased numbers of claims and the continuous attacks of 
the tabloid media. As Nick Pearce recollected during the interview
52
, at the time:  
there was a very, very high level of public or at least media concern … which fed into 
the political arena and made the Prime Minister and the Home Secretary both very 
concerned … firstly, to show that the asylum and immigration system could be 
properly managed but it wasn't out of control, that it wasn't open to widespread 
irregularity or abuse … ; and secondly, that in particular the asylum claims which 
were believed to be unfounded, should be as fast as possible reduced and the Prime 
Minister set a target at that time of a 50% reduction in the claims. So that was the 
immediate background to the [2002 NIA] Act. 
 
 Their focus shifted to the beneficial impacts of immigration and “the contribution the 
migrants were able to make … in the interest of economic growth” (interview with Home Office 
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) and as part of the government’s ‘modernisation’ (Powell 2008) approach rather than 
just concentrating on asylum. Labour electoral manifesto highlighted the “positive contribution to 
British society” made by foreigners (Labour’s manifesto 2001, 34). It stressed that asylum was not 
“an alternative route to immigration” (ibid) and highlighted the positive steps taken by the 
government to reduce the backlog. This was the main shift from the Conservative party’s 
perception of migration being marginal to the UK economy (Schuster and Solomos 2004). On one 
side there was Labour’s intention to expand the immigration of foreign professionals to help the 
British economy, while promoting “an informed and grown-up debate … to combat some of the 
negative, biased, inaccurate reporting in the press about the impact of migration” (interview with 
Home Office Official 2). On the other hand, the government believed that low-skilled economic 
migrants were abusing the asylum system rather than following a legal entry route, and “that 
closer control of the entry of low-skilled workers would stem the number of people entering 
illegally” (The Guardian 2009a). High-skilled migration was therefore seen as a potential benefit 
for the UK economy if managed correctly (Flynn 2003). It was a way of controlling the arrival of 
“desirable” (Schuster and Solomos 2004, 279) and “deserving” (Sales 2005, 448) highly-skilled 
migrants while limiting or discouraging the “undesirable” (Schuster and Solomos 2004, 279) and 
“undeserving” (Sales 2005, 448) asylum seekers who were perceived as a threat. Asylum seekers 
were barred from taking up employment, and their entitlement to welfare benefits was further 
curtailed. This phase was followed in 2001 by the Home Secretary’s (David Blunkett) 
announcement of a set of new asylum and immigration measures that would make the UK asylum 
system fairer. Consequently, the White Paper “Secure borders, safe heavens: integration with 
diversity in modern Britain” was published in February 2002. It was published in the aftermath of 
9/11 showing “that while unauthorised migration is linked to security concerns, it is also framed in 
the context of crime and border control” (Somerville 2007, 49). Illegal migration and, yet again, 
the theme of asylum, were identified and understood as a threat to security. 
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 In the same year, the Prime Minister declared that he was going to take the asylum matter 
in his own hands and a new bill was put on the agenda because the “act of legislating was as 
important, if not more important, than the context of the legislation” (interview with Hussain54). 
 
4.1.1 The White Paper: Secure Borders, Safe Haven: Integration with Diversity in Modern 
Britain 
The aim of the White Paper was to overhaul radically the asylum system and it emphasised “the 
control and the removal of unsuccessful asylum applicants” (Refugee Council 2002a, 2). The 
idea of ‘managed migration’ started to emerge as the White Paper outlined various new 
measures for the management “of flows of people from entry into the UK through work-related 
routes or the asylum system, to settlement and the acquisition of citizenship” (Home Office 
2002, 23). It also sent out the government’s “clear message” that “allowing asylum seekers to 
stay simply because the UK is their country of preference” (ibid, 48) was not an option while 
economic routes were open for those wanting to come to the UK to work rather than abusing the 
asylum route.  
 The measures introduced by the White Paper
55
, designed to stop illegal immigrants, badly 
affected asylum seekers too – just as happened with the Bossi-Fini law in Italy. It soon became 
apparent that the UK government was “anxious to portray itself as taking an even tougher line 
on asylum” (Refugee Council 2002b, 8). For example, according to Justice56, the White Paper 
did not mention anything that would improve the asylum determination process that is “the way 
in which they [asylum seekers] put forward their claims for asylum and how they are 
determined” (Justice 2002, 38). The goal of the government was to prevent asylum seekers from 
entering the country in the first instance whilst having a faster process with speedier removals 
for those who did manage to come in but whose claims were unsuccessful.  
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 Refugee Council’s former Parliamentary Officer. Interview date: 10th October 2008. 
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 The main reforms proposed by the White Paper concerned: the resettlement programme; a managed 
system of induction, accommodation, reporting and removal centres; the introduction of an Application 
Registration Card (ARC); the phasing out of voucher support; assisting unaccompanied asylum seeking 
children; the streamlining of the appeals system; the increase in the number of removals (Home Office 2002, 
52). 
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 Justice is an all-party law reform and human rights organisation and the UK section of the International 
Commission of Jurists. They aim to improve the British legal system through lobbying, research, education 
and intervention in the courts. 
84 
 
 The policy was contentious. The Joint Council for the Welfare of Immigrants
57
 (JCWI) 
expressed concern over the fact that many measures included in the White Paper reinforced the 
idea that asylum seekers were not genuine by implementing measures that did not respect 
human rights. At the same time, the organisation denounced the fact that some of the measures 
were already in place, thus “raising doubts as to the value of the consultation process” (JCWI 
2002, n.p.). These measures were the repeal of part III of the 1999 Act relating to the automatic 
right to a bail hearing, the increase in the rate of removals of failed asylum seekers, and the 
detention of families for longer periods.  
 The government’s aim was to regain the support of the public by showing that it was tough 
on asylum, hence not tolerating abuse. At the same time, they aimed to ‘hide’ the problem 
through the establishment of special accommodation centres for asylum seekers – as part of the 
dispersal system –  thus barring them from making ties with the host society. The ‘safe haven’ 
was “eclipsed by the agenda of securing borders” (Sales 2005, 459). 
 The reforms that caused more concern among the main refugee organisations
58
 were: the 
trialling of accommodation centres; changes in the support system; asylum appeals; and 
increased detention times not simply for removal
59
 purposes but also for families with children 
“for longer than just a few days” for the “reasonable belief that they would abscond” (Home 
Office 2002, 67). These specific provisions were re-presented in the NIA bill the following year 
and are the focus of the next section. 
 This first part of the chapter has highlighted that asylum was perceived as a threat by both 
Conservative and Labour governments. In the case of Labour, the threat was represented by the 
increased number of asylum applicants – while the government was still trying to clear the 
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 Amnesty International (AI), Immigration Centre about Asylum and Refugees (ICAR), Immigration 
Advisory Service (IAS), Immigration Law Practitioners’ Association (ILPA), Joint Council for the Welfare 
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 The UK has increased deportations’ numbers since 2000 that is when asylum became highly charged with 
political meaning. They justified “the deportation of failed asylum seekers” as “a necessary act to preserve 




backlog – thus burdening the state treasury and increasing the security risk. Both elements 
caused public concern and attracted criticism from the tabloid media. As a result, during their 
second term in government, the party’s proactive stance against asylum became particularly 
compelling as new tough measures were fulfilled through the publication of a new White Paper 
and consequently of a new bill that became the 2002 NIA Act. 
 
4.2 THE 2002 NATIONALITY, IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM ACT’S MAIN AREAS 
OF CONTENTION  
4.2.1 The ‘end-to-end system’: accommodation centres, termination of support, non-
suspensive appeals and detention 
Described by the then Minister of State for Immigration, Citizenship and Counter Terrorism, 
Beverley Hughes, as: “the most radical and far reaching reform of the United Kingdom’s 
immigration, asylum and nationality systems for many years” (Stevens 2004, 1), the 2002 NIA 
Act was first introduced on 12
th
 April 2002 in the House of Commons. The timetable was: 
House of Commons 
Introduction and first reading 12
th




 April 2002 – two weeks after First 
Reading as customary 
Standing Committee E From 30
th
 April to the 21
st
 May 2002 
Report Stage 11
th
 June 2002 
Report and Third Reading 12
th
 June 2002 
 
House of Lords 
First Reading 13
th
 June 2002 
Second Reading 24
th
 June  2002 
Committee Stage From 8
th
 July to 29
th
 July 2002 




 October 2002 
Re-commitment 17
th
 October 2002 
Report Stage 24
th
 October 2002 
Third Reading 31
st
 October 2002 
 
Royal Assent was given on 7
th
 November 2002. 
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 Many of the measures tackled and discussed during the making of the bill were originally 
introduced by the White Paper. The same objectives were confirmed and expanded by the bill 
whose main goal was that of establishing an effective ‘end-to-end system’ of induction, 
accommodation, detention and removal of people. This was supposed to happen through the 
establishment and trial of special centres aimed at speeding up the asylum process while 
tackling the real or perceived abuse of the asylum system through the end of the support system 
for some categories of asylum seekers. The parts of the bill
60
 that are analysed in depth in 
Chapter 6 are therefore linked to the above issues and in particular:  
 size and locations of accommodation centres 
 length of time asylum seekers should spend in these centres 
 education of asylum seeking children within the centres 
 support available for asylum seekers conditional on regular reporting while living in the 
accommodation centres 
 support of failed asylum seekers 
 detention 
 streamlining of the appeals’ system 
These topics relate to part 2 of the bill on accommodation centres; part 3 on support; part 4 on 
detention and removal; and finally part 5 on asylum appeals. These issues were highlighted by 
pro-asylum organisations as being particularly problematic. Here they provide the basis for 
analysing how the government confronted them in Parliament in order to make policy.  
 Regardless of the many criticisms and concerns these measures generated with regard to 
human rights, especially from NGOs, the topic that took up most of the time in parliamentary 
debates was the trialling of new “progressive” accommodation centres “in the sense that [they] 
would have speeded the process” (interview with Blunkett 61 ). However, they were not 
considered detention centres, as asylum seekers would “be able to come and go” (Home Office 
2002, 57) conditional on specific residential requirements such as reporting on a regular basis. 
This was deemed necessary to allow closer contact between asylum seekers and the relevant 
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authorities, reducing decision times, decreasing the chances of illegal working and financial and 
housing fraud, and reducing tension within the host communities. Accommodation in the 
centres would be available only to a small number of asylum seekers eligible for support and if 
they refused to go to the allocated centres, they would also lose any help from the government 
(Home Office 2002).  
 The centres were an old idea first presented by the Tories when in government but highly 
criticised by Labour at the time. This change of direction in Labour’s policy shows that the role 
of party politics is sensitive to the issue and to the time it takes place. Zincone (2006b, 2) talks 
about “electoral panic syndrome” according to which centre-left parties – who normally lean 
towards a more open approach on immigration issues - become more sensitive towards a public 
opinion usually averse to new waves of migrants. This behaviour may continue even after the 
elections “to comply with the electoral promises” (ibid, 15). As with the Italian case during the 
passage of the centre-left Turco-Napolitano law in 1998, the UK Labour party aligned itself 
with the Tories’ restrictive asylum policy-making because they were afraid to lose support 
among the voting public. Although the asylum policy-making style of the two countries is 
different, there was nevertheless a convergence of behaviour.  
 The establishment of the centres touched on several contentious issues, including full-board 
accommodation, health care, interpretation services and education facilities on site for children 
who were not allowed to go to mainstream schools
62
. This last feature was especially criticised 
by the organisations and by MPs across the political spectrum. The centres aroused strong 
disapproval at local and Parliamentary levels, especially within the Conservative party. Because 
the aim of the centres was part of the government’s continuing63 policy to alleviate the burden 
on services in London and the South East (with which most PMs and Lords agreed), they had to 
be big enough to host up to 750 people in remote rural areas in owned government sites. The 
two elements of size and location caught the attention of many and herein lay the controversy. 
The chosen rural areas happened to be in affluent middle class Conservative constituencies 
although during the interview, Blunkett said that “it wasn’t a deliberate plan to do it”. The 
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centres attracted the criticisms of local authorities, people living in those areas and the 
Conservative Party as it was thought that the situation was in fact affecting “only opposition 
members” since no building was “proposed in a Labour-held constituency” (Tony Baldry MP, 
2002, vol. 373, col. 733). On the other hand, the dispersal of some asylum seekers also took 
place in Labour areas, “in disadvantaged communities next to other disadvantaged people” 
(interview with Pearce) causing tensions among these communities too. The perception was that 
the Labour party did not want to alienate further their own voters in the already affected 
working class communities and chose instead wealthy Conservative communities without the 
risk of losing votes. The difficulty according to Nick Pearce, was that people coming from those 
communities were not given the opportunity to say whether they agreed with the dispersal 
system or if they “wanted dispersal” (interview) in their areas. This created “a contrast in the 
political voice available to different communities about this” (ibid), i.e. those from affluent 
middle class in rural areas and those from more disadvantaged working class areas, especially in 
the North of England and some parts of London. As a result, a strong opposition to the 
government’s plan was born through what has been coined as ‘NIMBY 64 ’ (Not In My 
Backyard) protests in the form of “locally organized campaigns opposing a locally unwanted 
land use, whether an industrial installation, human service facility or new housing
65” (Hubbard 
2005a, 54). In 2002 the Rushcliffe Borough Council, the Cherwell District Council, and the 
Wychavon District Council wrote a joint report
66
 against accommodation centres in the 
following three locations: Ministry of Defence land at Bicester in Oxfordshire, Newton’s former 
RAF site and Throckmorton, in Worcestershire. The case of the councils against 
accommodation centres in rural locations was on the grounds of practicality and planning 
issues. Some of these points concerned the large size of the centres, integration and education of 
asylum seekers but also local public concerns for crime, access to health services and 
employment just to name a few (ICAR 2002). The protests flagged up by the local residents 
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status of white spaces” (Hubbard 2005a, 52). 
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 The report was entitled Accommodation centres in rural locations: the case against. 
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prompted the government to call for an enquiry in Bicester, the first centre to be built. The 
strong opposition stretched out the planning process, affecting the start of work on site that 
slipped “by 14 months, and so raised costs67” (National Audit Office 2007a). In the end, due to 
recurring failures to find an appropriate site, the plan for building accommodation centres was 
eventually dropped by the government in 2005
68
. Furthermore, as Pearce said, the Treasury 
“was prepared to pay only for the pilot of four of them [centres] which was tiny compared to 
what David wanted” (interview). Eventually Tony Blair, who had initially sustained the idea of 
the centres, took his support away; after all he was mainly interested in stopping people 
claiming asylum and at the same time to remove them quickly as “he was less bothered about 
what happens during the duration of their claim” (interview with Pearce). This particular detail 
indicates that the real issue for the government was not so much the well-being of asylum 
seekers, rather, their removal from the country in accordance with public opinion and the need 
to win another general election. The accommodation centres project was finally scrapped in 
2007 essentially because of the high costs incurred, the falling numbers of asylum applicants 
and the improvement in processing asylum claims (BBC 2007; NAO 2007b).  
 The main asylum organisations, stakeholders in the decision process, did not agree with the 
government on various aspects concerning the centres, notably location, size and services. From 
a rather different perspective, they were concerned about the well-being of asylum seekers. 
They would not benefit from residing in those centres because of the distance from urban areas 
and their established communities making integration in the isolated rural areas very difficult. 
For example, the education of children within the centres and away from mainstream education 
was regarded as discriminatory
69
 and counterproductive for a successful integration, likely to 
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foment hostility, and isolation towards increasingly ostracised asylum seekers (Refugee Council 
2002c). 
 The second and by far the most controversial aspect for the NGOs, because of its highly 
detrimental impact on asylum seekers, was the decision to remove support in three cases. The 
first one concerned those asylum seekers who did not take up the government’s ‘offer’ to reside 
in an accommodation centre. The deal was that asylum seekers within the centres had to follow 
residence requirements, such as reporting on a regular basis. In case of non-compliance, i.e. if 
they left or breached the rules by, for example, not reporting on time, support would be 
discontinued. The second case affected people who did not apply for asylum ‘as soon as 
reasonably practicable’ upon arrival in the United Kingdom70 (also known as ‘Section 55: Late 
claim for asylum: refusal of support’). The third case related to asylum seekers who would not 
co-operate with the authorities, or would not give “a clear and coherent account of how they 
came to the UK” or “about their circumstances” (‘Section 57: Application for support: false or 
incomplete information’) (Refugee Council 2003, 1).   
But it was Section 55, which removed all benefit entitlements
71
 from in-country applicants, that 
was considered to be especially difficult. It was announced by the former Home Secretary only 
on 7
th
 October 2002 (Blunkett 2002) that is, less than a month before the bill was due to receive 
Royal Assent. Pearce admitted that Section 55 was “hammered out weeks before the Labour 
party conference
72
 and during it” (interview). This shows the pressure the party was under as 
they came up with last minute “blunt instrument[s]” (interview with Pearce) to deal with the 
perceived asylum crisis. The consequence of this late introduction was that, unlike the 
accommodation centres, it did not attract much debate. Furthermore, it was heavily criticised 
and condemned by refugee and human rights organisations that were warning of the dangers of 
destitution. Because asylum seekers were “not legitimate members of the community” and as 
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 On 17 December 2003 during the Second Reading of the Asylum and Immigration Bill, the Home 
Secretary announced that new arrivals would be expected to claim asylum within 72 hours (Amnesty 
International 2004a, 10).  
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 It has been evaluated that “almost 30 per cent of all asylum applications” in the first year “were referred 
for a decision to refuse support” (Refugee Action 2006, 25).  
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 The Conference happened between 29
th
 September and 4
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 October 2002; the bill received Royal Assent 
on 7
th
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such were perceived not to contribute to society, they were not “legitimate receivers of welfare 
state benefits” (Geddes 2003, 40). 
Because of its controversial nature, section 55 was challenged several times in court cases since 
its coming into force on 8
th
 January 2003. In May 2004 the English Court of Appeal ruled that 
the denial of protection was a denial of their human rights and in breach of Article 3 of the 
European Convention on Human Rights. The new procedure, effective from June 2004, held the 
National Asylum Support Service (NASS) responsible for support to all asylum seekers unless 
they had other ways of supporting themselves (Refugee Council 2002d; Save the Children n.d.). 
However, section 55 has not been in use since 2005 following a House of Lords ruling that 
“denying support in this way could breach the prohibition on inhuman and degrading treatment 
in the HRA” (Liberty 2010, 7). The question related to section 55 highlights the tension that 
existed between domestic policies and international agreements. Whereas domestic policies tend 
to protect national citizens, international conventions such as the European Convention of 
Human Rights (ECHR) have the duty to defend other subjects such as asylum seekers.  
 The third issue was that of appeals contained in Part 5
73
 of the bill. This topic was another 
last minute addition as it was announced together with the above support related provisions in 
October 2002. It introduced the concept of ‘clearly unfounded’74 applications if the country of 
origin was deemed to be safe with the subsequent removal to a safe-third country. Following 
from this, a ‘white list’ of ten safe countries that were about to join the European Union at the 
time
75
 was also presented. This provision had the consequent effect of denying in-country right 
of appeal, also known as non-suspensive appeals. Non-suspensive appeals could be applied to 
failed asylum seekers coming from any of the safe ten EU accession countries but could also be 
applied to any other asylum applicant (Refugee Council 2002c).   
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 Part 5 also dealt with the introduction of the Statutory Review process (a “paper-based examination made 
by a single judge in the High Court determining whether the law has been correctly applied” (Refugee 
Council n.d.) as an alternative to the Judicial Review for those who were refused the leave to appeal to the 
Immigration Appeal Tribunal (IAT). Judicial Review was condemned as it led “to layer upon layer of delay” 
(Blunkett, HC Deb 11 June 2002, vol. 387, col.797). 
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 Section 94. 
75
 The ten EU accession states were: the Republic of Cyprus, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, 
Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Poland, the Slovak Republic and Slovenia (RC 2002c). They were removed in 
2004. The current white list is made of: Albania, Bolivia, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Brazil, Ecuador, Gambia 
(men only), Ghana (men only), India, Jamaica, Kenya (men only), Liberia (men only), Macedonia, Mali 
(men only), Mauritius, Moldova, Mongolia, Montenegro, Malawi (men only), Nigeria (men only), Peru, 
Serbia, Kosovo, South Africa, Sierra Leone (men only), and Ukraine (Home Office 2011). 
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 The final aspect was that of detention, discussed in part 4 of the bill. Detention has always 
been (and still is) a contentious and sensitive issue, a “national scandal” (Refugee Council 1998) 
in particular with regard to families and children
76
. Although UK governments use detention to 
prevent “asylum seekers from absconding and disappearing into the community” (Bail for 
Immigration Detainees 2002, 3), the fact that they often detain someone “on an administrative 
decision without having committed a criminal offence” (Neil Gerrard MP77, HC Deb 14 May 
2002, vol. 384, col.253) sends out the message that asylum is a crime. Back in 2002 the 
numbers of asylum seekers detained “for arbitrary reasons and for indefinite periods without 
any external scrutiny” (Refugee Council 2002a, 14) was on the increase78. 
 In conclusion, the 2002 NIA Act worsened considerably the situation of asylum seekers. It 
introduced new harsher measures, tightened old ones, re-introduced procedures, such as the white 
list, that had been previously scrapped and even re-cycled old ideas like the establishment of 
accommodation centres which had been originally presented by the Conservative government 
years before and opposed by Labour. Compared to the previous three asylum Acts, the new law 
did not introduce any revolutionary ideas. Rather, it continued the trend of exclusion and 
stigmatization of the asylum seeking population which started in the mid-1990s.  
 
4.2.2 Continuity in the face of Labour party political strategies: race relations, welfare and 
crisis 
Despite the Labour government’s aim to create discontinuity with the Tories’ administrations, 
mainly in terms of highly skilled labour migration (Schuster and Solomos 2004; Somerville 
2007), the preceding section has highlighted that the 2002 NIA Act presented several 
similarities and continuities with the previous asylum Act produced by the Conservatives. This 
shows “a bi-partisan consensus on the ‘asylum problem’” (Bommes and Geddes 2002, 135). It 
has been observed in fact, that rather than a discontinuity between Tory and Labour’s asylum 
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 The current coalition government has promised to scrap the detention of children and so far the Home 
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Immigration Removal Centre in Scotland (Home Office 2010).  
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 Former MP for Walthamstow. 
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 The Home Office has produced detention statistics since 1995. However, there are no statistics showing 
the overall time spent in detention. Rather, they are produced in quarterly snapshots which do not give the 
full picture. An asylum seeker could in fact be detained for under three months thus not entering in the 
quarterly statistics (ICAR 2007). 
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policies, there has been continuation (Bloch 2000; Flynn 2003; Schuster and Solomos 2004; 
Bloch and Schuster 2005; Morris 2007). To start with, both Conservative and Labour 
administrations insisted on fair, fast and firm immigration controls allegedly to preserve good 
race relations (Bloch 2000, 39). The fact that Labour stressed the importance of good race 
relations while at the same time implementing restrictive asylum policies and using anti-asylum 
rhetoric was deceptive
79. The public’s concerns towards the asylum seeking population in fact 
increased over time rather than diminished. For example, it was argued by Schuster and Welch 
(2005) that widespread detention of asylum seekers indicated that they were criminal and, as 
such, dangerous to society (see also Bosworth 2008). In practice, politicians have reinforced the 
sense that this category of people is a threat to society – as specified in the first of the thesis’ 
hypotheses – and therefore its stability.  
 The second common aspect that indicates continuity was that the reduction of welfare 
support was believed to deter asylum migration (Bloch and Schuster 2005). Asylum seekers rely 
on the few welfare benefits available to them because they are not allowed to work
80
, de facto 
removing the warranty of obtaining social rights through their working status. Despite being 
labelled as a liberal welfare state (Esping-Andersen 1990), the UK’s policy towards asylum 
seekers’ welfare entitlements has been less than generous. Since 1996 both Conservative and 
Labour governments cut these entitlements, whereby benefits were “30% lower than standard 
benefits” (Casciani 2003). Besides, asylum seekers were not entitled to council housing81. For 
example, the 1996 Act removed “the entitlement of work permit holders to child benefit and a 
range of other non-work related benefits” (Sales 2002, 460) but benefits were also removed for 
in-country applicants and those who applied against a negative decisions (Still Human Still Here 
2009). The 1999 Act barred all non-EEA nationals with conditional leave to remain from non-
contributory benefits (Sales 2002) while support would be discontinued in certain cases, such as 
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 Sales (2002) for example, points out that the Race Relations (Amendment Act) 2000 extended the anti-
discrimination measures to the public sector. However, officials deciding on asylum case were excluded as 
they could determine an asylum claim based on the claimant’s country of origin. 
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 Asylum seekers are still not allowed to work at the time of writing unless they have been waiting for more 
than 12 months for an initial decision to be made by the Home Office. They are also not allowed to work if 
their asylum claim has been refused unless an asylum-based further submission has been outstanding for 
more than 12 months (UK Border Agency 2012). 
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 However, some people believe that “asylum seekers can ‘jump the queue’” because the National 
Asylum Support Service (NASS) buys available properties meaning that asylum seekers “may end up 
living on or near council estates” (Casciani 2003).  
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absence from the accommodation or misconduct leading to eviction (Still Human Still Here 
2009). The same Act aimed to prevent more asylum seekers entering the UK by enforcing a 
series of harsh measures such as the introduction of vouchers instead of cash, dispersal away 
from the south-east, detention and easier removals (1999 Act). The 2002 Act went even further 
by introducing section 55 that withdrew and refused all entitlements to applicants who did not 
apply ‘as soon as reasonably practicable’ while leaving them in extreme poverty in many cases.  
 The aim of the government to decrease the numbers of claims, is not reflected in the 
statistics reported in Figure 4.1 above. In 1999 there were 71,160 claims and in 2000 these went 
up to 80,315. Furthermore, the total grants also increased as they amounted to 21,420 in 1999 
and 32,195 in 2000. In conclusion, the harsher measures introduced in 1999 had no or little 
impact on the numbers of asylum applications. These were on the rise due to occurrences 
external to the UK’s perceived generous welfare system such as an escalation in conflicts or 
worsening of the political situation in different countries as table 4.1 below shows. The table 
also indicates a general decrease from 2003. This was due for example, to the end of the war in 
Yugoslavia and Iraq, the peace process in Sri Lanka and the imposition of visas on Zimbabwe 
(National Audit Office 2004; Spencer 2007). 
 
Table 4.1 Asylum applicants during the year – main origin 
Origin 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 
Iraq 1,800 7,475 6,705 14,570 4,020 1,888* 
Zimbabwe 230 1,010 2,115 7,655 3,290 2,500 
Afghanistan 3,975 5,555 9,000 7,205 2,280* 1,585* 
Somalia 7,495 5,020 6,465 6,540 5,090 3,295 
China 2,625 4,000 2,390 3,675 3,450 2,410 
Yugoslavia* 11,465 6,070 3,280 - - - 
Sri Lanka* 5,130 6,395 5,510 3,130 705 394 
Source: UNHCR 2002a; Migration Policy Institute n.d.* 
Notes: The data available for Yugoslavia for 2002, 2003 and 2004 is divided by country. In 2002, 2,265 people from 
Serbia and Montenegro applied for asylum and 310 were from Macedonia. In 2003, 815 were from Serbia and 
Montenegro, 62 from Macedonia, 14 from Croatia, and 34 from Bosnia and Herzegovina. In 2004, there were 386 
applicants from Serbia and Montenegro, 13 from Macedonia, 10 from Croatia and 26 from Bosnia and Herzegovina. 
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 This section of the chapter has stressed the perceived nature of asylum for UK 
governments. Despite the different origins, the focus of the Acts since 1993, but especially since 
1996, was to establish progressively more stringent provisions to deal with asylum in the hope 
of discouraging people from coming into the country. The threat of asylum had to be kept at bay 
by reinforcing national sovereignty (Gibney 2004). Therefore, the emphasis was on external 
border control to restrict the entry of asylum seekers and, once in the country, to limit their 
access to welfare allegedly in order to maintain good race relations (Bloch 2000; Bommes and 
Geddes 2002; Spencer 2007), but also security (Boswell 2007; Chakrabarti 2005; Huysmans 
2006; Somerville 2007).  
 The final section discusses why the Labour government needed to present a further bill on 
asylum and immigration in 2002 only after three years the last one was passed. Thus, it takes 
into consideration the background to the new legislation, the pressure of the media and the 
weight of public opinion on policy makers’ decisions. This part also considers the governing 
mode of the UK government. This is in relation to the third hypothesis that considers the shift 
from ‘government’ to ‘governance’. The strength of the core executive in taking decisions 
proved that at least in terms of asylum, the government was not at all hollowed-out. Rather, it 
was very much in control according to the ‘Westminster model’ notion and despite pressures 
from civil society and the international community. Finally, the chapter reflects on the fact that 
notwithstanding the increasing illiberal stance and rhetoric against asylum seekers, the British 
liberal state still accepts migrants because it is caught between a duty to protect its national 
boundaries and to give protection according to international conventions. 
 
4.3 DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS. ROLE OF THE MEDIA AND THE 
‘WESTMINISTER MODEL’  
This section explains first why the government felt the need to introduce new asylum legislation 
only three years after the last one was passed and second how the treatment of asylum reflects 
the governing style of the British state. 
 The 2002 NIA Act was the fourth piece of legislation affecting the United Kingdom’s 
asylum system since 1993 and the second since Labour was elected in 1997. Since 2002 there 
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have been a further five
82
 other major pieces of legislation regulating asylum and/or 
immigration. One has to wonder why so many in such a short time. Was it a response to 
negative feedback from public opinion or from the tabloid media? Was it EU pressure? Or 
perhaps was it an attempt by the government to reassert its power as nation-state? 
 Between 1999 and 2002 asylum reached its peak as a controversial political issue. A series 
of events caused the debate on asylum to be prominent to the point that every day sensational 
headlines would appear on the Daily Mail, The Daily Express and the ‘late’ News of the World, 
thundering about invasions, growth of crime rate, HIV and terrorism (Crisp 2003; Schuster and 
Solomos 2004). There were three main episodes that were picked up by the media as being 
particularly controversial for the UK government and its inability to control migration. Firstly, 
in June 2000 the discovery of the bodies of 58 Chinese people in a refrigerated lorry in Dover 
(BBC 2000) fuelled the debate on irregular migration showing that border control and irregular 
migration were irremediably linked (Gibney 2000). Nation states want border controls for 
security reasons (especially after 9/11) as well as to protect their welfare. For asylum seekers in 
particular, border gates were becoming increasingly difficult to open. Secondly, in May 2001 
and later on in the summer, racially motivated riots
83
 arose violently in areas around Manchester 
between British Asians and white British gangs of young people. This started a political quarrel 
as Liberal Democrat Simon Hughes blamed William Hague, leader of the Conservatives, for his 
anti-asylum comments (Ward and Watt 2001). Racial problems in the area, however, were not 
new. On the other hand, they escalated as BNP candidates presented themselves in the run-up to 
the general election in Oldham near Manchester (Ward 2001). Finally, there was the issue of the 
Sangatte centre in Northern France. Both Pearce and Blunkett emphasized during their 
interviews that there were images on “British television screens very regularly at that time” 
(interview with Pearce) of “people hanging on the trains, jumping out of lorries” (interview with 
Blunkett) “coming across in the ferries in the Eurotunnel” (interview with Pearce). The UK was 
under a double pressure to solve the problem: from the media and from France, although this 
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pressure was perhaps reciprocal as the UK wanted the Sangatte camp closed as soon as possible. 
As a result, David Blunkett and his French counterpart, the then Minister of Interior Nicolas 
Sarkozy, held a few official rendez-vous on the situation of the Sangatte refugee camp. 
According to Blunkett the UK “was seen as an attractive proposition” (interview) for two main 
reasons. On one side, its “benign economy, low unemployment, low inflation, low interest 
[rates]” meant that the UK “was seen [by irregular migrants] as an alternative route to legal 
open migration through the work permit system” (ibid). On the other hand, there were “the 
conflicts that were driving genuine asylum Iraq, Afghanistan, conflicts in Africa” (ibid). These 
elements acted as a ‘pull-factor’ for those migrants trying to enter the Channel tunnel illegally in 
order to make their way into the UK (BBC 2001a; Flynn 2003; Schuster and Solomos 2004). 
The “qui-pro-quo” was for the French to close Sangatte and for the British “to take 900 of the 
inmates” (interview with Blunkett). Besides, the Home Office on 23rd July 2002 announced the 
abolition of the permission to work for asylum seekers
84
. This was done despite the Refugee 
Council’s statement that previous Home Office research had highlighted the modest knowledge 
asylum seekers’ had of UK asylum and immigration policy (Refugee Council 2002a, 8; Refugee 
Council 2005). The abolition of the permission to work was not contained in the Act itself but 
the Sangatte saga had an impact on other restrictive reforms brought in by the law, such as 
juxtaposed controls
85
, the refusal for support
86
, and the introduction of a white list of safe 
countries
87
.The former Home Secretary said he could not ignore these episodes and especially 
could not risk losing the support of the party’s voters. So the government set out to form new 
law. Therefore, the bill was also partially a stand against the media’s attacks on the government 
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 Section 141: EEA ports: juxtaposed controls: “This section provides for a power that would allow the UK 
to operate immigration and other frontier controls at an EEA ferry port (such as Calais), for the purposes of 
giving effect to an international agreement. In addition, it would allow the Secretary of State to make any 
necessary legislative arrangements to accommodate French immigration control in UK ports (such as 
Dover)” (NIA Act explanatory notes 2002c). 
86
 Section 55: Late claim for asylum: refusal of support: Restricts “access to support provided to asylum 
seekers …  in cases where the Secretary of State is not satisfied that a person has made his asylum 
application as soon as reasonably practicable after his arrival in the United Kingdom. Section 55 is intended 
to put the burden of proof on the asylum seeker claiming support” (ibid). 
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 Section 94: Appeal from within the United Kingdom: unfounded human rights or asylum claim: 
“Subsection (3) provides that if the asylum or human rights claimant is entitled to reside in any of the States 
listed in subsection (4) then the claim shall be certified unless the Secretary of State is satisfied that it is not 
clearly unfounded. The States listed are all "EU accession states": Cyprus, the Czech Republic, Estonia, 
Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Poland, the Slovak Republic and Slovenia” (ibid). 
98 
 
about its inability to control immigration satisfactorily and served as Blunkett said, to give “a 
signal to people throughout the world that the United Kingdom is not a soft touch” (White Paper 
2002). It was essentially a way to uphold the nation’s power and control over its borders. Yet, 
the outcome was not what Labour had hoped for, as the anti-migration speeches used by the 
media but also by the same policy-makers
88
 served to increase public concerns about asylum, 
thus playing to the British National Party’s (BNP) agenda. 
 
4.3.1 The role of the media in shaping public opinion and policy 
Considering that “[i]n 2002 … there were sixty odd front pages … nearly 25%” covering 
asylum news (interview with Home Office official 1), it would be safe to affirm that the media 
or better “the Daily Mail” (interview with Shaw89), had a huge impact on the decisions of a 
government that was “scared of the reaction of the media if they were not seen to be tough” 
(interview with Gerrard MP
90) on asylum policy. Ministers aspired to have public support “and 
one of the loudest voices is obviously the media” (interview with Home Office official 1). 
However, the relationship between the government and the mass media is a “subtle” one 
(interview with Flynn
91
) and it serves the purposes of either part according to times and topics. 
In practice, when it is more advantageous to the government, “they'll make use of reactionary 
newspaper headlines” but when it is not, “they're well capable of arguing against it” (ibid). After 
all, “if the Daily Mail … had any consistent influence on political thinking of a population then 
we would never have had a Labour government” (ibid). So the belief that the government is 
powerless when confronted with the media and that the media dictates the nature of the debate is 
wrong. Besides, politicians “come with their own political manifestos too” (interview with 
Best
92
) just like the media and, as influential as they can be, they normally tend to reproduce 
public opinion’s views. As such, “they are telling people what they want to hear and … people 
who buy the Daily Mail would probably be inclined to think that anyway” (interview with Dr 
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Metcalfe). The government in reality was “largely responsible” for the increased public fear of 
migration (interview with Best). In fact, Labour‘s negative rhetoric on the conceptualisation of 
the ‘bogus’ asylum seeker, and on reducing the numbers of asylum claims while talking 
positively about labour migration instead of strengthening belief in the public in the asylum 
system had the opposite effect (Refugee Council 2002b). The government wanted “to reassure 
the public that they were dealing effectively with the asylum issue” but instead “they reinforced 
the public sense that this was a major problem” and “of course the public could not tell the 
difference” (interview with Spencer93). On the other hand, media attention to the matter could 
also be looked at from the perspective of performance or, better, lack of performance “against 
objectives, against promises” (interview with Professor Saggar 94 ). In fact, the Labour 
government inherited a huge backlog of asylum cases and “the underlying problem in the Home 
Office was that the management of those processes was at best weak and at worst non-existent” 
(ibid). So ministers would be more interested in delivering those promises, for example by 
responding to the objectives of clearing backlogs, rather than taking a particular position. In this 
way, asylum becomes equivalent to “school attainment, hospital waiting lists … Ministers see it 
very much in those terms” (ibid). Nevertheless, this information will eventually and inevitably 
appear in the tabloid media, thus reinforcing rather than just influencing people’s views on the 
matter.  
 In May 2002 Tony Blair promised to take things into his own hands
95
 and in February 2003 
he pledged to halve the number of asylum applications by September of the same year
96
 (BBC 
2003; Johnston 2002). Considering the promise made by the former Prime Minister, perhaps it 
is not a coincidence that in the same month of February 2003 the MORI Social Research 
Institute published research on behalf of Migration Watch UK on the public’s view of 
immigration. The findings showed that British people widely supported tougher measures on 
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asylum seekers and immigrants, while seven out of ten people believed that Britain was a ‘soft 
touch’. Hence, the government had little credibility as on this evidence 85% of people did not 
believe that immigration was under control. However, the MORI research concluded that 
although media coverage may be responsible for the public’s “general anxiety” (Ipsos MORI 
2003) and that the public lacked “direct local experience” on the issue, it was also true that they 
could not tell whether newspapers had indeed influenced the people’s views because 
[r]eaders of newspapers most outspoken on this issue tend to be themselves most 
critical, but of course, that in itself does not tell us whether they read those titles 
because they reflect their views on asylum/migration, or that their views have been 
influenced by their newspaper of choice (Ipsos Mori 2003). 
 
Furthermore, a public opinion poll published in June 2002 showed British people’s knowledge 
of asylum seekers and refugees as well as their perception of the media coverage on the issue. 
Respondents overestimated significantly the numbers of asylum seekers in the UK believing 
that 23% of the world’s asylum seekers were in the country while in reality at the time the real 
number amounted to only 1.98%
97
. Some 85% of respondents associated negative terms in the 
media such as the infamous expressions ‘bogus’ and ‘illegal immigrant’, with asylum seekers 
(Ipsos MORI 2002).  
 Although normally the public buy a newspaper according to their political views and/or 
purely for “entertainment” reasons (interview with Flynn), arguably the subject of asylum 
seekers is a double-edged weapon. The assumption is that although policy-makers may be 
blamed for the constant ‘feeding’ of negative rhetoric for the sake of appealing to the public and 
thus retaining votes, it is also true that they were caught between two powerful poles. They were 
responding to a media that were not only displaying their opinions, but they were also looking 
for sensationalist news. In this way, they constructed media myths which contained dangerous 
factual inaccuracies and “prevailing images” (Cohen 1994, 89) of asylum seekers, so that the 
public who read these tabloids were presented with only a partial and often biased picture.  
 It is undeniable that the government took full charge and responsibility to tackle even if 
opportunistically, the concerns of the media and the public thus emphasizing “a top-down view 
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of democracy based on the idea that the ‘government knows best’ (Marsh, Richards and Smith 
2003, 308) following the British political tradition of the ‘Westminster model’. 
 
4.3.2 The ‘Westminster model’ 
Commentators have argued that Labour’s pragmatic approach to policy-making caused an 
increasing shift from ‘government’ to ‘governance’ (Rhodes 1994; Richards and Smith 2002), 
that is, the government of civil society with “the state there being minimal” (Badie and 
Birnbaurn 1983, 121). The third hypothesis of this thesis emphasises just this while the research 
questions point to the role of networks in order to understand whether this shift did in effect 
happen also in the case of asylum policy.  
 Rhodes (1997, 2007) calls the growing presence of non-political actors who have an 
interest at stake the ‘Differentiated Polity’. As such, they compete with the government making 
the British political system fragmented and pluralistic. For example, in March 1999 the White 
Paper entitled Modernising Government was published and the words ‘reform’ and ‘renewal’ 
were two key words used to improve policies through the development of  
new relationships between Whitehall, the devolved administrations, local government 
and the voluntary and private sectors; consulting outside experts, those who 
implement policy and those affected by it early in the policy making process so we 
can develop policies that are deliverable from the start (Cabinet Office 1999, 16). 
 
 The involvement of stakeholders outside the government has allegedly become the norm 
rather than the exception. In his re-interpretation of the so called ‘Westminster model’ (Gamble 
1990) – characterized by a strong core executive, unity and parliamentary sovereignty – Rhodes 
(1997, 2007) emphasizes that the devolution of powers has caused Westminster to be replaced 
by a multitude of policy networks perceived as “empirical manifestation of governance” 
(Tomlinson 2010, 1045). In this ‘Differentiated Polity’, British policy-making is characterized 
by “functional and institutional specialisation and the fragmentation of policies and politics” 
(Rhodes 1997, 7). Accordingly, the state is no longer the “inflexible and monolithic” (Marsh, 
Richards and Smith 2003, 306; see also Smith 1999) entity but it has become disjointed into a 
disharmonious whole of separate bodies each of which specializes in different policy areas. Such 
an idea challenges the ‘Westminster model’ because it replaces ‘government’ with ‘governance’ 
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where networks, with their informal authority, are the new form of government. Policy networks 
hollow-out the state hence creating the “disUnited Kingdom” (Rhodes 2007, 1249). Undeniably, 
government of the UK has endured many changes. These are the increasing privatisation of 
previously state run services, a new layer of government that is the European Union and the 
consequent appearance of transnational policy networks, the transformation of government 
departments, the strengthening of local government, and finally, “a growing trend towards multi-
organisational forms of policy implementation” (Gray 2000, 284; Rhodes 1994). Furthermore, 
referenda on devolution in Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland in the 1990s were successful to 
the point that the UK conveyed varying levels of power to the national Parliament in Scotland, 
the national Assembly in Wales and the national Assembly in Northern Ireland (UK Parliament 
n.d.b). Rhodes (1994) has argued that these changes have made the British nation-state a ‘hollow 
state’ and whose central administration functions have been eroded. New actors have emerged 
and because of this, ‘governance’ has substituted the old notion of government. Even asylum 
support services were devolved “to the nine English regions and the devolved administrations of 
Scotland and Wales, bringing in local governance to a greater degree” (Somerville 2007, 77). 
This move was followed by the creation of the New Asylum Model
98
 (NAM) supplemented by 
‘juxtaposed controls’ in Paris and Calais as well as increased border controls (ibid). On the other 
hand, while there has been “extensive devolution …to the three peripheral nations … England 
remains under central control” (Keating 2009, 4) so that “power is both transferred and retained” 
but Westminster remains sovereign (ibid, 15) with a “relatively free hand in determining the 
direction of reform” (Taylor-Gooby and Larsen 2004, 55). This central control is certainly the 
case with asylum policies and even more so in the case of the 2002 NIA Act under analysis. 
With regard to the European Union, the “European policy-making frameworks were quite 
largely immaterial” (interview with Pearce) as the UK could opt-in or opt-out 99  from EU 
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 The New Asylum Model’s aim was “to introduce a faster, more tightly managed asylum process with 
an emphasis on rapid integration or removal. The Home Office began implementing the NAM in May 
2005” (Refugee Council 2007, 1).  
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 The UK has opted-out from the Common European Asylum System established during the Tampere 
summit in 1999  and from the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU). 
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directives according to their needs
100
. Although Brussels pushes member states to cooperate on 
the harmonisation of asylum policy “most European states were engaged in a sort of competitive 
race to the bottom, they essentially pursued their national strategies whilst signing up ... 
coordination was risible” (ibid). Besides, the relationship between the Home Office and the EU 
has always been ambivalent with the former “concerned with limiting EU competence, 
maintaining sovereignty and protecting national interests” (Marsh, Richards and Smith 2003, 
230).  
 The control displayed by the government was also a feature visible vis-à-vis the pro-asylum 
advocacy groups. Despite the accessibility of the government to hold meetings, the influence of 
these groups was minimal as showed in Chapter 6. Further, within the core executive, the Policy 
Unit (PU) became gradually more proactive (Holliday 2000) in the creation of domestic 
policies. As such, two more divisions were created: the Prime Minister’s Strategy Unit (PMSU) 
– “the Prime Minister private think tank” (interview with Professor Saggar) – and the Prime 
Minister’s Delivery Unit (PMDU). The former was an élite group within the Cabinet Office, 
created by Tony Blair in 2002 “to look ahead at the way policy would develop” (Blair 2010, 
339). It had three key roles:  
1) “to carry out strategy reviews and provide policy advice in accordance with the Prime 
Minister's policy priorities  
2) to support government departments in developing effective strategies and policies - 
including helping them to build their strategic capability  
3) to identify and effectively disseminate thinking on emerging issues and challenges for 
the UK Government e.g. through occasional strategic audits” (Cabinet Office 2007).  
The Unit would cooperate with other departments within the government but also external 
stakeholders “on a broad range of domestic policy, published through a range of outputs 
                                                     
100
 With the Treaty of Tampere in 2004 things have slightly changed as the Quality Majority Voting (QMV) 
removes national vetoes on asylum and immigration issues (Fitchew 2008). However, in 2010 the Home 
Office decided to opt-out from the revised Procedures and Qualification Directives of the Common 
European Asylum System (CEAS) setting minimum standards for the treatment of asylum claims. This 
directive would undermine the fast-track process set up by the UK but also the definition of ‘safe third 
country’ and ‘safe country of origin’ and would limit the States’ authority to decide on "manifestly 
unfounded" cases (Travis 2010; Refugee Council 2010). 
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including Green and White Papers” (ibid). The PMDU was established by Michael Barber in 
2001 “to ensure the delivery of the Prime Minister's top public service priority outcomes101 by 
2005” (Cabinet Office 2005). It was  
a relatively small organisation, staffed by civil servants but also outsiders …and other 
private sector companies, whose job was to track the delivery of key government 
priorities. It would focus like a laser on an issue, draw up a plan to resolve it working 
with the department concerned, and then performance-manage it to solutions. It 
would get first-class data which it would use for stocktakes that I took personally 
with the minister, their key staff and mine, every month or so. The unit would present 
a progress report and any necessary action would be authorised. We reduced 
drastically the number of unfounded asylum cases that way (Blair 2010, 338-339).  
 
 One of the government’s key priorities at the time was asylum. Weekly submissions to 
Blair on the course of the bill in Parliament were the norm, while stocktakes happened monthly 
or even fortnightly. The stocktakes became the way in which the Prime Minister “would get all 
these actors … from the central government” to “look at the issue they were facing [in] the 
immigration system and would try and solve them” (interview with Home Office Official 2). 
Allegedly, this is how section 55 and the white list came to be. A relatively small group of 
people united to face concerns over in-country applicants (that would apply in-country just to be 
able to claim benefits) and the influx of Eastern Europeans. 
 In conclusion, when it comes to asylum the idea that the core of the government is 
fragmented cannot be endorsed. Politicians would govern “in a relatively autonomous way” 
(Statham and Geddes, 2006, 266) thus making asylum policy definitely top-down as well as 
“closed and elitist” (Marsh, Richards and Smith 2003, 313). 
 The question at this point is why, despite the negative rhetoric from the part of the 
government and the increasing illiberal stance against asylum seekers displayed through stricter 
policies, the British nation-state continued to accept ‘unwanted’ immigration. The conclusions 
gather the main points discussed so far in this chapter and close with the idea that the British 
nation-state is constrained by its dual nature of nation and it is caught between its domestic duty 
to protect its boundaries and citizens and the moral obligation to help those who need it 
(Benhabib 2004).  
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The chapter has highlighted the UK long tradition of immigration and laws regulating 
immigration. Asylum policy is younger but quickly developed into a hot political issue. The 
chapter has addressed the research questions set out in the introduction and that relate to the 
first, second and, partially, the third hypotheses. The last is fully confronted in Chapter 6 that 
analyses the policy process that led to the formation of the 2002 NIA Act. 
 The first hypothesis sees asylum as a difficult issue for states because it is perceived as 
a threat. The literature review has highlighted Esping-Andersen’s (1990) typology of welfare 
states. In this typology the UK was regarded as generally ‘liberal’. It may be that this is the case 
in other areas of policy making. However, contrary to the typology the thesis has not found the 
UK to be liberal with respect to asylum, reflected in increasing restrictions on welfare 
entitlements for asylum seekers and refugees. This was because the debate on asylum had 
reached new heights of controversy between 1999 and 2001 and the government needed to 
demonstrate control. Claimant numbers had been exceptionally high and the media started to 
blame the government for its inability to control the phenomenon. At the same time, the tabloids 
were also feeding and stimulating public opinion’s fear of asylum seekers, seen as 
‘undeserving’, ‘bogus’ and ‘scavengers’. Asylum seekers were perceived as a threat to security, 
sovereignty and race relations, a burden to hide and remove quickly by the media, the public 
and consequently by governments. Labour felt the pressure and used the media’s accusations, 
possibly to its advantage. How did the government counter this pressure? The response of the 
party was to prove to the public and the media that they could take charge of the situation by 
further tightening the UK’s territorial sovereignty through visa restrictions, extensive external 
border control and destitution. The 2002 NIA Act therefore shows an increasingly stricter stance 
towards asylum seeker in the effort to discourage people from coming in the first place. It 
continued the Tories’ asylum policy, especially in terms of restricting welfare benefits and, at 
the same time, increasing detention as well as fast-tracking removals. The Act illustrates that 
successive governments have been concerned about the redistribution of resources and their 
policies have come to mirror this new progressively authoritarian position. On the other hand, 
labour migration was perceived differently from asylum. In this case, there was a shift from the 
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Tories’ way of thinking on labour migration. Whereas the Tories tolerated this type of 
migration, Labour ‘management’ of migration was endorsed. Highly-skilled migrants useful to 
the economy were now welcomed while low-skilled migration was limited and asylum seekers 
deterred. This new pro-skilled migrant rhetoric served two purposes: on one side, to respond to 
the economic needs of the country and on the other, to take distances from the uncomfortable 
asylum debate while exalting the value of highly-skilled migrants.  
 The 2002 NIA Act caused much debate within NGOs and with a portion of the public 
concerned with the government’s plan to have accommodation centres in their wealthy rural 
areas. However, other more pressing changes were those related to section 55 that would further 
threaten the welfare of in-country claimants, the re-introduction of the white list and an 
increased use of detention.  
 The advocacy groups were consulted but their influence was minimal. They did not initiate 
networks specifically for the bill but intensified their contacts with each other and the policy-
makers. The core executive was strong and united, thus reinforcing the idea of the ‘Westminster 
model’. The Act was in fact created by a small group of people in obedience to the Prime 
Minister’s will to tackle what was perceived as a crisis and a threat. In conclusion, the British 
state showed in those years great determination to control and govern asylum quite successfully. 
This indicates that the core of the government was far from being ‘hollowed-out’ (Rhodes 1994, 
1996; Gray 2000).  
 This section is in line with the research questions that aim to answer how different kinds of 
states respond to asylum but also to hypothesis 3 that deals with the shift from ‘government’ to 
‘governance’. 
 These last aspects, concerning the role, influence and power of networks at NGO and 
government level are the focus of Chapter 6. Its aim is to analyse the policy process that lead to 
the creation of the 2002 NIA Act while answering the research questions stemmed from the 
hypotheses related to governance and power. 






HISTORICAL AND CONTEXTUAL BACKGROUND IN ITALY 
As with Chapter 4, this part of the thesis provides the historical and political background prior 
to the making of law 189/2002 – the so-called ‘Bossi-Fini’. This section examines the 
development of immigration policies preceding the Bossi-Fini, the unsuccessful efforts of civil 
society to create asylum policy and the politics involved in these events. The aim of this 
analysis is to provide a better understanding of the country’s attitude towards asylum and labour 
migration. The chapter focuses on the research questions associated with hypotheses 1, 2, and 4. 
Firstly, why the government in 2002 perceived asylum differently from illegal labour migration, 
and why – nevertheless – both asylum and illegal labour migration represented a threat. 
Secondly, how the Italian state responded to this threat. Finally, it establishes the role of policy 
networks and their relationship with the government. 
 The first part of the chapter explains why asylum was not a priority for the country
102
, 
compared with labour migration and especially illegal migration. This explanation is important 
because it allows comparison with the UK where asylum, perceived as a threat, represented a 
very important political issue. As a result, the two nation states responded to asylum differently. 
This section investigates also the Italian Constitution which contains an article on the right to 
sanctuary in Italy. However, this article has never been ratified in law and its application goes 
back to one single occasion.  
 The second part contains an excursus of the legislations from 1986 until 2002. Earlier 
policies, preceding the Bossi-Fini, dated only from the end of the 1980s and the beginning of 
the 1990s and regulated mainly labour migration. This regulation was due to the widespread 
black economy and the rise of violence and robberies, especially in northern richer regions of 
the country, mainly linked to illegal migrants from Albania (Rusconi 2010).  
 The third section of the chapter looks at the origins and main aspects of the Bossi-Fini and 
the controversies raised by advocacy groups. This is in view of the analysis of the formulation 
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 Until the ratification of the EU Directives into Italian legislation. 
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of the legislation contained in Chapter 7 that deals with the role, influence, and power relations 
of policy networks and the government as per hypotheses three and four. 
 The final section of the chapter considers party politics involved in the legislations until 
2002 – and especially the Bossi-Fini. The weight of political parties in setting the agendas, the 
continuity of their policies whether it is a centre-right or centre-left government, the gap 
between their rhetoric and policy outcomes and the inclusion of other actors are central to the 
thesis aims.  
 
5.1 HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENTS IN LEGISLATION 
5.1.1 Asylum as an issue  
To date, Italy is the only Western European country that does not have substantive asylum 
legislation. Successive Italian governments failed or were not interested in creating specific 
asylum legislation because it was not a priority. Rather, governments preferred to incorporate into 
Italian legislation the six European Directives
103
 on asylum. They thought the Directives were 
enough, given the Italian circumstances and the asylum situation. There are several possible 
explanations as to why asylum was not a priority for the Italian state:  
1) The arrival of asylum seekers is recent history. Italy became a country of asylum only in 
1989. Christopher Hein (2010) – Director of the Italian Refugee Council (CIR) –  explains that 
before this date, most refugees would not stay in the country to live permanently but only for 
the time necessary to deal with their resettlement in a third country. This trend started after 
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 Council Directive 2001/55/EC of 20 July 2001 on Minimum Standards for Giving Temporary 
Protection in the Event of a Mass Influx of Displaced Persons and on Measures Promoting a Balance of 
Efforts Between Member States in Receiving such Persons and Bearing the Consequences There of 
implemented with legislative decree 7
 
April 2003, n. 85 (85/2003);  
Council Directive 2003/9/EC of 27 January 2003 Laying Down Minimum Standards for the Reception of 
Asylum Seekers in Member States implemented with legislative decree 30
th
 May 2005, n.140 (140/2005); 
Council Directive 2003/86/EC of 22 September 2003 on the Right to Family Reunification implemented 
with legislative decree 8 January 2007, n. 5 (5/2007);  
Council Directive 2003/109/EC of 25 November 2003 Concerning the Status of Third-Country Nationals 
Who are Long-Term Residents implemented with legislative decree 8
 
January 2007, n. 3 (3/2007);   
Council Directive 2004/83/EC (so called Qualification Directive) of 29 April 2004 on Minimum 
Standards for the Qualification and Status of Third Country Nationals or Stateless Persons as Refugees or 
as Persons Who Otherwise Need International Protection and the Content of the Protection Granted 
implemented with legislative decree 19 November 2007, n. 251 (251/2007);  
Council Directive 2005/85/EC of 1 December 2005 (so called Procedure Directive) on Minimum 
Standards on Procedures in Member States for Granting and Withdrawing Refugee Status implemented 
with legislative decree 28 January 2008, n. 25 (25/2008). 
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World War II when over 100,000 refugees arrived in Italy but were resettled in more traditional 
immigration countries such as Australia, Canada, New Zealand, and the United States. 
Estimates say that about 220,000 refugees were resettled from the end of the war until the fall of 
the Berlin Wall. The motivation behind the resettlement was that Italy was not deemed able to 
look after these people in the long term for economic, political and social reasons (Hein 2010). 
This resettlement program ended with the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989, a time when the EU 
considered Italy politically mature and rich enough to cater for the new refugees (ibid). As such, 
ad hoc provisions regulated asylum. However, the situation was about to change. In the 1990s 
the country was unprepared to deal with the influx of people from former Yugoslavia, 
Somalia
104
, and Albania, followed by Kurds and Kosovans in the late 90s (Vincenzi 2000) and 
later Eritreans, Iraqis
105
, Kurds, and Turks (Sigona 2005a) (See table 5.1 below for a breakdown 
of countries of origin). Consequently, there was a surge of asylum claims especially between 
1998 and 1999 as table 5.1 below illustrates (Colombo and Sciortino 2004; Hatton 2009; 
UNHCR 2012). Despite the increased relevance of the issue however, asylum did not figure as a 
high priority given the still low numbers of asylum claims. Regardless of the pressures at both 
supranational (by other European member states and international NGOs) and national level (by 
pro-migrant groups), governments of different political inclinations never really deemed it 
necessary to have specific asylum legislation. Even when centre-left coalitions were in power 
(historically, they are usually more inclined towards the needs of migrants than centre-right 
coalitions), they failed to legislate for two main reasons: lack of agreement between the parties 
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 Although because of the colonial ties, the first movements from Somalia date back to the 1960s. These 
movements intensified in the 1980s and especially after 1991 when the state collapsed (Mezzetti and 
Guglielmo 2009).  
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 There were 3,362 asylum applicants in 1998 compared to the previous year when only 336 people lodged 
an asylum claim (UNHCR 2002b, 345). 
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Table 5.1 Asylum applicants during the year – main origin 
Origins 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 
Serbia and 
Montenegro 
52 15 21 4,557 4,851 2,417 1,526 1,769 1,510 1,991 1,704 
Eritrea - - - - 13 33 276 927 1,230 831 1,313 
Somalia* 18 - 8 27 11 69 145 601 1,743 - - 
Turkey 71 17 85 1,790 517 4,062 1,690 519 - - - 
Iraq 181 151 336 3,362 1,838 6,082 1,985 1,170 - - - 
Sources: UNHCR 2005 and for Somalia UNHCR 2003. This latest data for Somalia raises doubts in terms of its 




Source: UNHCR 2012 
 
Notes: 
(1) The applications, initial decisions, and grants exclude dependants. 
(2) The total grants include applicants recognised as refugees and granted asylum and applicants not recognised as 
refugees but granted exceptional leave, humanitarian protection, or discretionary leave. 
 
2) Italy prioritised labour migration over asylum for two reasons. Firstly, because of the 
“sizeable structural economic demand for foreign labour” (Sciortino 2009, 3) compared to other 











Asylum applications, total initial decisions and 






of the Italian economy due to labour and skill shortages (Menz 2008) in the first three sectors
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of economy. Secondly, because of the low numbers of asylum claims. This is for three main 
reasons:  
(i) overall, governments prefer to give humanitarian and subsidiary protection
107
 as 
established by the EU Directives rather than refugee status;  
(ii) through amnesties people “can regularise their situation rather than apply for refugee 
status” (Hall, 2000);  
(iii) migrants used Italy as a way to reach other asylum destinations, most notably Germany, 
Switzerland, France and the UK (ibid). 
3) Immigration is still a ‘recent’ phenomenon. A “high level” (FIDH, 2007, 4) emigration 
country for more than a century, Italy became an immigration country only in the late 1970s
108
 
and net immigration increased rapidly in the 1980s and 1990s. Commonly, studies of migration 
flows associate the 1973 oil crisis as the official marker of modern migrant movements. 
Between 1973 and 1984 France, Switzerland, and Germany took steps to reduce further labour 
immigration. Part of these movements were diverted towards Italy and other Southern European 
countries as a backup choice or as a transit stop en route to their intended original destination
109
. 
Legal migration to Italy, however, grew before the oil crisis and the closure of the borders of the 
other EU countries (between 1970 and 1974) while during the oil crisis, legal migration stayed 
stable. It was only with the first amnesty, established by law 943/86 that “the first appreciable 
increase in the number of legal immigrants actually occurs” (Colombo and Sciortino 2004, 54). 
Further amnesties continued this trend, as the number of residence permits intensified. 
Colombo’s and Sciortino’s (2004) conclusion is that illegal immigration increased due to the 
amnesties; 
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 Primary sector: agriculture, farming, fishing and mining; secondary sector: industry, building industry 
and artisanship; tertiary sector: ‘services’ (i.e. complementary services to the primary and secondary sector), 
finance and tourism. 
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 Even before the EU Directives however, work permits on humanitarian grounds were given to “many 
refugees, particularly from Somalia and the former Yugoslavia” (Hall 2000). This relieved “them of the 
need to apply for asylum” (ibid). 
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 Even the concept of migratory flows did not exist until recently with the result that data was incomplete 
or missing (Bernard 2007). 
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 Immigration in Italy started well before 1973: between 1861 and the First World War, Italy’s liberal 
migration policies would allow refugees
109
 and economic migrants
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4) Finally, the right to asylum is enshrined in Article 10 of the Italian Constitution. 
However, a Parliamentary law has never enforced
110
 this article and it has been used in only one 
instance
111
. Article 10 states: 
Lo straniero, al quale sia impedito nel suo paese l’effettivo esercizio delle libertà 
democratiche garantite dalla Costituzione Italiana, ha diritto d’asilo nel territorio 
della Repubblica secondo le condizioni stabilite dalla legge (Italian Constitution, 
article 10, subparagraph 3). 
 
This article states that any foreigner has the right to asylum if there is an effective impediment of 
democratic freedoms that the Italian Constitution instead guarantees. This liberal approach 
would explain why the Italian Parliament has never applied the article. If applied literally, it 
would set a precedent and open the chance to enter Italian territory to many more people than the 
government would have been able and willing to take care of. Prefect Compagnucci
112
 made an 
example in the interview:  
in China, there is no freedom of expression. Freedom of expression is one of the 
elements of our Constitution. Clearly, any Chinese person who entered Italy and said 
“I cannot write my newspaper” had to be, according to article 10 of the Constitution, 
considered a political refugee. And this was … unthinkable (5.1). 
 
The creation of the Constitution coincides with the aftermath of the Second World War at a time 
when there was heightened sensitivity towards political refugees, especially those who had to 
leave Italy because of their dissent to the Fascist regime. As a result, the Constituent Fathers 
wanted to give a strong political message as they drafted the Constitution. They wanted to 
“indicate Italy as a country … of shelter, reception” (5.2) (interview with Compagnucci). At a 
time when the country needed help for reconstruction, it was presented as a place for refuge. 
The Constitution talks about asylum in the most generic terms and does not account for refugee 
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 In 1997, the Court of Appeal sentenced that an ordinary judge may decide whether to grant asylum 
according to the Constitution’s article. Sentence n. 4674/97, 12th December 1996 : “l’art.10, terzo comma, 
Cost., attribuisce direttamente allo straniero il quale si trovi nella situazione descritta da tale norma un 
vero e proprio diritto soggettivo all’ottenimento dell’asilo” (CIR 2006). The sentence would make asylum 
seekers particularly vulnerable to the discretionary will of the judge (Vassallo 2001). 
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 Apart from the most notable case of Abdullah Öcalan a Kurdish militant leader and founder of the 
Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK). This is “an extreme-left nationalist group that launched a war against the 
Turkish government in order to set up an independent Kurdish state along Marxist lines” (Witschi 2005). 
Öcalan originally fled Turkey in 1980 and lived in exile in Syria until the Syrian government extradited him 
under Turkish pressure. It was at this point that he went to Italy and sought asylum. Again under the 
pressure from the Turkish government, the Italian government took time to take any decision with regards to 
the asylum case. In the meantime Öcalan left. He was found in Kenya and sent back to Turkey where he 
remains in prison. Two months after he had left Italy, the Italian government granted him asylum (interview 
with Compagnucci; O’Toole 2000). 
112
 Telephone interview date: 18
th
 February 2011. 
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status. This makes article 10 very broad and incompatible with the current Italian situation 
whereby political parties (especially those on the right) feel they may have “to open the doors to 
everybody” (5.3) (interview with Compagnucci).   
 The 1951 Geneva Convention and the 1967 Protocol determine refugee status. Law n. 
722/1954 ratified the Convention while law 95/1970
113
 ratified the protocol.  
 The above section has highlighted that asylum was not a priority for successive governments 
for several reasons. From the recent entry of Italy on the asylum scene, to the low numbers of 
asylum claims, to article 10 of the Constitution because considered to be too generous, 
governments have prioritised the country’s needs by creating policies in favour of labour 
migration. However, due to Italy’s porous borders as well as widespread irregular market for 
labour, the issues of illegal entry and security are now high on the government’s agenda. Asylum 
as a government issue did not materialise until 1990 after the fall of the Berlin Wall, and only 
under the pressure of other European countries, as the next section highlights.  
 The following part focuses on the historical developments of migration and asylum 
legislation provisions in the country
114
. This is important to understand the importance of party-
politics in Italy and the politicians’ attitudes towards labour migration and asylum perceived to 
be a threat to sovereignty, security, and national identity. Ultimately, this background will 
provide further insight to carry out the comparison between Italy and the UK. 
 
5.1.2 Immigration legislation from 1986 until 2002 and the first (unsuccessful) attempts to 
create specific asylum legislation 
Before 1986 – date of the first Italian immigration legislation115, the only laws that regulated the 
entry of foreigners were “the fascist decrees of June 18, 1931 (n. 773116) and May 6, 1940 (n. 
635)” (Perlmutter 2000, 7) mainly in relation to public order and administrative police. 
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 Because of the existence of article 10, pertaining asylum only, and the Geneva Convention, pertaining 
refugee status, the Court of Appeal with sentence n.25028, 25
th
 November 2005, clarified that the mixing 
of these two categories goes to the advantage of the Geneva Convention because it is the only law that the 
Italian legal order has accepted. Furthermore, the Court established that the legal importance of the right 
to asylum in article 10 is only equal to the issuing of a temporary residence permit. This permit is given 
while the Central Commission analyses the asylum claim (Migranti-press 2006). Article 10, comma 3 of 
the Constitution becomes therefore less important than the Geneva Convention. 
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 See Appendix 12 for the summary of the legislation in Italy. 
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 Statute n. 943 of 30 December 1986. 
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 Towards the end of the 1980s with Italy becoming a country of immigration rather than 
emigration (Finotelli and Sciortino 2009) and with numbers of illegal immigrants increasing 
significantly, consecutive Italian governments have had to tackle the issue and stop being 
impartial trend watchers. The development of policies was the natural outcome to control and 
regulate “the phenomenon of the increase” in numbers due to new “arrivals” (5.4) (interview 
with Compagnucci). Different Italian governments – leaning on the right and left of the political 
spectrum – have passed regularisation programmes to allow illegal migrants already on the 
territory to legalise their position in order to work while also setting quotas for the entry of 
foreign workers, thus maintaining continuity in their policies. 
 Law 943/86 was the result of the concern that a new influx of foreign workers could 
jeopardize the chances of finding a job for Italians. Therefore, the main point of the law was to 
protect Italian workers “against potentially ‘unfair’ competition on the labour market” (Zincone 
and Caponio 2005, 2; Faedda 2001; Bernard 2007; Hein 2010). It also introduced amnesties 
(sanatorie) to regularise undocumented migrants on the territory giving them the same rights as 
the indigenous population in terms of health care, education, and public housing. Unfortunately, 
this operation was not sufficient to ease the tension between immigrants and Italians with the 
latter becoming more and more distressed and intolerant. Additionally, what happened in 1989 
in Italy changed and re-shaped the then existing situation. During the summer, some criminals 
murdered an asylum seeker from South Africa – Jerry Masslo – during a robbery. The refusal of 
his asylum claim was due to the geographical limitation provided for by the 1951 Convention 
according to which only European asylum seekers could get refugee status. In the past, because 
numbers were so low, Italy would mainly recognise asylum seekers either coming from the 
Soviet Bloc (Colombo and Sciortino 2004) or ad hoc by granting refugee status to non-
Europeans depending on their circumstances
117
. The death of Masslo caught the attention of the 
mass media and made the Italians aware of all migrants’ condition. For the first time, the 
biggest anti-racism demonstration to-date happened (Super Amministratore 2008; Hein 2010).  
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 The political world caught up eventually and in February 1990 the then government passed 
law 39/90 also known as ‘Martelli law’118. The law had two purposes. On one side, it reformed 
the asylum procedure. Most importantly, for the first time, article 1 allowed entrance at the 
Italian borders to non-European refugees putting an end to the geographical delimitation. Article 
1 is the only article of the law that still stands at the time of writing
119
. However, this new norm 
dealt only partially with asylum as only article 1 of the law contained information on refugee 
status. In particular, the norm was quite restrictive as it stayed within the refugee definition as 
outlined by the Geneva Convention (that requires persecution on an individual basis in order to 
grant refugee status) and did not recognise asylum as set out by article 10 of the Italian 
Constitution. The second aim of the law was to conform to the requirements set by other 
European members to enter Schengen and to reassure them that the country was capable of 
preventing unwanted immigrants from entering into the Schengen area. As such, the second part 
of the law dealt with economic migration and, in particular, quotas
120
 to be set according to the 
country’s economic needs, residence permits 121 , expulsions 122 , and it introduced visa 
requirements and sanctions for migrant traffickers.  
 Dealing with asylum and economic migration within the same law started a trend that is still 
evident nowadays. The media and politicians alike often use a ‘crime and punishment’ type of 
rhetoric with the consequence of muddling asylum/refugee related issues with labour migration. 
This behaviour increases the confusion and the resentment of many Italians who do not have a full 
understanding of the problematic. However, the law had the merit to stabilise to a certain extent 
the situation of migrants (Gramaglia 2008). 
 As the number of refugees increased due to the conflicts in Somalia
123
 and former Yugoslavia 
(see table 5.1), the issue of permits for humanitarian reasons followed and in 1995, Italy passed 
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 See Appendix 13 for the asylum procedure according to the Martelli law. 
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 Article 1 was amended by the ‘Bossi-Fini’ law with articles 1-bis. - (Casi di trattenimento) - 1-ter. - 
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Legislative Decree 25
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 July 1998, n.286
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. The Bossi-Fini Act later modified the Consolidated Act. 
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 Article 7 and 7bis. 
123
 In 1991, there were 1,704 asylum applications from Somalia (Migration Policy Institute n.d.). 
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Legislative Decree n. 489 of 18 (also known as ‘Dini Decree’). This gave more rights to illegal 
immigrants such as health and education and it tackled the issue of smuggling and trafficking 
(Zincone and Caponio 2005). 
 Ultimately, in 1998 the centre-left government passed new legislation (law 40/1998 so-
called ‘Turco-Napolitano’, then Consolidated Act 286/1998), aware of the inadequacy of the 
Martelli law in front of these changes. As with the Martelli law, the aim of this new piece of 
legislation was to demonstrate to other European countries that Italy too could handle the 
situation given the criticisms owed to country’s porous borders. It was also an effort to reassure 
the Italian public that the immigration situation was under control and that it did not represent a 
threat to security and national cohesion. This was a time, in fact, when the mass media would 
report increasingly news about criminal acts, especially robberies in wealthy areas, at the hand 
of immigrants, mainly Albanians (Rusconi 2010). These events sparked discontent among the 
public as well as a certain part of the political world. The law had three particular objectives
124
: 
“to contrast illegal migration and the criminal exploitation of the migratory flows; to implement 
policies related to limited, programmed and regulated legal entries”; and finally, “to start 
realistic but effective integration paths for new legal migrants and foreigners already resident 
regularly in Italy” (Camera dei Deputati 1997). As such, the control of external borders 
intensified, sanctions against the smuggling of migrants increased and temporary detention 
centres opened (Centri di Permanenza Temporanea – CPT). In terms of integration, the 
legislation introduced a permanent residence permit
125
 following five years of regular permanent 
residence, and created a national fund for migration policies
126
, thus establishing cooperation 
between local governments and NGOs (Legge Turco Napolitano; Finotelli and Sciortino 2009). 
The law, however, did not deal with asylum. As the Turco-Napolitano was under discussion in 
1998, the Gruppo di Riflessione dell'Area Religiosa, a network formed by religious 
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 “contrasto dell'immigrazione clandestina e dello sfruttamento criminale dei flussi migratori; 
realizzazione di una puntuale politica di ingressi legali limitati, programmati e regolati; avvio di realistici 
ma effettivi percorsi di integrazione per i nuovi immigrati legali e per gli stranieri già regolarmente 
soggiornanti in Italia”. 
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 Article 7 Carta di soggiorno. 
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127, produced “an alternative proposal” (5.5) (interview with Briguglio128). However, 
CIR and UNHCR put pressure on the government to remove the part related to asylum making 
“a limping norm since ’98 because immigration law was passed but not the asylum law” (5.6) 
(interview with Hein
129
). This was because the two organisations at the time believed that it was 
important to keep separate asylum and labour migration especially in view of a problem related 
to in-country appeals
130
. The issue networks that operated during the Bossi-Fini have always 
been in operation. However, their modus operandi was different. In 1998, the then centre-left 
government put together a commission of experts to work through the bill. The commission 
included civil servants and experts from various pro-migrants organisations showing a higher 
degree of attention towards these groups. However, “despite the Prodi government being on the 
left, they did not listen to the associations at all” (5.7) (interview with Briguglio). 
 What seemed (and still is at the time of writing) to be important for the Italian state was to 
combat illegal entries with any means necessary in a double effort: to ease the Italian’s fear of 
migrants and to show the European colleagues they were worthy partners in the fight against 
illegal migration. At the same time, in September 1997
131
, the first Commission in the Senate 
started the examination of one governmental bill and two parliamentarian bills. A year later, in 
November 1998 the Senate finally approved the three bills in one unified text
132
. The Chamber 
of Deputies however, did not start the analysis of this text until July 1999. The journey of this 
law was long but eventually in March 2000, a modified text went back to the Senate where it 
also ended its course (Camera dei Deputati 2001; Vassallo 2001). “Someone ‘killed’ the Prodi 
government and the thing fell into disuse” (5.8) (interview with Hein). In the spring of 2001, 
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 Caritas, ACLI, Comunita' di Sant'Egidio, Confederazione delle Chiese Evangeliche. This group formed 
on the ashes of a previous network called Pact for an anti-racist parliament (patto per un parlamento 
antirazzista). This last group stopped functioning as the first Berlusconi government was elected and they 
started to exclude groups associated with the Italian left. The religious group was more successful because 
“the moderate part of the centre-right was attentive to what the catholic world was saying” (interview with 
Briguglio). 
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 External immigration expert. Interview date: 5
th
 November 2008. 
129
 Christopher Hein, Director of the Italian Refugee Council. Interview date: 4
th
 November 2008. 
130
 The same problem presented itself while the Bossi-Fini was under discussion but in this case, the 
UNHCR came to an agreement with the government. 
131
 This was during the thirteenth legislature that is while a centre-left coalition was in power. 
132
 The objective of this bill (C.5381) was to complete – in terms of asylum – what the Turco-Napolitano 
law and the law decree 286/1998 had started. The bill as it was approved in the Senate in 2001, recognised 
the right to asylum and humanitarian protection on individual bases according to article 10 of the Italian 




new parliamentary elections stopped any possible development as Berlusconi’s centre right 
government was elected. 
 In 2006, the major pro-immigration organisations of the so-called third sector – that are 
part of the more recently formed Tavolo Asilo – presented a new asylum proposal to the newly 
appointed centre-left government
133
. The government was effectively ready to listen and to act 
as it declared the willingness to create a single asylum procedure; to abolish the detention of 
asylum seekers in closed centres; to reform the non-suspensive appeals system; and finally, to 
improve reception and integration (CIR 2007). This government though only lasted just under 
two years and again the law was set aside. The instability of Italian governments is indeed a 
problem. They do not tend to last very long and if they do, they have other priorities.  
 The Italian Parliament categorised by unstable coalitions is not comparable to the strong 
and unitary UK Parliament according to the ‘Westminster model’. This is reflected in the clearer 
objectives set out by the UK government in dealing with asylum thus producing several pieces 
of asylum legislation. 
 Finally, in 2002 the then ruling coalition passed the ‘Bossi-Fini’. Its goal was to cut down 
on illegal migrants while making legal migration a sought after wish. Besides, contrary to the 
UK, asylum in Italy was just emerging as an issue for the government. These important factors 
shaped the Bossi-Fini. In the law, two articles regulate the entrance and stay of asylum seekers 
while the rest of the law is about labour migration and tools to deter unwanted migrants, 
including asylum seekers. Although, two articles could not discipline the matter in its entirety, 
at least they served the purpose to bring some sort of attention to the issue, as well as to attempt 
to put some order into the field where Italy lagged well behind other EU countries.  
 The second part of the chapter focuses on the origins and the main points of the law. 
 
                                                     
133
 Prodi’s government (May 2006-May2008). 
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5.2 THE ‘BOSSI-FINI’: ORIGINS, CONTROVERSIES, AND MAIN POINTS  
The bill, presented in the Cabinet (Consiglio dei Ministri) on 9th August 2001 and introduced in 
the Senate on 2
nd
 November 2001 by Senator Boscetto
134
, became law 189/2002, most 
commonly known as ‘Bossi-Fini’ on 30th July 2002135. It developed following this timetable:  
Senate (S.795) 
Assigned to the 1
st
 Permanent Commission 
(Constitutional Affairs)  
14
th
 November 2001 








Discussion in other Permanent Commissions 








 (Labour and Welfare), G.A.E. 
(European Commission Affairs) 
Between 27
th








 February 2002 
Approved 28
th
 February 2002 
 
Chamber of Deputies (C.2454) 
Transmitted from the Senate 1
st
 March 2002 
1
st
 Permanent Commission (Constitutional 
Affairs) (sede referente) 
From 20
th
 March until 3
rd
 June 2002 
Discussion in other Permanent Commissions 






















 (Social Affairs), 14
th
 
(European Union Policies). 
Between 7
th
 May and 3
rd
 June 2002 
 
Senate (S.795-B) 
Transmitted from the Chamber of Deputies 4
th
 June 2002 
Assigned to the 1
st




 June 2002 
Discussion in the above Commission (sede 11th, 18th and 19th June 2002 
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 Spokesman for the Commission. Forza Italia (FI) party. 
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Human Rights Extraordinary Commission 
(sede consultiva) and  
5
th









 July 2002 
Discussion on the Floor of the House From 20
th
 June until 11
th
 July 2002 
Approved  11
th
 July 2002 
 
 The bill was a government initiative and the first draft presented in July 2001 did not 
consider asylum at all. The articles related to asylum made their first appearance a month after, 
in August (Briguglio 2001a). It stemmed from two other bills raised while the centre-right was 
in opposition, the ‘Bossi-Berlusconi’ bill and the ‘Landi-Fini’ bill. The former, written by the 
populist party Northern League (Lega Nord – LN), pictured migrants as guest workers “by 
linking the presence of immigrants in Italy to their employment” (Geddes 2008, 358) and its 




. The latter was a bill born 
within the lines of Alleanza Nazionale (National Alliance – AN) a former post-fascist party, and 
had more of a “law and order approach” (Zincone 2011, 270). Its main features included the 
introduction of clandestine immigration as a crime, immediate arrest and escort to the border 
(ibid). In the final version of the Bossi-Fini however, there is no crime for illegal immigration 
while “family reunion was still immediate for holders of renewable residence permits of at least 
one year” (Zincone 2006b, 31). What happened during the process – as Chapter 7 will show – 
was that the presence of the moderate influence of the Catholic party Centro Cristiano 
Democratico - Cristiani Democratici Uniti (CCD-CDU) had the power to mitigate and soften 
the harsher proposals put forward by the LN. Both these parties were part of the ruling coalition 
within the Casa delle Libertà (CDL – House of Freedoms) that also included Forza Italia (FI – 
Go Italy) led by Berlusconi and AN. LN and the CCD-CDU had several confrontations 
especially on the front of family reunions and the amnesty for the illegal labour force. The latter 
in particular was the object of heated hostilities between the two parties. In the end, they came 
to an agreement. As Chapter 7 illustrates, part of the deal was that this provision would not 
figure in the Act but be passed at a later stage. 
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 Migrants could apply for family reunion after three years of legal residence. 
137
 Migrants could apply for naturalisation after ten years of legal residence. 
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 AN avoided interfering in its aim to reposition itself “as a modern, mainstream European 
centre-right party” (Geddes 2008, 354) so to avoid being identified as a xenophobic party. 
Forza Italia played mainly a mediating role for three reasons. Firstly, because the Lega had 
walked out of the previous coalition government causing its fall. Secondly, as Geddes (ibid) 
highlights, immigration was perceived as a threat in terms of national identity, employment and 
security by FI, AN and especially LN voters. On the other hand, they shared worries with the 
Catholic parties “to respond to business concerns about adverse effects of draconian 
immigration legislation on labour supply” (Geddes 2008, 356). At the same time, the CCD-
CDU had the support of the Catholic Church and the business interests to increase labour 
migration. This backing would explain why in the end, the LN had no choice but to please its 
party members as well as a small part of the electorate (excluding the businesses) with 
“repressive symbolic proposals” (Bale 2008, 461; Colombo and Sciortino 2003) such as the use 
of the Navy to send back migrants and mandatory fingerprinting of immigrants.  
Despite these symbolic victories, comments from the LN, FI and AN promoted the law as “a 
great success” and a victory for the government (La Repubblica 2002c). It reinforced the words 
of Umberto Bossi, leader of the LN, who only a few months earlier railed against the left, 
responsible for the “invasions” with the hope “to end the nation-state” (La Repubblica 2002a). 
Although the LN could not stop the amnesty it was nevertheless able to send out a strong 
message to its supporters that they had power through a series of repressive “headline-grabbing 
measures” (Albertazzi and McDonnell 2005, 962; Geddes 2008) namely the taking of 
fingerprints of migrants and the use of the navy to intercept migrant boats and send them back. 
For the CCD-CDU it was also a success because the party was able to get through few but 
central concessions to ameliorate and soften the harshest sections of the law including the 
amnesty. For the left the Bossi-Fini turned out to be a “legge manifesto138” (manifesto law) 
(Sen. Villone, Atti Parlamentari, Senate Deb 19
 
February 2002, sitting 124), a political stance to 
show that the government was in control and was able to deliver and against the “inhumanity of 





the ideology of the multiracial society” (5.9) (Cè MP139, Atti Parlamentari, Chamber of Deputies 
Deb 4 June 2002, sitting 153).  
 The changes that happened throughout the policy-making process of the Act and the 
consequent comments made by politicians show that political parties were more than simple 
conduits. They were a fundamental source for the formation of this piece of legislation. The 
political tension between different parties in Italy has always been historically acute but more so 
in ruling coalitions which are often characterised by intra-coalition negotiations. Ideologically 
different political parties and their electoral bases in fact limit internal cohesion in the coalition 
governments (Diamanti 2007; Fabbrini 2012). Fabbrini (2012) underlines the lack of a strong 
unitary party since the post-Cold War era while strong rivalry has emerged between the parties 
forming the centre-right or centre-left coalition. So much that “[i]n Italy, it is no longer the 
political parties that aggregate different interests but the latter that use the parties for promoting 
their specific demands” (ibid, 19). As in the case of the Bossi-Fini, cooperation was not easy to 
achieve. Because of the different interests involved, the coalition suffered a great deal. While 
the LN promoted its infamous anti-migrant and anti-Muslim rhetoric, the Catholic CCD-CDU 
supported a more lenient policy in terms of labour migration and family reunion steered by the 
Catholic Church, the employers’ organisations and the Italian families in need of domestic 
workers and carers.  
 The tension within the ruling coalition was also present in the opposition. The opposition 
was “weak and internally divided because the institution that should promote it – namely, the 
parliament – has been sorely weakened” (Fabbrini 2012, 21) due to the increasingly central role 
of the government especially following the electoral reform of 1993. This explains the inability 
of the opposition to counterbalance the strength of the government during the debate of the 
Bossi-Fini (see Chapter 7). 
 The part on asylum
140
 was a later addition and it shows two different approaches. On one 
side, a top-down approach as the asylum articles are EU derived. The government, in effect, 
sought help by ‘borrowing’ some of the ideas on detention and removal from the European 
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 LNP.  
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 See Appendix 14 for the asylum procedure according to the Bossi-Fini. 
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Directive then under discussion
141
 “in cases in which it is possible to detain the asylum seeker, 
as well as the possibility of removal given by the accelerated procedure, after the first instance” 
(5.10) (ddl 795, 10). On the other side, a bottom-up approach because the Ministry of Interior142 
cooperated very closely with the UNHCR and acted under pressure from mayors and 
organisations that traditionally deal with the support of asylum seekers and refugees thus, de 
facto acting for the State.  
 The ddl, introduced in the Consiglio dei Ministri (Cabinet) on 9th August 2001, caused 
major objections from the Ministers who had only a few hours to look at it (Bonetti 2001a).  
 The approval of the proposed law with amendments in the Cabinet, including points on the 
detention of asylum seekers in centres, happened on 12
th
 October. The formal introduction in the 
Senate instead happened on 2
nd
 November 2001 when it became Senate Act (Atto Senato) or ddl 
S.795
143
 Amendment to the provisions on the matter of immigration and asylum (Modifica alla 
normative in materia di immigrazione e asilo) while the formal announcement was on 5th 
November. The time between the approval and the introduction of the bill was a worrying time 
for charities and organisations because kept in the dark by the government deliberately, did not 
know whether the bill was going to continue its legislative procedure or not (Bonetti 2001a). 
 As expected, the assignment of the bill to the first standing Committee for Constitutional 
Affairs occurred on 14
th
 November while work began on 21
st
 November.  On 28
th
 February 
2002, it was approved in the Senate and passed on to the Chamber of Deputies on 1
st
 March 
2002. Here, its approval with changes came about on 4
th
 June 2002. The Senate analysed it 
again until its final approval on 11
th
 July 2002.  
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 Proposal for a Council Directive on minimum standards on procedures in Member States for granting 
and withdrawing refugee status, Official Journal of the European Communities, (2001/C 62 E/16) and 
COM(2000) 578 final. 
142
 In the person of two specific individuals: the then Minister of Interior Mantovano and Prefect 
Compagnucci who were the authors of the two articles (see Chapter 7). 
143
 Prior to and in conjunction with this ddl, other four law decrees on similar topics were presented but they 
were eventually discussed and finally absorbed by the law decree under discussion. These were: ddl S.55 
Norme in difesa della cultura Italiana (Norms in defence of the Italian culture); ddl S.770 Nuove norme in 
materia di immigrazione (New norms on the matter of immigration); ddl S.797 Disciplina dell' ingresso 
degli stranieri che svolgono attivita' sportiva a titolo professionistico o comunque retribuita (Regulation on 
the entry of foreigners performing sport activities at professional level or anyway compensated); and finally 
ddl S.963 Norme in materia di ingressi dei lavoratori extracomunitari occupati nel settore dello spettacolo 
(Norms on the matter of entrance for extracomunitarian workers in the sector of show business). None of 
these other law decrees dealt with asylum. 
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 The Presidential Decree, DPR no. 303144 of 16th September 2004, approved the regulations 
to carry into effect the Bossi-Fini law in relation to refugee status and the law came into effect 
on 21
st
 April 2005 (Boca, Pittau and Ricci 2009). 
 Although the law was presented as a “great innovation” (5.11) (interview with Hein), it was 
in reality a “copy and paste” (5.12) (interview with Pacini145) of previous legislation and “not a 
law with its own thought” (5.13) (interview with Guarino146). The Bossi-Fini is nothing but a 
modification to the Consolidated Act that to date remains the most important Italian law 
regulating immigration (Zincone 2011) and article 1 of the old Martelli law with regard to 
asylum. The new law simply narrowed down some older provisions. 
 There were several controversial aspects in the Bossi-Fini given the criticism received by 
pro-migrant organisations, the opposition parties in Parliament as well as the reactions raised 
within the parties in the majority. The next section looks more in details at the main aspects of the 
law. 
 
5.2.1 Main aspects of the bill: (many) controversies and (very little) good news 
Because the Bossi-Fini was not a new law but a reaction to the previous one passed by a centre-
left government, it did not distort completely the Turco-Napolitano law. Rather, the provisions 
were tightened and made more severe especially with regard to labour migration. For this 
reason, the bill was greeted generally in two ways by the associations working for the defence 
of migrants: on one side, disappointment from a constitutional point of view to see an already 
defective norm (referring to the Turco-Napolitano) further threatened by provisions deemed to 
be “constitutionally censurable”(5.14) (Sen. Vallone, Atti Parlamentari, Senate Deb 19 February 
2002, sitting 124); on the other, “substantial relief in the face of the scarce correspondence 
between the contents of the ddl and the usual propaganda of some of the majority parties” (5.15) 
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 Decreto del Presidente della Repubblica. 
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 Luca Pacini, responsible for Welfare and Immigration at ANCI (the national association of Italian 
municipalities). Interview date: 3
rd
 November 2008. 
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(Briguglio 2001a). There were in fact also some new provisions
147
 especially related to asylum 
that were an improvement to the Italian situation.  
 Starting with immigration, because the law was essentially an anti-immigrant norm, by far 
the most problematic issue for part of the majority (namely the LN) was that related to the 
regularisation
148
 of the illegal workforce. The employment of illegal migrants is in fact 
widespread and accepted by the same employers (because of the benefits it brings to the few) 
(Reyneri 1998) and regularisations of the illegal workforce have been the norm (Geddes et al. 
2004). Both factors have increased and even further encouraged illegal entries (Zincone 2011). 
Originally, there was not going to be any regularisation at all. Nevertheless, ‘the norm that was 
not meant to be’ became a reality. It comprised those migrants considered socially relevant such 
as domestic and care workers, who had worked and lived in Italy for at least three months. The 
extension of the amnesty to all the other workers without a valid resident permit occurred a few 
months later through a law decree after the approval of the law
149
. This was possible thanks to 
the pressure exercised by the employers’ associations but especially by the Catholic groups in 
the majority. The government could not turn its back to the requests made by these two 
categories. In the end, 702.156 requests were presented (Ministero del Lavoro e della 
Previdenza Sociale 2006, 21; Ministero dell’Interno 2002) and about 650.00 were accepted 
(Menefra 2003). To date, this has been the biggest European amnesty (Colombo and Sciortino 
2003; Reyneri 2004). 
 The other two important issues, which created more of a steer in the civil society and the 
opposition, were those on the abolition of the sponsorship
150
 programme and the introduction of 
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 Article 32 Simplified Procedure (Procedura semplificata). 
148
 Article 33 Declaration for the emergence of irregular labour (Dichiarazione di emersione di lavoro 
irregolare). 
149
 Law decree 25 September 2002 bearing urgent dispositions in matter of regularisation of underground 
work and of part-time employer-employee relationships (recante disposizioni urgenti in materia di 
emersione del lavoro sommerso e di rapporti di lavoro a tempo parziale). The regularisation of undeclared 
work was the subject of two law decrees (195/2002 and 210/2002) converted into law 222/2002 on 9
th
 
October 2002 (Inps Veneto 2003, 327) and law 266/2002 on 22 November 2002 (Camera dei Deputati 
2002). 
150
 This particular process however was used infrequently by the centre-left. On the other hand, the call of 
the immigrant ‘al buio’ or recruitment by name that is while still living abroad has been the norm since 1987 
with the introduction of law 943/1986 (Briguglio 2004). 
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a residence contract for working reasons (contratto di soggiorno per lavoro151). The sponsorship 
introduced originally by the Turco-Napolitano, served to guarantee regular entries. With the 
new law, employers would need to employ unknown foreign citizens while still abroad instead 
of NGOs, family members or trade unions vouching for the foreign worker. The concession of a 
two-year residence permit connected to a work contract linked for the first time residence and 
work and the aim was to avoid the illegal residence and presence of migrants on the territory. In 
practice, the migrant with an expired work permit had little chance of renewing the residence 
permit. Often the renewal of the work permit did not happen on time because of the 
impossibility of finding another job within the set time limit or the long waiting times needed, 
thus transforming the migrant into an irregular worker. In fact, the real issue here was the 
reduction of the time available to look for another job from one year to six months. 
The article related to the contract, also contained the provision on digital imprints for migrants 
requesting a resident permit and/or its renewal. It was a “mechanism of protection for legality 
and a warranty also for the migrants” (5.16) (Casadio 2002). This matter however, was not the 
subject of disagreement within the majority where the Lega proposed it, but within the 
opposition. In fact, as the government passed the amendment, Francesco Rutelli of the Catholic 
political party Margherita (Daisy) proposed to solve the dilemma by taking the imprints of 
everybody, including Italians, so as not to become “an instrument against the foreigners” (5.17) 
(Casadio 2002). In reality, the possibility of taking digital imprints for everybody was not new, 
as an older law from 1999 did already provide for this but not compulsorily.  
 Other changes that targeted illegal migrants specifically were:  
1) Immediate expulsion by way of escorting the foreigner without a regular residence and/or 
working permit and no documents to the border by the police
152
 
2) Administrative detention153 “in all the hypotheses of clandestine entry” (5.18) (Vassallo 
2001) 
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 Article 5 Residence permit (Permesso di soggiorno) and article 6: Residence contract for subordinate 
work (Contratto di soggiorno per lavoro subordinato). 
152
 Article 12 Administrative expulsion (Espulsione amministrativa). 
153
 Article 12  
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3) Lengthening of detention times from 30 to 60 days154 for all irregular migrants within the 
temporary accommodation centres (CPTs) established by the Turco-Napolitano 
4) Restriction of family reunions155 
5) Rejection (respingimento) at the border but also at sea using the Italian Navy156 through 
the so called ‘push-backs’. The latter is the highly contentious practice of sending boats of 
migrants en route to Italy back to countries of origin
157
 and is considered a serious breach 
of the country’s “obligations under international human rights law, in particular the 1951 
Refugee Convention and the European Convention on Human Rights” (ECRE 2009; 
Global Detention Project 2009a; Human Rights Watch 2009).  
 All of the above new rules and regulations part of the Bossi-Fini – introduced to stop illegal 
migrants but also to deter migrants settling in the country for a longer period than it was 
necessary for the Italian economy – also had a profound impact on asylum seekers. This is 
especially true for those provisions put in place to reject people before they even had the chance 
to claim asylum.  
 In terms of asylum specifically, the smaller yet important portion related to the topic which 
represented the real novelty of this law. In fact, surprisingly, the law contained also two articles 
on asylum. ‘Surprisingly’ because it was a centre-right government – whose main allies were 
the Lega famous for its anti-immigration stances and AN – that passed the law. They saw the 
law in its organisational aspects e.g. organising a system non-existent until then made of 
reception and shared responsibilities, rather than ideological ones as a centre-left coalition 
would have most probably done. Previous centre-left governments, despite claims of wanting 
specific asylum legislation, were never able to agree and pass such legislation (interview with 
Compagnucci). This was due allegedly, to a lack of real interest towards the issue (interview 
with the National Eligibility Commission Official). Furthermore, whereas the other important 
partner of the coalition, the Catholic party CCD-CDU, had a key role in relaxing the most 
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 Article 13 Execution of expulsions (Esecuzione dell’espulsione). 
155
 Article 23 Family Reunions (Ricongiungimento familiare). 
156
 Article 11 Dispositions against clandestine immigrations. 
157
 For example, Libya that is not a signatory to the 1951 Refugee Convention. Italy has singed bi-lateral 
agreements also with Albania, Tunisia and Morocco. These states agreed to increase their efforts to 
control illegal migration, “in exchange for development assistance from Italy, and a small annual quota 
for legal labour migration to Italy” (Boswell 2005b, 15). 
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stringent parts of the law related to regularisation and family reunion, they did not intervene on 
asylum. They preferred to concentrate their efforts on the other aspects legitimised by the rest of 
the Catholic world as well as the employers’ groups. 
 Clearly, asylum was not the government’s priority so much that the very first version of the 
bill that landed in the Cabinet on 9
th
 August 2001 did not even have the two articles on asylum 
(Briguglio 2001c). Asylum had a marginal but important position. It was marginal because, as 
highlighted in the introduction to the bill, for the government it was not worth having asylum 
legislation until there were equal minimum procedures throughout Europe but it was at least 
useful to solve the problem of ‘false’ or instrumental asylum claims. In fact, under article 1 of 
the Martelli law
158
  anybody who presented an asylum claim could obtain a residence permit 
irrespective of their position be it “regular, not regular, under a removal order … or anything 
else” (5.19) (Disegno di Legge 795, 9). However, “90% of false claimants” (5.20) (ddl 795, 6) 
would abscond. Consequently, the new regulation introduced a procedure specifically for those 
claims considered manifestly unfounded. It was also important because for the first time for 12 
years, that is after the Martelli law, asylum made its renewed – albeit minimal – appearance in a 
law. It was an attempt to put some order in the chaotic or non-existent asylum system. However, 
the law gave the wrong message by drawing up “norms with such different objectives159” (5.21) 
(Cento MP, Atti Parlamentari, Chamber of Deputies Deb 13 May 2002, sitting 143, 18) that is 
by associating migration first with criminality
160
 and then migration with asylum that instead 
should be seen as a “guaranteed constitutional right” (5.22) (Bonetti 2001b). It merely 
reinforced the belief and assumption in public opinion that asylum seekers and immigrants 
belong to the same category but it also underlined a lack of interest as well as knowledge of the 
issue.  
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Article 1 of the Martelli Law provided for both the suspension of the removal provision and a temporary 
residence permit while waiting for the Central Commission to issue its final decision on the claim. 
159
 Cento MP, Greens. 
160
 The link between immigration and crime was further strengthened with the introduction in 2009 with law 
94/2009, the so-called ‘security package’ whereby “clandestine immigration” became “a crime punishable 
by a heavy fine” (Cento Bull 2010, 422). The law introduced renewed harsher measures in relation to family 
reunion and obtaining Italian citizenship, increased fines for illegal entries and for over-stayers, introduced 
the ronde that is groups of citizens organised to patrol the cities’ streets in order to report crimes, it required 
the debatable duty of public officers (including doctors) to report illegal migrants to the authorities, while 
the CPTs were renamed ‘centres for identification and expulsion’ (CIE) where migrants could be held for up 
to six months (Grigion 2009; D’Orsi 2010). 
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 The most important aspects of the law with regard to asylum were: 
1) The introduction of either an optional or a mandatory arrest of asylum seekers to be 
held in identification centres needed for speedier removals (FIDH 2005). As a result, a 
double procedure was put into place: ordinary for the optional arrest and simplified
161
 
for mandatory arrest. The latter case was designed specifically for those trying to go 
through the Italian border without a passport which is the case for most asylum seekers 
(ICS 2005), or were already on the territory illegally or finally had been expelled or 
turned down 
2) In the case of a negative decision by the Territorial Commission, an immediate 
expulsion
162
  order would reach the asylum seeker. At this point, the new procedure 
provided for the chance to appeal the decision. The Territorial Commission became 
responsible for the new pronouncement. The issue here was that the same components – 
with the integration of a member of the National Commission
163
 – who had turned down 
the appeal in the first instance had to take the decision  
3) Furthermore, the appeal did not have suspensive effect meaning that unless a request to 
stay in the country to wait for the results was allowed, the claimant had to leave the 
country with the possible risk of infringing the principle of non-refoulement contained 
in article 33 of the 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees
164
 
4) The establishment of Territorial Commissions165 decentralized throughout the Italian 
territory to support the work of the National Commission. Having Commissions 
                                                     
161
 Procedura ordinaria and procedura semplificata. 
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 This provision together with the mandatory imprisonment of those foreigners without a residence 
permit or with an expired one who fail to comply with an order to leave the country were ruled to be 
unconstitutional by the Constitutional Court with Corrective Decree converted to Statute no. 271/ 2004.  
163
 Until 2002 there was only the Commissione Centrale per il riconoscimento dello "status di rifugiato" 
(Central Commission for the recognition of refugee status) in Rome. The Bossi-Fini with article 32, 
subsection 1-quinquies renamed the Commission as Commissione Nazionale per il diritto di asilo (National 
Commission for the right to asylum). The new Commission directs and coordinates the work of the ten 
Territorial Commissions and trains the employees. 
164
 Article 33 prohibition of expulsion or return (“refoulement”): “No Contracting State shall expel or 
return (“refouler”) a refugee in any manner whatsoever to the frontiers of territories where his life or 
freedom would be threatened on account of his race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular 
social group or political opinion” (UNHCR 1951).  
165
 The Bossi-Fini introduced seven Commissions: Gorizia, Milano, Roma, Foggia, Siracusa, Crotone and 
Trapani. Since 2008 (decreto legislativo no. 25 of 28
th 
January 2008) three more have been added: Torino, 
Bari, and Caserta. The Commissions became operative on 21
st
 April 2005. 
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throughout the territory meant cutting down travelling time for the person claiming 
asylum as well as faster decisions  
5) Finally, the changes to the Programma Nazionale Asilo (Asylum National Program) 
PNA renamed Sistema di Protezione per Richiedenti Asilo e Rifugiati (Central Service 
of the protection System for Asylum Seekers and Refugees) or SPRAR166. In a time 
when it was feared that the PNA would have ceased to exist the law demonstrated to be 
a step ahead by restructuring and transforming “the program … in a system providing 
… some stable funds albeit insufficient”  (5.23)  (interview with Dinh Le Quyen167).  
These last two aspects were the only positive features of the part of the law related to asylum.  
 The law essentially was born to tighten the existing measures about entry of migrants on 
the Italian territory and the only new features were those related to asylum. The pro-asylum and 
pro-immigration groups, together with the opposition in government, were therefore very 
critical about the changes because some of the features of the previous law were not even 
implemented in full while asylum should have been deliberated under a different and more 
considered light.  
 But, what was the impellent necessity for the second Berlusconi government to create 
‘new’ legislation only three years after the last one168? The final section of the chapter looks at 
the then political situation and party politics that created the Bossi-Fini with particular emphasis 
on the Lega Nord and the permanent gap between the politicians’ rhetoric and the outcome of 
policies that seems to be a constant feature in the policies concerning immigration. Continuities 
and discontinuities are also part of this analysis. 
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 Article 32-1 sexies. 
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 Ngo Dinh Le Quyen , Responsible for immigration, asylum and human trafficking for Caritas in Rome 
and President of the immigration commission for Caritas Europe (Responsabile Immigrazione, Asilo e 
Tratta per Caritas di Roma and Presidente della Commissione Immigrazione di Caritas Europa). Interview 
date: 6
th
 November 2008. 
168
 The Turco-Napolitano became law in 1998 but came into force a year later partly because of the 
referendum called by the LNP to repeal the law in January1999. However, the Constitutional Court with 
sentence n.31 of 7
th
 February 2000 will declare the inadmissibility of the referendum. The repeal would have 
meant the cancellation also of article 14 concerning the establishment of Temporary Permanence Centres 
(CPT) and the detention of illegal immigrants within these. CPTs were considered among the measures that 
allowed Italy to enter the Schengen area and article 75 of the Italian Constitution does not allow 
referendums to deal with international treaties (Zincone and Di Gregorio 2002). 
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5.3 PARTY POLITICS: POLITICAL PARTIES IN THE MAKING OF IMMIGRATION 
POLICIES, THE PERSISTENT ‘GAP’ BETWEEN RHETORIC AND OUTCOMES, 
CONTINUITIES AND DISCONTINUITIES IN POLICY-MAKING  
Immigration became a ‘hot’ political subject matter in 2000 that is during the creation of the 
coalition House of Freedoms
169
 (Casa delle Libertà) with the inclusion of the Northern League. 
Immigration is the ‘hobby horse’ of the political debate of the Lega that started their populist 
xenophobic career first as an anti-southern party, then as anti-immigration party and finally as 
an anti-migrant party (Finotelli and Sciortino 2009).  
 The website of the Governo Berlusconi 2001-2006 explained the law as an “esigenza 
ineludibile” – an inevitable necessity to reform profoundly the law in this subject (Governo 
Berlusconi, n.d.). There are four different reasons or possible explanations for this statement. To 
start with, the Turco-Napolitano and the Martelli law formed in a climate of pressure exercised 
by Italy’s European neighbours. The critics relate to the fact that Italy does not provide effective 
control on its porous borders. Many migrants would in fact ‘use’ the country as a passage to 
reach their final destination, for example France or Germany. It is still possible to observe this 
trend although the number of foreigners settling in Italy has increased significantly. It is not 
surprising then that the pressure from the EU has never ceased in fact, one of the provisions of 
the Bossi-Fini is to use the Italian Navy to intercept and stop boats of migrants before they 
arrive in Italian waters or closer to its shores.  
 Secondly, the government thought the Turco-Napolitano law “registered … considerable 
delays in the actuation of many of the expected tools
170
 … but especially and fundamentally” it 
“has not been able to face the emergencies (5.24)” (Bertolini MP171, Atti Parlamentari, Chamber 
of Deputies Deb 13 May 2002, sitting 143, 4).  In practice, the law was not deemed to be strict 
enough despite the cooperation between the centre-left government and the centre-right 
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 The other members were Forza Italia, Alleanza Nazionale, Biancofiore formed by two Christian parties 
the CCD and CDU and the Nuovo Partito Socialista. 
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 The Bossi-Fini was implemented over two year after its approval. 
171
 Speaker for Forza Italia. 
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opposition during the previous legislature
172
 to restrict, manage and regulate people’s 
movements within the country (Bozzini and Fella 2008). 
 Thirdly, both laws showed their inadequacy to the times as new and diverse types of 
movements started to emerge especially in relation to Eastern European visa over-stayers 
(Finotelli and Sciortino 2009) and migrants from North Africa. In the meantime, immigration 
came at the forefront of political news and scored quite high in the fears of Italian public 
opinion (Colombo and Sciortino 2004; Sciortino and Colombo 2004). 
 The last aspect relates to the fact that the Bossi-Fini initiated in political circles showing a 
“highly polarised and ideological political atmosphere” (Zincone 2006a, 364). The Berlusconi 
government and especially the Northern League had made precise promises to the Italian public 
about tackling illegal entry and residence of foreigners (Zincone 2006a). The theme of 
immigration though, had been cautiously kept hidden during the electoral campaign (Colombo 
and Sciortino 2003; Zincone and Di Gregorio 2002) following the logic that political parties 
usually do not “take clear, strong, or divergent positions” (Freeman 1995, 884) on the subject of 
immigration to avoid setbacks (Perlmutter 2000; Geddes 2008; Schain 2008). In contrast, more 
extreme right wing parties who do criticise immigration and migrants openly seldom obtain 
many seats and have “limited or no chance of participating in or forming governments” 
(Freeman 1995, 884). The Northern League for instance, came into the limelight because of 
their strong stance against immigration and immigrants. They obtained only 3.9% votes in the 
2001 elections (Albertazzi and McDonnell 2005) but contrary to Freeman’s statement, they 
became one of the strongest allies of Berlusconi and his governments.  
 
5.3.1 The rhetoric and outcome gap 
Yet, despite the harsher tones against immigration registered in those years due to an increase in 
the politicisation of the issue, especially coming from the Lega Nord, authors have highlighted a 
persistent ‘gap’ (Boswell 2007) between parties’ rhetoric and the law’s actual “contradictory 
outputs” (Zincone 2011, 249). This gap is only apparent however (Finotelli and Sciortino 2009) 
and is “standard” (Geddes 2008, 350) across liberal states. Centre-right and centre-left 
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governments that have succeeded each other over the years have produced laws with similar 
outputs. Although the centre-right has a more conservative stance towards immigration 
compared to the centre-left, the fact that there was always a Catholic component in both 
coalitions, allowed policies to be similar in character. Catholic parties usually have the power to 
mitigate choices and requests but also to maintain a certain continuity and stability in 
immigration policy despite changes in government (Zincone 2006b). Naturally, the laws of the 
market have an impact on the continuation of policies too whereas the embedded tendency of 
the right to have harsher control measures is mitigated by the needs of the Italian market for 
foreign workers.  
 Anna Cento Bull (2010) has traced the gap back to the fact that the Lega’s rhetoric against 
immigration is merely symbolic. This means that the use of strong language against migrants 
and migration and the inclusion in laws of strict measures (for example the Bossi-Fini although 
the author’s focus is on the most recent ‘security package’ adopted in 2009 and wished for 
strongly by the Lega), in reality are a means to subordinate “identity to material issues, thereby 
(paradoxically) assuaging the fears of its electorate while helping it come to terms with 
culturally undesired socio-economic changes” (ibid, 418). In practice, while the security 
package highlighted repressive measures against migrants, the governments implemented other 
procedures that in a way contradicted the position of the Lega. An example of this kind of 
behaviour is the regularisation programs passed in 2009 but only after the ‘security package’ 
had become law (the same thing happened in 2002 with the approval of the Bossi-Fini in July 
while the law on the regularisation passed a few months later in the autumn). According to the 
author, the party in a way fulfil their duty by reassuring their electorate “that clandestine entry 
will not be tolerated” (ibid, 429). At the same time, the party is aware of the impossibility of 
implementing many of these measures
173
 in real life. Nevertheless, their popularity remains 
stable as they blame policy failures on other actors such as “the left-leaning judiciary, the 
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 The author gives a series of reasons from the “non-appearance of the defendant at the trial” to the “lack 
of bi-lateral agreements at state level” (Cento Bull 2010, 422-423).  
The lack of bi-lateral agreements but also and especially the costs to carry out a mass deportation with 
“thousands of people” and  “hundreds of planes” were points confirmed in interview on 15th February 2011 
by Senator Boscetto with regard to the making of the Bossi-Fini and the deal on the regularisation. It was an 
aspect, he continued of “real politik” as it was unimaginable to sustain such costs. 
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medical profession, the opposition parties, the EU and even its allies in government” (ibid). She 
concludes that “the gap between policy rhetoric and policy outcomes” (ibid 431) is not due to 
bargaining that happened within the coalition in power but because of the electoral needs to be 
tackled. This latter points describe certainly a reality that sees at national (public) level policy-
makers making anti-immigration propaganda, after all “that’s what the Italians want to hear” 
(5.25) (interview with Official of the National Commission
174
), while at local, private level, 
members of the same party are asking to regulate migrants for work purposes. However, as Bale 
(2008, 453) writes, “[p]arties are, after all, populated by individuals who are themselves 
ideological, sharing the gut instincts of their supporters – and sometimes even more so”. 
Furthermore, the parliamentary debates analysed with the aim to assess how the Bossi-Fini 
came to be tell a different story, as they recorded the harsh exchange of views between the Lega 
and their allies in the Catholic Party, CCD-CDU
175 . They also show that for every ‘soft’ 
measure passed in Parliament by the Catholics, an immediate more conservative and strict 
answer would come from the Lega (Colombo and Sciortino 2003). Many of these measures
176
 as 
Colombo and Sciortino (2003, 211) emphasise, had a limited role and served more the purpose 
to catch the attention of public opinion on the repressive side of the law “rather than on its 
contradictions”. Interviews with policy-makers also highlighted the confrontations between the 
two parties and the more defined role of the government whose aim was to mediate. Finally, 
analysis of the media articles of the time demonstrates furthermore the dissatisfaction of the 
employers’ groups and the Church with the law. It is therefore perhaps reductive to ‘blame’ the 
gap simply on electoral needs, as this would imply a precise cunning strategy on the part of the 
Lega and as such astute acumen of all the party members as well. Rather, the Bossi-Fini was the 
result of a mix of factors: ideology (populist/xenophobic and Catholic), bargaining (at 
parliamentary level between the Lega and the CCD-CDU while outside parliament it was 
between the government and the employers’ associations and the Conference of Italian 
Bishops
177
), and needs of the electorate (voting for the Lega, for the CCD-CDU but also Forza 
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Italia and Alleanza Nazionale that had a similar utilitarian view of immigration). These factors 
have created patchwork legislation (Finotelli and Sciortino 2009; Zincone 2011) and the 
regularisation is the apex of this patchwork. It “confirmed rather than contradicted” (Colombo 
and Sciortino 2003, 210) the government’s policy in terms of immigration in favour of more 
discretionary politics to determine quotas while at the same time reducing consultation 
processes.  
 With regard to asylum, this gap is perhaps less obvious or it is even reversed. On one side 
for example, the Lega states that the right to asylum is “sacred” (Lega Nord Romagna, n.d.) but 
during the discussion of the Bossi-Fini, one of the Northern League’s representatives showed 
the boorish attitude of the party on asylum related issues. He sustained that asylum cannot be 
given to a “population of seven million people” simply because they do not have “fundamental 
liberties and social rights”; instead they should “be helped in their home” (5.26) (Dussin MP178, 
Atti Parlamentari, Chamber of Deputies Deb 13 May 2002, sitting 143, 30). Indeed the Bossi-
Fini contained only two articles demonstrating yet again little interest towards the issue of 
asylum but the new double procedure, together with the introduction of non-suspensive appeals 
and measures to decrease entries and stop illegal immigration, had an impact on asylum seekers 
overall. The debates and the interviews show a lack of discussion on the topic confirming the 
idea that asylum was still irrelevant. Clearly, this was because all the attention was on the 
immigration side of the law and especially the regularisation, because of the low numbers of 
claims but also because the part on asylum was discussed outside the floor of the two Houses 
and through communication between the Ministry of Interior and the UNHCR.  
 
5.3.2 Continuities 
From the excursus of the laws implemented between 1986 and 2002 it is possible to draw a 
comparison in terms of continuity
179
 of Italian immigration policy making. Four similar and 
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 In terms of continuity, Zincone points out that it “is not continuous” (2006b, 1). Rather, it depends on the 
electoral cycle as the new government in power will strive to keep the promises made during the electoral 
campaign while distancing themselves from the actions of the previous government. She observed that 
during the 2001 electoral campaign, the centre-left Olive Tree coalition assailed by the ‘electoral panic 
syndrome’ (ibid), departed from its original pro-immigration stand to get closer to public opinion’s view of 
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essential aspects emerge: some features of the policies, starting with the Martelli law, were EU 
derived due to the pressure exercised by EU member states. As such, a factor the laws have in 
common is the emphasis on the control of external borders. At the same time however, the laws 
failed to implement stricter internal controls thus allowing an expansion of the informal 
economy. Internally in fact, “powerful demographic, economic and social forces have sustained 
and expanded the demand for foreign workers” (Finotelli and Sciortino180 2009, 121). Foreign 
labour though has been recruited mainly through the regularisation
181
 of illegal migrants already 
present on the territory rather than the “active recruitment” (ibid, 127) of workers from abroad. 
Political forces therefore, had to deal with external pressures characterised by restrictionist 
impulses on one side determined by public demand and the political parties on the right, and 
internal pressures characterised instead by the demand for foreign workers coming from 
employers and families (Finotelli and Sciortino 2009; Zincone 2006b).  
 In terms of asylum, the situation is different. On one side, the EU pressure may explain the 
inclusion of asylum in both the Bossi-Fini and Martelli laws. The European partners as well as 
international NGOs insisted that Italy adopted asylum legislation but this never materialised due 
to the length of the discussion and the fall of the government. On the other hand, as the Director 
of the Italian Refugee Council pointed out, asylum was missing from the Turco-Napolitano 
allegedly on the request of NGOs that were at the time putting pressure on the government to 
pass asylum legislation. Therefore, it appears that there is no continuity on the asylum debate. 
The only continuity that can be traced back is the fact that asylum has always been set against a 
generic background that includes immigration allegedly because of a lack of interest of both the 
right and the left towards the subject of asylum. So many of the measures introduced to stop 
illegal migrants, would automatically stop asylum seekers. For example, in the case of the 
                                                                                                                                                         
migrants. Thus, they shifted to the right. In the same way, the centre-right government, after winning the 
elections introduced tough new measures complying with part of their electorate’s position on migration and 
highlighting the differences from their predecessors. However, they had to make adjustments due to the 
Constitutional Courts’ ruling that some articles of the Act clashed with the Italian Constitution (La 
Repubblica 2004). 
180
 Finotelli and Sciortino (2009) apply their analysis to more recent developments including the so-called 
‘security package’ (Pacchetto sicurezza) passed and implemented in 2008 by the centre-right. 
181
 To date, there have been seven regularisation programs: the first one in 1982 (12.000 foreign workers 
were regularised) in 1986 with law 943/86 (105.000 applications granted), in 1990 with the Martelli law 
(217.000), in 1995 with the Dini decree (244.000), in 1986 with the Turco-Napolitano law (217.000), in 
2002 with the Bossi-Fini, and in 2009 with law 102/2009 so-called ‘pacchetto anti-crisi’ (anti-crisis 
package) (294,744) (Briguglio 1998; Mola 2002; Barabagli, Colombo and Sciortino 2004; Rusconi 2010). 
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Bossi-Fini, the use of the Navy to intercept boats carrying migrants and more recently the 
bilateral agreements signed by Italy and Libya to send back migrants
182
. Libya is not a signatory 
of the 1951 Refugee Convention and stopping boats at sea and sending back migrants 
effectively stopped people applying for asylum in Italy.  
 
5.3.3 Discontinuities 
This section so far has highlighted the key role played by the political parties in policy-making 
with the rise of the “right” (but mainly the Northern League) as a “formidable national actor” 
(Menz 2008, 233). There are however, other key players at civil society level that comprise 
religious and secular voluntary organisations and charities that are more or less involved in the 
policy-making depending on their resources (such as people, time availability and money), but 
also trade unions that have become increasingly concerned with migrants’ well-being 183 , 
employers’ associations and families. Employers’ associations on average are for the 
liberalisation of immigration policies and “value managed migration of labor migrants, both 
high and low skill, feeding into the primary, tertiary, and, in the case of Italy, also the secondary 
sector to alleviate labor and in some instances skill shortages” (Menz 2008, 232). They continue 
to be important allies of governments when drafting new legislation. An example of this, are the 
measures related to the quotas
184
 that serve the economic interests of the employers (Menz 
2008).  
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 In August 2004, Italy signed a bi-lateral agreement with the Libyan Government to allow deportation 
of ‘illegal’ migrants to Libyan’s detention camps – financed by the Italian Government (Andrijasevic, R. 
2006). In 2008, Berlusconi and Libyan Leader Gaddafi signed a ‘Friendship, Partnership and Cooperation 
Agreement’ taking effect from March 2009 (Ministero degli Affari Esteri n.d.; Statewatch 2009). The 
Council of Europe, including the Italians, were also training their Libyan counterparts in the fight against 
illegal immigration (Del Grande 2009; Global Detention Project 2009b; Human Rights Watch 2009) 
while the setting up of centres in North Africa was a proposal of the UK Government back in 2003 at the 
Thessaloniki Summit (Blair 2003). A serious possible consequence of this is that asylum seekers are at 
risk of human rights violations.  
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 They have organised several demonstrations and rallies in support of labour migration and migrants’ 
communities. After all, migrants have become part of their clientele. However, they “expend much less 
effort on lobbying” (Menz 2008, 263) than employers. 
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 “preferential quotas amounting to a total of 22,000 slots for 2005, up from only 6,000 for 1998 contained 
within more general quotas (99,500 for 2005, up from 58,000 in 1998)” (ibid). Quotas cover “a high 
proportion of seasonal workers, especially in agriculture, temporally limited contract workers and a tightly 
limited number of self-employed. Furthermore, special consideration is given to university professors and 
researchers, certified translators and interpreters, domestic aides and au pairs, trainees, language teachers, 
sailors, athletes, artists, temporarily posted workers, and accredited foreign journalists” (ibid). 
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 The real discontinuity concerns the relationships between pro-immigrant groups and the 
government. As hypothesis 4 postulated, the existence of policy networks that interact with the 
government may be the cause of power struggles between the networks and the government. 
The interaction between these groups and the political parties is highlighted in the study by 
Perlmutter (2000) which analyses three different political phases between 1990 and 1994. 
During the first phase in 1990, parties were strong and this was noticeable in the making of the 
Martelli law. Things changed during the second phase between 1992 and 1993 due to the 
absence or crisis of strong political leadership. This political impasse gave a chance to pro-
immigrant groups to lobby their MPs fairly strongly creating a circle called Patto per un 
Parlamento Antirazzista (Pact for an Antiracist Parliament). The final phase in 1994 coincided 
with the election of the first Berlusconi government during which parties re-claimed their space 
whilst cutting out the lobbies. This is also the period in which a shift from the proportional 
representation system to a majoritarian system happened, thus, giving “less autonomy” to 
“individual parliamentarians” and no “potential legislative majority to influence” (Perlmutter 
2000, 19-20). The introduction of this shift was due also – but not exclusively – to attempts to 
regulate lobbying activities. Lobbying in Italy has been seen by many authors as a negative 
factor because it weakens “the sovereignty of political decision” (Fotia 2002, 113) and 
consequently it decreases “the representativeness of political parties” (Lanzalaco 2002, 125). 
Furthermore, in most cases, lobbying is open to the strongest and most organised interests to the 
detriment of less organised ones (Fotia 2002). At the same time, lobbying increases the 
permeability and the vulnerability of institutions already weakened by their subordination to the 
same political parties (Pasquino 1988). The exploitation of this weakness by organised interests 
circumvents parties’ political control. However, the move to a majoritarian system, with the aim 
of forming a bipolar political system, would expose fewer parliamentarians to the pressures of 
group interests whilst having a less corrupt system of policy-making (Perlmutter 2000; Vassallo 
2007). Allegedly though, because the Italian political system is formed by a plurality of political 
parties forming coalitions with different orientations and programs, it opens the door to 
interactions between interest groups with different aims and parties or single members of a 
given party (Fotia 2002).  
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 The Bossi-Fini law, unlike the previous Turco-Napolitano law drafted mainly in the 
legislative offices of the Ministry of Interior and Social Affairs (Zincone and Di Gregorio 
2002), was a ‘creature’ of the second Berlusconi government, formed by a collection of 
different parties that had the majority in both Houses. Besides, the Turco-Napolitano included 
open discussions and input from experts and non-governmental religious organisations and in 
particular, an umbrella group comprising several Christian associations
1
. The group of reflection 
for the religious area (Gruppo di Riflessione per l’area Religiosa) cooperated with the 
government chiefly on aspects related to policies of integration. Because of their religious 
denomination, they had fair success in lobbying the most moderate part of the centre-right. Yet, 
despite the fact that a centre-left coalition was in power and that the religious group were part of 
a government Committee, they did not have much success in getting their point across, the law 
being the result of civil servants’ work (interview with Briguglio). Zincone and Di Gregorio 
(2002) described this aspect as “closure of the ministries to the outside world” (ibid, 9) most 
probably due to the pressure exercised by the other EU states – and as a sort of pre-requisite to 
become part of the Schengen area – so to avoid delays in passing the law. With the Bossi-Fini, 
this closure became tighter and tighter as the government deliberately excluded from the process 
even the religious groups. 
 In 2002 and as with Berlusconi’s previous government in 1994, political parties in the 
ruling coalition were in control. This explains why on average pro-immigrant groups did not 
have such a weight in the consultation process. They lacked political opportunity in that 
particular government including the ‘powerful’ (because of its reputation, and extensive 
network of associations) Caritas. The Bossi-Fini in fact, was drafted “with no consultation at 
EU level or with local and regional actors” (Geddes 2008, 360). 
 According to Dinh Le Quyen from Caritas, during the formulation of the Bossi-Fini the 
government preferred to discuss things with the Conferenza Episcopale Italiana (CEI). 
However, this explanation does not give the full picture. Although non-state actors’ 
involvement was limited by the government’s wishes to conclude the formation of the law 
quickly and with as little change as possible in order not to change its original principles, it is 
also true that the ruling coalition did entertain some sort of relationship in a neo-corporatist style 
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with those interests with the most economic importance. This created an ‘élitist power structure’ 
according to which only a few groups benefited from their advantageous knowledge and 
economic position, thus gaining access to policy-makers (Marsh and Rhodes 1992). Firstly, 
there were highly organised businesses as the main beneficiaries of immigration (Freeman 
1995). As such, they were able to express their concerns and to exert some pressure both 
officially and unofficially with the parties in the Majority. Secondly, pro-immigrant Catholic 
organisations – most notably Caritas and the Comunità di Sant’Egidio – were cut out from the 
government’s discussions but managed to have their voices heard by policy-makers with likely 
ideas within the Catholic party in the Majority creating an “unlikely alliance” (Zincone 2006a, 
359). This alliance makes Italy a weak state with “an exclusive strategy toward the left” (Tarrow 
2008, 82) as only Catholic and economic interest groups were able to sway parties on the right 
of the government. This is how the regularisation programme came to be. However, the 
government chose who to speak to and when and they were only swayed by external economic 
influences because of the market’s need for cheap immigrant labour. These first two set of 
actors had an important role – at times a decisive one – with regard to immigration.  
 In contrast to the part on immigration that saw the complete closure of the government 
towards pro-migrant groups, asylum saw the involvement of two important actors: the UNHCR 
on all the aspects concerning asylum and the national Association of Italian Municipalities 
(ANCI) that was more vocal on a system of funding to help the integration of refugees 
(SPRAR). The institutionalisation of SPRAR into the law was possible thanks to the pressure 
coming from mayors of several Italian municipalities that, beyond their political make-up, were 
concerned about the safety of their streets and citizens (interview with Compagnucci). The 
inclusion of some of the UNHCR amendments in the Act therefore, was not a consequence of 
the cooperation between the refugees’ organisations and the political parties as in the case of the 
Catholic groups. It was thanks to the perceived important role of the UNHCR as an international 
accredited organisation and at the same time, a bottom-up pressure exercised by mayors through 





The right to sanctuary in Italy is embedded in article 10 of the Italian Constitution dating back 
to 1967. However, to date Italy remains the only European country without specific legislation 
on asylum, allegedly because of a real lack of interest from political parties that are more 
interested in controlling the illegal entry of migrants without, however, much success. Rather, 
the country has preferred to deal with asylum through the transposition into domestic law of six 
EU Directives.  
 In the meantime, Italy has seen five pieces of legislation just on immigration, among which 
figures the Bossi-Fini Act. This is because the migration/asylum phenomenon is still relatively 
new, as the country has only recently gone ‘officially’ from an emigration country to an 
immigration one. This passage has been swift if compared to other EU countries, exacerbating 
“[t]he lack of immigration experience, the absence of an adequate legal framework and a 
strained public administration” (Finotelli and Sciortino 2009, 120). As a result, many Italians as 
well as political parties on the right perceived immigration as a threat to national identity and 
security. This is different from the UK where asylum was perceived as a threat rather than 
labour migration which was seen instead as a potential source of profit for the economy. The 
sudden change of Italy to an immigration country has favoured, at the same time, the increase of 
populist policies supported warmly by the Northern League. This political party, despite its 
strong anti-immigration stance, has become one of the most important allies of the three 
Berlusconi governments and was, together with the Catholic party CCD-CDU, the main actor 
during the making of the Bossi-Fini law. Nevertheless, the anti-immigrant rhetoric of the party 
and the rest of the government’s coalition did not live up to its own standards, as there was a 
gap between words and actions. The measures adopted were not as strict as originally drafted 
and even those that made it into the Act were implemented with difficulty. The gap with regard 
to the Bossi-Fini was due to a series of factors. First, different parties and as such different 
ideologies formed the coalition. Second, there was the bargaining that happened between the 
Lega – which wanted more stringent measures – and the CCD-CDU – which wanted to 
implement softer measures and passed successfully the regularisation of carers and domestic 
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workers. Finally, there was the symbolic value of the words used by the Lega leaders against 
migrants in the effort to please their electorate. 
 The Bossi-Fini turned out to be simply a further restriction of measures introduced by the 
previous Turco-Napolitano. The two articles on asylum represent the real innovation in the law. 
Nevertheless, the trend that started with the Martelli law to have in the same law measures 
related to immigration and asylum has continued with the Bossi-Fini, as if a couple of articles 
could indeed deal with such an intricate phenomenon. This represents one of the continuities 
noticed in the comparison of the laws on immigration together, with the presence of the 
Catholic groups within government, which has tended to soften the measures introduced. There 
were however also discontinuities and these related mainly to the collaboration between the 
government and pro-migrant groups. Alternate phases have seen the incorporation or the 
exclusion of these groups. Centre-left governments have been more open to dialogue and advice 
while centre-right governments have done the exact opposite. This was the case with the Bossi-
Fini, whereby from the very beginning groups were deliberately left out of the equation. 
However, because of the presence of Catholic parties in government, religious groups were still 
able to exercise some influence through their policy-makers, while secular groups could not. At 
the same time, the asylum part of the law came out from the cooperation between the Ministry 
of Interior, the UNHCR and, on the part related to the institutionalisation of a service for 
refugees, ANCI. The articles on asylum did not encounter much resistance during the debates as 
the main issue was represented by labour migration.  
 The influence of Catholic parties and Catholic groups confirms Italy’s place as a 
conservative state in Esping-Andersen’s (1990) typology. The Catholic Church is depicted as 
having vast tentacular power. The evidence also concurs with Geddes et al. (2004) typology of 
Mediterranean countries in relation to widespread illegal migration and weak institutions. 
Indeed at times the government was merely an intermediary between the parties in the majority. 
On the other hand, the collaboration between the UNHCR and the Interior Ministry and at the 
same time the reticence of the government to open up even to Catholic groups show that welfare 
states do not necessarily fit into one fixed typology. Rather, depending on the issue – as it was 
asylum policy-making here – things may in fact be different or change over time. 
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 The next two chapters deal with the UK and Italian parliamentary debates and discuss 
insights quoted from interviews. These are key to understanding the micro- and meso-levels of 
the policy process (i.e. the levels that consider the inputs and impact of policy networks in the 
decision-making settings) referred to in the literature review chapter. Furthermore, they are 
























THE 2002 NATIONALITY, IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM ACT 
The aim of this chapter is to account for the policy-making process that created the 2002 NIA 
Act between April 2002, when the first reading happened, and 7
th
 November of the same year, 
when the bill received Royal Assent. Through the analysis of the asylum policy-making process, 
the chapter demonstrates that policy was made by political élites and in particular by specific 
individuals within the Prime Minister’s Delivery Unit. These individuals felt that the policy was 
necessary to deal with the perceived asylum crisis. As highlighted in Chapter 4, between 1999 
and 2002, negative headlines would appear on a daily basis in right-wing media complaining 
about ‘bogus’ asylum seekers and the inability of the government to tackle the seeming abuse of 
the asylum system in ‘soft-touch’ Britain. Public opinion was persuaded by the media to 
perceive asylum as a threat to national identity, security and welfare. Because of this perception, 
the government saw asylum as a priority issue to be tackled in order to restore its image, mainly 
for electoral purposes.  
 The bill underwent changes during its passage, but these were mainly cosmetic in 
character. These changes all happened during scrutiny in the House of Lords, where the 
government suffered three important defeats. Concessions to proposed amendments were 
minimal despite the strong lobby of pro-asylum advocacy groups. This is relevant to hypotheses 
3 on governance and 4 on networks because it shows that asylum was still a matter of core 
executive control. This is in opposition to the belief that the ‘Westminster model’ is weaker than 
it was. Although there were widespread and open consultations between advocacy groups and 
the government, there was a deep ideological divide between them. Whereas the former wanted 
a safe environment for refugees and asylum seekers, the latter wished to (re)assert its power 
through a more decisive control on asylum seekers’ right of entry. Because of this fundamental 
dissent and the unequal distribution of resources between pro-asylum groups and in relation to 
the government, the groups and NGOs are best characterised as issue networks rather than 
highly integrated policy communities or governance networks. The Refugee Council may be 
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characterised as the most powerful NGO within the refugee sector by virtue of its knowledge 
and resources, but also in its flexibility toward the government. 
 Further, the chapter highlights three geographical levels of involvement in the making of 
the Act: national, regional and local. The first level considers the national view of how the 
asylum system should work. At the time under consideration, it was steered by the Labour 
government and was based on the perceived asylum crisis. The regional view relates to the case 
of accommodation centres. The government wanted the centres to alleviate the burden on 
welfare services in London and the South East of England, where many asylum seekers tended 
to go because of existing links and job availability. The third level takes into consideration the 
local view and the issue of ‘NIMBY’ (Not In My Backyard) protests in those communities that 
were going to be affected by the construction of accommodation centres. All the sites chosen by 
the government to host accommodation centre were in affluent, middle class Conservative 
constituencies. When Conservative MPs opposed this, they were accused of ‘NIMBYism’. 
 Finally, the chapter explains how asylum policy was shaped by two forces. The first is the 
institutional structures of the UK government i.e. Number 10, the Cabinet Office, the Home 
Office, the House of Commons and the House of Lords. The second is the nature of the British 
state and its heritage of welfare policy. This was an important part of what was being contested 
in debates over asylum policy.  
 The next section provides an overview of the policy process. It starts with the identification 
of the key actors
185
 involved in making the Act, both at government and civil society level and 
the networks they formed. This is followed by a detailed analysis of the debates, including 
amendments, results and changes. These are in chronological order, starting with the most 
debated topic (accommodation centres) and followed by the ones most criticised by NGOs 
(termination of support and changes to the appeals’ system). This allows identification of the 
process by which compromise was reached, the roles of the main actors and how they deployed 
power to reach compromise within each issue.  
 
                                                     
185
 See Appendices 3 and 4 for the list of UK key actors who agreed to take part in the interviews. 
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6.1 THE POLICY PROCESS: ACTORS AND NETWORKS 
6.1.1 Actors and networks: roles, interaction and power 
Interviews and analysis of the debates focused on the interaction between two main types of 
actors. On one side there was the government. The 2002 NIA Act started in its core with major 
political steerage coming from the Prime Minister and the Home Secretary. The other major 
actor was civil society, which comprised NGOs whose aim was to lobby the government on 
behalf of asylum seekers, but also groups of citizens that organised specifically to protest 
against the government’s decision to build accommodation centres in their areas. This 
interaction is discussed through the medium of five types of networks: internal or cross-
government networks that could also be described as “ministerial meetings and civil servants 
meetings” (interview with Professor Saggar); “all-party-meetings either under the all-party-
group or specially fixed to talk about the bill and to brief people” (interview with Lord Dubs186); 
networks or “official stakeholders fora”  (interview with Shaw) on invitation organised by the 
Home Office in order to meet up with the main actors in the sector; “hundreds and hundreds” 
(ibid) of networks within the NGOs themselves; and finally meetings between local citizens and 
local authorities to discuss the establishment of the accommodation centres in their areas.  
 The five types of networks and the key stakeholders acting within them are analysed 
below. 
 
6.1.1.1 Internal or cross-government networks 
These types of networks are made up of lawyers and civil servants working in different 
departments “reflecting the fact that we were interested in how migration was impacting on 
housing and health care as well as the wider economy and employment” (interview with Home 
Office Official 1). The Home Office, in charge of asylum and immigration policies in particular, 
is described as “a thinking area” as it was “not in charge of how [policies are] implemented [or] 
put into practice” (ibid). It is therefore essential to discuss matters with “the operational part of 
the business”, then with the Home Office lawyers and finally with “other parts of the business” 
(ibid) that may be effected by the changes, like judges or the prison system.  
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 Interview date: 11
th
 February 2011. 
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 Nick Pearce, who at the time was the Policy Adviser of the then Home Secretary David 
Blunkett, emphasised the importance and influence of legal advisers within the Home Office if 
compared to other government departments, in the “formation of policy because it [the Home 
Office] is much more bounded by judicial interpretation [and] judicial review”. Legal advisers 
would even attend policy meeting with the Prime Minister to “advise on whether something was 
compatible with the Human Rights Act and also of course with the 1951 Refugee Convention” 
(interview). Pierce believed that the influence of these advisers was greater than that of any 
lobbying group. This is because ministers and civil servants form a “partnership” that at times 
can be instrumental. Home Office Official 3
187
 stated during the interview that “if you imagine 
that David Blunkett has a sense of what needs to happen ... any civil servant who comes up with 
a proposal that fits within that, he's going to be enormously influential”. But within the Home 
Office those who counted, those who really held the power in the policy-making process of the 
Act were a relatively small group of people, in particular the Prime Minister (Tony Blair), the 
Home Secretary (David Blunkett), Nick Pearce and the Attorney General (Peter Goldsmith) who 
“was pretty instrumental” (interview with Home Office Official 3) in the formation of the safe 
third country and section 55 processes. This way of making politics has been described as 
‘Blair’s sofa’s cabinet’ whereby “[d]ecisions are often taken over a cup of tea on the sofa in Mr 
Blair's No 10 office – known to insiders as "the den" –  rather than in formal, minuted committee 
meetings” (Wheeler 2004). Tony Blair and David Blunkett especially were pushing “the officials 
very hard” (interview with Pearce) to come up with suitable solutions. Pearce stressed the 
importance of the Home Office and No.10 as “it was by and large all done between” the two. 
Home Office Official 1 did confirm this trend as her perception was “that it was all coming from 
David Blunkett” but added that also “Nick Pearce was a huge architect of the Act”. In fact, both 
the White Paper and the Act were “very much the product of Nick Pearce” as well as “David 
Blunkett and a couple of policy people in the Department … they came up with this end-to-end 
system … the reception centres, the accommodation centres and then the detention 
centres”(ibid). So these important personalities were moving the wires like puppeteers thus 
highlighting the political steerage behind the Act.  
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 Telephone interview date: 8
th
 March 2011. 
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6.1.1.2 All-party meetings 
All-party meetings were the official instrumental tool used by both MPs and Lords to collect the 
information needed while the bill was under discussion in parliament. They are normally 
organised “either under the all-party-group or specially fixed” (interview with Lord Dubs) and 
are friendly gatherings as a hostile attitude would jeopardise the cooperation. “Building a good 
working relationship with key people” (interview with Hussain) was essential as it was the 
identification of those “MPs 188  who are in the Parliamentary Committees, who are more 
influential or who have had a long standing interest in this” (interview with Dr Metcalfe). This 
was also a key feature noticed in Italy. There, it was perhaps even more important to identify 
and establish a good relationship with MPs who were more willing to listen and cooperate given 
the closure of the Italian government towards civil society groups. This is discussed in the next 
chapter. 
 There were also less official and more private meetings between MPs of different parties 
and also between MPs and NGOs’ representatives because “the vast majority of real policy-
making goes on behind the scenes” (interview with Home Office Official 1). These meetings are 
a way to test the ground and find out “how far” an MP, for example, “is ready to go … and what 




 Compromise is an essential part of any political debate, although the analysis of the debates 
does not show a great deal of concessions. These were mainly in relation to setting a monitor for 
the accommodation centres that would also establish if the centre was appropriate for the 
inhabitants, the length of time people should stay in the centres and the education of children in 
the centres. 
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 The process works roughly like this: first “e-mail the MP or send an MP a copy of your briefings”; 
then when it goes to Committee stage you might send another briefing specifically on individual clauses 
and possible amendments”; finally “it would go to the House of Lords and then you would repeat the 
process”. For a more high profile bill quite often the MPs would approach you, in particular the party élite 
on a particular point. So for immigration and asylum it would be the Home Affair spokesperson or 
occasionally a Labour rebel might come to you” (interview with Dr Metcalfe). 
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 Interview date: 1
st
 March 2011. 
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6.1.1.3 Home Office fora 
When the Labour party was elected in 1997 they “dissolved most of the stakeholder fora” 
(interview with Shaw) but created a new major one in 2000: the National Refugee Integration 
Forum
190. It was regarded as the “essential link between national, regional and local problem 
solving” (National Archives, n.d.) and it was formed by five sub-groups from outside central 
government, each with different expertise
191
. Attending fora, however, may be “rather 
frustrating because it feels like you're just going through a tick box” (interview with Shaw). 
This is what happened with the Act as it was by and large a creature of the government which 
was “on a political mission” (interview with Flynn). 
 In 2002 consultations within and outside the government were fairly regular although not 
very open, as attendance at the government meetings was subject to invitation. These meetings 
were frequent and at times included different actors. Also in Italy, the meetings were by 
invitation but, contrary to the UK, they were rare and infrequent. On one occasion, in the UK 
debates it was mentioned that some politicians met with parents, teachers, head teachers and the 
Church’s Commission for Racial Justice to discuss accommodation centres but especially the 
education of children within these centres. The effect of this was to raise the issue and the 
consequent amendments in the House of Lords.  
 As Hansard indicated, the government showed a certain degree of flexibility by discussing 
and exploring different ideas but in the end they accepted little bargaining. Especially in relation 
to accommodation centres, they listened to different points of view about the impact centres 
would have on local communities and were certainly conscious of public opinion on asylum 
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 It was however dissolved six years later as part of a plan to “overhaul … the way in which refugee 
integration services are structured and funded in England” (Home Office 2006, 3). That was the 
beginning of the New Asylum Mode (NAM). It is more recent however, the launch in 2007 by the Labour 
government of the National Asylum Stakeholders Forum (NASF) as the main medium of contact with the 
biggest asylum organisations within the voluntary sector, the regions and local government. NASF “meets 
every two months, it is co-chaired by the Border Agency and the Refugee Council … and it's primarily at 
Chief Executive’s level” (interview with Shaw). There was furthermore the Inter-Agency Partnership 
headed by the RC. It “was formed in 1999 prior to the introduction of NASS. The Partnership is 
contracted by NASS to provide advice, support and emergency accommodation to newly arrived asylum 
seekers and to provide on-going support to asylum seekers living in dispersal accommodation. The 
Partnership consists of six established agencies - Migrant Helpline, Refugee Action, Refugee Arrivals 
Project, Refugee Council, Scottish Refugee Council and the Welsh Refugee Council” (Refugee Council 
2004a, 2). 
191
 Children and Young Persons, Accommodation and Community Safety, Community and Media, Health, 
and Employment and Training (National Archive n.d.). 
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seekers and the tabloid press coverage. Finally, after the public enquiry – itself the result of 
criticism coming from affected local communities and their citizens – was published, they were 
forced to accept that accommodation centres were not such a feasible project. They agreed to 
experiment with a smaller centre not based in a rural area, as suggested by the Refugee Council. 
As Blunkett admitted,  
we were not getting anywhere. We got ourselves into the worst of our worlds where 
the original idea which was benign, was being painted as being restrictive and 
confining … and so we had to find a solution that would have assisted us with 
demonstrating just how good this could have been (interview). 
 
 Lobbying from civil society in the fora was reasonably strong but perhaps not enough to 
bring substantial changes to the government’s initial position, given the centrality of the asylum 
issue in the UK at the time. 
 
6.1.1.4 NGO networks 
NGOs were well organised and there was wide consultation with the government. As Flynn 
recalled: 
the culture of the government is very much open door at superficial level. It's actually 
not difficult to phone a senior head of department in Lunar House. Everybody knows 
each other by their first names; it's all very friendly and clubbable at that level. 
Measured by the opportunity to sit down and have discussions with influential 
people, then it seems to be [easy]. But what really matters is the outcome of all these 
discussions. If you find out that it doesn't make that much difference, then you don't 
have that much influence and that's where we are (interview). 
 
So, despite wide consultations, NGOs bore little or no influence on the government’s plans and 
decisiveness to tackle the perceived abuse of the asylum system. 
 Stability, trust and interdependence characterised the cooperation among the NGOs during 
the passage of the 2002 NIA Act and are key for the application of Rhodes’ network analysis 
(1997, 2007).  
 Within civil society there were two main groups of NGO actors who were more vocal and 
certainly more influential than others, as the parliamentary debates confirm. The first group, 
“involved very much in the legal” (interview with Best) comprised the Immigration Advisory 
Service (IAS), the Immigration Law Practitioner’s Association (ILPA), the Joint Council for the 
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Welfare of Immigrants (JCWI), Justice and the Refugee Legal Centre. They were particularly 
active in briefing MPs on more technical issues, mainly in relation to human rights. The second 
group focused on more specialised issues, for instance children or detention
192
. They would 
lobby the government on every aspect concerning, for example, the wellbeing of children “like 
the Children Consortium that … were obviously very material in lobbying on the part of 
children in proposed accommodation centres” (interview with Best). Both groups existed as a 
network prior to the Act, as was the case in Italy, and were formed by various organisations that 
already knew each other and had worked together before. More generally in fact, all of the 
above NGOs worked in several – at times overlapping – networks. For example, Save the 
Children operated within an umbrella group called Refugee Children’s Consortium which is 
made up of different children’s organisations but includes others not working specifically on 
children: ILPA and the Medical Foundation for the Care of Victims of Torture, for example, are 
also members. At the same time, most of these organisations were part of a different umbrella 
group called Asylum Rights Campaign (ARC) chaired by the Refugee Council.  
 
6.1.1.5 Citizen groups 
These groups were also very vocal and were able to involve local authorities and MPs but were 
also backed up by national asylum and refugee support groups
193
. These protests were powerful 
and delayed the start of construction but their influence was limited to that. In fact, the Home 
Office failed to engage with the local community prior to the start of the works “even though it 
was aware of the strength of feeling locally” (House of Commons 2008, 4). Once again, the 
government decisiveness and its political steerage overrode everything else, including 
knowledge of the local community’s feelings towards the centres. The meetings between 
citizens and local authorities, albeit useful to understand the feelings of the public with regard to 
the centres, were not the real focus of the thesis, however. Furthermore, they deal specifically 
with the accommodation centres rather than the Act as a whole. 
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 For example, the Bail for Immigration Detainees or the Association of Visitors to Immigration 
Detainees. 
193
 These latter groups however opposed the centres not to maintain the high standards of an all-white 
affluent area but to protect asylum seekers from isolation and institutionalisation. Their reasons were 
therefore different but strengthened the cause against the centres. 
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 Figure 6.1 below shows how the asylum decision-making process was influenced by 
various stakeholders with different interests at stake. They fed information to the government – 
which included the core executive, the House of Lords and House of Commons – in an attempt 
to influence it through tabloid media articles and images on TV of “people hanging on the 
trains, jumping out of lorries” (interview with Blunkett), but also opinion polls and surveys that 
indicated asylum as one of the top priority issues for the British public. There were also 
organised protests by local citizens affected by the establishment of accommodation centres and 
the resulting reports written by their local councils on the feasibility of the project. At the 
bottom of this hierarchical structure, there are the national and international NGOs and the 
Refugee Community Organisations (RCOs). They are placed at the bottom because they were 
less likely to influence the policy process. Their agenda – the protection and safeguard of 
asylum seekers – was different from that of the government which was to regain the trust of the 
voting public. The RCOs did not interact directly with the government but were linked to the 
national NGOs. RCOs are too many and very often do not have the resources (people, time and 
money) to engage with policy directly. They therefore networked with leading organisations in 
their field (e.g. the Refugee Council) that did have resources and knowledge. However, they 
were advised by the Refugee Council to network with their MPs. The national NGOs were also 
networking with international NGOs (e.g. Amnesty International), the government, the Houses 
of Commons and Lords through formal and informal meetings. They also tried to influence 
local opinion by releasing interviews or public briefings in order to dispel myths about asylum 
seekers that were promoted by the tabloids. Finally, they attended more or less official meetings 
with the government and briefed MPs and Lords. EU institutions did not bear any influence on 
the NIA Act. It was a government initiative and the core executive’s aim was to reassert their 
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 As highlighted in the previous chapters, asylum in the UK was perceived as an important 
and difficult issue which led to the formation of issue networks. The next section explains why 
and highlights their characteristics. 
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6.1.2 Issue networks  
One of the main characteristics of issue networks is that there are often strong differences 
between the viewpoints of NGOs and government. The attitude of the organisations was 
refugee-centric because of their focus on human rights and integration. Their fear was that 
people could become marginalised and institutionalised in the case of the accommodation 
centres (Refugee Council 2002b, 18) and destitute in the case of Section 55, related to the 
refusal of support. The government did not have any “sympathy with our [NGOs] basic case 
about the centrality of human rights to the refugee situation” (interview with Flynn). The idea 
was mainly to keep people in an enclosed space and well under control while offering in-house 
services including the education of children, allegedly to protect them from bullying and other 
regrettable incidents. More specifically, in relation to the establishment of accommodation 
centres (but not exclusively), NGOs displayed a refugee-centred approach while the government 
adopted what may be portrayed as a state-centred approach and, but only to a limited extent, a 
community-centred approach. The community-centred approach was forced by the strong 
opposition within the communities where the centres were due to be built. Despite this 
difference of opinions between the government and NGOs, consultations were widespread. MPs 
and Lords in particular needed the expertise of NGOs because of the technicalities of the bill. 
 Two further characteristics of an issue network, as explained by Marsh and Rhodes (1992), 
are the large number of participants and the limited resources available, such as personnel, time, 
and money. According to the London Refugee Directory, available on the Refugees in Effective 
& Active Partnership website, there are 748 refugee organisations in London alone. Affected 
interests comprised several groups. For example, the ARC was the umbrella group
194
 for the 
sector and comprised churches, refugee charities, and human rights organisations. While each 
one of these groups potentially had a voice, it was only the bigger and more established refugee 
communities that would attend both the ARC and the Immigration Law Practitioners’ 
Association (ILPA) meetings because they “had the people to do it” (interview with Hussain). 
So, as Neil Gerrard emphasised, it was mainly “professionals rather than …community groups” 
who participated in the consultations. They were “better organised”, better resourced and better 
                                                     
194
 It was established in 1993. 
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prepared to confront the technicalities of the bill (interview). Therefore, only a small group of 
these were at the time involved directly in the making of the bill with the Refugee Council (RC) 
being the most influential. Thanks to their expertise and knowledge, they proposed to the 
government to trial one smaller accommodation centre. Furthermore, because of their resources, 
the RC chaired the ARC and co-operated with Refugee Community Organisations (RCOs). In 
particular, the RC’s Community Development Team kept the RCOs abreast of any 
developments and asked them to lobby their MPs. The RC collaborated also with local groups 
with regard to the establishment of accommodation centres in their local communities. This was 
not an easy co-operation as the groups had different agendas. On the other hand, the 
collaboration was to everybody’s advantage because neither the RC nor the local groups wanted 
big centres in rural areas. 
 Heclo (1978), the first to theorise issue networks, pointed out that issue networks share 
knowledge, but often do not share actions or beliefs. Marsh and Rhodes (1992) believed 
networks do agree on occasions, but “conflict is ever present” (ibid, 29). In the specific case 
under study, the NGOs shared knowledge on the issue of asylum but they also shared similar 
beliefs and actions. Because of the amount of work they have shared through the years, they 
have been able to form a good working environment where “differences of view” do exist “but 
not big ones” (interview with Hardwick 195 ). As such, their meetings were open, informal, 
frequent and relationships friendly (interview with Hussain). Cooperation was “terribly easy” 
(interview with Best) because they shared “a common set of values and a common set of 
objectives and a common enemy and those things always overrode everything” (interview with 
Hardwick). 
 Another characteristic that did not match strictly with the notion set out by Marsh and 
Rhodes (1992) is that issue networks are unstable and contacts fluctuate. The analysis has 
revealed that the relationships among pro-asylum organisations were stable as well as their 
contacts during the making of the bill. The ARC umbrella group, for instance, used to meet 
“fortnightly” (interview with Hussain) with regular exchange of e-mails. Yet, contacts before 
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 In 2002 he was the Chief Executive of the RC. Interview date: 8
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and after the bill did fluctuate as meetings became less frequent, happening every one to three 
months.  
 In conclusion, the groups within the issue network had unequal powers. This was a 
reflection of their unequal resources but also the unequal access to the government. Only the 
bigger, better resourced and knowledgeable organisations had access. The RC, had an extra 
ingredient. Being “constructive and pragmatic” turned out to be the winning formula for the 
organisation as “it wasn’t the question about them being open to us, but us being open to them” 
(interview with Hardwick). 
 The next section introduces the debates in the House of Commons and the House of Lords. 
 
6.2 KEY DEBATES 
A recurrent criticism moved by several MPs and Lords, was the lack of time to discuss 
amendments appropriately, especially considering that the bill “grew by a third in length due to 
government amendments” (Baroness Anelay of St Johns196, HL Deb 24 June 2002, vol. 636, col. 
1097). As a result, some amendments were not discussed or “introduced in such a way that no 
debate took place” (Lord Filkin, HL Deb ibid, col. 1089). Some amendments were included at 
the last minute giving no chance of discussion, causing some MPs to ask for the re-committal to 
a Standing Committee, but to no avail. The Lords on the other hand, obtained the re-
commitment and a second report stage. 
 In 2002 the government had a majority in the House of Commons but not in the House of 
Lords. This meant that amendments in the former were rarely accepted – and in the case of this 
bill none was passed unless they came from the government itself. Potential rebel MPs were 
absent from the Committee. As Neil Gerrard commented, “the Whips will ensure if there are a 
lot of MPs who are critical of the bill, [that] they're not on the Committee. They will make sure 
it's pretty well impossible for the government to lose anything” (interview). 
 There were many instances found during the analysis of Hansard in which Labour MPs 
would question parts of the bill that were not clear or posed risks to the refugee community. 
Many spoke out because of their direct experience working in constituencies with high refugee 
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populations. However, criticism was usually contained and amendments were often withdrawn 
after hearing the answer to their concerns, whether satisfactory or not. Simon Hughes
197
 for 
example, stated that it was a disappointment to have heard infrequently “some of the voices that 
were expected to come from the Labour party in support of immigrants and asylum seekers” 
(Hansard, HC Deb 11 June 2002, vol. 373, col. 733). Most of the amendments came from the 
opposition Liberal Democrat and Conservative parties. 
 The House of Lords was the place where “an actual change” (interview with Gerrard MP) 
could happen, especially in the case of “major arguments … at Report Stage in the Commons” 
(ibid). This did happen with the NIA bill as the government was defeated several times. For 
instance, the first defeat was in relation to the establishment of accommodation centres; the 
second to the education of children within the centres; and the third to the time people should 
spend in accommodation centres. 
 The focus of the next part of the chapter is on the actual debates in relation to the most 
contentious issues presented and discussed in Chapter 4. They came under scrutiny in both 
houses. However, the amendments that did not pass in the Commons were re-presented in the 
Lords namely: clause 14 on the establishment of accommodation centres and clause 82 relating 
to unfounded human rights or asylum claims. Although the appeals’ streamlining was welcome, 
the need to examine non-suspensive appeals was recognised. This was because firstly, the 
“draconian measure” (Lord Dholakia, HL Deb 24 June 2002, vol. 636, col. 1103) of third 
country removal without being able to appeal in the UK was not mentioned in the White Paper. 
Secondly, it was “pushed at a late stage of the bill's passage through Parliament, giving the 
impression that once again there is a knee-jerk reaction to our overworked appeal system” 
(ibid). Thirdly, because of different interpretations of the 1951 Convention throughout the 
European Union, it was pointed out that other countries would “take back undocumented 
asylum seekers” that have supposedly “passed through their territory” (Baroness Uddin, HL 
Deb, 24 June 2002, vol. 636, col. 1120). Also the new clause on the refusal of support in case of 
late claim for asylum (section 55) was discussed. Of all these clauses, the one that attracted 
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much debate in both Houses was clause 14 with regard to the education of children within the 
centres.  
 The debates associated with the accommodation centres are the focus of the next section. 
This is longer than the sections dedicated to the support and appeals because a lot of time went 
into the discussion of the centres given the interests at stake and the several related topics, such 
as size, location, length of time spent in the centres and education of children. 
 
6.2.1 Accommodation centres 
The establishment of accommodation centres attracted the biggest numbers of amendments and 
was discussed at length. Because of the inclusion of several different aspects, they appeared in 
different clauses. The aspects concerned the size, location, and length of time asylum seekers 
should spend in the centres, facilities available, education of children and support of asylum 
seekers who did not accept to stay in the centres.  
 The centres were an old idea launched by the Conservatives when they were in power and 
recycled by Labour – who had originally opposed it. On average, the initial trial and the idea 
that people should not be in the centres for long were the topics that found agreement across 
party lines and in both Houses. Apart from the initial accord though, many disagreements were 
recorded while particularly heated arguments happened during Third Reading in the House of 
Commons. They were due to fact that the sites chosen were all in Conservative areas. MPs 
concerned about the impact on their constituencies used the briefings written by various 
organisations in favour of small centres in urban areas to justify their reasoning.  
 The main concerns debated in the Commons were also the ones reported in the Lords 
namely, those related to the size, location, length of time spent in the centres and children’s 
education away from mainstream schools
198
.  
 The two most controversial topics, size and location, are analysed below. They illustrate 
the advisory role of networks and in particular of the Refugee Council, the locus of power, 
government inflexibility and the important role of the House of Lords. 
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6.2.1.1 Clause 16: Establishment of centres 
The analysis of this particular clause shows that the government accepted some change after 
suffering its first defeat in the House of Lords. Yet, change was minimal. This demonstrates that 
the government was determined but it was nevertheless forced to accept the negotiation process 
in order to move on with the debates. The clause also shows the relative power of the biggest 




The government’s proposal to have centres hosting up to 750 people on disused government 
land situated in small rural areas was heavily criticised by the opposition and by some Labour 
MPs. The opposition in both Houses agreed that centres should be much smaller. The response 
of the government throughout the debates was the same in both places. Angela Eagle, 
Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for the Home Department and Lord Filkin, Under-
Secretary of State for the Home Department, explained the reluctance of the government to 
“prescribe a size” (Angela Eagle, HC Deb 7 May 2002, vol. 384, col. 72) for the trials while 
locking “in the pilots and any development of centres in the future” (Lord Filkin, Hansard HL 
Deb 9 July 2002, vol. 637 col. 603). In practice, the government did not want a system that 
lacked the flexibility to alter things if circumstances dictated. The power to make changes was 
in the hands of the government and not with MPs and Lords. 
 In the House of Commons, opposition MPs across the political spectrum supported 
amendment
199
 no. 18 introduced by Mr Malins
200
 to limit the number of asylum seekers to 250 
within each centre against the initial number of 750 proposed by the government. The 
importance of having small centres that could offer better services for families with children and 
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single men alike was also reiterated
201
 in the Lords by Conservative member Baroness Anelay 
of St. Johns who received the support of the rest of the opposition (members of the Liberal 
Democrat party and crossbenchers alike). The majority on the other hand, was divided on the 
matter, especially in the House of Lords. Whereas Lord Corbett of Castle Vale
202
 arose in 
defence of the government’s idea as he believed that the main issue was not one of centre size203 
but of management
204
, others like Baroness Kennedy of the Shaws, were concerned about the 
wellbeing of women and children in big centres. 
 At Report Stage, Lord Filkin stated that the suggestion put forward by the opposition 
benches to have a smaller centre of about 250 people talking the same language, or up to only 
two-three different languages to keep the costs down, was taken into consideration. However, 
no final decision was taken until later in November when Beverly Hughes, Minister for 
Citizenship and Immigration, announced that the government had accepted that some of the trial 
accommodation centres should be smaller. 
 
Location 
This was one of the most difficult topics. Labour was against urban areas “where services and 
facilities are already under pressure” (Mike Gapes MP205, HC Deb 11 June 2002, vol. 373, col. 
770).  The Conservatives were against rural areas because the centres were all going to be 
trialled in their constituencies where the local population protested against their establishment. 
This aspect raised the question of ‘NIMBYism’.  
 A Labour Peer who agreed with the government was Lord Dubs. As former Head of the 
Refugee Council and a former refugee himself, he spoke from personal experience as he 
believed that housing people from the same country, sharing the same language and background 
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 It would be “extremely unlikely that in the early years of these centres that maximum number will be 
maintained for anything like 52 weeks of the year” (HL Deb 9 July 2002, vol. 637 col. 591). 
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 For Lord Corbett of Castle Vale, it would be beneficial in terms of mutual support to gather clusters of 
people coming from the same country, sharing the same cultural background and language. 
205
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was important because they could “stay together and give each other support” (interview206). He 
also said that the opposition raised by the local communities was not to be trusted because it 
“may be disguised as opposition to the size … [but] is actually based upon prejudice against 
having people from other” (HL Deb 9 October 2002, vol. 639, col. 307). This was the first time 
that a member of one of the Houses commented on the fact that people were rejecting the 
centres due to prejudice toward foreigners, and it suggests both a lack of awareness and of 
interest towards the issue. In fact, as highlighted in Chapter 4 the government was concerned 
mostly with ‘hiding’ people. Furthermore, because the dispersal system implemented with the 
1999 Act caused many problems (e.g. racist attacks) in poor, working class Labour 
constituencies, the alternative were the wealthy Conservative constituencies.  
 In the Lords, Baroness Anelay of St. Johns presented amendment no. 100
207
 whose aim was 
to clarify rules and guidelines for the construction of the centres “in rural areas where public 
services are already overstretched” (HL Deb 9 July 2002, vol. 637, col. 614). The issue reflected 
the anxieties expressed by the local communities, although other points were made, for 
example, with regard to the availability of religious facilities and consultations with voluntary 
organisations. What is distinctive about this particular amendment and the ensuing discussion is 
that within the Conservative party in the Lords there was concern about the well-being of the 
future occupants. In general, the Lords’ emphasis on human rights seemed to be of greater 
concern than in the Commons, suggesting a different political culture permeating the second 
chamber. On the other hand, the Conservative party wanted to come to terms with the demands 
and anger in their constituencies – after all it was a political issue for them and they did not wish 
to jeopardize their prospects for re-election. The voting population in these constituencies had 
far more power than the non-voting asylum seeking population.  
Later in October, Baroness Anelay moved amendment no.12
208
, again on the location of 
accommodation centres. On this occasion, it was pointed out by Lord Filkin that planning 
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 “( ) Prior to providing an accommodation centre, the Secretary of State shall consult with the relevant 
local authorities, health authorities and police authorities” (HL Deb 9 July 2002, vol. 637, col. 614). 
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 “( ) An accommodation centre shall be established only when the Secretary of State is satisfied that the 
proposed location is suitable to the needs of the persons to be accommodated therein” (HL Deb 9 October 
2002, vol. 639, col. 289). 
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permission for two sites had been presented but rejected. Besides, due to the growing opposition 
from local residents, building plans for the accommodation centres would most probably be 
delayed until 2004 after public enquiries
209
 were requested by the Home Secretary. The question 
put forward by the Baroness to have amendment no.12 included in the bill and related to the 
suitability of the centres according to the needs of the people within the centres was accepted as 
171 people voted in favour while 107 were “not content”. This was the first big defeat faced by 
the government during the making of the bill up to this point. While the government did not 
wish to accept the Baroness’s amendment, they were ready to soften their initial position by 
proposing a middle ground solution. On 5
th
 November, Beverly Hughes announced that one of 
the centres would be in or very close to an urban area and would be for single men only. 
Furthermore, she confirmed that there had been meetings with the Refugee Council and 
negotiations were on-going to discuss “issues on which we do not currently agree but both sides 
are committed to trying to resolve them” (ibid, col. 151). 




 November the Houses gathered again to consider each other’s latest 
amendments and final considerations before the official closure of the debates. This was an 
important moment because it was at this stage that clear bargaining took place and the definitive 
changes happened.  
 Following talks with the Refugee Council, which argued that the government’s plan was 
flawed, not flexible and did not meet the Council’s proposal for a “cluster and core approach” 
(Baroness Anelay HL Deb 6 November 2002, vol. 640, col. 771), Baroness Anelay of St. Johns 
proposed two very similar amendments
210
 to no.12 These amendments were the beginning of a 
series of exchanges between the Lords and Commons until the government tabled a middle 
ground amendment to have an independent monitor. It is not clear from the debates how the 
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 One of these was held in April 2003 for the proposed accommodation centre at RAF Newton in 
Nottinghamshire. Many points were raised among which the fear of crime figured “highly in the concerns 
expressed by the many objectors” (Brier, D.H. 2003, p.64). The Inspector concluded that the fear of crime 
was not “sufficiently robust or objectively based” (ibid, 66) to reject the Government proposal based on this 
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compromise was reached. The government most probably felt the pressure to proceed quickly in 
order to close the deal. This amendment had been originally proposed by the Conservatives on 
Report on 10
th
 October and reflected “some of the concerns expressed … by organisations such 
as the UNHCR, the Refugee Children's Consortium and the Immigration Advisory Service” (HL 
Deb 10 October 2002, vol. 639, col. 412). The advice and proposals of issue networks in this 
case were taken on board firstly by the opposition and later by the government though only 
following defeat in the Lords.  
 
Issues arising from Clause 16 
The clause related to the size and location of accommodation centres has highlighted four key 
points. First, location was a major issue at national, regional and local levels. At national and 
regional levels, the government deemed it necessary to have centres in rural areas to unburden 
the welfare services in London and the South East. Labour stressed the importance of this, 
leading to tension with the local level which was represented by the communities affected by 
the centres’ plans, their local authorities and local MPs. The latter, in turn, brought the issue 
forward in Parliament so that the Conservatives were depicted as NIMBYs by Labour. 
 Second, as proposed by the first hypothesis, asylum seekers were perceived as a threat by 
both the local citizens affected by the government’s project to build accommodation centres in 
their communities and by the core executive. The latter was concerned with deterrence and 
“administrative efficiency” (Forum Against Islamophobia & Racism 2002, 5). The centres were 
supposed to cut down on the time needed to process a claim as well as return claimants who did 
not qualify for refugee status or leave to remain. With regard to the former, a study of the 
opposition to the centres suggested that the protests developed “to reaffirm the boundary 
between a rurality regarded as unsullied, sexually pure and white, and urban environments 
imagined as multicultural, permissive and spoiled” (Hubbard 2005b, 3). The opposition to the 
centres was therefore due not to objective concerns about the wellbeing of the asylum seekers. 
Rather, it was because the locals felt threatened by their arrival and were preoccupied with the 
“depreciation” of their properties (Tony Baldry MP, HC Deb 11 June 2002, vol. 386, col. 772). 
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 The second and third points are closely related as they deal with the governance of several 
stakeholders and their power struggle (hypotheses 3 and 4). The main actors here were the 
government, the opposition in the two Houses, the citizens and their local authorities and finally 
the NGOs. The process shows the bargaining power of the House of Lords, the power of people 
in the Conservative constituencies and finally the lobby of the organisations and especially of 
the Refugee Council with which negotiations with the government were in progress. In the 
House of Lords – as opposed to the Commons – the government did not have the majority. This 
gave the Lords more freedom and especially more power to negotiate. As a result, the 
government was defeated for the first time. Although during the interview Blunkett stated that 
the concession related to the trial of smaller centres was due to “persuasion”, he also said that 
they “were not getting anywhere” (ibid). The feeling was that pressure to move on was greater 
than any possible change in opinion. After all, the government accepted the trial of only one 
smaller accommodation centre out of four, due to host up to 3000 asylum seekers in total. Local 
citizens succeeded in getting a public inquiry. The mobilisation of local interests delayed the 
project illustrating that citizens, their local authorities and MPs had some power. However, the 
government was not willing to accept defeat easily. Its power was far superior as the 
government went ahead as originally planned despite widespread criticism. Finally, the weight 
carried by issue networks did have an impact. One common thread between the two small but 
nevertheless important concessions (the trialling of a smaller centre and the independent 
monitor) is the significant presence of the NGOs. The request to have a smaller centre was 
based on briefings given by representatives of organisations “ranging from the Refugee Council 
to Amnesty International” (Tony Baldry MP, HC Deb 11 June 2002, vol. 386, col. 753) as a 
way of alleviating tensions within the centres and concerns among the local community. On 11
th
 
June Mr Blunkett accepted the approaches of the Refugee Council to experiment with a smaller 
centre and confirmed his willingness to cooperate with the organisation to achieve that.  
 Among all the NGOs, the one that was mentioned more often during the debates, not only 
by the politicians referring to meetings or briefings but also by the government, was the 
Refugee Council. Despite the claim that at best they could only change “the margins” and 
“make things controversial” (interview with Hussain), the fact that they were often cited and 
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their advice, sought after even by the government itself is a sign of successful lobbying. In fact, 
while “some bodies, organisations and agencies” opposed the centres in principle, others 
including the RC, engaged in a dialogue “to influence [the government], not simply to stand 
back and criticise it” (interview with Pearce). The winning strategy of the RC was to be “more 
reasonable” and as such they had a “slightly more impact … than others” (Blunkett, HC Deb 7 
November 2002, vol. 392, col. 457). Their willingness to cooperate with the government 
without being too confrontational, their knowledge and possibly status put them primus inter 
pares. 
 Another topic that caused discontent was the one related to the length of time people 
should be housed in the accommodation centres and was discussed within clause 25 below. 
 
6.2.1.2 Clause 25: Length of stay. Time spent in accommodation centres 
Concerns with this clause were mainly in relation to families with children and proposals varied 
greatly. Although there was general agreement across party lines to put a limit in the bill – in 
opposition and Labour – there were disagreements within the same party about the actual time 
people should stay in the centres. For example, in the Commons the Conservatives asked first 
for a 3 month time limit, then a “fairyland” (Blunkett, HC Deb 11 June 2002, vol. 386, col. 742) 
6 week limit and later 10 weeks to process the claims. The Liberal Democrats asked for six 
months and later 9 months (six months plus three if needed). Also among the Labour members 
there were various requests: those who agreed with the Conservatives’ 3 months proposal and 
those who asked for a 4 month period. 
 In the Lords the Tories, through Baroness Anelay of St Johns, put forward an 
amendment
211
 re-proposing the suggestion made by Mr Letwin in the Commons to house 
asylum seekers for a maximum period of 10 weeks and stressing the importance of setting a 
time limit in the bill. Liberal Democrat peers, Lord Avebury and Lord Greaves agreed in 
principle with the point made by the Baroness on the need to have set time limit but found the 
10 weeks’ limit too restrictive. The six month period proposal made by their Liberal Democrat 
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colleague Simon Hughes was for them “the absolute limit” (Lord Greaves, HL Deb 9 July 2002, 
vol. 637, col. 670). Labour member Baroness Whitaker, who believed in fast tracking families 
with children, suggested a stay between 10 weeks and 3 months
212
 but did not put forward any 
amendment. Eventually, given the importance of the issue, a new clause
213
, proposed by Lord 
Filkin on July 10
th
 following concerns about the education of children in accommodation 
centres rather than schools, was created ad hoc to deal with it. According to the new clause, the 
Secretary of State would decide whether to keep the family in the accommodation centre or 
send it to a dispersal area. The time limit was six months, extended to nine in some cases based 
on the length of time needed to reach the final decision on the family’s claim. During Report 
Stage on 9
th
 October, the issue – again under clause 15 – was discussed once more as new 
proposals came forward from opposition members. 
 On two separate occasions, Liberal Democrat Lord Dholakia proposed an amendment
214
 to 
press the government to insert a time limit in the bill to avoid the danger of people becoming 
institutionalised. Specifically, the time limit he was looking for was for a four month maximum 
period. Baroness Anelay of St Johns, who had previously asked to set a 10 week time limit, 
supported the amendment moved by Lord Dholakia. She stressed that after Recession and 
meetings with concerned organisations, she “decided that it would be appropriate to be more 
flexible to the government and to set them a realistic upper time limit” (HL Deb 9 October 
2002, vol. 639, col.319). Lord Borrie from the Labour party did not agree with the amendment 
as he could not understand the wish for a time limit in case asylum seekers wanted to stay 
longer in the centre but could not because of a limit imposed on them.  
 By Third Reading on 31
st
 October, in the Lords the government had already made two 
concessions on the subject. The first one regarded families with children whereby Blunkett in 
the House of Commons had expressed his intention to follow through Mr Simon Hughes’ 
proposal for a possible nine month period. The second was the result of concerns expressed by 
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Peers during the Report stage: to extend the time limit to everybody “for other classes of 
applicant” (Lord Filkin, HL Deb 31 October 2002, vol. 640, col. 320) or for different 
accommodation centres. Nevertheless, as the House was asked to vote on the amendment 
(No.19) proposed by Lord Dholakia, the government faced its third defeat as 144 people voted 
in favour of the amendment and 121 voted against. The government’s reply to the above was a 
new amendment that restated the six months limit unless the secretary of State deemed it 
necessary for that person to stay three extra months in light of exceptional circumstance. The 
proposal also provided for an order to allow the Parliament to abbreviate either or both periods 
(Beverley Hughes, HC Deb 5 November 2002, vol. 392, col. 154). Moreover, the amendments 
also anticipated that a person could remain in the accommodation centre for longer than six 
months if they wished to. 
 
Issues arising from Clause 25 
Not as controversial as the location of centres, this topic nevertheless raised many eyebrows as 
differences of opinions existed within the same party. This was the case with the Liberal 
Democrat and Labour parties. The latter were dealt with by the Whips “to enforce its members 
to vote along party lines” because “it is a serious issue when you step out of line” (interview 
with Dr MetCalfe). Neil Gerrard, who was on the bill Committee, also commented how the 
government whips “would not allow anyone … who was going to vote against the Government 
inside the Committee. So you had to do a deal” (interview). The deal was that a Labour MP 
could dissent and show disconcert but could not to vote against the government in order to 
follow the details of the bill and be able to raise issues in Parliament. The government therefore, 
had the power to ensure that its party members would vote along its wishes, at least in the 
Commons, due to its overwhelming majority. 
 In the Lords, as in the case of the accommodation centres, the government was defeated. 
Its reluctance to have any set limits “purely for the sake of administrative coherence” (Angela 
Eagle, HC Deb 9 May 2002, Standing Committee E, col. 109), had to change over the time 
issue. Firstly, during Third Reading on 11
th
 June, Mr Blunkett confirmed the possibility to 
provide for a six plus three-month period only for families, thus accepting Mr Hughes’ 
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proposal. Mr Blunkett in the interview admitted he did not remember this particular as too 
many years had passed. However, he recalled that the change of heart was due to the fact that 
“we were not going nowhere [sic] and this was going out of hand” (interview with Blunkett). 
Just as in the case of the size of the accommodation centres, the government accepted changes 
allegedly based on the fact that things were not moving quikly or smoothly enough. On the 
other hand, this was not a major shift. The Home Secretary from the very beginning maintained 
the position that no asylum seeker should be in an accommodation centre in excess of six 
months (HC Deb 7 February 2002, vol. 379, col. 1039). So, the concession was minimal. 
Besides, they maintained their position even after the third defeat, i.e. 6 months, which could 
however be shortened or lengthened. 
 The government’s response shows the negotiation process that happened during the 
debates. At first inflexible, the government had to find a way to please also the opposition 
without compromising on its basic requirement to state a limit.  
 The issue networks were important enough to be able to force some minor changes. For 
example, Baroness Anelay mentioned that after talking to outside organisations during the 
summer recess, she came to realise that a longer time period was better than the 10 weeks 
originally proposed. Although, the names of the organisations were not mentioned in the 
debates in this instance, the fact that she changed her mind after networking shows the weight of 
the NGOs.  
 A further issue that sparked controversy in the two Houses was that of the education of 
asylum seeking children in accommodation centres rather than mainstream education. 
  
6.2.1.3 Clause 36: education: general and Clause 37: education: special cases. Education of 
children 
As in the case of the centres, networking with outside bodies was important especially with 
regard to the two Houses. During the discussion of this clause, the government was defeated for 
the second time in the House of Lords. The defeat however was not accepted by the 
government. Instead they agreed to include provisions for children with special need as well as 
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talented ones. Ultimately, the Lords accepted the government’s provisions and did not press the 
issue further, showing once again the power of the government to achieve its objective.  
 The issue of education of children in the centres rather than in mainstream schools was 
discussed in the Commons in clause 18 together with the facilities available to asylum seekers 
within the accommodation centres. Yet again, there were several different positions: MPs and 
Lords who preferred to see asylum seeking children in mainstream education for the benefit of 
all children; and others who instead believed that education in an accommodation centre would 
be the best solution for children who had suffered traumatic experiences. The latter was the line 
followed by Labour members. Throughout the debate Mr Blunkett insisted on the importance of 
education for children in accommodation centres mainly because it “is virtually impossible to 
drag a family away from a neighbourhood school” (HC Deb 11 June 2002, vol. 386, col. 750) in 
case of removal
215
. However, there was also widespread opposition to the latter proposition as 
“over 140 MPs, over 100 of whom were Labour, signed a Motion calling on the government to 
withdraw this part of the bill” (Lord Bhatia216, HL Deb 10 July 2002, vol. 637, col. 690). There 
was also an alignment in positions between the Liberal Democrats and the government as 
Simon Hughes agreed with the original idea of “a period of transition and acclimatisation” (HC 
Deb 9 May 2002, Standing Committee E, col. 149) for some children. 
 In the Lords, the education of children within accommodation centres was discussed under 
clause 15 together with the clause on support during Committee Stage and not in clause 18 as in 
the Commons. Generally, across the opposition, the government’s clause was considered 
“regrettable” and “disgraceful” (Lord Moser, Crossbench, HL Deb 10 July 2002, vol. 637, 
col.694). Labour members mainly supported the government’s proposals, including Lord Dubs 
who, during the interview, explained that that it was not inhumane to have asylum seeking 
children in a special school but only for a temporary period of time to give them time to learn 
English. However, he also thought that the government should have been more flexible in 
taking decisions in the children’s best interests. The main proposals of clause 15 were to allow 
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families with school age children to be given the chance to go to a local school, and only if there 
was no place there, they should be placed in accommodation centres
217
 in order to overcome 
“concerns about overcrowding schools” (Bishop of Portsmouth, HL Deb 9 October 2002, vol. 
639, col. 325). The amendment was re-presented during Report Stage on 9
th
 October following a 
meeting
218
 held with parents, teachers and Head teachers and the Churches Commission for 
Racial Justice. Labour peers
219
 voted in favour of the amendment. Everybody else across the 
political spectrum stressed that those organisations working with children rejected the 
“government's defences of the policy” (Lord Bhatia, HL Deb 9 October 2002, vol. 639, col. 
340) including among others, Save the Children, the Transport and General Workers' Union and 
the National Union of Teachers. In the end, by just one vote the government was defeated for 
the second time in the House of Lords as 83 people voted for the amendment and 82 voted 
against it. The government did not accept the above amendment as it would have restricted its 
power to provide for accommodation in the centre and to take into account individual 
circumstances when deciding where a child should be educated. Despite the defeat, on 6
th
 
November the Lords (both opposition
220
 and Labour
221) ended up supporting the government’s 
line. This was because the government’s concession about monitoring the centres was passed 





Issues arising from clauses 36 and 37 
As with the issue on the size and location of the centres, networking here was relevant but 
ultimately exerted little power. The Bishop of Portsmouth in the Lords presented again his 
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 Amendment no. 107A: “and ( ) there is a place available in an appropriate maintained school for any 
dependant of school age” (Lord Bhatia, HL Deb 10 July 2002, vol. 637, col. 690). The same amendment 
was re-proposed by the Bishop of Portsmouth on 9
th
 October 2002 with amendment No.16 (col. 325); and 
finally on 6
th
 November with amendment No. 20. 
218
 “No school apartheid”. 
219
 Lord Clinton Davies and Lord Judd among others. 
220
 Baroness Carnegy of Lour (Conservative). 
221
 Lord Lea of Crondall Baroness Gibson of Market Rasen. 
222
 In the Act this is contained in Clause 36: Education: general where in section (2) it reads: “A child who is 
a resident of an accommodation centre may not be admitted to a maintained school or a maintained nursery 
(subject to section 37).(3)But subsection (2) does not prevent a child’s admission to a school which is—(a)a 
community special school or a foundation special school, and(b)named in a statement in respect of the child 
under section 324 of the Education Act 1996 (c. 56) (special educational needs)” (Nationality, Immigration 
and Asylum Act). 
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amendment after meeting several organisations concerned with the issue of children’s 
education.  
 The bulk of the amendments taken into consideration in the House of Commons were 
withdrawn and the only ones that were agreed to were initiated by members of the government. 
In terms of power relations, this means that the government prevailed the scene despite criticism 
and growing opposition coming from over 30 Labour MPs and children’ charities Save the 
Children, Barnado's, the Children's Society, Unicef UK and the NSPCC (Travis 2002).  
 
6.3 SUPPORT  
The issue of support was discussed originally within clause 34
223
 and set the rule under which 
only a destitute asylum seekers or the dependant of an asylum seekers could be offered a place 
within an accommodation centre. Getting a place in the centre would automatically mean 
provision of support under NASS. However, those who refused the place would be cut out from 
support altogether. The government’s move was consistent with the development of “a more 
managed asylum policy” (Angela Eagle, HC Deb 14 May 2002, Standing Committee E, col. 
197) so as to keep asylum seekers under control during their claim.  
 Support for asylum seekers was also discussed in new clause 54
224
 which was introduced 
only in the autumn in the Lords. The clause stated that the asylum seeker should apply for 
asylum ‘as soon as reasonably practicable’ in order to discourage “the manipulation of the 
asylum system” (Lord Filkin, HL Deb 17 October, vol. 639, col. 977). The fact that section 55 
was introduced at such a late stage in the Lords meant that no real discussion could take place, 
thus obstructing the lobbying work of issue networks. On the other hand, the Conservatives 
agreed with the government’s plan as the withdrawal of support was in fact another old idea (as 
were the accommodation centres) proposed by the party a few years back. This shows 
continuity of policies despite the opposition exhibited by Labour in the past. 
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 In the Act: Clause 43. 
224
 In the Act: Clause 55. 
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6.3.1 Clause 43 Asylum-seeker: form of support  
6.3.1.1 The end of the ‘support only’ option 
In the Commons, there was agreement across party lines in the opposition as both the Liberal 
Democrats and Conservatives opposed the clause and agreed on a particular amendment
225
 “to 
tease out the government’s intentions on cash only support” (Richard Allan MP, HC Deb 14 
May 2002, Standing Committee E, col. 195). In fact, the original clause would only provide 
support for people in accommodation centres while leaving out those who instead chose to stay 
with family and friends. This was against the government’s national and regional plans to deter 
people from moving to London and the South East and especially to keep track of asylum 
seekers.  
 In the Lords, the same topic was confronted during the discussion of clause 37 on 10th July 
and then again as clause 42 during the second Report Stage on 24
th
 October. Some Labour party 
Peers opposed the clause calling it a “retrograde step” (Lord Dubs, HL Deb 10 July 2002, vol. 
637, col. 804) as it stopped the ‘support only’ option thus leading to destitution and family 
separation. The opposition led to an alignment of views between Liberal Democrat and Labour 
Peers as an amendment to remove the Secretary of State's power to withdraw subsistence-only 
support was proposed in October (Lord Dholakia, HL Deb 24 October 2002, vol. 639, col. 
1440). The issue here was that too many asylum seekers 226  were choosing the ‘cash only’ 
support option while remaining in London and the South East, thus not relieving the pressure on 
services there. By taking away the ‘cash only’ option, the government would have kept the 
claimants under control while alleviating pressure in the region. Asylum seekers who did not 
take up their place in the centre would have been left without any support. So the establishment 
of accommodation centres served a double purpose. First, it aimed to solve the perceived 
asylum crisis nationally and regionally or at least to show the population that the government 
was dealing with the problem. As in the case of the location of the centres, the centrality of the 
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 Amendment No. 207, in page 17, line 37, leave out paragraph (a). In the end the amendment was 
withdrawn and the Clause was ordered to stand part of the bill, as the proposer (Mr Allan) claimed to be 
satisfied “that the Government will carefully consider the circumstances” (HC Deb 14 May 2002, Standing 
Committee E, col. 203). 
226
 “At the end of June 2002, more than 23,000 of the more than 33,000 asylum seekers taking subsistence-
only support were living in London” (Lord Filkin, HL Deb 24 October 2002, vol. 639, col. 1441). 
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national level in the making of the policy was paramount as the government did not want to lose 
face. Second, it intended to deter new arrivals by threating to take away support. 
Notwithstanding this inauspicious future for asylum seekers, the amendment did not pass as all 
Labour Peers and the majority of Conservative Peers voted against it. The Conservatives took 
sides with the government in this case showing a tension between opposing the government and 
agreeing with it. It might be argued that to agree with the government, was not in the Tories’ 
best interest because of the issues related to the location of the centres. But they were also aware 
of the asylum pressure in London and the South East and agreed in general with Labour’s party 
plans to deter ‘non-genuine’ asylum seekers. 
 
6.3.2 Clause 55 Late claim for asylum: refusal of support 
This clause was introduced to minimise the abuse of the asylum system. Lord Filkin presented 
for the first time during Re-commitment on 17
th
 October. This late introduction was due, 
according to Nick Pearce, to pressure from No. 10 on David Blunkett because the bill “was 
insufficiently radical compared to what he [Blunkett] had wanted from the White Paper” 
(interview with Pearce). However, the government’s plan to end the ‘support only’ option in the 
autumn of that year was revealed back in July in a leaked memorandum from Downing Street 
and published by The Guardian. Lord Filkin commented that the government had “no plans to 
introduce this measure in the near future” and he had “no knowledge of any proposal for 
implementation in the autumn” (Hansard HL Deb 10 July 2002, vol. 637, col. 807). This was 
confirmed by Pearce who said that the norm was “hammered out” (interview) weeks before the 
2002 Labour Party conference and during it. However, as the leaked memorandum shows, the 
intention had always been there. 
 
6.3.2.1 Refusal of support if asylum claimed was not submitted ‘as soon as reasonably 
practicable’ 
The problem with this norm was the lack of clarity surrounding the wording. A person, the 
clause states, should claim asylum “as soon as reasonably practicable” by giving a trustworthy 
version of their arrival. However, the provision did not specify what “reasonably” meant. This 
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ambiguity was picked upon by several Peers across parties who asked about the exact meaning 
of the sentence (Baroness Anelay of St Johns, HL Deb 17 October 2002, vol. 639, col.798), and 
if it was “compatible with human rights” (Lord Campbell of Alloway227, HL Deb 17 October 
2002, vol. 639, col. 984). On this occasion, the clause passed with 103 positive votes and only 
39 negative ones.  
This topic was discussed again a week later as the House of Lords was asked to vote for an 
amendment
228
 that would rest the “burden of proof … with the Secretary of State” (Lord 
Goodhart, HL Deb 24 October 2002, vol. 639, col. 1464) rather than the asylum seeker that he 
or she has claimed “as soon as reasonably practicable”. This amendment followed the guidelines 
of a report of the Joint Committee of Human Rights
229
 (JCHR) that heavily criticised section 
55
230. The JCHR found that the sentence “as soon as reasonably practicable” was “unacceptably 
imprecise” and “lacking in objectivity” (Joint Committee on Human Rights 2002b, 9) and that 
leaving someone destitute would breach articles 3 and 8 of the ECHR. The government 
disagreed with the Joint Committee and did not accept the amendment as it would have 
undermined its objectives to manage late asylum claims and control the entire process. 
Ultimately, only 56 people voted in favour of the amendment, which would have made the 
provision more humane, including one Labour Peer (Lord Bruce of Donington) and one 
Conservative Peer (Lord Campbell of Alloway also member of the Joint committee) while 110 
voted against (including the rebel Lord Judd who had been critical of the government).  
 
Issues arising from Clause 55 
This clause was presented at a very late stage in the debates. Consequently, the time available to 
discuss the issue thoroughly and to understand its consequences was limited. NGOs had little 
time “to look at what it would mean and to put their ideas, their views to MPs” (interview with 




 10B and 12a. 
229
 The Joint Committee on Human Rights is formed by twelve appointed members from the House of 
Commons and the House of Lords. The Committee’s role is to consider human rights issues in the UK. 
230
 Also section 57: Application for support: false or incomplete information. It was considered to be 
unlawful as “it would amount to the use of a power for an extraneous or improper purpose” (Joint 
Committee on Human Rights 2002b, 12) that is threatening a claimant to make him/her destitute because 
they could not say how they entered the country. The Committee thought this was an issue concerned 
with criminal investigation rather than one concerned with support. 
175 
 
Gerrard MP) about the dangers related to a late claim and the consequent withdrawal of 
support
231
. The risk of the new system imposed by the bill was that asylum seekers would be left 
destitute, leading to tension with the home population, illegal working (Oxfam 2002) and 
deterring integration on one side, while placing extra pressure on inner city communities 
(Refugee Council 2002a) on the other. In practice, rather than reducing the perceived threat of 
asylum, the government was in danger of encouraging it especially in communities with large 
concentrations of asylum seekers. The late introduction of the clause meant that there was no 
time to mobilise the issue networks.  
 In terms of the debates, the House of Lords had the chance to push for an improved version 
of clause 55 but they did not. The Conservatives were not as vocal as on other clauses. This is 
understandable, as in 1996 they took a similar position when they tried to take away the 
possibility of support for all in-country applicants. On that occasion though, Labour had been 
very critical of the initiative (Refugee Council 2002e). In 2002, Labour’s U-turn in this aspect 
of their asylum policy shows more concern about public opinion than human rights, which is in 
line with the perceived threat that asylum seekers represented and the moves of the government 
to deal with the issue.  
 
6.4 ASYLUM APPEALS 
The aim of this part of the bill was to change the 1999 legislation by removing the possibility of 
“in-country appeals”, if the Secretary of State certified the claim as a third-country case. This 
would cause the appellant to appeal from outside the UK unless the removal breached the 
person’s human rights for example, Article 3 of the ECHR that prohibits torture and "inhuman 
or degrading treatment or punishment”. However, if the human rights claim was certified as 
‘manifestly unfounded’, which later became ‘clearly unfounded’, then the removal would be 
made compulsory and the person returned immediately to the country of origin from where 
he/she could appeal within 28 days. In practice, this clause introduced non-suspensive appeals 
and turned out to be controversial because of several negative implications attached to it. These 
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 The Refugee Council for example, estimated that in February 2002 around 20,000 asylum seekers were 
living with friends and family while waiting to hear for a decision on their asylum claim. 
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were a possible judicial oversight without the chance to correct the unlawful decision (Justice 
2003) or the risk of non-refoulement by passing the asylum seeker “back down the line to their 
country of origin” (Refugee Council 2002b, 2).  
 A ‘white list’ was also added by Blunkett at a later stage in the debates. This list included 
all ten new EU countries that were going to join in 2004. They were considered to be safe 
notwithstanding on-going and widespread discrimination and police brutality towards Roma 
especially in the Czech Republic, Poland and the Slovak Republic (Justice 2002; Refugee 
Council 2002b). This section represented a deep change in policy for Labour. Simon Hughes 
reminded the floor how, in the run-up to the 1997 election, the then Conservative Home 
Secretary stated “that removing people before they appeal undermines justice” (HC Deb 11 June 
2002, vol. 386, col. 799). On the other hand, asylum was not such a hot political issue in 1997 
as asylum claims were fewer than they reached in 1999 due to the war in Kosovo. On average, 
there was consensus coming from the Conservatives. Some of the provisions included in this 
clause (together with the norms on stopping support) had been presented in 1996 by Home 
Secretary Michael Howard as the Asylum and Immigration Bill was introduced in Parliament. 
These provisions were: the introduction of a ‘white list’ and ‘fast track’ procedures for 
‘manifestly unfounded’ claims (Webber 1996). Labour opposed these changes because Howard 
played the “race card” (The Guardian 2002). The white list and the abolition of the in-country 
right of appeal in particular had already been introduced by other European
232
 states showing 
that Britain was following the EU trend, despite claims by the then Home Secretary that 
immigration policy was not under the influence of Brussels (Nicholson 1997). Because of this 
continuation of policy
233
 (Bloch 2000; Schuster and Solomos 2004), it is understandable that the 
Conservatives’ supported the Home Secretary and the government against the Liberal 
Democrats with regards to New Clause 14 and the subsections detailing removal with no chance 
of appeal for a person coming from an EU safe country who did not apply for asylum there.  
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 Denmark, Finland, Germany, the Netherlands and Switzerland. 
233
 As well as discourse. Blunkett repeated “Thatcher's magic word "swamped"” (Foot 2002) but also 
‘bogus’ a term also introduced by the Conservative Party. 
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6.4.1 Section 94 Appeal from within the United Kingdom: ‘unfounded human rights’ or 
asylum claim 
6.4.1.1 Right to appeal, unfounded cases, and safe list 
These debates focused on different issues, which included unfounded claims
234
, a safe list of 
countries, judicial review, and the difficulties connected to launching an appeal from a different 
country: for example, accessing a lawyer with knowledge of British Law. The aim of section 94 
coincided with the overall message of the bill that asylum was a threat. It was designed to deter 
so-called ‘asylum shopping’ while regaining the trust of the electorate who do not comprehend 
“the reason why people who have crowded through the rest of Europe have not chosen to 
exercise a claim there … People out there think that we are crackers” (David Blunkett, HC Deb 
11 June 2002, vol. 386, col.799).  
 The right to appeal within the United Kingdom was discussed in the Commons during 
Report Stage on 11
th
 June. The government emphasised that people’s reasons for coming to 
Britain were not always linked to personal safety. Rather, they were attracted by appealing 
benefits such as a: 
benign economy, low unemployment, low inflation, low interests. We needed 
workers and people thought they could get a job without having a work permit if they 
got here they thought "oh well, we'll be able to work; if we claim asylum, we'll get a 
roof over our head and something to keep us going" ... so it was seen as an alternative 
route to legal open migration through the work permit system (interview with 
Blunkett). 
 
Blunkett’s affirmations were in stark contrast with the research commissioned by the Home 
Office and published just a month later in July 2002 that found that many asylum seekers came 
to the UK in order to seek safety firstly and mostly. Besides, this investigation followed other 
research done to explore similar issues and with similar outcomes. The researchers also found 
little evidence that the UK was the chosen destination because of “better employment 
opportunities” (Home Office 2002, 55) or that people had in depth knowledge of the UK 
immigration and asylum process and their entitlements to benefits. 
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 “We are talking about two categories: clearly unfounded, when people produce no evidence of having 
been at risk or that the country from which they came was unsafe for them; and the category of those who … 
have not made a claim in any of the countries through which they have passed, where their asylum claim 
would have been quite legitimate” (Blunkett, HC Deb 11 June 2002, vol. 386, col. 798). 
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 In the Lords new Clause 14 became Clause 82: Appeal from within United Kingdom: 
unfounded human rights or asylum claim. Several amendments were raised but one in particular 
showed the networking with NGOs. Labour Peer Lord Archer of Sandwell presented an 
amendment against the danger of the clause to “remove the right of appeal to the judiciary 
against an executive decision” (HL Deb 23 July 2002, vol. 638, col. 343). The concerns had 
been voiced by several NGOs as they felt that executive decisions should not be left solely in 
the hands of the judicial review but should be checked by “a specific channel of appeal” (ibid, 
col. 343-344). They also believed that the claimant should be able to present his case to the 
adjudicator whilst in the country and not from abroad, as this would entail too many technical 
difficulties. The amendment, despite support from some Conservative Peers as well as Cross 
benchers, was withdrawn.   
 A few months later on 7
th
 October 2002, Blunkett announced – together with the notice of 
the withdrawal of asylum support – the introduction of a list of safe countries making the 
chance to appeal more difficult. This announcement, made by Lord Falconer on 17
th
 October, 
included ten safe countries
235
 with the possibility (subject to Parliament scrutiny) for the 
Secretary of State to add to the list countries that pose “no serious risk of persecution of persons 
entitled to reside in that State or part” of the State (HL 17th October 2002, vol. 639, col. 1054). 
Countries could also be removed from the list but only through primary legislation
236
. While the 
Liberal Democrats disagreed in principle with the notion of the white list as “no country is 
100% safe” (Lord Goodhart, HL 17th October 2002, vol. 639, col. 1019), Conservative Lord 
Kingsland reminded the House that the government’s position was very similar to one promoted 
by the Conservative Party but opposed by Labour “both when in opposition and when in 
government” (ibid, col.1022). Other Peers commented that the risk of persecution in the new 
countries was “still debatable” (Earl of Sandwich, ibid, col. 1026), and “almost impossible for 
any Roma” (Lord Avebury, ibid, col. 1029) to claim asylum successfully. Lord Falconer237 
explained that if the ‘clearly unfound’ certificate was issued, a second check would follow with 
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 Cyprus, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Poland, Slovakia, Slovenia. 
236
 This was done in 2004. Although others were added. 
237
 Lord Falconer of Thoroton was Minister of State (Criminal Policy), Labour Party. 
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a judicial review in the High Court
238
. In conclusion, he rejected amendment no.34 (and all the 
others
239) as it would “remove the ‘clearly unfounded’ provision” (HL Deb 24 October 2002, 
vol. 639, col. 1511).  
 This section has highlighted several points. Firstly, Labour’s position on appeals and safe 
countries changed. Just a few years before, Labour had been critical of the same proposals 
presented by the Conservatives then still in government. Now that Labour was in government it 
was important to show to public opinion that they were being tough on asylum. Secondly, not 
much obstruction came from the Tories because they had proposed something very similar six 
years before. This alliance of party-politics on the issue made the government more resilient 
towards opposition coming from the Liberal Democrat and some of the Labour Peers
240
. 
Thirdly, the EU had a small role in this particular cause. For example, Lord Falconer stated that 
all the member states at the Justice and Home Affairs Council in Luxembourg had agreed that 
there should be a presumption that asylum claims from the new accession countries should be 
manifestly unfound (HL Deb 24 October 2002, vol. 639, col. 1509). Despite the fact that 
“European policy-making frameworks were quite largely immaterial” (interview with Pearce) 
and that “European states … essentially pursued their national strategies” (ibid), in this case it 
suited the government to affirm that everybody else in Europe had agreed to do the same. 
Finally, the debates showed the networking that existed between the NGOs and MPs and Peers. 
The parliamentarians were briefed on the dangers of this clause. The Refugee Council for 
instance, thought it was “unlikely” that people would be able to appeal successfully from the 
country from which they fled in the first place thus, making non-suspensive appeals “ no appeal 
at all” (Refugee Council 2002b, 2). In the Lords in particular, questions were raised and 
examples were drawn thanks to briefings and information made available from the Refugee 
                                                     
238“As soon as that intention has been indicated, the applicant is given three days to lodge his application. 
Once the application is lodged removal is deferred until permission is either granted, in which case it will be 
deferred for longer, or refused, in which case protection against removal is granted. So, the critical point in 
answer to the first question of the noble Lord is that the three days apply from the time that the intention to 
apply for judicial review is raised” (Lord Falconer, HL Deb 24 October 2002, vol. 639, col. 1508). 
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 Only one was not rejected. This was amendment no. 39A asking the Secretary of State to consult an 
independent advisory panel before adding a new country to the existing list. In fact, the government agreed 
to form the panel “to audit and advice on the country information … used to assess asylum applications” 
(Lord Falconer, HL Deb 24 October 2002, vol. 639, col. 1511). This amendment does not appear however in 
the final act. 
240
 Such as Lord Clinton-Davies and Lord Archer of Sandwell, Lord Judd and Baroness Whitaker who 
supported an amendment presented by Liberal Democrat Lord Goodhart. 
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Legal Centre and IAS on the numbers of claims with consequent successful appeals. Now with 
the new clause, these claims would become certified simply because of the country of origin of 
the appellant (in this particular case it was the Czech Republic).  
 
6.5 CONCLUSION 
This chapter has showed how the perceived threat of asylum led the UK government to create 
the 2002 NIA Act. What has emerged during detailed analysis of the debates on individual 
clauses and the interviews with NGOs and policy makers is that the policy was government 
driven with the Prime Minister, the Home Secretary, his political adviser and a few other key 
figures as the main individuals behind the Act. The power to make policy rested in the hands of 
the government despite the strong lobby of the involved organisations and the objections 
presented by the opposition, especially in the Lords.  
 During the debates, the government generally prevailed. In the House of Commons, 
because of its overwhelming majority the bulk of amendments taken into consideration were 
withdrawn and the only ones that were agreed to were initiated by members of the government. 
There was one exception, when Blunkett took on board the suggestion made by one of the 
Liberal Democrat MPs to extend the stay in the centre of asylum seekers from six to nine 
months. This change was, however, incorporated only in the House of Lords and as the section 
has demonstrated, it was a small concession.  
 It was only in the House of Lords that some minor changes were accepted. Here the 
government did not have the majority and Peers were, generally, less involved with the 
contentions around party politics than in the other House. The government was defeated here in 





 November when each House took into consideration the other place’s 
amendments. Following this, concessions were made. Yet, there was little compromise. 
Negotiation was mainly on some aspects of accommodation centres thanks to the obstruction of 
one part of the opposition (mainly the Conservative part because the centres were due to be built 
in their constituencies) and the strong resistance of people living in the affected areas and their 
local authorities. In particular, this conflict resulted in postponement of the start of the works by 
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requesting a public enquiry that the government was forced to give. On the other hand, the Act 
showed that even in the Lords, most Labour and Conservative Peers decided to back the 
government. The Conservatives in particular, agreed with the government’s policy on the 
following issues: the establishment of centres, the creation of a white list, the introduction of 
non-suspensive appeals and finally the withdrawal of support in certain cases. This is not 
surprising considering that these were procedures that the Conservative government had tried to 
introduce back in 1996 that is, one year before the election of the Labour party. What is 
important is that while Labour opposed these ideas when they were in opposition, they now 
introduced them in the bill. There is therefore a continuation in policy between the two parties. 
The odd one out was the Liberal Democrat party, which tried to oppose most proposals but to 
no avail. Yet, on occasion they agreed with the government (on the length of time spent in the 
centres, and the education of children in the centres).  
 The opposition by local groups to the government highlights more clearly the geographical 
aspect of the thesis. On one side, there are the national and regional views represented by central 
government to hide asylum seekers from public view. Asylum seekers were to be contained in 
full-board accommodation centres – inclusive of schools – and away from London and the 
South-East. On the other side the local view, portrayed by concerned citizens, held that the scale 
and proposed locations of the centres were inappropriate both for local communities and the 
asylum seekers themselves. This particular point emphasises the centrality of government in 
asylum policy making in spite of recent debates on rescaling state’s functions to other bodies. 
 The other key actors were NGOs. These groups have been characterised as issue networks 
because of their special interest on this difficult issue and the inherent differences between them 
and the government with regards to asylum seekers. In general, there was only limited 
consultation, because of the few and unequal resources available, the consequent unequal 
power, their open membership and their shared knowledge of the issue. They did share many 
actions and beliefs – which is not a normal characteristic of issue networks – and were 
communicating on a regular basis while the bill was debated. Interviews with NGOs highlighted 
their limited influence on the outcome of the bill because of their lack of power. Their 
consultations with the government were widespread but too often superficial. They also briefed 
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MPs and Lords on the technicalities of the bill showing, in this case, some influence as their 
words and thoughts were reported during the debates. They were therefore a very important 
source of information. With respect to governance, the Refugee Council was the most powerful 
NGO thanks to its influence compared to others and to its privileged access to the policy 
making process. The interview with Nick Hardwick highlighted two possible reasons for this. 
Firstly, the non-antagonistic nature of the organisation that was able to form a good working 
relationship with the government thanks to its openness while it did not just stand back and 
criticise. The second reason was because the Refugee Council used to run services on behalf of 
the government and could therefore be regarded as a partner. Nevertheless, despite their open 
access, influence was mainly limited to that aspect of the bill concerning the accommodation 
centres.  
 The next chapter focuses on the policy-making of the Italian Bossi-Fini. The findings of 


















LAW No. 189/2002 
This chapter examines the policy process that led to the formation of the law most commonly 
known as ‘Bossi-Fini’. It follows on from Chapters 5 and 6, which provided the historical and 
political background prior to immigration law No. 189/2002 in Italy and the analysis of the UK 
policy-making process that created the 2002 NIA Act. Although both laws were passed in the 
same year they were different in nature and in the way the policy process happened. Contrary to 
the 2002 NIA Act in the UK, which targeted asylum matters specifically and labour migration 
marginally, the Italian law was created to regulate immigration. However, it is still highly 
relevant to the issue of asylum for two main reasons: 
1) because asylum was viewed in the context of illegal migration, some of the provisions 
that targeted irregular migrants (such as those on non-suspensive appeals, detention or the use of 
the navy to intercept boats of migrants in the Mediterranean) had an impact on asylum seekers 
too;  
2) for the first time, a government introduced two articles on asylum aiming to create an 
end-to-end system from entry to recognition of status (or rejection) to integration. Because until 
this point asylum had never been considered a priority, Italy did not have specific asylum 
legislation. Successive governments preferred to deal with asylum crises on an ad hoc basis. 
Consequently, the analysis focuses on the Act as a whole including both immigration and 
asylum aspects. 
 Through the analysis of the policy-making process, the chapter demonstrates that the 
political parties dominated the scene while the government mainly acted as an intermediary. 
This is quite the opposite of what happened in the UK as the previous chapter has established. 
Here, the undisputed leaders were specific political élites close to the Prime Minister. Evidence 
from the analysis of the Italian parliamentary debates and the media articles of the time indicate 
that two specific parties in the government majority were the real power holders in the policy 
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process related to illegal migration. These were the Catholic CCD-CDU
241
 and the Northern 
League (NL). The CCD-CDU had the support of the Catholic world and the employers’ 
organisations with regard to the regularisation of illegal migrants. Thanks to this network, the 
harshest parts of the law were softened after strong clashes developed between the CCD-CDU 
and the NL and despite the claims of the government not to alter the legislation. On the other 
hand the NL, notorious for its stark political stance against migrants, reacted badly to the 
requests brought forward by their Catholic rivals. As suggested by the first hypothesis in 
Chapter 1, the government and especially the NL perceived illegal migration as an issue and as 
a threat to national identity and security. As a result, the NL introduced a series of controversial 
measures, such as those on the use of the navy to combat illegal entry along the coasts of Italy 
and mandatory fingerprinting of immigrants (Legge Bossi-Fini; see also Colombo and Sciortino 
2003; Zincone and Di Gregorio 2002; Geddes 2008). This was done for political image and 
electoral purposes so to maintain the stronghold of the party’s Northern provinces (Albertazzi 
and McDonnell 2005).  
 With regard to asylum the important power holder within the government was the Ministry 
of Interior. The then Interior Minister, a member of former post-fascist party National Alliance, 
and the Deputy Prefect of the Department for Civil Liberties and Immigration wrote the two 
articles on asylum which were then inserted in the law. The passage of these two articles did not 
encounter any problem in parliament as opposed to the rest of the law. This happened not only 
because the articles came directly from the Ministry and did not have a parliamentary origin but 
especially because asylum was not perceived as being as problematic as illegal and labour 
migration. Besides, by implementing the most deterring measures (navy and fingerprints), 
asylum seekers would be automatically excluded. 
 In this scenario, there was not much space left for NGOs and charities. In contrast to the 
UK where consultation with the government was widespread, in Italy the government secured 
the bill against potential disruptions from civil society by closing down all communication 
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, that the issue of labour 
migration and to a lesser extent asylum were a matter of executive control just as in the UK. 
Nevertheless, despite the difference in the UK and Italian governments’ behaviour and 
treatment of NGOs and charities, networks in both countries share a common trait. These 
networks are characterised as issue networks as argued in Chapter 2. This is because of the 
essential difference of opinion on immigration/asylum between the government and the political 
parties on one side and the advocacy groups on the other, as well as inequality of power and 
resources among the groups and in relation to the government. Yet, the closure of the 
government was not so impermeable. The biggest Catholic groups were still able to exercise 
some pressure on immigration issues on the Catholic party in the majority. Further minor 
changes to the legislation were made thanks to lobbying by the main employers’ groups. On 
asylum issues, however, the only organisation that played an important role was the United 
Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR). Thanks to their specialised knowledge, 
expertise and international status they were able to create a good relationship and collaboration 
with the Ministry of Interior. The real outsiders were those groups with a left-wing orientation 
with whom the right-wing government did not wish to discuss things. 
 Finally, the chapter highlights the relevance of parties to asylum policy formation. To 
understand this, it is necessary to take into account that policy was made at three different but 
interconnected levels. The most prominent one was the national level where the political parties 
in the majority were able to impose their views on the topic; the national, regional and local 
levels however superimposed on each other. On immigration, the Italian Regions (governed by 
a regional council of the same political make-up of the government
244
) and the local businesses 
were able to reach a compromise with the Ministry of Interior on the size of the quotas of 
migrants needed. On asylum, the local mayors in unison with the National Association of Italian 
Municipalities, which in turn cooperated with the UNHCR, influenced the Ministry of Interior 
in a ‘bottom-up’ pressure. 
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 The next section first distinguishes in more detail the key stakeholders at government, 
parliament and civil society level. Then it focuses on the networks that operated at the time.  
 The final part of the chapter presents the analysis of the debates and the issues that were 
more pressing for all the players involved (government, majority and opposition and the pro-
migrant groups).  
 
7.1 THE POLICY PROCESS: ACTORS AND NETWORKS 
7.1.1 Actors and networks: roles, interaction and power 
As with the preceding chapter, this part of the thesis draws from the analysis of the debates and 
the interviews and is concerned with the identification and the interaction between different 
stakeholders. Firstly, the Ministry of Interior where the two articles on asylum were written. 
Secondly, the political parties within the majority because they were the real force behind the 
bill. Despite the fact that the bill was initiated by the government, the latter only had a 
mediating role between the political parties’ conflicting interests on immigration. Finally, the 
NGOs that can be further divided into five sub-groups which constituted an issue network. 
 
7.1.1.1 The Ministry of Interior 
As the numbers of asylum seekers, refugees and migrants was on the increase, the NGOs and 
the local authorities were spending their already tight budget in providing minimum services. 
The Ministry of Interior was blamed for not taking responsibility towards asylum seekers. It was 
however able to create a trusted relationship with ANCI, the national association of Italian 
municipalities, based on a volunteering approach
245
. Even many mayors of the centre-right 
adhered to the initiative because it was “a very political” issue “but not a party political” (7.1) 
one (interview with Compagnucci). Political ideologies would fall the moment a mayor of any 
political derivation from the Lega to Rifondazione Comunista (ibid) saw homeless asylum 
seekers on their streets. However, “if only centre-left mayors had pushed for this, probably it 
would have not happened” (7.2) (ibid). The great push coming from ‘below’ i.e. from the 
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NGOs, Caritas and the priests was essential. They would put pressure onto the mayors to 
participate in the public notices to get access to the National Fund
246
.  
 With regard to networks, there were fora organised by the government to consult with the 
experts (the so-called third sector, the navy and the business parties) but they were by invitation 
only, limited in number and not very inclusive (interview with Volontè MP
247
). For example, the 
third sector was excluded at first from these meetings. They were involved later but only once 
or twice and their demands were not even taken into consideration.  
 
7.1.1.2 Political parties: Catholics vs. Northern League and Right vs. Left 
In the 1990s parliamentarians were “less willing to support causes like immigration” because to 
discuss immigration too openly “did not provide immediate positive visibility” (Perlmutter 
2000, 20) and would lead to confrontation (Triadafilopoulos and Zaslove 2006). Things have 
changed since then considering the growth of the migrant population, the bigger role of Italy on 
the European scene and the consequent pressure from the EU on the matter.  
 In 2002, each party within the coalition in the majority promoted their own position and 
personal views on the matter especially in relation to illegal migration. Consequently, intense 
exchange of views developed. Confrontations during the Bossi-Fini’s debate were indeed 
constant within the majority while the LN’s game of taking advantage of the electorate’s fears 
towards migrants did not play in their favour as in the 2001 elections they obtained only “3.9% 
of the vote and a sharp fall in its share of the vote in its northern heartlands” (Geddes 2008, 
355). Yet, they played a significant role in the coalition becoming through the years one of the 
most important allies of the government. They were in fact, together with AN, the initiators of 
the bill and the main antagonists of the CCD-CDU. In contrast, the opposition did take part in 
the immigration debate mainly with the view to ostracize the work of the majority.  
 In the majority, AN but especially the LN were quite inflexible and resolute that the law 
should not change because of their anti-immigrant ideologies. The CCD-CDU wanted to include 
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 January 2011. 
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a lot of changes under the pressures first of all of the Church, the Catholic pro-immigrant 
organisations, the trade unions, the employers and the families. Finally, FI acted mainly as an 
intermediate. This was due to threats from both the CCD-CDU and the LN that they would not 
vote for the law.  
 Fights and bitter remarks were the norms during the debates between the various parts but 
there were also negotiations. Colombo and Sciortino (2003, 209) for example, highlight how on 
2 February 2002, the Cabinet made proposals for the use of the naval forces against those boats 
that carried illegal migrants; then just five days later on 7 February 2002, the regularisation for 
care and domestic workers was put forward. In the same way, on May 10
th
 2002, the 
spokesperson for the government, Bertolini, proposed to collect digital imprints for those 
migrants applying for or renewing their residence permits. Finally three days later, Tabacci, 
former MP for UDC, presented the amendment to enlarge the regularisation to all the categories 
of illegal workers. This game of ‘give and take’ became the mean for the ‘solidarist248’ (Zincone 
2006a and 2006b) CCD-CDU’s crucial role to soften the law and for the ‘identitarian’ (ibid) LN 
to assert their presence in Parliament and defend the foundation of the law (limit labour 
migration and deter illegal entries).  
 At parliamentary level, some meetings happened in the Cabinet, in the Senate and in the 
Chamber of Deputies before the formal passages in the two Houses. There is no trace of these in 
the records held by the government but they were open only to party leaders (interview with 
Volontè MP). More informal meetings were held between NGOs and political parties – 
especially the UDC – and this is how amendments were drawn (interview with Volontè MP). 
This was an essential part of the process because it was the only way for the pro-migrant groups 
to express their concerns. However, this was mainly done on a one-to-one basis and it applied in 
particular to pro-migrant Catholic associations and to the immigration part of the law. The 
asylum part of the law was instead confronted mainly by the UNHCR and the Ministry of 
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Interior and later it also involved ANCI with regards to the provision of services for asylum 
seekers and refugees at local level.  
 
7.1.1.3 Civil society 
Finally, there was civil society comprising five sub-groups whose importance changed 
according to the different phases of the law. The first three groups were formed by the so called 
third sector, NGOs and charities which have known each other, cooperated fairly well and in a 
stable manner since the times of the war in Kosovo (interview with Briguglio). These groups 
were:  
1) A first small group formed by the UNHCR and CIR, which due to their internal statute, 
would operate only on asylum related issues. Their strength with regards to this particular bill 
was that asylum was not perceived by the government as being as difficult to manage as illegal 
migration. Furthermore, the presence of the well-known and internationally well-established 
UNHCR served as a guarantee to the legislator. The UNHCR acted as the ‘glue’ as it was the 
mediator between the other groups and the Ministry of Interior. 
2)  A second larger group249 working on several aspects of both asylum and immigration 
such as AI, ARCI, Caritas, Centro Astalli, Comunità di Sant’Egidio, FCEI, ICS, and Migrantes. 
Because of its composition, this second group can be further divided into Catholic and non-
Catholic organisations. For example, Caritas and Migrantes were both part of the influential and 
tentacular Conferenza Episcopale Italiana (CEI), the permanent assembly of Italian bishops. 
CEI has a very strong presence throughout Italy and includes several other organisations. With 
regard to the Bossi-Fini, the government preferred to confer directly with the CEI rather than 
with Caritas (interview with Dinh Le Quyen) or other Catholic groups perceived to be more 
militant
250
 and as such, less welcome by the government. As a matter of fact, the vast majority 
of the interviewees lamented the lack of dialogue with the government. Yet, those belonging to 
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the Catholic association world were more successful than non-Catholic ones in lobbying 
members of the CCD-CDU party in the majority. They did not oppose the government’s ideas 
based on “principle … and ideology” (7.3) (ibid) as other organisations that are known for their 
leftist background would possibly do.  
3) The third group was made up of ‘specialised’ organisations. These were: Save the 
Children mainly intervening on unaccompanied minors and family reunions; IOM tackling 
repatriation, trafficking and the integration of migrants; and ASGI, a lawyers’ association 
specialising in migration’s juridical aspects; 
4) Then there was ANCI251 the representative body for Italian Municipalities giving voice 
to 7.500
252
 of these and their mayors’ interests. ANCI turned out to be an important player in the 
lobbying game with regard to the establishment of SPRAR
253
. ANCI took part in many formal 
and informal discussions where they would participate with documents drafted on the basis on 
the information given by municipalities (interview with Pacini). They had their own internal 
network made up of mayors; 
5) Finally, there was a fifth group comprising the most prominent employers’ 
(Confindustria, Confcommercio, Coldiretti and Confartigianato) and the three main trade 
unions (CGIL, CISL and UIL). This last group has been more “variable, random, discontinuous 
and multiple” (Zincone 2006a, 350). The employers dealt directly with the government and with 
political parties. Trade unions were as weak as NGOs in their dealings with the parties but were 
particularly active on the organisation of pro-migrant rallies in cities to raise awareness on the 
issue of illegal migrants. 
 Figure 7.1 below shows the decision-making process during the discussion of the Bossi-
Fini. Stakeholders attempted to provide information to both the government and the political 
parties in order to influence their decisions. The establishment was composed by the 
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(Ministero dell’Interno n.d.). 
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government that in this specific case had more of an intermediate role, the Interior Ministry with 
regard to matters related to asylum, and finally the political parties in the majority and in the 
opposition within parliament. Given the nature of the then government, which was based on a 
coalition, the majority was split into two separate entities, each one with a very strong idea on 
how labour migration had to be managed: the Catholic CCD-CDU and the more right-wing 
Northern League and National Alliance parties. Of the latter two, the NL was the most vocal.  
 Public opinion did matter just as that of employer groups whose need for foreign carers and 
workers was great. Employers groups dealt with both the political parties and the government 
through formal and informal hearings. They formed an “unlikely alliance” (Zincone and 
Caponio 2005) with the Catholic world as they shared the same need. The Church bore some 
influence on the government but only the CEI was allowed to discuss things directly. Other 
Catholic charities and NGOs were shut out from any interaction with the government. Non-
religious groups were also not included. Therefore, they are at the bottom of this hierarchical 
structure together with trade unions. Trade unions and advocacy groups however organised 
marches and rallies in towns and squares to raise awareness of the law. The UNHCR was the 
sole organisation able to network directly with the Interior Ministry on asylum matters. 
 EU institutions did have some influence on the law but mainly on the asylum part as the 





















   
 
 
    
    
    














 How did these groups fit into the policy process? The next section looks at how networks 
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7.1.2 Issue networks 
As in the case of the UK, issue networks were most representative of the Italian situation at that 
time for the following three main reasons: different views between the ruling government and 
the NGOs of how immigration should work; the awareness and understanding of asylum, the 
common ideals and shared actions were not facilitated by the then reigning climate of hostility 
displayed by the government towards the organisations; and finally, the difference in resources 
available to the groups. These three aspects are discussed below. 
 
7.1.2.1 Different views 
There was a gulf that divided the government’s vision of how immigration should work and 
should be controlled from that of the NGOs believing in a more humane approach. Whereas the 
government used the law as their supreme act to defend Italian sovereignty i.e. to deter migrants 
from coming to the country
254
, NGOs were more concerned with the integration of migrants 
within Italy. Things were furthermore complicated by the fact that the conceptual political 
divide between left and right is so embedded in Italian political history that even such a delicate 
issue became a battlefield for political parties. It was also an excuse to cut out from any possible 
involvement the organisations that had any social undertone and especially those traditionally 
linked to the left. This strategy was devised in the Cabinet because the government did not want 
to “lose the power of the control room (7.4)” (interview with Sen. Eufemi255). The associations 
therefore had no direct influence on the government. What happened was that these groups were 
“essentially non-bargaining” (La Palombara 1964, 249) losing autonomy to political parties. 
This non-bargaining position was that displayed by most interests groups because they were 
associated with the centre-left government (Perlmutter 2000; Bozzini and Fella 2008) such as 
ARCI, “historical emanation of the Italian Communist Party” (7.5) (interview with Hein). There 
was no relationship whatsoever with the centre-right government so “as far as lobbying goes, it 
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can be synthesized into nothing” (7.6) (interview with Miraglia256). Most associations were left 
out from the governmental institutional and formal channels
257
 apart from a few meetings
258
. 
This shows that core political élites had little or no interest in debating and negotiating with 
most advocacy groups, thus, making the policy domain close and unattainable. Most of the 
respondents acknowledged the fact that the Bossi-Fini was “a very colourful law on the political 
level” (7.7) (interview with Dinh Le Quyen). Therefore, the only way to get through to the 
government was to speak to MPs “for reasons linked to identity” i.e. according to their political 
alliances (second interview with Schiavone
259
). The other option was to talk with those who 
were notoriously more sympathetic to the cause as “in 2001 if you said the word ‘asilo’260 one 
would think about kindergarten ... it was already a miracle to find someone sensitive” (7.8) 
(ibid). As such, religious organisations would dialogue mainly with MPs from the centre while 
traditionally left organisations would discuss matters with candidates belonging to the left and 
so on. Because of the political make-up of the government, the level of involvement of the non-
Catholic part of the civil society was weaker on a more formal level. 
 Immigration in 2002 was a relatively new subject, charged with highly controversial 
political meaning and where most pro-immigrant lobbies would overtly criticise the 
government. Asylum on the other hand, was certainly the area where the government had a little 
bit less interest and where the two articles gave a “touch of humanity” (7.9) (interview with 
Compagnucci) to the norm showing a degree of respect for the Geneva Convention. On the 
other hand, these decisions could be considered a duty for Italy when taking into account the 
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 Commission in the Senate eventually organized a small number of meetings. The first ones were 
only directed to the employers’ associations. Later, representatives from the department of public security, 
from the carabinieri, from the Guardia di Finanza, and from the navy and port authorities were also 
included (Atti Parlamentari, Chamber of Deputies Deb 13 May 2002, sitting 143); but also the third sector: 
“something at 9 o’clock at night of which no trace remains even in the Parliamentary records, totally 
useless” (interview with Briguglio). Further auditions were also opened to some pro-immigrant 
organisations but only after specific requests.  
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 February 2011. 
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 asylum but in Italian asilo also means kindergarten. 
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lack of asylum legislation and the existing Schengen
261
 agreements. The country was simply 
coming out of “prehistory” (7.10) (second interview with Schiavone). Because of these factors, 
the UNHCR, as an institutionalised organisation, was at greater advantage compared to other 
groups in the bargaining game. They were able to bring forward amendments that were 
incorporated in the law in cooperation with the Ministry of Interior rather than political parties.  
 
7.1.2.2 Shared knowledge, shared beliefs and shared actions 
Most of the respondents had known each other “through the issue” (Heclo 1978, 103) from the 
early 1990s
262
 and their collaboration slowly increased through the years up to the Kosovo war 
in 1998-1999. Because of this cooperation, all the NGO respondents defined the relationship 
with each other as positive where “no-one was more important than the other” (interview with 
Pacini). After all, in the “great game of alliances” (7.11) (interview with Pacini263) the “aim was 
to try to converge towards shared” (7.12) (first interview with Schiavone264) objectives because 
of their weakness in front of the government. They were a ‘shared knowledge’, and a ‘shared 
belief’ group (Heclo 1978, 103). They were also a ‘shared action’ group (ibid) but only to a 
degree because of the lack of a real structure and discontinuity of their meetings. The analysis of 
the interviews has, in fact, showed that e-mail exchange and meetings with a high degree of 
participation were the routine, revealing the existence of flexible and open networks. Yet, the 
UNHCR interviewee did not agree entirely with the term ‘network’, considering it to be too 
“big” (interview with Humburg265). As an alternative, he referred to “phases” in which they had 
“more structured fora” (7.13) (ibid) and others where instead they had ad hoc meetings 
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according to the topic of conversation. Prior to 2005
266
 in fact, the groups’ cooperation was not 
institutionalised and although they described their dialogue as constructive (ibid), it was without 
a precise pattern, it was “chaotic” because “everything was starting at the same moment, there 
was no coordination, there were no negotiating tables, there was no experience, we were not in 
the habit of discussing things, the UNHCR was not used to coordinate the NGOS” (7.14) 
(second interview with Schiavone). Meetings would sometimes happen “at the end of the 
conference XY, to the meeting Z, to the seminar X” as things “in Italy always happen in a rather 
disorderly way” (7.15) (interview with Dinh Le Quyen). They would meet in the “hottest 
periods” (7.16) (interview with Pompei267) according to the issue or amendment to discuss it in 
conjunction with other topics such as the EU Directive
268
 on the reception of asylum seekers 
(interviews with Hein; Miraglia; Dinh Le Quyen; and Pacini). Acting towards a shared action 
under these conditions was therefore challenging so that having a common aim did “not 
necessarily produce agreement” (Heclo 1978, 104). Divergence of opinions occurred as “it 
would be naïve” (7.17) (second interview with Schiavone) to think the contrary. Three other 
factors contributed to the problem though. On one side, the government’s lack of interest 
towards these groups weakened further their collaboration making the “journey … more 
withdrawn” (7.18) (interview with Di Lecce269) as the organisations were pushed to work with 
their political referees on a 1-1 basis. On the other side, the competition for funding
270
 among 
groups led to less cohesion and as a consequence a weaker political pressure (interview with Di 
Lecce; and former UNHCR official
271
). Finally, the different interests at stake, including 
organisational differences, produced disagreements. This was in relation to pro-immigrant 
organisations working on both asylum and immigration aspects of the law as sometimes they 
had to “clarify the respective mandates” (7.19) (interview with Humburg) as in the case of 
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271
 Telephone interview date: 5
th
 January 2011.  
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bodies like Caritas which ran services while others, like Amnesty International, were more 
concerned with aspects of policy. The Church could have exerted more pressure on the 
government on asylum matters but they preferred to concentrate their efforts on family reunions, 
the taking of fingerprints and the regularisation that were precisely the aspects on which the 
CCD-CDU party was more vocal (first interview with Schiavone; and interview with 
Briguglio). Because of this strong support for regularisation, the Comunità di Sant’Egidio 
received much criticism from the left (opposition parties and organisations alike) because they 
only “asked for some [of the migrants] and not for the others” (7.20) (interview with Pompei). 
On the other hand, their strategy was due to their being aware that they could not have obtained 
more. So, the organisations had set their own priorities based on the then political climate and 
economic needs. Knowing that the UNHCR was already very vocal on asylum related issues, it 
did make sense for the other groups to press on other topics that were at the forefront at the 
time, i.e. labour migration and in particular, the regularisation of domestic helpers and carers 
upon which Italian families depend so much.  
 Internal disagreements within the network also happened in relation to non-suspensive 
appeals. This was probably the most controversial point contained in article 32 as it was planned 
not to suspend the removal of the asylum seeker waiting for the appeal from the national 
territory
272
. In reality, the organisations did not disagree with each other but only with the 
UNHCR, which was criticised for not putting more pressure on the government. Its position was 
considered “too modest compared to the importance of the matter” (7.21) (second interview 
with Schiavone). Nevertheless, it was due to the UNHCR’s negotiation that the debate on the 
appeals happened in the first place (interview with Dinh Le Quyen). Indeed, the political 
approach of the UNHCR was to follow a mediating role. This was required by the need to have 
a dialogue with a government that was deaf “to humanitarian and civil rights’ protection 
requests” (7.22) (first interview with Schiavone). The UNHCR approach can be justified in 
terms of “strategic evaluations” (7.23) (second interview with Schiavone) i.e. what the UN 
refugee organisation can achieve at a certain moment in time and in a given country. In that 
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precise moment, in Italy there was the passage “from the Palaeolithic to the Neolithic” (7.24) 
(ibid) and the resources were spent trying to improve other aspects of the text and specifically to 
provide for an asylum procedure and the establishment of SPRAR. Considering that the essence 
of the law was the restriction of illegal immigration, no more than that could have been done 
(interview with Compagnucci). Hence, to allow non-suspensive appeals in the Act would have 
meant giving the chance to overcome the problem through instrumental asylum claims. 
 
7.1.2.3 Unequal resources and unequal power: ‘parentela’ and ‘clientela’ 
The third and final reason for which an issue network has been identified is because of the 
different resources available and unequal power among the members of the network. On one 
side, there were the Catholic organisations – with Caritas as the leading one because of their 
known work at local level – that had the ‘advantage’ of lobbying their political referees who 
happened to be part of the ruling coalition. They were still not able to get through to the 
government that preferred to dialogue with the highest leaders of the Church (interview with 
Dinh Le Quyen). Then there were business groups that, although were not part of this research, 
were nevertheless relevant because of the importance of immigration over asylum. Finally, there 
was the UNHCR which, thanks to its institutional importance, international presence and 
extensive experience representing the third sector, became the government’s “principal speaker” 
(7.25) (interview with Dinh Le Quyen). Typically, the outcomes on the asylum aspects were 
“due to the pressures from the UNHCR regardless of what the other organisations think” (7.26) 
(interview with Briguglio). The organisation was without a doubt leading the debate on asylum 




Catholic groups and business organisations developed a parentela relationship that is “a 
relatively close … relationship between certain associational groups on the one hand, and the 
politically dominant Christian Democratic Party on the other thus exercising ‘considerable 
influence’” (La Palombara 1964, 306). For instance, although the Catholic organisation 
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Comunità di Sant’Egidio tried to dialogue also with FI and AN, they specifically chose to speak 
first and foremost with representatives of one of the politically dominant Catholic parties, CCD-
CDU, so they looked actively for representatives (interview with Pompei). The association 
launched an impressive campaign called Ho bisogno di te (I need you) and were able to 
mobilise hundreds of Italian families and elderly people who met under the Parliament and 
started shouting the slogan “I need you”. It was thanks to their pressure, in particular to Luca 
Volontè – spokesperson of CCD-CDU – and Bruno Tabacci – ‘responsible’ for the so-called 
‘Tabacci knot’ – that they succeeded with their request to the government to have a 
regularisation for care workers. In the same way, Coldiretti, one of the biggest Italian 
Confederations specialising in agriculture, benefited from their position and had regular 
meetings with the government and the parties in the majority. Coldiretti have a seasonal need of 
migrants compared to other sectors that employ them for longer periods of time. The 
agricultural sector in Italy takes particular profit from the employment of migrants because of 
the ageing of the native population as well as the depopulation of rural areas. Migrants are 
highly valued due to their acceptance of low wages and difficult working conditions that are not 
attractive to the younger Italian population
273
. The Coldiretti’s request to have residence permits 
lasting three years
274
 was accepted by the ruling coalition and it is described in article 5 of the 
Act
275
 (interview with Magrini
276
). While LN opposed migration generally on the basis that it 
threatened security and local northern culture, the employers’ associations, especially in the 
                                                     
273
 About 46% of migrants who work in the sector are less than 35 years old while the Italians of the same 
age amount to just 5% (Cicerchia and Pallara 2009, 96). Furthermore, it is believed that a striking 95% of 
migrants are employed illegally in the Calabria region alone, by far the highest percentage of employment 
of illegal workforce in Italy (ibid, 34). Through decrees issued by the Minister of Labour Roberto Maroni 
in February, March, May and July 2002, the numbers of seasonal migrants from Central and Eastern 
Europe increased while the non-seasonal migration decreased and went from 50,000 to 19,000 in 2002 
(Einaudi 2007 quoted in Geddes 2008).  
274
 Permessi di soggiorno pluriennali. This type of residence permit was particularly important for those 
regions (especially Trentino Alto Adige and Friuli Venezia Giulia) relying on the seasonal entrance of 
migrants living close to the border (Melica 2001). 
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 Art 5 (Permesso di soggiorno) 3-ter. Allo straniero che dimostri di essere venuto in Italia almeno due 
anni di seguito per prestare lavoro stagionale puo’ essere rilasciato, qualora si tratti di impieghi ripetitivi, 
un permesso pluriennale, a tale titolo, fino a tre annualita’, per la durata temporale annuale di cui ha 
usufruito nell’ultimo dei due anni precedenti con un solo provvedimento. Il relativo visto di ingresso e’ 
rilasciato ogni anno. Il permesso e’ revocato immediatamente nel caso in cui lo straniero violi le 
disposizioni del presente testo unico. 
276
 Representative of Coldiretti, telephone interview: 13
th
 June 2011.  
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North-East of Italy, that is the core of the populist party, were demanding more immigrants and 
larger quotas.  
 The original text, which came out from the Cabinet in September 2001, already 
incorporated some changes related to the quotas based on the requests put forward by those 
regions directed by members of the Casa delle Libertà (House of Freedoms) i.e. the ruling 
coalition while the others had been substantially ignored (Bonetti 2001c). In the original articles 
on the quotas (article 14 in the ddl presented by the Senate and article 16 presented by the 
Chamber of Deputies) the regions had a much smaller role compared to the final article of the 
law (article 17). Here, the article reads that the region “may” present a report on the “presence 
and conditions of migrants” (Legge Bossi-Fini) together with the effective needs of the regions 
for the following three years. So what caused the government to make these changes? In 
February 2002, a meeting was held between the Veneto region, the government and twelve 
employers’ associations representing all the different sectors (industry, agriculture, crafts, 
cooperation and the tertiary service sector) within the Veneto region. On this occasion, the 
employers’ associations established a permanent coordination group on immigration and labour 
and at the same time recognised the important role of the region in identifying the need for 
foreign labour in accordance with the associations. They asked that the Bossi-Fini took in the 
amendment related to the role of the regions in order to be able to determine the need for quotas 
as article 17 effectively does. The amendment was presented by the regional Councillor for 
Veneto, a member of AN, in conjunction with the then Minister for Labour and Social Affairs, a 
member of the Lega (Confindustria Vicenza 2002). The membership of these two politicians is 
significant here because the two parties that opposed migration at the national level were 
swayed by economic interests presented powerfully by a well organised united front (the region 
and the employers’ associations). This shows that if a powerful interest group has direct 
contacts with the public administration (in this case the Councillor and the Minister), it may 





If a clientela relationship develops then “an interest group … succeeds in becoming … the 
natural expression and representative of a given social sector which … constitutes the … 
reference point for the activity of the administrative agency” (La Palombara 1964, 262). The 
research has highlighted a possible clientela relationship between the UNHCR and the Ministry 
of Interior because of their position at the time. The UNHCR held a special position because it 
was recognized officially and “accredited … by the Ministry of External Affairs” (7.27) 
(interview with Humburg) because of its highly reputable status and extensive first-hand 
experience of asylum issues throughout the world. Most importantly, the fact that their 
relationship with the government was not as political in nature as some of the other 
organisations, helped in the establishment of a less problematic and more open relationship. As 
in the case of the cooperation between the regions, the employers and the Ministry of Labour, 
the UNHCR was able, in a joint effort with the Ministry of Interior and ANCI, to establish 
SPRAR
277
 the new name for the PNA. The UNHCR was the main umbrella organisation 
comprising diverse political interests “from Rifondazione Comunista to the Pope” (7.28) 
(interview with Compagnucci) into an unofficial negotiating table organised by the Ministry. 
 The next two sections focus on the debates and look more in detail at the most contentious 
issues of the law and how they were confronted by the above actors. 
 
7.2 KEY DEBATES  
The bill had a troubled journey because of its controversial nature and three main different 
views: that of the fairly liberal opposition, that of the restrictive Forza Italia, AN, and Lega and 
that of the ‘inbetweeners’ represented by the Catholic party that had the merit of softening the 
harshest parts of the law but only to a degree. As a result, the bill had so many amendments that 
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 The cooperation between the UNHCR, the Interior Ministry and ANCI originated prior to the Bossi-Fini; 
it started in 2000-2001 with the creation of the PNA that intended to put an end to the structural shortage of 
services for refugees. Initially, other associations took part into the discussion because as service providers, 
they were deemed to be able to cooperate for the establishment of the PNA. Unfortunately, the very limited 
funding available created “shocking”277 (interview with Former UNHCR official277) sour conflicts. The 
organisations “perceived the start of a public system of reception based on municipalities as a sort of 
competition” (second interview with Schiavone). Due to internal fights, they were never able to create a 
leadership and to go beyond their personal interests. The UNHCR and the Ministry decided therefore to 
make ANCI the main service provider. 
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the discussion and vote was not possible “before the deadline set out for the presentation of the 
amendments onto the Floor of the House” (7.29) (Sen. Pastore278, Atti Parlamentari, Senate Deb 
19 February 2002, sitting 124, 5). On that occasion
279
 only a minority of amendments was 
discussed
280. This was due to the obstruction presented by the Greens that subsequently “spread 
to all the members of the opposition” (7.30) (ibid). The 1,035 amendments were the 
spontaneous outcome of the initial reactions to the bill itself and were presented to the 1
st
 
permanent Committee for Constitutional Affairs on 14
th
 November 2001. Of these, 500 were 
examined and only 335 were voted (ibid). It was on this occasion that the "contratto di 
soggiorno per lavoro" was introduced, together with the immediate expulsion with 
accompaniment to the border and the use of the Italian navy. The Committee had little time to 
analyse all the amendments due to the haste of the government to proceed. This showed a lack 
of willingness on the part of the government itself and the majority to accept the oppositions’ 
point of view but also reflected the pressures received by the Lega that accused the government 
of not being hard enough. Later, on 9th April 2002, the CDL on the Floor of the House in the 
Chamber of Deputies deliberated the declaration of urgency as a result of the strong 
stonewalling from the centre-left that “[a]fter a sitting in the Constitutional Affairs Committee 
that lasted until 3am … will not allow the bill to see the final vote” (7.27) (ANSA 2002). 
 The part on asylum did not face the same controversies and no major upheaval happened in 
Parliament. The articles, written by the then Minister of Interior together with the then Prefect 
responsible for all immigration matters, had the support of the UNHCR. This peaceful 
cooperation, combined with the factual need of the country to have some kind of procedure in 
place after years of unsuccessful attempts and an institutionalised support service for refugees 
strongly supported by mayors of different political make-up, was not disrupted. After all, the 
procedure introduced administrative detention and non-suspensive appeals. As such, it was not a 
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 November 2001: 1
st
 permanent Committee for Constitutional Affairs. 
280
 From article 1 to 13: cooperation with foreign states in the Mediterranean; ad hoc Committee to monitor 
immigration; the creation of a Sportello unico (single office) dealing with all immigration matters instead of 
having separate offices; residence permit becomes contratto di soggiorno per lavoro” (contract for work 
residence) so no job, no residence permit; use of the navy; exclusion orders carried out by bringing the 
person to the border rather than just by paper. In the end only seven amendments passed; 124 were rejected; 
42 were barred; and 22 were withdrawn
280




matter of concern for the right of the government. The opposition – backed by civil society – 
tried to oppose the two articles because it considered them insufficient to deal with such a 
delicate issue but their amendments were ignored by the government. 
 The next section starts with the part of the debates related to asylum. 
 
7.2.1 Asylum debates 
Of the two articles on asylum the most relevant is the second one comprising many different 
elements such as the new double procedure, the detention of asylum seekers, the new territorial 
commissions, the constitution of SPRAR and the National Fund for asylum policies and 
services for asylum seekers, refugees and those with humanitarian protection established by the 
Interior Ministry. The first article provides for the issuing of a temporary residence permit if 
requested and valid up to the identification procedure. It is therefore not surprising that the more 
substantial article (in terms of content) was also the one that attracted more attention and more 
amendments. However, from the initial debates in the Senate through to the debates in the 
Chamber of Deputies, many MPs (mainly from the left and some from the Catholic parties in 
the majority) asked for the removal of both articles given that the same UNHCR and not some 
“pervicacious Bolsheviks” (7.32) (Russo Spena MP, Atti Parlamentari, Chamber of Deputies 
Deb 30
 
May 2002, sitting 150, 86) held that the articles were below minimum international 
standards. Although the government was aware of the need to have a distinct law and that the 
two articles only took into consideration some aspects of asylum, they were also clear about the 




 As mentioned earlier the very first draft did not consider asylum. However, the text that 
came out from the Cabinet on 12
th
 October 2001 did contain the rough version of what was 
going to be the final result. The three most relevant innovations were those related to: detention, 
the Commission and the introduction of non-suspensive appeals. Detention could be 
compulsory
282
 for those asylum seekers who had tried to elude the checks at the border or for 
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 Forza Italia. 
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 1-bis comma 2. 
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those who had claimed asylum after receiving a notice of expulsion, and ‘optional’283 for asylum 
seekers waiting to be identified – in practice, the vast majority of asylum seekers belonged to 
this category. The Commission for the recognition of asylum changed its name into National 
Commission
284
 and its tasks transferred to Territorial Commissions
285
 scattered throughout the 
country. Finally, the automatic suspensive effect was deleted after the negative decision of the 
Commission. From a logistic point of view, the decentralization of the Commissions throughout 
the territory (including near the borders) meant less travel for those claiming asylum and 
possibly faster decisions due to a less bureaucratic system. Conversely, Fulvio Vassallo (2001) 
from the University of Palermo underlined the negative feature of the Commissions that due to 
their composition
286
 made up of representatives of the Ministry of Interior, would not guarantee 
impartiality. Additionally, the same Commission that has turned down the asylum claim is in 
charge of the appeal procedure. This position was also shared by other associations who 
effectively talked about the abolition of the right to asylum. Whereas the decentralization of the 
commissions was a welcome novelty (interviews with Hein; and Dinh Le Quyen), the detention 
of asylum seekers who had claimed asylum after the expulsion notice was considered acceptable 
but not that of asylum seekers who had spontaneously presented to the authorities. The most 
controversial point was however, the one on the cancellation of the suspensive effect.
287
 This 
was considered by NGOs and the opposition in breach of article 33 of the Geneva Convention 
on non-refoulement. It was also pointed out that provisions related to the subsistence of asylum 
seekers had not been even considered (Briguglio 2001b).  
 The subsequent version of the bill was approved by the Senate on 28
th
 February. In this 
instance, article 24 was approved fairly immediately because the few amendments presented 
were simply not accepted, with no further explanation on the part of the government or the 
majority. Article 25 on the other hand had nearly 300 amendments most of which were 
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 The National Commission for example is chaired by a prefetto (prefect), and it is formed by a senior civil 
servant working for the Italian Cabinet, a civil servant following a diplomatic careeer, a prefect from the 
Department of Civil Liberties and Immigration and from a senior civil servant from the Department of 
Public Security. A representative from the UNHCR participates to the meetings without the right to vote 
(Legge Bossi-Fini, article 6, subsection 1-quinqies). 
287
 1-ter, comma 6. 
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presented by the opposition. Those approved were only six
288
: three presented by Senator 
Boscetto spokesperson of the Government and member of the Forza Italia party; two presented 
by Senator Forlani from the Catholic majority CCD-CDU; and one presented by Senators 
Guerzoni, De Zulueta and Budin of the Democrats of the Left and Olive Tree coalition. The 
more interesting amendments among the six that were accepted, were those presented by the 
Catholics and by the opposition presumably under influence from the UNHCR
289
. Although the 
discussion in Parliament is reported in full, it displays only the amendments and the votes and 
not a real exchange of ideas. The changes
290
 the UNHCR had proposed in December 2001 
corresponded word by word to the amendments presented on the Floor of the House.  
 The debate on the two articles – now articles 27 and 28 – continued in the Chamber of 
Deputies on 30
th
 May during sitting 150. Again article 27 was passed fairly immediately while 
article 28 had a total of 92 amendments. Only 13
291
 of these – presented in the 1st Permanent 
Committee by the Committee itself on 7
th
 May 2002 – were accepted by the government and 
passed. None of the amendments “fruit of auditions” (7.33) (Boato MP, Atti Parlamentari, 
Chamber of Deputies Deb 30 May 2002, sitting 150, 111) with AI, ICS, MSF, the IOM, the 
UNHCR and others and presented by the opposition went through. It is important to underline 
here that amendment 28.259 did in fact consider one of the amendments originally proposed by 
the UNHCR in December 2001: that concerning repatriation in the light of those international 
conventions of which Italy is signatory especially article 3 of the ECHR. Another amendment 
worth emphasizing is no. 28.260 that introduced the SPRAR as the result of “agreements with 
local authorities and the UNHCR” (7.34) (Undersecretary Mantovano, Atti Parlamentari, 
Chamber of Deputies bulletin 18 April 2002). The UNHCR in fact, in one of the few hearings
292
 
the government gave just one week before on 12
th
 April stressed the importance of continuing 
and improving the PNA to be able to deliver better quality services to asylum seekers and 
refugees (Manca di Nissa, Atti Parlamentari, Chamber of Deputies Deb 12
 
April 2002). The 
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 Amendments 25.12, 25.13 and 25.105a. 
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 Thanks to the archives maintained by external expert Sergio Briguglio. 
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 28.250, 28.251, 28,252, 28.253, 28.254, 28.255, 28.256, 28.257, 28.258, 28.259, 0.28.260.5, 28.260, 
28.261.  
292
 Indagine conoscitiva. The formal audition was granted on 12
th
 April in the 1
st
 Commission within the 
Chamber of Deputies following a request from ICS, MSF and AI. Also the OIM took part. 
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creation of SPRAR or better the changes to the PNA, meant firstly more input from the regions 
that would participate on a voluntary basis, secondly collaboration between regions and local 
authorities, and ultimately acknowledgment of the importance of creating a national system 
recognised by the Italian state to help asylum seekers and refugees. It was a ‘bottom-up’ 
approach that made all this possible. During the hearing, the UNHCR’s representative also 
proposed an “intermediate phase” (7.35) (ibid) of fifteen days during which the claimant could 
apply for an appeal without being repatriated given the potentially fatal situation he/she would 
risk, if sent back after been erroneously deemed not to be genuine. It emerged that the UN’s 
refugee agency wished originally for the articles on asylum to be removed. However, conscious 
of the (unspecified) pressures the Italian Government was under, they accepted the situation and 
instead proposed amendments on three points, one of which was accepted: suspensive appeals; 
humanitarian protection
293
; further warranties on the functioning of the Territorial 
Commissions( especially in terms of the selection of the members based on their competency in 
carrying out their duties as well as their professional background). 
 
7.2.2 Immigration debates 
In terms of immigration the bill was not met with favourable opinions. Part of the opposition 
compared it to the German Gast-arbeiter (Livia Turco294 MP, Atti Parlamentari, Chamber of 
Deputies bulletin 18 April 2002) to be used according to the market’s needs with migrants 
required to go back to the country of origin when the contract expired (Reyneri 2004). This 
system would in turn create “insecurity because the immigrant whose permanence is linked to 
the employer’s needs has no interest in integrating” (7.36) (ibid) into the host society. Pro-
immigrant lobbies claimed the bill saw the migrant only in a utilitarian view or as “arms” (7.37) 
(interview with Pacini) “useful only if and until when he produces wealth … reducing 
immigration to a matter of public order” (7.38) (Sen. Malabarba295, Atti Parlamentari, Senate 
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Deb 28 November 2001, sitting 57). Trade unions
296
 believed that the policy would bring an 
increase in irregular migration. Finally, the employers’ associations297, especially those in the 
north-eastern regions of Italy where the employment of foreign labour is fairly widespread due 
to a higher industrial development compared to the rest of the country, were also critical. In 
2003, the former President of the Veneto Industrialists and Vice-President of Confindustria, 
Mister Tognana, affirmed that the policies of the Lega did not represent his category because the 
“collective imagination” proposed by the party is different from the reality of the factories 
(Maurelli 2003, 3). 
 The Bossi-Fini roused strong emotions also within the same majority in parliament. Harsh 
conflicts between the Northern League and the Catholic parties of the so called Whiteflower
298
 
became the norm from the very first discussion of the law in the Cabinet throughout the whole 
parliamentary process. This caused delays over delays to the approval of the ddl in the Cabinet 
in November 2001 until the final passages of the law in July 2002. The Catholics, deeply 
unsatisfied by the “imprecise or deliberately ambiguous” (Colombo and Sciortino 2003, 205) 
text loosely based on the proposals made a couple of years earlier
299
, presented about a hundred 
amendments the discussion of which started in January 2002. The amendments were introduced 
in a meeting held in December 2001 between the parties’ group leaders, part of the government 
coalition of the House of Freedoms
300
 (CDL). The amendments contained the reintroduction of 
the sponsorship program, the abolition of the residence permit and the introduction of quotas on 
a regional basis. The most important feature and controversy of this and previous discussions 
was however, the possibility of a mini-amnesty for 300,000 domestic workers (La Padania 
2001). In reality, the Catholics wanted an amnesty for all irregular migrants including those 
employed in industries setting off the anger of the leader of the Lega Nord, Umberto Bossi, 
whose fierce stance against illegal immigrants and for the devolution had been at the centre of 
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 See Chapter 5: proposals by Fini-Landi and Bossi-Berlusconi. 
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the Carroccio301’s electoral campaign. Apparently, the Lega “renounced to their identity” (7.39) 
(interview to Calderoli MP in Il Sole 24 Ore 2001, 9) to join the governing coalition. As a 
result, passing the law that they considered impregnable from start to finish was of the utmost 
importance.  
 The intentions of the government were clear throughout: to deter unsolicited migration in 
order to ‘protect’ public order while ‘favouring’ “those immigrants that enter Italy regularly and 
in Italy they respect the laws and work honestly” (7.40) (Undersecretary Mantovano, Atti 
Parlamentari, Senate Deb 20 February 2002, sitting 125, 8). In practice, the idea was “to do a 
law… for both the Italians … the Europeans” (ibid) as well as the honest migrants that would be 
“functional to the” Italian “production mechanism and ‘disposed of’ … when this utility stops” 
(7.41) (Barilli n.d). The very first steps in this direction started with the controversies linked to 
the regularisation of migrants. 
 
7.2.2.1 Regularisation  
The article and consequent amendments on the ‘declaration of emergence of irregular work’ 
were presented for the first time in the Senate. However, the discussion on the topic started 
earlier in the Cabinet. It is interesting to see how the provision developed considering that at the 
very beginning of the discussion, the hypothesis of having such regularisation was not an option 
especially for the Lega while it was essential for the Catholics within the majority (CCD-CDU). 
The result has been a juggling government going forwards and backwards on its positions trying 
to please both parties. Back in November 2001 for example, the speaker for the government, 
Senator Boscetto, agreed to open a discussion on the topic. The following month the first 
amendments on the topic were presented by several groups within the opposition
302
 and one by 
the CCD-CDU; while in a meeting with all the leaders of the political parties came to light the 
prospect of having a mini-regularisation of 300,000 workers without a residence permits but 
employed as domestic workers (Benini 2001). The discussion continued in the Senate where 
further amendments were presented by both sides. The difference was that the opposition 
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targeted all migrants without a regular residence permit whereas the majority concentrated 
explicitly on care and domestic workers, specifying that it was not in the government’s 
intentions to give any other type of regularisation (Senator Boscetto, Atti Parlamentari, Senate 
Deb 20 February 2002, sitting 125). In the government’s view in fact, to extend the 
‘regularisation’ (regolarizzazione) to all potential illegal migrants would have meant an 
‘amnesty’ (sanatoria) similar to those given in the past by the centre-left. Naturally, a possible 
alignment with a centre-left position was something that the government wanted to avoid at all 
costs given the increasing concerns of the Italian population towards immigration and the 
pressures exerted by the Northern League on the matter. The tendency of the government to 
disassociate from previous moves was such that even a couple of years later, Mantovano 
justified the government’s decision to extend the regularisation to other workers by explaining 
the “substantial difference” between the two terms because the “past sanatorie” would only 
“consider the presence … of people out of work, guaranteeing only the registration at the 
Jobcentre. The regularisation” on the other hand, not only did this but it also “requested a real 
job relationship … formalized with a job contract and a regular salary” (7.42) (Ministero 
dell’Interno 2004). Eventually, an amendment303 proposed by the same government endorsing 
the emergence of domestic and care workers was passed and the so-called ‘mini-regularisation’ 
became in fact a ‘maxi-regularisation’ as the government agreed to extend it to all foreign 
workers without a regular permit.  
 In the Chamber of Deputies the article was once again the object of interest from both parts 
of the Parliament. Over 40 amendments were presented and clashes between the UDC and the 
rest of the majority due to the imposition not to employ more than one care worker per family 
emerged (Canetti 2002). A total of fifteen amendments were withdrawn the following day by 
Forza Italia304 and the Northern League305. The remaining ones were voted on 3rd June during 
sitting 152 including the one proposed by Tabacci MP
306
 to incorporate into the regularisation 




 The amendments were withdrawn on 9
th
 May 2002 (29.16, 29.40, 29.39, 29.17, 29.20, 29.19 and 29.01). 
305









 and to avoid the one-year imprisonment for employers. This amendment 
was co-signed by other parliamentarians including some from the opposition and was also 
known as ‘nodo’ Tabacci (Tabacci knot). It represented a further obstacle to be dealt with, thus, 
increasing the tensions within the majority and preventing the bill becoming law in the shortest 
possible time. In fact, both the Lega and AN opposed fiercely the proposal as they believed it 
represented a sanatoria (La Repubblica 2002b). The impasse was solved after a meeting in the 
Cabinet. It was agreed that the Catholics would withdraw the ‘Tabacci amendment’ in exchange 
of an ad hoc provision to be approved and passed at the same time i.e. ‘contextually’ as the bill 
became law (Rassegna Online 2002; Il Giornale 2002).  However, the other Catholic group at 
the opposition – the Daisy group – decided to ‘adopt’ as its own the amendment but to no avail 
as the Chamber clearly rejected it including the same UDC that proposed the amendment in the 
first place. After the voting, 13 amendments
308
 were passed, the majority of which had been 
presented by the 1
st
 Commission. The issue though, was far from being solved. The LN opposed 
the term ‘contextual’ and instead proposed to include the provision into the immigration quotas, 
thus, generating more polemics and threats from the UDC to re-present in the Senate the 
amendment signed by Tabacci. In the end, the Senate approved the article (now article 33) that 
came out from the Camera without any further changes while the ‘nodo’ was untied as the 
Cabinet effectively kept its promise. Through an order of the day
309
, the government undertook 
to present a provision (i.e. a law-decree) – as the Bossi-Fini would come into force – that would 
legalise the position of the extracomunitari in the same way as the regularisation provided for 
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 Amendment 29.3presented on 13
th
 May in the Camera during sitting 143. 
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 29.70, 29.71, 29.72, 29.52, 29.53, 29.54, 29.55, 29.73, 29.74, 29.75 proposed by the Commission; 
0.29.52.1 (Testo così modificato nel corso della seduta) proposed by Sinisi (Daisy, DL-Olive Tree) 
together with  Bressa (Daisy, DL-Olive Tree), Leoni (DS-Olive Tree), Bellillo (Misto-Italian Comunists) 
and Boato (Misto-Greens-Union); 29.6 proposed by Luciano Dussin, Fontanini and Cè (LNP); 29.10 
proposed by Landi di Chiavenna (AN).  
309
 G33.3 Il Relatore, Il Senato, impegna il Governo:a presentare un provvedimento che, all'atto 
dell'entrata in vigore del disegno di legge n. 795-B, legalizzi la posizione degli extracomunitari che, 
presenti irregolarmente sul territorio italiano, prestano lavoro subordinato, a condizioni analoghe a 
quelle previste per la regolarizzazione di cui all'articolo 33 dello stesso disegno di legge; a inserire nel 
predetto provvedimento la non punibilità delle violazioni delle norme relative al soggiorno, al lavoro e di 
carattere finanziario, in relazione alla occupazione degli extracomunitari di cui al provvedimento di 
legalizzazione; a non adottare decreti di allontanamento dal territorio nazionale per i lavoratori 
compresi nella legalizzazione. 
 (Briguglio 2002).   
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by article 33 of the law. The controversial term ‘contextual’ was dropped to the delight of the 
Lega. The law-decree became law 266/2002 in November 2002. 
 
7.2.2.2 Sponsor 
The sponsor had been introduced by article 23
310
 of the Turco-Napolitano law according to 
which an Italian or foreign citizen with a legal residence permit, if able to provide 
accommodation as well as cover for costs related to maintenance and health, could help a 
migrant to come to Italy to look for a job for a period of one year but only. This mechanism had 
been requested by Catholic associations and mainly used to employ domestic workers (Meroni 
2002). The reason for the abolition was due to the fact that in 2001, 60 per cent of these requests 
came from foreigners acting as guarantors opening “hypotheses and scenarios that for objective 
reasons did not give” the government “peace of mind” (7.43) (Ministero dell’Interno 2004). In 
practice, this method allegedly opened entry to people who did not already have a job and, for 
such reason, were more “exposed at risk of working illegally” (7.44) (Senator Boscetto, Atti 
Parlamentari, Senate Deb 19
 
February 2002, sitting 124) as well as ending in the hands of 
organised crime especially at the end of the one-year period. As an alternative, the government 
gave the option to the Italian regions and the local authorities to organize courses for the 
formation of would be migrants in the countries of origin
311
 in the hope of facilitating the entry 
of migrants with a “rudimentary notion of our language and law” (7.45) (Undersecretary 
Mantovano, Atti Parlamentari, Chamber of Deputies bulletin 18 April 2002). The problem with 
sponsorship was the fact that the previous government had established low quotas for the 
entrance of people through the programme (15,000 in 2000 and the same number in 2001), 
though the requests by far exceeded the numbers imposed through the decree (Morbello 2002). 
Therefore, in the government’s view there were two main issues connected to the sponsor: a) 
too many guarantors were non-Italians. The Turco-Napolitano did not put a limit despite the fact 
that it is common for migrants who live and are settled in a given country to help others creating 
that social process called ‘chain migration’ (Massey et al. 2002). Perhaps the government 
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 Art. 23 (Prestazione di garanzia per l'accesso al lavoro). 
311
 Article 19. 
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wanted to avoid just this as it was believed that many were not genuine in their intentions, 
leading to prostitution, drugs dealing and illegal work; and b) the partial or inadequate success 
of the programme despite the fact it had been implemented recently. For example, a study in the 
Veneto region showed that “in 2000 more than 1200 sponsored workers found a job” (7.46) 
(Morbello 2002) the majority of which were likely to be among those who entered through the 
programme making it quite successful. Furthermore, very often an employer would rather meet 
in person a future employee especially in the case of domestic workers and carers.  
 In the Senate, both the CCD-CDU and the opposition presented amendments to keep the 
sponsorship programme although the government decided against
312
. Despite this, a series of 
new (and extremely similar to each other) amendments on the same topic were presented in the 
Chamber of Deputies on 7th May revealing a cooperation between unlikely allies. Some were 
brought forward by the opposition
313
 but also surprisingly by a representative of FI
314
 who 
emphasized that the direct acquaintance between employer and employee is more adequate than 
choosing from a list of names
315
. The main difference compared to the other amendments was 
that the guarantor had to be Italian and had to give a guarantee to the State of 20,000/40,000 
Euros depending on the length of the job search (Meroni 2002). As this was an individual 
request and not having the support of the rest of the group, it was withdrawn a couple of days 
later. The votes on the amendments happened on 29
th
 May during sitting 149 but the 
sponsorship was not reintegrated. 
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 Commission, sitting 72, amendments: 3.28 
proposed by Guerzoni, Battafarano, Viviani, Piloni, Di Siena, Gruosso, De Zulueta (DS-Ulivo) and re-
proposed on 20th february 2002 during sitting 125; 16.29 proposed by Guerzoni, Viviani, Battafarano, 
Gruosso, Piloni, Di Siena (DS-Ulivo); 16.3 Peterlini (AUT - Gruppo per le autonomie).  
Senate, Floor of the House, sitting 131, 27
th
 February 2002, amendments: 16.1 proposed by Senator 
Eufemi (CCD-CDU); 16.29 proposed by Guerzoni, Viviani, Battafarano, Gruosso, Piloni, Di Siena; 16.3 
Kofler (AUT); 16.500 Borea (CCD-CDU); 16.502 proposed by Brutti Massimo, Viviani and equal to 
16.3. 
313
 Amendments proposed by the Opposition: 3.28; 18.16; 18.22; 18.1; 18.5, 18.3; 18.6; 18.28; 18.7; 18.31; 
18.17; 18.29; 18.34; 18.23; 18.18; 18.24; 18.25; 18.12; 18.4.  
314
 Amendment proposed by Dario Rivolta from FI: 3.44: “Dopo le parole: ai sensi dell'articolo 20 
aggiungere le seguenti: È prevista una percentuale pari al 5 per cento della quota d'ingresso prefissata 
annua, di cui al comma 4, per gli stranieri che entrano in Italia, su richiesta di un cittadino italiano e al 
fine di ricerca lavoro, garantiti dallo stesso cittadino italiano che ne ha fatto richiesta allo Sportello 
Unico della Provincia di appartenenza”.  
315
 So called chiamata nominativa. 
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7.2.2.3 Residence permit and work permit  
This provision was regulated by article 5 and aimed at connecting the possibility of residence in 
Italy to the existence of a job, so in practice if there was no job, there would have not been a 
residence permit. Furthermore, it imposed “on the sole employers the solution to the problem” 
to provide “a dignified accommodation to foreign workers” (7.43) (Sen. Viviani 316 , Atti 
Parlamentari, Senate Deb 29 November 2001, sitting 34, Commission for Work and Welfare).  
 Article 5 in the Senate had a total of 53 amendments and only 4 were approved. One of 
these was presented by the Misto 317  group while the other three were presented by the 
government speaker Senator Boscetto. However, nothing particularly substantial was added to 
the bill approved a few months earlier in the Cabinet.  
 As the text passed to the Camera and in particular to the 1st permanent Commission over 
100
318
 amendments came out from the analysis. Here on 9
th
 May another major issue emerged: 
the addition of the subsection on the fingerprints for those migrants requesting a resident permit 
or the renewal of the permit
319
 because “it is fair to know who you are dealing with” (7.48) 
(Dussin MP
320
, Atti Parlamentari, Chamber of Deputies Deb 13 May 2002, sitting 143, 28). 
However, for the opposition this measure gave the message that “foreigners are all potential 
criminals or … subjects to keep under control” (7.49) (Mascia MP, ibid). The government 
favoured only four amendments
321
 that consequently were approved: two (including the one on 
the imprints) proposed by the Commission and two minor ones proposed by Soda MP of the 




 A ‘Mixed’ group is made up of several different parties ranging from extreme left to extreme right as 
well as Catholics: PRI, Rifondazione Comunista, MS Fiamma Tricolore, SI, Comunista, LAL, NPSI, LGU, 
MTL, Udeur-PE, Ind-Cdl, Cdl, Italia dei Valori, MIS, DC-Aut.   
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 5.69; 5.1; 5.99; 5.17; 5.101; 5.41; 5.31; 5.70; 5.100; 5.43; 5.18; 5.68; 5.19; 5.71; 5.44; 5.104; 5.20; 5.72; 
5.21; 5.105; 5.106; 5.73; 5.45; 5.22; 5.46; 5.67; 5.47; 5.40; 5.98; 5.74; 5.48; 5.23; 5.2; 5.24; 5.12; 5.3; 5.13; 
5.25; 5.4; 5.93; 5.14; 5.92; 5.26; 5.15; 5.5; 5.75; 5.6; 5.76; 5.32; 5.33; 5.77; 5.49; 5.78; 5.94; 5.27; 5.34; 
5.79; 5.28; 5.50; 5.16; 5.103; 5.29; 5.80; 5.51; 5.66; 5.52; 5.81; 5.35; 5.7; 5.82; 5.8; 5.36; 5.84; 5.37; 5.83; 
5.120; 5.85; 5.95; 5.53; 5.65; 5.96; 5.86; 5.39; 5.9; 5.54; 5.38; 5.55; 5.87; 5.10; 5.88; 5.102; 5.107; 5.89; 
5.56; 5.57; 5.58; 5.97; 5.90; 5.11; 5.59; 5.91; 5.60; 5.61; 5.62; 5.64; 5.300;5.110. 
319
 Al comma 1, dopo la lettera a), è inserita la seguente: «a-bis) dopo il comma 2 è inserito il seguente:  
2-bis. Lo straniero che richiede il permesso di soggiorno è sottoposto a rilievi fotodattiloscopici».  
Conseguentemente, dopo la lettera e) è inserita la seguente: «e-bis) dopo il comma 4 è inserito il 
seguente:  
4-bis. Lo straniero che richiede il rinnovo del permesso di soggiorno è sottoposto a rilievi 
fotodattiloscopici». 5. 300. Il Relatore.  
320
 Northern League 
321
 5.111 (new formula for 5.110); 5.200; 5.31 and 5.45. 
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order of the day to take digital imprints also of Italians. A few more final amendments were 
presented in Senate
323
 just days before the law was finally passed but none was accepted. 
 This final section of the chapter has focused on the main challenges posed by the law and 
faced by the government and the organisations. The part on asylum was not seen as an issue by 
the government because of the ingenious inclusion of four provisions: the double procedure, the 
non-suspensive appeals, the decentralisation of the Commissions, and the establishment of 
SPRAR, essential for the integration of asylum seekers and refugees in Italy thanks to the 
inclusion of local authorities. Many within civil society and the opposition called for the articles 
to be withdrawn so as to bind the government to the promise to create the long sought after 
legislation. All in all however, the same organisations which tried to have the articles removed 
were pleased in the end by the decision to keep the articles as they put some order into the 
mayhem of the Italian asylum system.  
 The articles on immigration were more problematic because they saw the hostility rising 
between two parties within the same coalition but with two very different ideas of how 
immigration should be handled. The final law was quite different from what came out originally 




This chapter has focused on the policy-making process behind the Bossi-Fini law. The analysis 
of the debates, the survey of the articles of the time, as well as the interviews with NGO 
representatives and policy makers have highlighted some important points. Firstly, the 
dominance of the political parties in the majority that led to tensions within the same coalition. 
The LN in fact defended the harsher line originally outlined in the Cabinet. The Catholic CCD-
CDU acted more in defence of migrants’ rights thanks to the pressures exercised by the Church 
and in particular, the CEI and the Catholic pro-migrants organisations, but also the employers’ 
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 Presented by D’Alia MP of the CD-CDU party. 
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 Atti Parlamentari, Senate Deb 9 July 2002, sitting 208. 
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associations. The resulting final Act therefore was not as strict as it was claimed it was going to 
be at first. Some of the originally proposed harshest measures (for example, the crime of 
clandestine immigration and the withdrawal of family reunions) were scrapped at the very 
beginning. Instead, a regularisation programme for domestic and care workers was introduced 
and after the bill became law it was massively extended to all the other categories of workers. 
On the other hand, other severe provisions were put in as an alternative. However, these were 
more of a populist compromise for that part of the majority less inclined to a solidarist approach 
towards migrants in general, than a real threat. The Catholics were the real power-brokers as 
they were able to soften the law through bargaining. The government played a mediating role 
between the two parties. 
 Secondly, the chapter has highlighted the great difficulties of most of the advocacy groups 
especially those historically linked to the left or perceived to be on the left, in participating in 
the policy-making process. Many of these groups and especially Caritas, like the Refugee 
Council in the UK, used to run services for asylum seekers and immigrants. This factor 
however, did not give them favoured access as they were still not included in the policy process. 
The government, according to most of the civil society’s respondents, was simply not interested 
in a dialogue as the few consultations showed. For others, the problem was not the lack of 
interest but the decisiveness and strength of the government. Pro-migrant organisations lacked 
political opportunity because of the government’s political make-up. For these reasons they can 
be characterised as issue networks. They had a completely different view from the government 
of how asylum and immigration should work. Furthermore, due to the closure of the 
government, advocacy groups were only able to express their concerns and lobby their political 
referents, thus weakening collaboration with each other. Furthermore, interviews highlighted 
that although organisations had known each other for a long time and collaborated fairly well 
together, their cooperation was not sustained throughout the policy debate but varied according 
to the period and the topic. This is because immigration and asylum were still relatively new in 
2001/2002 and associations were not well organised, while coordination from the UNHCR was 
just starting. Collaboration was also difficult at times because of the lack of funding and 
competition to get policy makers’ attention. Finally, the resources available to the organisations 
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were also different. For example, the UNHCR, thanks to its extensive experience and 
knowledge of the issue and to the relative interest of the government on asylum, was perceived 
as being the most adept with which to discuss the matter. The UN agency was able to deploy a 
certain degree of pressure and collaboration with the Ministry of Interior. On the other hand, 
immigration was a much more a delicate subject. It stemmed from a political and ideological 
attitude and had a different set of actors involved, creating a strange alliance between the 
employers’ organisations, the Church and families.  
 The third point relates to the relationship between asylum and immigration. The Bossi-Fini 
was born to regulate immigration but especially to deter unwanted migration. It was therefore 
quite restrictive. The interesting thing about the process is that despite the government’s closure 
towards any possible social aspect related to improve immigrants’ lives, it introduced two 
articles on asylum. This was unforeseen by many working for migrants, first because Italy did 
not have legislation on asylum and second because a centre-right government succeeded where 
previous centre-left governments failed. The two articles, although not complete, at least 
bridged the gap existing until then in Italy. Furthermore, all the unpleasant fights that happened 
on the immigration side did not happen on asylum. This was partly due to the fact that these 
articles had a government origin – they were written by the Minister of Interior together with 
the Prefect in close alliance with the UNHCR – but also because asylum was not perceived as 
being as problematic as illegal migration and finally, it was a process long overdue.  
 Fourthly, the policy process has illustrated that although politicians were still the main 
mediators in the decision-making process, they felt the pressure exercised by others (Klijn and 
Skelcher 2007). The findings have showed that policy was the result of a mix of ‘top-down’ and 
‘bottom-up’ approach. The governance of networks was nevertheless minimal. On one side, 
there was the closure of the government and on the other side, the pressure of very few 
organisations (the CEI and its Catholic organisations, the employers’ associations, the UNHCR 
in collaboration with ANCI that from its part involved the mayors of both main coalitions) on 
points that the government could not possibly ignore. But the fact that they had their voices 
heard by the government and the moderate Catholic parties within the majority illustrates a 
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bottom-up approach for policy making. Some of the requests brought forward by these 
categories were observed to improve or soften the norm in some of its harshest parts.  
 The mixture of top-down and bottom-up approaches links national, regional and local 
views on the matters of asylum and immigration which overlapped frequently and were 
permeated by party politics at a high degree. Power within government was less geographically 
centralised than it might have been because of the determination of the political parties as well 
as the bottom-up pressure deriving from local mayors to improve services for asylum seekers 























COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF THE ASYLUM POLICY-MAKING 
PROCESS IN THE UNITED KINGDOM AND IN ITALY 
The aim of this chapter is to use the analysis of the asylum policy processes in Chapters 6 and 7 
to determine how far they reflect the nature of the two states. Despite their dissimilar historical, 
economic, social and political developments, the two countries in 2002 created asylum and 
immigration policies with very similar goals, aimed at deterring illegal entry to the detriment of 
basic rights for asylum seekers. Yet, the way in which they reached their aim was 
unquestionably different. The two Acts are therefore a way to understand how far the policy-
making process is a product of national political structures.  
 During the analysis three key themes that are pertinent to both countries have emerged:  
1) The existence of issue networks 
2) The nature of the political systems 
3) National, regional and local levels of policy-making  
These themes reflect the research questions and hypotheses set out in Chapter 1 and they are 
concerned with government power to create asylum and immigration policy in the presence of 
other actors within the policy domain (hypotheses 3 and 4). They also relate to the ability of the 
government to deal with party politics, given the difficult issue of asylum in the UK and 
immigration in Italy as well as the nature of their political systems (hypotheses 1 and 2). 
Although both Acts were government initiatives, the political leaders differed in the two states. 
Whereas in the UK there was a lot of political steerage coming from No.10 and the Cabinet 
Office through influential individuals such as the Prime Minister and the Home Secretary, in 
Italy it was the political parties in the majority that set the rules of the game while the 
government acted as mediator. Both governments had to deal with internal constraints that were 
different in nature, resulting in compromises in order to pass the two laws. Furthermore, a 
comparison of how party politics affected the formation of asylum policy reveals the importance 
of different levels of policy-making: national, regional and local. The national level was 
represented in both countries by the governments’ and the political parties’ expression of how 
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asylum and immigration should work and be regulated. The regional level in the UK was linked 
to the establishment of accommodation centres away from London and the South East; in Italy, 
the regions contributed to the decisions related to immigration quotas. Finally, the local view 
was expressed in the UK by local residents, local authorities and MPs opposing the 
government’s plan to build accommodation centres; in Italy, it was conveyed by local 
employers in need of labour power and by mayors in need of support from the government to 
run services for asylum seekers. These themes account for similarities and differences in the 
attitudes of the two governments towards immigration and asylum in 2002, and the different 
perspectives of policy-makers and civil society
324
 towards each other and towards the two 
issues. 
 The themes are developed in the chapter as follows. Firstly, the similarities and differences 
between the networks at civil society level and their relationships with the governments are 
highlighted. Secondly, government’s ability to make asylum policy given the constraints and the 
political compromises they had to deal with, is covered in the second part of this chapter. 
Finally, how the two political systems were affected by the actions of political parties is 
discussed. This was particularly evident in the Italian case where the coalition parties displayed 
very strong yet different ideologies and were the most prominent actors at all three levels: 
national, regional and local. In the UK – although these three dimensions are present – it was 
especially at local level that party politics permeated the most because of the protests within the 
Tory constituencies. Hence, the relationships between the central core and the periphery (i.e. the 
government and the other two levels) were very different in the two countries precisely because 
of the political parties’ influence.  
 
8.1 KEY THEME 1. ISSUE NETWORKS: DIFFERENCES AND SIMILARITIES.  
While the literature review in Chapter 2 highlighted the major differences between the various 
concepts of policy networks, Chapters 6 and 7 showed that in both countries in 2002 issue 
networks were key, despite differences in the states’ political and welfare systems. These 
networks were formed by advocacy coalitions working for the welfare of asylum seekers and 
                                                     
324
 For civil society, I intend NGOs, charities, the UNHCR and trade unions. 
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migrants. As proposed by hypothesis 3 – which presupposes the change from ‘government’ to 
‘governance’ – the advocacy groups tried to influence the law through direct and indirect 
lobbying. 
 The issue networks in the two countries were different in nature. To begin with, the Italian 
networks were not as established as the UK ones. The research has picked up a higher degree of 
instability in Italy in both meetings and disagreements. In the UK, in contrast, meetings within 
networks were more regular and structured. Groups were also often invited to both official and 
unofficial meetings with several policy-makers as well as civil servants, regardless of the 
political party they belonged to. In addition, there were more internal conflicts in the Italian 
network than in the UK one because of differences of opinion and also because of the different 
interests involved. In Italy, their mandates often overlapped due to their internal statutes but 
generally they worked together as they had before on several other occasions.  
 In terms of the nature of the political system, as per the second hypothesis, the 
governments displayed different attitudes with regard to the lobbying of NGOs and charities. 
While in the UK basic consultation was widespread, in Italy it was kept to a bare minimum 
according to government wishes. This is because the UK government did not feel threatened by 
the groups that did not have the support of the public. In particular, No.10 chose to engage more 
actively with the Refugee Council on the question of accommodation centres (hence, the 
decision to run a trial with a smaller one) because of the widespread local hostility towards the 
government’s decision and the pressures exercised in the Lords. In Italy, the government 
displayed two different behaviours. On asylum there was widespread consultation between the 
Ministry of Interior and the UNHCR while political parties did not interfere. The UNHCR acted 
as mediator with the other groups that were left out from the official process. On labour 
migration, only employers’ groups and some experts (for example, the Navy) were included in 
the consultation process while advocacy groups were deliberately kept in the dark and excluded 
by the official government consultations. The thesis is that the government did not want to deal 
with ‘unnecessary’ delays 325  because of humanitarian reasons (the Church was already 
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 The previous centre-left government did entertain wide consultations with NGOs and charities while 
discussing the Turco-Napolitano law. This resulted in longer discussions and possibly delays. 
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performing this duty) and also felt threatened by the pro-migrant groups. It wanted to keep hold 
of the operations as much as possible while keeping interference to a minimum in order to 
appear stronger. In relation to labour migration, some Catholic organisations backed by CEI 
were none the less still able to communicate with some policy-makers and, albeit disorderly, 
they were able to influence to a degree the policy process. They had to revert to lobbying on a 
one-to-one basis i.e. with “legislators of like ideological predisposition” (La Palombara 1964, 
249). The bishops were the only ones who were allowed to communicate with the government. 
However, these meetings happened behind closed doors. The work of NGOs and charities was 
nevertheless weakened by this strategy as their work as a unit suffered. On the other hand, the 
influence of the Church and employers’ groups was strong and the government had to accept 
that their requests were not only moved by humanitarian concerns (at least in the case of the 
Church), but also and especially for utilitarian needs. Some sectors of the Italian market 
necessitated the use of foreign labour and the black market was widespread. At the same time, 
because “welfare is a matter of familial responsibility” (Bloch and Schuster 2002, 398), things 
were particularly difficult for those with no family support, which included refugees and asylum 
seekers. Italian families in particular, have come to rely more and more on foreign care workers 
and domestic helpers. It is easier to understand in this context the important role played by the 
Catholic world in the making of the Bossi-Fini and the regularisation of illegal migrants 
employed by families. This reinforces Esping-Andersen’s (1990) description of the corporatist 
Italian welfare regime, whilst showing similarities to the Mediterranean welfare systems 
(Ferrera 1996; Sciortino 2004), that is, a non-interventionist state and underdeveloped family 
services. The regularisation, therefore, became the necessary tool in the attempt to put some 
order into this situation. Notwithstanding these differences between issue networks in the two 
countries, the UK pro-migrant groups cannot be considered more powerful or successful than 
the Italian ones. What constituted success for the UK groups could only be measured by the 
amendments presented in parliament, following friendly all-party meetings or more structured 
fora organised by the government. Both types of meetings served the purpose to inform MPs 
and Peers of the current asylum situation. The organisations on the other hand, did not feel they 
had a particularly privileged relationship with the establishment or that they had any influence at 
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all. Groups had limited public and media support apart from the Guardian newspaper (interview 
with Pearce). The fact that asylum and immigration were highly politicised issues (due to 
asylum being perceived as a threat as proposed by hypothesis 1), makes the work of 
associations very difficult and frustrating. They may have had some results, but only at the 
margins, and made things appear more controversial. The main problems they pointed towards 
were: the government’s large majority, the electoral advantage in taking a strong stance against 
asylum seekers, the public opinion polls that were putting asylum at the top of people’s 
concerns and finally the Daily Mail’s negative headlines. Another element that emerged during 
the analysis was the last minute changes affecting further the governance role of stakeholders. 
Chapter 4 for example, showed that during the making of the 2002 NIA Act, two important 
provisions
326
 were added at the last minute. The advocacy groups therefore did not have the 
chance to discuss the issues thoroughly among themselves and to inform MPs and Peers of the 
consequences of these new obligations. The thesis is that these moves were made at the last 
minute in a way that would hinder any possible objection or opposition. In Italy, despite the 
weakness of the pro-migrant groups as a whole, Catholic groups were still able to permeate the 
fortress built by the government. They did this by communicating directly with individual 
Catholic policy-makers with whom they had a political affiliation, in unofficial one-to-one 
meetings.  
 There are three similarities among the two networks. Firstly, there was a lack of similar 
ideology between the governments and pro-migrant groups in both countries. The groups 
demanded less strict laws and more rights for migrants while the governments were reluctant to 
grant them. There was, as a result, limited trust and cooperation between the core executive and 
network members. At most, there was consultation on specific aspects of the bills. Secondly, the 
groups in both countries shared few and unequal resources (e.g. in terms of obtainability of 
funding, number of staff, knowledge and availability of time). The big organisations had more 
resources. In Italy, this was particularly important as Catholic groups were advantaged 
compared to their non-Catholic counterparts, owing to the political formation of the coalition 
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 These were: section 55 that removed all benefits from in-country applicants if their claim was not made 
“as soon as reasonably practicable” after the person's arrival; and Section 94 that introduced the concept of 
‘clearly unfounded’ asylum applications and denied in-country appeals (non-suspensive appeals).  
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government which comprised the Catholic group CCD-CDU. So, despite the unavailability of 
the government to discuss the law with the advocacy groups directly and openly, the Catholic 
groups were still able to communicate indirectly with their MPs. Thirdly, only those groups 
with more status had access to the governments. This applies specifically to the RC in the UK 
and UNHCR in Italy. They were the biggest, best resourced and best known pro-asylum 
organisations and were often officially invited by the UK government and its MPs (who relied 
heavily on their briefings) and by the Italian Ministry of Interior to take part in meetings.  
 To explore further the role played by issue networks, the theoretical framework
327
 of Marsh 
and Rhodes (1992) is used. 
 
8.1.1 Membership: participants and interests 
Pro-migrant organisations usually have a very large, fluctuating membership that makes them 
unstable due to the lack of resources (for example limited funding). They also have limited 
vertical interdependence (Marsh and Rhodes 1992).  
 In the UK – contrary to Italy – there are many pro-asylum groups. Some of these in 2002 
gathered under the umbrella group ARC chaired by the Refugee Council. The RC co-operated 
with refugee community organisations (RCOs) keeping them abreast of any developments while 
asking them to lobby their MPs. RCOs were too many and too small and did not take part in the 
ARC meetings. There was some limited vertical interdependence as the smaller groups 
depended on the information passed on to them by the bigger members of the network.  
 The situation in Italy differed because of the closure of the then government to most types 
of charitable or advocacy lobbying. Because the UNHCR was the only recognised organisation 
among the advocacy groups to have access to the Ministry of Interior, it was the main 
spokesperson for the other associations. This dependency was limited by the fact that the 
UNHCR’s only interest was in asylum and not in labour migration. As a specialised refugee 
organisation and because of its internal statute, the UNHCR could not comment on immigration 
matters. Other organisations concerned with both immigration and asylum would instead 
pronounce themselves on both aspects. On the other hand, due to the specific dual nature of the 
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Bossi-Fini regulating both immigration and asylum, the UNHCR would “comment or intervene 
upon” both (8.1) (Interview with Humburg). A consequence of this dependency and behaviour 
was that the Italian organisations had to remind each other’s remits occasionally in order not to 
trespass the remit of other organisations. As Schiavone pointed out, a reason why this situation 
may have arisen was because of the lack of experience and coordination especially on the part 
of the UNHCR as at the time “there were no negotiating tables … we were not in the habit of 
discussing things, the UNHCR was not used to coordinate the NGOs” (8.2) (second interview). 
 Another typical feature of pro-migrant groups is that different interests normally permeate 
the network. This was the case in both countries. Some groups were more concerned with 
services (and the financial aspects related to run these services) while others focused on the 
legal or policy development aspects. This produced several networks in the UK: on detention, 
on the EU, on support and on policy. They were able to work together on the different aspects 
of the bill and their collaboration was for the most part very positive. In Italy the picture was 
different. There was one network formed by organisations whose interests were more practical 
as they ran services and managed funds (for example, Caritas) and others that were more 
concerned with the juridical aspects of the law (for example, ASGI or AI). None of the pro-
immigrant organisations mentioned during the interview a possible collaboration with the 
business groups, despite some of the claims being similar, such as the reinstitution of the 
sponsor programme. They may have had common interests at stake – those of expanding 
immigration and to regularise illegal migrants – but they seemed to operate on two separate 
levels. Whilst the Catholic groups’ stance was more humanistic and they were keen on the 
regularisation of domestic workers and care helpers, the employers’ groups were market 
oriented, asking for the regularisation of all the other categories of undocumented migrants. 
Nevertheless, this alliance served the purpose of introducing the regularisation of domestic 
workers and care givers contained in article 33 of the Bossi-Fini and, a few months later, 




8.1.2 Integration: frequency of interaction, continuity and consensus 
The fluctuation of membership over time was not an issue for this research. This is because to 
identify any changes that may have an impact on policy implementation would require a 
prolonged period of study measured in years. Because this research focuses on the formulation 
of two specific laws, the period taken into consideration is much shorter (i.e. 8 months for the 
Bossi-Fini and about 7 months for the 2002 NIA Act). There was, however, fluctuation in the 
intensity and quality of contacts, especially in Italy. Here, although organisations had worked 
together before, they did not have any structured network so meetings were often happening 
impromptu. Besides, due to the government’s political make-up, the majority was less open to 
discuss the matter, especially with associations with a left-wing orientation or background. As a 
result, the associations had to resort to lobbying MPs on a one-to-one basis thus weakening the 
potential for cooperation. In the UK, interaction among groups was more frequent. Contrary to 
the Italian case, there were two main structured networks with meetings organised by NGOs and 
those organised by the Home Office. For example, the ARC meetings would happen on average 
every two weeks while e-mails were a regular feature for exchanging information. Access did 
not fluctuate over time rather, according to the issue: “policy or … welfare support, benefits, 
accommodation, housing or … vouchers, or … detention, or … enforcement” (interview with 
Shaw). This meant that the organisations could not develop a strategy for the development of 
the legislation as a whole thus undermining their lobbying activities. 
 In both countries conflict was present between the government and the lobbying groups 
because of the nature of the asylum issue. Because issue networks tend to form around a 
delicate topic, conflicts with the government are common. This was certainly the case of asylum 
in the UK, where a predominantly strong core executive decided the sorts of the legislation. It 
was also the case of labour migration in Italy, where the political context was dominated by the 
political parties in the majority and where it was decided at Cabinet level not to interact with 
pro-migrant groups in order to keep conflict (and delays) to a minimum. There was a “genuine 
ideological divide” (Somerville 2007, 114) between pro-migrant organisations328, concerned 
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 Italy: ARCI, Caritas, Centro Astalli, CIR, Comunità  di S.Egidio, ICS, FCEI, trade unions and UNHCR; 
UK: AI, IAS, ILPA, JCWI, Justice, Liberty, and RC. These are the stakeholders who had more resources to 
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with the wellbeing of all migrants regardless of the authenticity of their claims and the 
government’s329 concern with keeping numbers down and with maintaining its credibility in 
front of that part of the voting population requesting a decrease of inflows. Migrant 
organisations, typically, criticise governments because their policies tend to implement strict 
measures to the detriment – rather than the benefit – of the migrant population. Because of these 
criticisms, governments are less likely to involve NGOs and charities in shaping policy as was 
the case here. As such, any effort to bring about substantial change is hampered because it is not 
in the interest of the government. This research showed predominantly “a relatively weak pro-
migrant lobby” that worked “in a political context … strongly dominated by the state’ (Statham 
and Geddes 2006, 265). Nevertheless, groups in the UK were invited to take part in official 
meetings organised by the government whilst in Italy official meetings with the government 
happened only a couple of times.  
 Conflict was not a unique feature of the relationship between the governments and civil 
society though. Tensions also existed among participants of the networks, mainly in Italy. In the 
UK, groups within the advocacy coalition network were a ‘shared-knowledge’, ‘shared-beliefs’ 
and often a ‘shared-action’ group (Heclo 1978). Cooperation stayed strong due to the “common 
enemy” (interview with Hardwick): the government. Being fairly well organised, groups would 
decide together their next steps showing general consensus on how to lobby the government. In 
Italy, groups shared knowledge but not always beliefs and even less actions because of the one-
to-one interaction with their MPs. Overall, most interviewees judged the relationships with each 
other as positive. On the other hand, the situation the groups were in was also considered quite 
chaotic because there was no coordination. Furthermore, the different interests involved and the 
dual nature of the legislation led to moments of less cohesion. The number one issue for the 
Italian government was illegal migration in connection with the black market rather than 
                                                                                                                                                         
lobby the governments/MPs, who were more vocal by organising protests for example, the trade unions in 
Italy, whose briefings and cooperation were often quoted in Parliament and also those (the majority) that 
agreed to be interviewed. 
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 It is from January 2001 a paper published by the Home Office entitled Migration: an economic and 
social analysis that put asylum seekers, illegal entrants, overstayers and family reunions on the same 
level. In particular, the paper claims that asylum seekers can “choose their choice of destination” based on 
“political factors, cultural, family and personal ties, and perceived economic opportunity”. As such, 
“people … will switch between different migration categories in response to those same incentives” 
(Glover et al. 2001, 11). 
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asylum. This, together with the fact that the principal communicator on asylum with the 
Ministry of Interior was the UNHCR pushed the pro-migrant groups to concentrate their efforts 
specifically on labour migration and particularly on the regularisation programme. This caused 
the Comunità di Sant’ Egidio to be criticised by other groups and by the opposition then in 
government for its choice to concentrate efforts on the regularisation of domestic helpers and 
care workers only (instead of including other categories of undocumented migrants, such as 
factory workers or those employed by farmers or even failed asylum seekers). As a service 
provider, the Comunità was in daily contact with people at both ends: migrants (legal and 
illegal) and the people who employ them, especially families. At the time, they were aware that 
one of the main problems Italian families had to face was the lack of helpers for the elderly and 
for people with disabilities. This is the legacy of a “rudimentary welfare state” (Menz 2008, 
234) whose provisions for its citizens are minimal
330
. The need for carers was therefore great 
and the Catholic association felt they had to push in that direction. Their position is 
understandable partly because of the government’s particular critical stance against illegal 
migrants, despite the market’s need for this type of work force, and partly because the asylum 
‘problem’ was repeatedly pushed away with the promise to tackle it at a later stage. Another 
cause of concern (and conflict) was in relation to the suspensive appeals. The UNHCR was 
heavily criticised by the ICS for not being more assertive with the government. The refugee 
agency made a historical, social and political evaluation based on the then asylum system in 
Italy (second interview with Schiavone). They preferred to obtain a general improvement of the 
situation – considering that there was no asylum legislation and no asylum procedure – rather 
than jeopardize matters to push for an improvement that may not have happened anyway. A 
final source of conflict was in relation to the availability of resources. Although this was linked 
specifically to the creation of the PNA that happened a couple of years before the Bossi-Fini, 
this may have had repercussions for the future collaboration of the groups. This is discussed in 
the next section. 
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 Welfare entitlements for immigrants are even more basic from the lack of public housing availability, to 
“casual, highly precarious, poorly paid employment” (Menz 2009, 234) to the compulsory report of illegal 
migrants by doctors.  
228 
 
 This section has demonstrated that UK networks were better structured and organised and 
had a higher degree of interaction. The openness of the UK government to consultations with 
these groups also helped towards this collaboration in the network. In contrast, collaboration in 
Italy was hampered by the reticence of the Italian government to interact with groups during the 
policy process, ‘forcing’ them to interact with their MPs on a one-to-one basis rather than as a 
group, and finally to the difficulty of the law itself that covered asylum as well as labour 
migration. 
 
8.1.3 Distribution of resources  
Lack of resources (as in funding, people, time, knowledge) led to the instability of networks. 
This meant that only the largest or better known organisations had a chance to lobby policy-
makers through face-to-face meetings or to attend meetings organised within the network. In 
Italy, the lack of financial support created issues with regard to the distribution of funding. The 
groups more concerned with the delivery of services feared the competition and the possible 
decrease of funding on which depended their own survival. Prior to the Bossi-Fini and during 
the set-up of the PNA in 2001, some of the groups, that had until then managed the services for 
asylum seekers through funding coming from different sources, clashed quite fervently. They 
did not appreciate the entrance of ANCI onto the floor as one of the main service providers 
because “the start of a public system of reception” was considered “as a sort of competition” 
(8.3) (second interview with Schiavone). During the discussions of the Bossi-Fini these clashes 
did not materialise but two interviewees implied that these disagreements had repercussions for 
future group collaboration. This may explain, partly, the lack of a more structured teamwork. 
On the other hand, through article 32 of the Bossi-Fini, the PNA institutionalised the 
establishment of the National Fund for the Policies and Services on Asylum
331
. According to 
this fund all local bodies may request financial support to deliver services for the integration and 
reception of asylum seekers not staying in identification centres (also established by the law). 
Allegedly, some groups preferred to maintain a softer line with the government (for example, on 
the issue related to the non-suspensive appeals for which the UNHCR was criticised) in the 
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hope of getting a “slice of the wedding cake” (8.4) (Briguglio 2002). This would explain the 
lack of clashes on the same issue that instead heated the discussions just one year earlier. 
 
8.1.4 Power 
The consequence of having unequal resources and unequal access to government meant that 
organisations had unequal powers in helping frame legislation. This corroborates hypothesis 4 
according to which power is held unevenly within the network. However, power in this case is a 
relative notion because the limitations of the associations were great. The most important 
obstacle was that the two governments kept outside lobbying to a minimum and well under 
control. Besides, the ability of the largest organisations to generate change in the legislation was 
hampered by the fact that their relationship with the governments was merely consultative.  
 The two organisations that had privileged access to the government were the RC in the UK 
and the UNHCR in Italy. The RC had a bigger role than others in relation to accommodation 
centres. Its technical knowledge of asylum in the UK and non-confrontational attitude gave it 
status in the eyes of the government that was becoming more and more uncomfortable about the 
widespread objections to the centres. Also the fact that the RC ran services for the Home Office 
in 2002 gave it more power and influence compared to other organisations. The only 
comparable national organisation in Italy to the RC, the CIR, had similar goals to the RC 
(lobbying activities, sensitization of the media and public opinion, social and legal support) but 
did not run services on behalf of the Italian government. This explains why CIR was not 
included in the consultations by the government; they were not needed to offer a consultation 
that the UNHCR was already providing. The UNHCR in fact was 
the leading organisation to have relationships with us, with the legislator and also 
with the government. It was the most active one, it was also the most identifiable, the 
most recognised. It had a series of qualifications that made it more reliable, more 




The UNHCR shared with the RC deep knowledge of the asylum issue and a non-confrontational 
attitude that gave it status and increased its chance of being consulted. It found an important ally 
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within the Ministry of Interior with which it collaborated very closely to create the two articles 
on asylum.  
 In the UK, the government was open to limited consultation with NGOs and charities. 
These civil society groups lobbied individual MPs who in turn lobbied the government. They 
were also invited by Ministers to attend official meetings, though more often by MPs who 
needed background information or to be briefed on a particular topic. The 2002 NIA Act was 
quite a technical bill and NGO’s knowledge and expertise was welcome and sought after. Lord 
Dubs’ view was that “compared to most European countries access is much better here just by 
tradition, by convention” (interview). Nevertheless, the ultimate influence of NGOs on the final 
Act was minimal. The Italian government was not so gracious. Its claim was that it listened to 
everybody without exception. However, it was “a partial listening” (8.6) (interview with Senator 
Boscetto). Analysis of the documentation in Chapter 7 revealed that only the biggest interests 
(i.e. the employers’ associations) were invited to take part in official meetings and also in “less 
visible forms of lobbying, consultation, and even co-decision making” (Menz 2009 236). In 
reality, the government was for the most part sealed off from any kind of lobbying coming from 
NGOs, charities and trade unions, a line decided at Cabinet level due to the legislation being “a 
contribution extensive in scope … this was a law that involved a lot the people understood as 
society” and as such, a plurality of issues (8.7) (interview with Senator Eufemi). All migrant 
organisations were left out to minimise interference. By letting down the guards and allowing 
groups to infiltrate, “the government risks losing the management of the control room” (8.8) 
(interview with Senator Eufemi) as pressures in Parliament may weaken it. Furthermore, the 
government wanted to proceed speedily and close the matter as soon as possible in order to 
maintain its promise to the electorate to stop illegal immigration. 
 This section has showed that both countries had issue networks despite the marked 
differences in the way the two policies were created. The application of the case studies to the 
framework on issue networks developed by Marsh and Rhodes in 1992 helped identify the 
similarities and differences between the networks in the two countries. However, their 
theoretical explanation did not fit thoroughly with the reality of these particular case studies. For 
example, the networks in the UK would meet up regularly, in opposition to the theory that 
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assumes fluctuation of contacts. On the other hand, their theory entails studying a field for a 
prolonged period of time (e.g. years) in order to be able to show the impact of networks on 
policy outcome. The case studies in this research take into account a shorter period of time. 
 Conflict was also an issue that was not met in the UK while in Italy, although present, it 
was not an important feature of the meetings.  
 Marsh and Rhodes’ framework, to the best of the researcher’s knowledge, has never been 
used in a comparative approach to find out the asylum policy-making process. It was therefore 
useful to highlight important differences that define the networks in the two countries.  
 
8.2 KEY THEME 2. NATURE OF POLITICAL SYSTEMS: THE DETERMINATION 
OF WESTMINSTER AND THE WEAKNESS OF MONTECITORIO, INTERNAL 
CONSTRAINTS AND LEVELS OF COMPROMISE 
The second key theme that emerged during the analysis was the ability of the governments to 
make asylum and immigration policies, given the constraints they encountered and the levels of 
compromise they had to adhere to in order to pass the laws. This is related to the nature of their 
political system as presented by hypothesis 2.  
 In both countries the bills were government initiatives, reflecting the urgency of asylum in 
the UK and illegal migration in Italy. National sovereignty was perceived to be at stake, while 
public opinion was against migration and media pressure, especially in the UK, was strong.  
 In the UK, the decisiveness of the government, the lack of bargaining with other political 
forces and with asylum lobbying groups that were at most consulted, is consistent with the 
‘Westminster Model’. This means that the British government was characterised by 
parliamentary sovereignty, strong executive and “majority party control of the executive (that is, 
prime Minister, cabinet and the civil service)” (Rhodes 2003, 5). The creation and the increase 
of activity of the Prime Minister’s Policy Unit together with the “Downing Street Press Office 
… and a Strategic Communications Unit reporting to the Chief Press Secretary” (Holliday 2000, 
170), further demonstrate this point: control was key. The research has demonstrated that in the 
UK, despite the government’s openness to consultation with groups, the law was made in the 
core of the government, the Policy Unit, “under clear direction steers from the politicians” 
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(interview with Home Office Official 3). These were the Prime Minister, Tony Blair, the Home 
Secretary, David Blunkett, Nick Pearce, “a huge architect of the Act” (ibid) and a few other 
senior officials with an interest at stake. The strength and determination of the government and 
its leaders does not mean that compromise did not happen. The government had to grant 
concessions in the Lords
333
 after three important defeats. Two events occurred that changed the 
state of affairs within the government: the meetings between the Peers and NGOs during the 
summer; and the obstructions caused by the protests in the Conservative localities chosen for 
the centres. These two aspects led to the defeats in the Lords and the relative victory of the 
Tories. The consequence of these defeats allowed for some bargaining to happen and 
concessions did occur. The Conservative party’s weight as the second biggest party after Labour 
was certainly important but the alignment and the continuity of asylum policy between Labour 
and Conservatives was also a factor not to under evaluate. The Act in fact, continued the 
restrictive policy-making style of the Conservatives, for example, on the further curtailment of 
welfare entitlements. The Tories also supported the amendments related to the unfounded 
human rights and non-suspensive appeals while the establishment of the centres’ initiative 
found general agreement across party lines. On the other hand, the decisiveness of the 
government not to give in (too much) to pressures and to compromise only on essential but 
minor aspects are also indicators of its strength. Clearly, the UK government’s authority was 
prevailing over everything and everybody else. In essence, the last word was still that of the 
government that maintained throughout the debates a strict attitude towards the law. The real 
constraint on the government was represented by judicial reviews rather than NGOs lobbying. 
What seemed to be working generally were the legal challenges
334
 “on very specific points of 
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 For example, the experiment with one smaller centre; the permanence in accommodation centres for 
families with children from 6 to 9 months (as Simon Hughes from the opposition party Liberal Democrat 
had originally proposed in the House of Commons) further extended it to all asylum seekers in the House of 
Lords; and the establishment of a monitoring system of the centres (another ‘victory’ of the Conservatives in 
the Lords). 
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 For example, the provision to deny welfare support to asylum seekers who did not claim “as soon as 
reasonably practicable” that is immediately after their arrival in the country. Two particular issues arose. 
One was the risk of destitution so the Home Office legal advisers had to prove that if an asylum seeker 
stayed with friends or family he/she was not at risk of destitution. The other was how to make sure that 
asylum seekers knew they had to claim immediately. The suggestions were tested in the Courts as a pre-
emptive measure. In the first case, it was found that there was a breach of article 3 of the ECHR and 
therefore the law had to be changed. In the second case, the Home Office had to put up signs in the ports 
(Refugee Council 2004a). In Italy, judicial review exists but in a different format. According to article 
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legal policy” (interview with Dr MetCalfe). Some groups supported judicial reviews of 
government’s decisions and that was a factual and “frequent constraint on executive power” 
(interview with Pearce). 
 In contrast to the UK, in Italy the debate on illegal migration was the real issue and was 
subjected to the pressures coming from two opposite forces within the ruling majority – the 
CCD-CDU, which promoted the interests of the Catholic world, and the NL, which opposed 
immigration based on principle – leading to strong clashes. The government had mainly a 
mediating role showing both its inability to control the parties within its parliamentary majority 
and, to a degree, fear of their power, in case they decided to make the government fall – an 
aspect not to under evaluate in the ever fragile Italian political system of coalitions. The core of 
the government therefore was not as compact or decisive as the British one. Furthermore, 
because of the clashes within the majority, the concessions given in Parliament were much more 
consistent than those in the UK. For any contentious measure, there was a ‘softer’ amendment 
to counterbalance the situation. For example, the original statements made by the government 
on the bill said that no amnesty was ever going to happen. This was done to reassure public 
opinion that they were going to take their distances and discontinue the previous centre-left 
governments’ policies. However, the confrontations between the Northern League and the 
Catholic Party CCD-CDU led to the regularisation
335
 of illegal migrants.  Being based on a 
coalition, the then government was very sensitive to its members’ rants especially when they 
threatened to vote against the bill (interview with Volonté MP). The parties of the ruling 
coalition in fact, came from very different backgrounds and as such, did not share the same 
ideologies. In contrast to the UK, the opposition parties failed to bring about any change. This 
was mainly because of the resolution of the government not to open up any dialogue but it was 
also due to the fact that the opposition was divided into a “galaxy” (8.9) (interview with Brutti 
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 comma of the Italian Constitution, the Constitutional Court can annul anti-constitutional laws 
after scrutiny. 
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 To note the use of the term ‘regularisation’ (regolarizzazione) rather than ‘amnesty’ (sanatoria). It was 
a strategic decision made by the government to reassure their electorate that the two terms had different 
connotations and results. In reality, they had the same meaning. It was a “pun (gioco di parole)” because 
“ the term 'sanatoria' was linked to the polemics from the previous years” when “both a part of AN and 
the League argued strongly against the amnesties made by the centre-left; they could not call it an 





) of many groups big and small that hardly shared the same position
337
. It was not a 
compact group, decreasing further their chance of a victory. This is mirrored in the hundreds 
and hundreds of amendments presented by the opposition. These were all rejected, showing the 
determination of the majority to conclude the process quickly and without interference. On the 
asylum front, things developed very differently. Because of the lesser importance of asylum 
matters for policy-makers, the two articles on asylum did not encounter any major obstacle. 
Whereas the welfare entitlements of asylum seekers in the UK were further curtailed in the hope 
of discouraging more asylum seekers from coming to the country, the welfare of asylum seekers 
and refugees in Italy was slightly improved through the institutionalisation of the PNA now 
called SPRAR
338
. In the case of the UK the changes related to the welfare happened through 
intra-governmental discussions; in Italy ‘bottom-up’ pressure coming from mayors through 
ANCI and the UNHCR was fundamental for the developments. 
 This section has substantiated that, due to the different political contexts, the laws were 
developed in contrasting ways. Firstly, the emphasis in the UK was on asylum and in Italy it 
was on illegal migration. A different attitude was showed towards asylum in Italy. Here, policy-
makers did not perceive asylum as a major problem but for the first time the legislation 
contained two articles on the question. Secondly, the role of the core executive differed 
considerably with the Italian government acting as a mediator and the UK Policy Unit taking 
charge of the development of the law. Even in Parliament the tone used by policy-makers 
during the debates was drastically different. In the UK it was far more gentle and polite than in 
Italy. This does not mean that there were no conflicts as 
in the Commons they hit you over the head with a blunt instrument and here [House 
of Lords] they stick a knife in your back, give it a twist, it comes out and it's such a 
small knife that doesn't show but the wound is deep and it hurts. They can be quite 
tough but they are tough in a more polite way (interview with Lord Dubs).  
 
“Montecitorio” on the other hand, “is still a long way from Westminster” (Zucchini 2008, 112; 
see also Capano and Vignati 2008). Debates were characterized by a “chaotic struggle” and it 
                                                     
336
 Interview date: 15
th
 February 2011. 
337
 For example, the DS tended to separate their position from that of the radical left although there was a 
convergence of ideas because of the severity of the proposals (interview with Brutti MP). 
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 See Chapter 5 for an explanation. 
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was not evident when the “battlefield” (ibid) became clear political confrontation. Shouting and 
insults happened often as the LN and CCD-CDU’s requests were radically different, leading to 
several intra-coalition conflicts but also bargaining between parliament and government. 
 The next and final section is dedicated to the third key theme that has emerged during the 
analysis. 
 
8.3 KEY THEME 3. THE THREE LEVELS OF POLICY-MAKING: THE 
PERMEATION OF PARTY POLITICS AT NATIONAL, REGIONAL AND LOCAL 
LEVELS 
This section looks at how the political parties permeated the national, regional and local 
dimensions during the policy process in 2002. The way party politics developed and affected 
asylum policy in the two states was very different, showing once again the dissimilarities in 
their political systems. This in turn had an impact on the way the two laws developed. This 
section is related to the first two hypotheses that deal respectively with the nature of asylum and 
the nature of the political systems. The nature of the nation-states’ political systems determined 
how they responded to the perceived threat of asylum/illegal migration. The three levels were 
not as distinct and separate as it may appear. They overlapped often (especially in Italy) 
precisely because of the relationships between the main political parties at all levels. 
 In the UK, the national level prevailed thanks to the strength and unity of the core 
executive and its majority in the Commons. Here, the NIA Act’s main opposition came from 
some Labour backbenchers, the Liberal Democrat party and – on some issues – the 
Conservatives. The trial of accommodation centres cut across parties in terms of consensus. The 
main difficulties were encountered in the House of Lords. In spite of this, even in the Lords 
where Peers are more independent from party politics, they did not insist too much on certain 
issues such as the ‘refusal of support’ and the ‘unfounded human rights’ clauses. With the latter 
clause in particular, the Conservatives in both Commons and Lords agreed with the government 
because they had proposed something very similar just a few years back. Despite concerns in 
terms of human rights, generally the opposition in the Lords aligned itself with the 
government’s strict position. The national view, however, clashed with the local level because 
236 
 
of the proposals to establish accommodation centres in rural but wealthy Conservative 
constituencies causing disagreements among citizens and local authorities. The local level had 
the ‘merit’ of delaying the policy process for two main reasons. First, local citizens and their 
local authorities opposed the accommodation centres fiercely. The protests caused the 
government to open an enquiry and consultations with the locals. This in turn, affected the start 
of the works of the centres that were delayed (and never completed). Second, the Tories in the 
opposition took advantage of the situation by bringing up repeatedly the subject of the location 
of the facilities (as well as the size). More time was therefore devoted to the centres than any 
other issues. Local constituencies therefore had an impact at national level causing considerable 
delay. None the less, in the end the government’s national view prevailed over the regional and 
local views showing a definite ‘top-down’ approach to asylum policy-making. In fact, the 
government only agreed to trial one smaller centre but it continued with its resolution to build 
the centres as planned. The fact that they were never built was due to the Treasury opposition to 
spend money when the numbers of asylum claims was gradually but steadily reducing. 
  In Italy, these three levels were permeated by party politics to a much higher degree than in 
the UK. So, contrary to the UK where the government was the most prominent actor
339
, in Italy, 
the most important actors were the political parties whose views prevailed overall. However, the 
final law was the fruit of a mix of top-down and bottom-up pressure showing a lesser degree of 
centralisation of power as well as strength of the government. At the national level, the political 
parties imposed their views on the legislation with a series of give and takes that frustrated the 
policy process. The authoritarian position of the NL was softened by the presence of the 
Catholics that had instead a more solidarist approach and promoted the will of the Catholic 
world (CEI in particular). At the regional and local levels there was a lot of bottom-up pressure 
coming from members (regions and mayors) belonging to the same parties of the ruling 
coalition to improve aspects related to immigration quotas and the asylum protection system. At 
the regional level in particular, Italian regions and employers’ organisations put pressure on the 
government so that regions could have a bigger say on immigration quotas. The regions that had 
the strongest impact on the national level were those governed by members of the political 
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parties of AN and LN that is, the same political colour of the parties in government. This shows 
that whereas at national level the same parties and especially the LN, opposed immigration 
based on principles and ideologies, at regional level the ideologies left space for a more 
pragmatic view based on labour market needs. Finally at the local level, the mayors put pressure 
on the government through ANCI to improve the services for refugees and asylum seekers with 
the institutionalisation of the PNA. The Prefect within the Ministry of Interior was able to 
involve mayors from the centre-left administration but also – and more surprisingly – the 
centre-right. This was only possible because there was a centre-right coalition in power and 
because the issue of asylum went beyond the party political. From a point of view of a city’s 
image, they had to solve the issue regardless of the left/right dichotomy. From a human rights’ 
perspective, it was left to local authorities to provide help and shelter in cases where the civil 
society could not because of a lack of resources.  
 
8.4 CONCLUSION 
This chapter has reported three major findings from the comparative analysis. Firstly, despite 
the different nature of the governments both countries had issue networks. Marsh and Rhodes’ 
(1992) framework on networks was useful in identifying the similarities and differences within 
the networks in the two countries and their relative strengths and weaknesses in affecting policy 
making. They were identified as issue networks because of the irreconcilable different opinions 
between advocacy groups and the governments. However, the networks displayed some 
important differences. Here lies the value of the comparative research: contrasting and 
evaluating the same variable in two different contexts. The authors’ theoretical framework was 
applied to an empirical situation that has confirmed some points but has also found some 
differences. The second finding relates to the importance of the nature of the government 
systems. Particularly, how the UK and Italy were able to create legislation in relation to their 
dealings with other political forces as well as civil society. The centre of power in the UK was 
the core of the government but in Italy it was the political parties in the majority that had more 
strength while the government played an intermediate role. The findings have shown that in the 
UK the government could only be slowed down on some aspects of the law in the Lords. 
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However, the continuity of asylum policy between Labour and Conservatives made it possible 
for Labour to get away with the most stringent provisions. In Italy, because asylum was not 
perceived as a threat, the Ministry of Interior was able to prepare undisturbed the only two 
articles on asylum in agreement with the UNHCR. Important also was the role of the Italian 
municipalities and their mayors regardless of their political colour. Furthermore, while the UK 
government was open to consultation, the Italian one was not. However, the final NIA Act in 
the UK was the expression of the core executive while the Bossi-Fini was the result of intra-
coalition clashes within the majority. Here, the government was not as resolute as the UK one 
but mainly acted as mediator showing its weakness in the face of the political parties. As a 
result, compromise was heavier in Italy than in the UK. The strength of the Lords in opposition 
to some parts of the bill in the UK and the continuous clashes among the majority in Italy lead 
the two governments to compromise on certain aspects of the laws. Whereas in the UK the 
compromises were minimal, in Italy they changed the face of the law because of the volatile 
situation of the coalition government and the economic and political system. In the UK, the 
debate between majority and opposition developed mainly around the issue of accommodation 
centres. Concessions in Italy were only among the ruling members because the opposition was 
weak in parliament. A different attitude was showed towards asylum in Italy though. Here, the 
argument is that the severity of the law in terms of illegal labour migration on one side, and the 
relative low numbers of asylum claims together with the lack of an asylum system
340
 on the 
other, forced the government to put some kind of ‘generous’ concession in the norm related to 
the institutionalisation of the PNA into a national system (SPRAR).  
 Finally, the last section on party politics has shown the interaction of national, regional and 
local levels of policy-making. In the UK, the national point of view of the government prevailed 
over the other two dimensions thanks to the strength of the core executive. There was some 
resistance at the local level that ended up postponing the start of the works in relation to the 
accommodation centres, but overall government resolution succeeded. In Italy, the three levels 
were more tangled because of a larger permeation of party politics. This, in turn, has highlighted 
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 There were also continuous pressures exercised by the European partners to have asylum legislation and 
to share responsibility over asylum seekers and refugees – in a way the asylum developments in Italy were a 
mix of top-down derived from the EU asylum directive then under discussion 
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that the law was a mixture of top-down and bottom-up pressure. This difference mirrors the way 
in which asylum was lived by the governments: as a threat in the UK given the widespread 
interest and anxiety showed by the population, but not such an important issue in Italy. Here, the 
main issue for the people was illegal labour migration fuelled by right-wing parties. 
 The final chapter contains the conclusions to the thesis, which deal with the importance of 






















CONCLUSIONS: SUMMARY AND DISCUSSION 
9.1 SUMMARY 
The thesis aim was to establish how policy proposals become policy decisions through the lens 
of asylum policy. It focused on the perception of asylum in the two states, the response of each 
government to the issue, and the levels of power of governments and other stakeholders 
involved in the policy process. In both countries negotiations within parliament were key but 
outcomes differed because of the different political systems, the power of the centre and the 
relative lack of power of the other stakeholders despite their interests and concern. It was 
through their advisory role that stakeholders comprising issue networks had the ability to 
change some of the proposals, but not fundamentally. 
 The main contention of the thesis was that the process was determined by the nature of the 
state and its political system. To this end, it examined Italy and the UK, chosen because of their 
political systems which have some similarities (e.g. bicameral) but many differences (e.g. in 
2002 one was a coalition). The Italian coalition government was poles apart from the current 
UK coalition government as it was formed by several parties with deep ideological differences. 
These differences hindered the negotiations in the majority and frustrated cooperation whilst 
forcing the centre to adopt a mediating role. 
 The focus was asylum policy, the objective of which was perceived differently in the two 
countries. The thesis has demonstrated that the significance of the asylum “threat” varied 
between governments, affecting how they treated the issue. It was a particularly difficult topic in 
the UK where it was one of the government’s top priorities due to the negative headlines and 
public reaction to asylum seekers and to migration policy more generally. In contrast, in Italy 
asylum was not a priority, concern being greater with labour migration and especially illegal 
migration. 
 The thesis aimed to determine how far the perception of the asylum issue combined with 
the nature of the states to produce policy outcomes. The key mediating variable was 
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hypothesised to be the role of issue networks and their power to influence the political system. 
A model was created to test four main hypotheses: 
1) The premise of the first hypothesis was that asylum is perceived as a difficult issue and 
a potential threat to governments’ sovereignty, national security, economy and national identity. 
This threat was more noticeable in the UK than in Italy. While in the UK the government 
responded to very strong pressure and criticism coming from the media and the public, in Italy, 
asylum per se was not deemed to be as difficult as labour migration and illegal migration. 
Besides, pressure here was not as strong as in the UK but the Italian government aimed at 
keeping their promises made to their electorate during the political campaign. The perception of 
asylum as a difficult issue in the UK therefore, affected the way it was treated during the 
process that led to the creation of the NIA Act. Conversely, the Italian Bossi-Fini’s main goal 
was to toughen some aspects of the previous legislation related to labour migration while 
introducing important novelties in terms of asylum. On the other hand, the same measures used 
to detect and deter illegal migrants were also used for asylum seekers.  
2) The second hypothesis theorised that differences in the nature of the state (in particular, 
different welfare and political systems) dictate the way in which policies are created to deal with 
the difficult issue of asylum. Legislation outcomes may, therefore, be different between 
countries. The thesis’ findings show that, despite the different political and historical nature of 
the two governments, both countries passed laws with similar goals to limit the entry of 
unwanted citizens (the UK had a Labour government and showed features of liberal states and 
Italy had a centre-right government and displayed features of Conservative and Southern 
European states). However, the way in which the two policies were created was different. For 
example, the UK government with its strong parliamentary sovereignty held consultations with 
several pro-asylum organisations and granted only minor concessions to the opposition in the 
Lords. The Italian government, in contrast, displayed the opposite behaviour. Organisations 
were automatically excluded from any consultation and no changes suggested by the opposition 
were taken into consideration. The final law was the result of political negotiations between two 
parties in the majority, the Catholics and the Northern League, confirming the hypothesis of a 
polarised country subjected to an unstable political coalition. 
242 
 
3) Hypothesis 3 dealt with the shift from ‘government’ to ‘governance’ due to the 
increasing presence and influence of stakeholders other than the government in the policy arena. 
The question is: to what extent is the policy process influenced by networks of interest, so that 
‘government’ has become ‘governance’? The issue of ‘government’ becoming ‘governance’ 
was never a reality in either country, but especially in the UK where the ‘Westminster model’ 
prevailed. The findings have highlighted a different degree of inclusion of governmental and 
non-governmental organisations in the policy process as well as their relative power. In the UK 
consultation was widespread but the government and in particular its core (i.e. the Prime 
Minister, the Home Secretary, his Policy Advisor and a few other Ministers in the Delivery 
Unit) were the ones behind the Act. In Italy, consultation was non-existent officially but 
unofficially some Catholic groups were able to speak on a one-to-one basis with their 
representatives in the majority. So during the policy-making process networks made of pro-
asylum and immigration groups were largely immaterial. 
4) Hypothesis 4 was about the relationship between government and networks. In both 
countries there were issue networks that because of their characteristics are unable to bring 
about substantial change as highlighted in the literature review chapter. Furthermore, networks 
exercised power unevenly. In both countries there were two organisations that had more power 
than others. The findings demonstrate how members of issue networks have different power 
from one another. Indeed, in the UK the most ‘powerful’ organisation in terms of resources as 
well as status was the Refugee Council. In Italy, it was the UNHCR thanks to its non-
confrontational attitude towards the government as well as the openness to dialogue of the 
Interior Ministry. Furthermore, the UNHCR was not associated with any political party and so it 
was easier for them to get access in order to negotiate some terms of the two articles on asylum. 
  The next section contains the discussion which highlights the contribution of the research 
to the current knowledge in the field of asylum policy-making 
 
9.2 DISCUSSION AND WIDER REFLECTIONS 
The originality of this research lies in its comparative approach. Firstly, asylum policy-making 
is an area that has not been overly studied. This is the case especially in Italy where the focus 
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has been on immigration policy-making with respect to illegal and labour migration (for 
example, Finotelli and Sciortino 2009; Sciortino and Colombo 2004) and multi-level policy-
making in the same field (Zincone 2006a, 2006b, 2011; Zincone and Caponio 2004, 2005). In 
the UK, where literature on asylum is flourishing, migration policy is rarely examined in terms 
of policy networks (most notably Somerville and Wallace Goodman 2010) and asylum policy 
even less so. Lastly, no previous study has confronted how asylum legislation is created in a 
comparative framework. There is little study in the area of how interests may shape asylum 
policy-making in different countries, while taking into consideration the nature of the state in 
decision-making. Different countries in fact have different governmental structures which 
impact on how decisions are taken and affect how individuals and organisations are able 
to participate within network. Therefore, the role and nature of the state and the political 
system which included the operation of networks in both countries were central to the analysis.  
 Firstly, given these differences between the two governments under study, the nature of 
the state became one of the key focal points. According to the second hypothesis, the nature of 
the state determines the way in which a certain difficult issue is confronted by the 
establishment. Following Esping-Andersen’s (1990) typology of welfare states, this research 
underlines the usefulness of comparative studies of European welfare states. A comparison of 
similarities and differences between UK and Italy allows us a deeper understanding of how 
policies are made. For example, findings on the UK asylum policy have found that the 
government was not entirely liberal – contrary to the typology – as it further decreased asylum 
seekers’ safety and freedom with the introduction of non-suspensive appeals and 
accommodation centres. Unlike the UK, the nature of the state in Italy concurred up to a point 
with Esping-Andersen’s idea of a conservative state. According to this notion, the Italian state is 
non-interventionist when it comes to services for the family that are left to the care of the 
Catholic Church. This was also the case with the asylum system that historically has always 
been under the care of both Catholic and non-religious pro-asylum organisations. For the first 
time however, a small change was registered as the Ministry of Interior decided to cooperate 
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closely with the UNHCR to reform the basic asylum program and to devolve a higher amount of 
funding to municipalities able and willing to take part into the program.  
Esping-Andersen’s typology therefore has limitations that should be taken into account. The 
critics to the typology highlighted in chapter 2 showed that welfare states are not fixed entities. 
They change over time and share different features with each other that may place them in 
different categories depending on which aspect one is focusing. For example, this study agrees 
with Bonoli’s (1997) welfare classification of the UK (who gets what and how much) and Italy 
(dependence on family). It also agrees with the interpretation by Geddes et al. (2004) that sees 
the country placed in a South European group, run by weak state institutions while informal 
institutions like Catholic pro-migrant organisations providing services for migrants and asylum 
seekers are very important. 
 Secondly, the thesis has highlighted the ways in which governance can operate in subtle 
ways in neoliberal states, where non-state organisations – such as migrant organisations, Non-
governmental Organisations (NGOs), employers groups, trade unions, religious groups, etc –
  may be co-opted into the delivery of state-like functions: for example, finding housing 
accommodation in the UK or running/monitoring immigration centres in Italy and asylum 
centres in the UK and hence contribute to the legitimisation of policies they might otherwise 
have opposed.  In the UK the interview with the former chief of the Refugee Council brought 
this issue to the forefront as they were the organisation with the most access to the government. 
In Italy this was not observed. Here the UNHCR was the privileged associative body but they 
did not provide services on behalf of the government. It was the Catholic associations that 
carried out most of these duties and Caritas in primis. However, they still did not have access to 
the government.  
 Thirdly, the focus on governance has examined the role of institutions (the government 
and political parties) in policy-making and also that of advocacy groups and their 
interconnections with each other and the government with the aim to influencing policy. The 
literature review has acknowledged that there are alternative approaches to the study of 
networks and governance that do not emphasise the power of the state. Rather, they take into 
consideration migrants’ views as those of important actors. However, because the aim of the 
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thesis was to understand the policy process rather than policy outcomes, migrants and asylum 
seekers were not included in the sample of people to be interviewed due to the limited power 
migrants and asylum seekers currently have at parliamentary level. They may nevertheless have 
some impact on networks. 
 The interviews carried out with civil society groups and policy-makers were essential to 
understand how things panned out during the process. To do this, the use of policy network 
theories was key. In particular, the theoretical framework of Marsh and Rhodes (1992) on issue 
networks was analysed and adapted to this research. The purpose of this adaptation was to 
facilitate the comparison of the networks in the two countries. Some of the key characteristics 
described in their theory did find confirmation in the empirical research. For example, the fact 
that between advocacy groups and the governments there was lack of trust and dialogue. On the 
other hand, findings have showed – contrary to what Marsh and Rhodes had envisaged – that 
there were two organisations that both governments trusted and came to rely upon. These were 
the Refugee Council in the UK and the UNHCR in Italy. These two organisations were also 
those with more resources and recognised status and for these reasons, they had privileged 
access to the policy process. Furthermore, while the Italian network was characterised by strong 
instability, the UK one was not. This is an important factor that shows that the observed reality 
is different from hypotheses, especially in a comparative framework. 
 A further criticism of Rhodes’ (1997) ideas is that although the influence of non-state 
actors represented by the private and voluntary sector is recognised, he underestimates the 
interaction among the actors within the network. This was true for the Italian case particularly 
where the advocacy groups came to rely greatly on the UNHCR because of the closure of the 
government to their plea. 
 Other points in the framework were less pertinent given the nature of the study and the 
topic. For example, although Marsh and Rhodes point to the fact that a ‘differentiated polity’ is 
corroding the unity of the ‘Westminster model’, this research has in fact found out that the 
contrary was true in 2002 during the making of the NIA Act. The core of the government was 
united and power strong. The same thing cannot be said for the Italian government. Here, unity 
was threatened by the very nature of the coalition in power that gathered political parties with 
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diametrically opposed identities and ideologies (the moderate Catholics and the populist/anti-
immigrants Northern League members), making collaboration difficult and relations at times 
hostile.  
 Although the two states differed in many ways, the two laws had similar outcomes. Both 
pieces of legislation in fact aimed at keeping unwanted citizens at bay. Furthermore, despite the 
fact that consultation was widespread in the UK but not in Italy the result was similar: the 
presence of issue networks had little influence on the policy process. This shows that issue 
networks did not have power over the governments and that those governments were 
comparatively free to do as they pleased. On the other hand, the way in which the result was 
achieved was different. In the UK a more democratic process during the making of the law 
brought three defeats to the government in the House of Lords, but concessions were none the 
less minimal. In Italy, the government had a mediating role while the political parties 
represented the real force behind the legislation. There was also a resolute behaviour not to 
discuss and disclose matters with the wider civil society. At the same time broader interests had 
an influence on the developments of the law and these were the economic and regional interests 
in labour migration. This part of the thesis was concerned with the levels of policy making in 
the two countries and aimed at contributing to geographical knowledge and geographical scales 
of influence and policy making.  In particular, it related to the third key theme emerged during 
the analysis: the permeation of party politics at national, regional and local levels during the 
policy process. 
 The study deals with asylum making policy at a time when not just the role of the state, 
but the geographical forms of state sovereignty and regulation, have been undergoing change 
and debate. The thesis has highlighted that the three levels or scalar structuring of policy 
making continue to operate in this field, despite widespread assumptions of an unbundling or 
rescaling of the state and its function. It seems these scales do still matter in the process by 
which policy gets made, and that when it comes to asylum, the role of the state is still central.  
 The weight of party politics was stronger and more evident in the Italian case than in the 
UK where, despite the local view (mobilised local citizens together with their local authorities) 
clashing with the national view (core of the government) on the implementation of the 
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accommodation centres, the central government’s view prevailed. In Italy on the other hand, it 
was the political parties that were more prominent. Their influence was noticed at national level 
during the debates on the law as well as at regional and local level. However, whereas in the UK 
there was a distinct top-down approach to policy making, in Italy policy was influenced also by 
a bottom-up approach. Money (1999, 62) for example implies that local political parties are in 
tune with public inclinations on immigration so that “policy positions of mainstream parties will 
tend to converge toward the local median voter” and “the positions of the parties will tend to 
shift in tandem”. For example, the Italian regions, in cooperation with employers’ 
organisations, put pressure on the government to accept larger immigration quotas because of 
market needs. As far as asylum was concerned, ANCI was able to get mayors of different 
political colours to agree and put pressure on the government to commit more funding for the 
development of an asylum system.   
 In conclusion, the literature review for the thesis has showed that there are some gaps in 
the literature that should be addressed. For example, a different approach might incorporate 
interviews with asylum seekers to see if their actions (for example hunger strikes, demonstration 
and riots) do have an impact on local policy making and if so, would this carry more weight at 
national level. The thesis has in fact focused on two specific laws passed in the same year. A 
different way to look at the same issue would be to concentrate on a longer period of time and 
incorporate more legislation or legislative outcomes.  
 
9.3 CONCLUSION 
The empirical findings of the thesis have emphasised the differences between the political 
systems of the UK and Italy. Yet, whilst having two different political systems the two states 
created asylum policy with similar deterring outcomes. Policy differences were due to three 
main factors: historical events and developments in asylum policy, key people in government 
and (but to a lesser extent and only if beneficial to the key people in government) key interest 
groups.  
Asylum in the UK was a major difficult issue and was perceived as a “threat” by a government 
that was strongly criticised by the media and part of the voting population. In Italy, it was illegal 
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labour migration that created more problems at government level where the ruling majority 
wanted to keep the promises made during the electoral campaign. The difference in the notion 
of “threat” was particularly significant for the research. It enriched the comparative element 
because whereas in the UK efforts were made to control asylum seekers, in Italy the concept of 
asylum was still relatively new. This meant that for the first time there were some guidelines on 
the matter in law. 
 There were also different interests at stake: those of the two governments including the 
political parties especially in Italy and those of the issue network members. Key people in the 
UK government and in the two political parties in the ruling majority in Italy held more power 
as they steered the legislation with little hindrance from opposition parties and civil society. As 
both governments had an overwhelming majority in both Houses, it was easier for them to 
overcome major obstructions. On the other hand, while the UK government suffered three 
important defeats in the Lords, the Italian government suffered none. At the same time though, 
generally in the UK there was a convergence of ideas between the Conservatives and Labour, 
especially in relation to the most pressing parts of the law (most notably the accommodation 
centres and non-suspensive appeals). This increased the chances of a more peaceful 
collaboration. In Italy instead it became evident that it was the political parties in the majority 
that were dominating the policy process and the Bossi-Fini was the expression of these parties. 
Furthermore, in both countries there was also a bottom-up approach that turned out to be 
significant in the development of the laws especially in Italy. In the UK, citizens mobilised to 
have an enquiry on the feasibility of the centres. This slowed down the process. In Italy, mayors 
of different political colours, united under the Italian municipality association (ANCI) were able 
to put pressure on the Ministry of Interior to improve the funding available to provide shelter for 
asylum seekers. 
 Finally, the findings show that the power of issue network members was weak as well as 
uneven. The presence of issue networks had similar implications in both countries due to their 
minimal weight on the decision-making process. The ‘governance’ of stakeholders did not 
weaken the power of central government in either. Yet, the way the governments cooperated 
with civil society was different with the UK government being more open to consultations and 
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the Italian one more closed. Only the two biggest, more resourceful and more experienced 
organisations were able to deploy some form of power. However, both organisations were 
approached by the two governments on practical issues: the accommodation centres in the UK 
that had met many obstacles and the development of an asylum system in the Italy until then 
non-existent. The efficacy of these two organisations was therefore due to both their recognised 
national and international status and the objective needs of the two governments to have 
practical solutions. These findings suggest that some NGOs may be able to use what power they 

























ITALIAN INTERVIEWEES: CIVIL SOCIETY 
 























Caritas Ngo Dinh Le Quyen 
Responsible for 
immigration, 
asylum and human 
trafficking  
06/11/2008 
Centro Astalli – Jesuit 
Refugee Centre 
Berardino Guarino Projects’ Director 04/11/2008 
Comunità di 
Sant’Egidio 
Daniela Pompei Representative 06/11/2008 
Federazione delle 
Chiese Evangeliche 
in Italia (FCEI) 
Franca Di Lecce 





Italian Consortium of 
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Gianfranco Schiavone 
President of the 
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Christopher Hein Director 04/11/2008 
N/A Sergio Briguglio External expert 05/11/2008 
UNHCR Jürgen Humburg Official 
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CCD-CDU Luca Volontè MP 
Telephone interview:  
12/01/2011 





Massimo Brutti MP 
Telephone interview: 
15/02/2011  


































UK INTERVIEWEES: CIVIL SOCIETY 
 










 October 2008 








 October 2008 
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Immigration 
Advisory Service 
Keith Best Chief Executive 15
th
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Joint Council for the 
Welfare of 
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Don Flynn Policy Officer 21
st
 October 2008 
Justice Dr Eric MetCalfe 
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Refugee Council Imran Hussain Policy Officer 10
th
 October 2008 
Refugee Council Richard Williams EU Working Group 23
rd
 October 2008 
Refugee Council Nick Hardwick Chief Executive 8
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Home Office Nick Pearce 
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Adviser to Blunkett 
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Independent Lord Bhatia Lord 2
nd
 February 2011 
Labour Lord Dubs Lord 11
th
 February 2011 
Liberal Democrat Lord Dholakia Lord 1
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COMPARISON OF KEY ACTORS IN THE TWO COUNTRIES 
 
Actors United Kingdom Italy 
Government 
Decisive role of No.10 and Home 
Office. They had their own internal 
network formed by legal advisers and 
other HO officials. Their work was 
important but it was steered by the 
Prime Minister and the Home 
Secretary. 
Mediating role between the CCD-
CDU and the NL. 
Opposition 
In the House of Commons, the 
opposition parties only flagged up 
issues but did not have any real 
bargaining power because of the 
majority in the government. These 
issues were brought up once again in 
the House of Lords. Here the 
opposition parties defeated the 
government showing some bargaining 
power. 
Very small role due to the closure of 
the government to any interference 
(Their role was limited to proposing 
amendments that were almost entirely 
discarded and obstructing the works 
by delaying the policy process). 
Political 
Parties 
Many of the issues discussed during 
the policy process found agreement 
across party lines. There were also 
disagreements but political parties 
were not particularly prominent. 
Asylum was a hot political issue 
generally rather than a party-political 
divisive issue as immigration in Italy. 
The CCD-CDU and the NL were the 
real power holders within 
government. They clashed strongly on 
labour migration. 
Civil society 
NGOs and charities were involved in 
the consultation process but they did 
not have bargaining power. This 
included the RC that came out from the 
analysis as the most powerful NGO 
thanks to their expertise, national status 
but also their positive non-
confrontational collaboration with the 
government. 
 
There were protests against the 
establishment of the accommodation 
centres. These were organised by local 
citizens and local authorities in Tories 
constituencies. Their protests forced 
the government to open a consultation 
process with the local authorities and 
delayed the start of the works. But the 
government in the end went ahead as 
planned. 
NGOs and charities were excluded by 
the government’s consultation 
process. However, Catholic groups 
had a fair chance to be listened to by 
Catholic MPs within the majority; the 
UNHCR was the only specialised 
agency on asylum issues. For this 
reason (together with the fact the 
asylum was not perceived a priority 
by the government and their non-
party-political stance) they had some 
bargaining power. This lead to the 
collaboration with the Ministry of 
Interior; ANCI also had some 
bargaining power thanks to the 
cooperation with the Ministry of 
Interior, the UNHCR and the mayors 
especially those from right-wing 
parties given the ruling government’s 
political make-up; employers groups 
were consulted and cooperated with 





APPENDIX 6  
DISCUSSION GUIDE IN ITALIAN 
 
Interessi/preoccupazioni 
1. Qual’era il suo interesse nei confronti della Bossi-Fini? 
2. Quali erano le preoccupazioni maggiori? 
3. Quale era il suo ruolo – o quello della sua organizzazione – durante il processo di 
policy-making della Bossi-Fini (coinvolgimento attivo o parziale?) 
 
Networks (gruppi di consulenza professionale) 
1. C’erano networks? Ne faceva parte? 
2. Che tipo di networks? (interne all’organizzazione/esterne; formali/informali) e quante? 
3. Come sono state create?  
4. Come funzionavano? (Flessibili e aperte oppure chiuse?) 
5. Quale era il ruolo di queste networks nello sviluppo della legge? 
6. Con chi ha avuto piu’ contatti e come? 
7. Chi erano gli altri membri? 
8. Questo tipo di networking esisteva gia’ oppure e’ stato creato specificatamente per a 
Bossi-Fini?  
9. Chi ha promosso l’iniziativa? 
 
Natura dell’interazione 
1. A che tipo di riunioni ha partecipato? 
2. Chi altri vi prendeva parte? 
3. Quante riunioni?  
4. Frequenza? 
5. Dove vi incontravate? 
6. Di che cosa discutevate? 
7. Come vi scambiavate le informazioni? 
 
Risultati 
1. Hanno sempre accettato il suo punto di vista (successo / insuccesso) 
2. Quando la Bossi-Fini alla fine e’ passata, qual’e’ stata la sua reazione? 
3. Qual’e’ il suo punto di vista sulla legge? 
4. Pensa che sarebbe potuta andare diversamente? Come? 
5. Avrebbe fatto qualcosa in maniera differente? 
 
Compromessi/Potere 
1. Durante il processo di policy-making process, ha avuto ripensamenti o rivalutato la sua 
posizione iniziale? 
2. Se si perche’? 
3. In quale momento? 
4. Compromessi?  
5. Perche’ e dove? 
6. Pensa che i diversi stakeholders (dir. terzo fiduciario cui le parti in lite affidano la 
custodia di cose) avessero lo stesso potere?  
7. C’e’ una maniera per misurare la sua influenza? 
256 
 
8. L’influenza della Chiesa Cattolica 
 
NGOs 
1. Ha fatto lobby sul governo e i mass-media? 
2. Come ha identificato i suoi alleati e i non-alleati? 
3. Veniva ascoltato?  
4. Atteggiamento dei ministri nei confronti della legge? 
 
Influenza 
1. Influenza dei mass-media sul governo 






























DISCUSSION GUIDE IN ENGLISH 
 
Interests 
1. What was the particular rationale for this legislation? Where did it come from and why?  
 
Sources 
1 What sources of knowledge did you draw on to guide your policy choices? (Did you 
prefer academic studies, commissioned research, own organizational knowledge, 
special commissions, voluntary sector, or media as sites of knowledge production? 
Why?) 
2 What kind of sources did you use to carry out research? (Through in-house research 
units, commissioning external research, or less formal networks?) 
3 What information was derived from other organisations? 
 
Networks 
1 What kind of networks did you form with other organisations? 
2 Where these already existing? 
3 How would you describe the relationship with the organization? 
 
Influence/Power 
1.  How influential were you? 
2. Do you think the Government – due to its majority – was more powerful than the 
NGOs? 
3. The nation-state is ‘hollowing-out’ but not on immigration issues – at least in 2002. Is it 
true? Why? 
4. Are things changing? 
 
Compromise 
1. Did you change your opinion during the process? 
2. If so, when and why? 




1. Why did you spend so much time debating accommodation centres when there were 
more pressing topics to discuss for example, section 55; the repeal of part III of the 
1999 Act on automatic bail hearing; and children’s detention? 
2. During the debates, it was pointed out that accommodation centres were all in 
Conservative areas and the Conservatives were accused of NYMBIsm. Did you agree? 
3. Why was section 55 introduced so late? Was it a Government’s manoeuvre or was it a 
genuine late thought? 
4. Did the Home Office have an agenda? 
5. If so, were politicians manipulating others’ opinions to reach their goals? 
 
Media/constituencies 
1 How powerful was the media in influencing your views? 
2 How important were constituencies? 
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3 Were they more influential than the media? 
4 Do you think the media shapes public opinion or has public opinion their minds made 
up? (e.g. the average reader of the Daily Mail is probably inclined to think that way) 
 
EU 
1. Did the EU have any influence at all on the Government throughout the policy-making 
process of the NIA Act?  
 
AT THE END: 
Is there anything you feel I have left out? 































APPENDIX 8  





 October 2008 
 
Dear Dr Hein, 
 
I am a PhD student at University College London under the supervision of Professor John Salt 
Director of the Migration Research Unit and Dr Alan Ingram. Given your expertise and great 
experience of asylum issues, I am getting in touch with you in reference to my research on the 
formulation of asylum policies in Italy and the UK. 
 
My research focuses on the interaction and power relations between the various stakeholders in 
the making of asylum policies. While Italy does not even have asylum legislation, the UK has 
produced several Acts. Furthermore, while both countries share similar attitudes towards asylum 
seekers, they present different policy outcomes due to their different historical and political 
trajectories. My project focuses on the UK Nationality and Immigration Act 2002 and on the 
Italian Bossi-Fini law of the same year. My research will involve interviews in each country 
with a range of actors who were actively involved in the respective legislative processes, 
including policy-makers, NGOs, Refugee Community Organisations. 
 
A short summary of my project is attached. 
 
In particular, I would like to interview you. I believe my research would benefit greatly from 
your insights into the policy making process in this area and would be very grateful if you were 
able to take part. I estimate that the procedure would not take up more than an hour of your 
time. 
 






COPY OF LETTER IN ITALIAN SENT TO ITALIAN INTERVIEWEE 
(GIANFRANCO SCHIAVONE)  
 
 
Londra, 3 ottobre 2008 
 
OGGETTO: Intervista per ricerca di dottorato 
 
Egregio Dott. Schiavone, 
 
Sono una studentessa alla University College London dove sto facendo un dottorato di ricerca 
sotto la supervisione del Professor John Salt, Direttore della Migration Research Unit e del Dr 
Alan Ingram. Ci siamo incontrati parecchi mesi fa di sfuggita durante una conferenza a Udine 
tramite Alessandra Fantin e data la Sua gran esperienza in materia di asilo, Le scrivo ora in 
merito alla mia ricerca sulla formulazione delle politiche di asilo in Italia e nel Regno Unito.  
 
La mia ricerca si occupa dell’interazione tra i vari stakeholders e del potere che esercitano nel 
creare le politiche d'asilo. Infatti mentre l'Italia non ha nemmeno una legge organica sull'asilo, il 
Regno Unito ho prodotto diverse leggi in materia. Inoltre nonostante i due paesi in questione 
abbiano degli atteggiamenti simili verso i richiedenti asilo, producono leggi differenti grazie ad 
uno sviluppo storico e politico diverso. Mettero' a confronto il Nationality and Immigration Act 
2002 e la legge Bossi-Fini in quanto contengono significanti implicazioni per i richiedenti asilo. 
La mia intenzione e' di intervistare stakeholders attivamente coinvolti nei processi di policy-
making delle due leggi (policy-makers, NGOs, Refugee Community Organisations). 
 
Un breve sommario in inglese della mia ricerca e’ in allegato. 
 
Come avra’ visto dall’oggetto della mia lettera vorrei avere l’opportunita’ di intervistarLa. 
Credo profondamente che la mia ricerca trarrebbe un enorme beneficio dal suo intuito e 




Spererei di andare prima a Roma per condurre delle altre interviste in novembre per poi salire in 
Friuli (i miei genitori abitano a Sacile) verso la fine di novembre, inizi dicembre. La procedura 
non dovrebbe durare piu’ di 1 ora.  
 

































The Rt Hon. David Blunkett 
House of Commons,  
London SW1A 0AA  17
th
 December 2010 
 
 
Dear Mr Blunkett, 
 
I am an ESRC funded PhD student at University College London under the supervision of 
Doctor Alan Ingram and Professor John Salt. 
 
My thesis compares the formulation of asylum policies in the UK and Italy, especially in 
relation to national governance. Although other studies have focused on the role of 
interconnecting networks in policy-making, none so far has specifically looked into asylum 
legislation in a comparative manner. My focus is on the UK Nationality and Immigration Act 
2002 and on the Italian Bossi-Fini law of the same year.  
 
My thesis looks particularly at the interaction and power relations between the various 
stakeholders in the making of asylum policies. While Italy does not even have asylum 
legislation, the UK has produced several Acts over the last decade or so. Furthermore, while 
both countries share similar attitudes towards asylum seekers, they present different policy 
outcomes due to their different historical and political trajectories. For example, asylum 
legislation in Italy has tended to be an addendum to mainstream migration legislation but in the 
UK the main focus of several Acts has been asylum. 
 
I am now in the later stages of my research. So far my main work has focused on 
Parliamentary debates, official documents, media coverage of the issue together with 
preliminary interviews with various stakeholders, including representative of NGOs and some 
politicians. It has now reached the stage where I have been able to identify key actors and their 
role in both countries. I now need to discuss with them why they articulated particular views 
and took the actions they did. 
 
I believe your insights as Home Secretary into the policy making process that produced 
the 2002 Act are vital in explaining how it came about and how the network of stakeholders was 
created and functioned. I am writing to ask if you would be willing to spare me 30-45 minutes 
of your time to answer some queries about your role that have emerged from my analysis of the 




I would be grateful if you would suggest possible dates and times, before the end of 
January 2011 if at all possible. If you feel able to respond positively to my request, I will send 






























ASYLUM LEGISLATION IN THE UK 
 






The Act incorporated the 1951 UN Convention on refugees 
into UK law. It introduced: the power to fingerprint all asylum 
applicants (and their dependants) to deter multiple 
applications; accelerated and ‘fast-track’ appeals procedures to 
assess asylum applications; the right to appeal before removal 
from the UK; the restriction to access to housing for asylum 
applicants (UK Border Agency n.d.) . 




The Act “provided that the right of appeal against removal to 
safe third countries in the EU (and Canada, Norway, 
Switzerland and the USA) would be exercisable only from 
abroad”. It removed benefit entitlements to in-country asylum 
applicants and further restricted access to housing. It 
introduced a 'white list' of countries (UKBA n.d.). 
Immigration and Asylum 
Bill 
1999 
The Act removed remaining benefit entitlements from all 
asylum applicants and created the National Asylum Support 
Service (NASS) to support and disperse destitute asylum 
seekers on the basis of a no-choice dispersal system (Daly 
n.d.). 




It provided for the establishment of accommodation centres; 
repealed the provision of automatic bail hearings created by the 
Immigration and Asylum Act 1999; removed support in three 
cases: for asylum seekers who did not take up the 
government’s ‘offer’ to reside in an accommodation centre; for 
those who did not apply for asylum ‘as soon as reasonably 
practicable’ upon arrival in the United Kingdom; and for 
claimants who would not co-operate with the authorities. It 
introduced non-suspensive appeals and a ‘white list’ of ten safe 
countries that were about to join the European Union in 2002; 
extended the power of detention including families with 
children (NIA Act). 
Asylum and Immigration 
Act (Treatment of 
Claimants, etc.) 
2004 
The Act introduced “a provision to allow termination of 
support to families and a power to attach a condition of 
community activity to hard case support”. It also included 
“changes to homelessness law so that a refugee will be deemed 
to have acquired a local connection with the local authority in 
which their dispersal accommodation is situated. The Act also 
creates new penalties for people who arrive in the UK without 
valid documentation” (Refugee Council 2004b, 2). 
Immigration, Asylum and 
Nationality Act 
2006 
It reiterates what  it was said in the government’s five year 
plan: 
- stop granting indefinite leave to remain (ILR) to recognised 
refugees, and the introduction of an appeal against a decision 
to remove or refuse to extend their right to remain in the UK; 
- measures to further strengthen border controls by 
fingerprinting all visa applications and carrying out electronic 
checks on people entering and leaving the country; 
- the extension and consolidation of vouchers as a form of 
support for failed asylum seekers who are unable to return to 
country of origin; 
- the introduction of a number of counter terrorism measures, 
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including a clause that extends the grounds on which the 
government can exclude people from asylum (Refugee Council 
2006, 2). 
UK Borders Act 2007 
It “introduces the power to impose compulsory biometric 
identity documents for non-EU immigrants; enables the 
government to require children under the age of 16 to carry a 
biometric identity card; allows automatic deportation of some 
foreign nationals in two circumstances: if they are imprisoned 
for specific offences or they are imprisoned for more than one 
year”. It gives “immigration officers with police-like powers, 
including increased detention, entry, search and seizure 
powers”. It “allows additional reporting and residency 
conditions to be imposed on immigrants granted limited leave 
to remain. This could mean reporting regularly to the UK 
Border Agency or residing at a specific address” (The 
Guardian 2009b). 




This Act covers a wide area including. In terms of immigration 
it “introduces a special immigration status for those believed to 
have been involved in terrorism and other serious crimes. 
Recipients have no formal leave to enter or remain in Britain, 
and the home secretary can impose conditions on their 
residence and employment and require them to wear an 
electronic tag. Special immigration status can also be applied 
to their spouses (The Guardian 2009c). 




It is also known as ‘simplification bill’ whose aim is to review 
all existing asylum and immigration legislation. It “creates new 
powers to allow customs officials and immigration officers to 
share information; amends the rules on naturalisation; creates a 
new category of temporary leave to remain, entitled 
"probationary citizenship leave". This will form part of the new 
route to citizenship and will constitute an additional period for 
which migrants are denied access to services and welfare; 
introduces the concept of voluntary community service for 
migrants” to “reduce the length of the naturalisation process by 




















IMMIGRATION/ASYLUM LEGISLATION IN ITALY 
 
Legislation Year Main points 
Legge Martelli 
Law 28 February 1990 n.39 
1990 
Only Art.1 contains information on the right to asylum. For the 
first time, this allows entrance at the Italian borders to non-
European refugees.  In fact, with the 1951 Geneva Convention, 
only European refugees could make their way into the Italian 
soil until this time. 
Legge Turco-Napolitano -  
Disciplina dell’immigrazione 
e norme sulla condizione 
dello straniero (Discipline of 
immigration and regulations 
on the condition of the 
foreigner) Law 6 March 
1998 n. 40 
1998 
This law introduced a series of new regulations from the 
reinforcement of borders controls to the definition of flows and 
type of immigrations. A quota system fixed every year 
according to the countries of origin and to the type of workers 
was introduced. Quotas did not however cover the entries for 
family reunion, asylum seekers and humanitarian reasons. The 
law furthermore, introduced new ways of opposing illegal 
immigration also with the creation of detention centres, where 
immigrants who had received an expulsion order were held 
from twenty to thirty days while all the controls are done. 
Finally, the law also provided a carta di soggiorno, a particular 
permit with unlimited duration for those immigrants who had 
legally lived in Italy for 5 years (Legge Turco-Napolitano).   
Law decree 25 July, no. 286 
– Testo unico  
delle disposizioni 
concernenti la disciplina 
dell’immigrazione e norme 
sulla condizione dello  
straniero (Single text 
regulating the discipline on 
immigration and norms on 
the situation of the foreigner) 
1998 
The new decree supported the dispositions against illegal 
immigration as well as discrimination against specific groups, 
such as refugees. Although, the decree could be seen in a 
positive way for the improvements made on the conditions of 
the legal immigrant, it is important to take notice of the 
reinforcement of the expulsions and rejection through the 
institution of fermo amministrativo, which is a type of 
detention in those cases where a person cannot be immediately 
expelled (Decreto legislativo 286/98). 
Legge Bossi-Fini 
Law 189/2002, effective 
since 21
st
 April 2005date of 
entry into force of the 
implementing Regulation 





The norm has introduced 4 new points with regards to asylum: 
1) The introduction if identification centers. Asylum seekers 
will  be held while waiting for their request to be examined; 
2) Double asylum procedure: simplified for asylum seekers 
within the identification centers; and ordinary for free asylum 
seekers; 
3) The institution of 7 territorial commissions to recognize 
refugee status (in Gorizia, Milan, Rome, Foggia, Siracusa, 
Crotone, Trapani);  
4) If refugee status is not given, asylum seekers will be 
expelled immediately from the country even if they have 
appealed.  (ICS 2005). 
Law-decree 92/2008 
containing ‘urgent measures 
on public security’ converted 
into law 125/2008 
2008 
It introduced the following provisions: aggravante di 
clandestinità (aggravating circumstances for illegal migrants) 
according to which the illegal migrant who has committed a 
crime may have a higher punishment; expulsion of the foreign 
citizen (including a EU citizen) if condemned for two years (it 
used to be 10 years); stricter punishments for employers taking 
on illegal migrants and home owners renting to illegal 
migrants; the CPTs change name and became centri di 
identificazione ed espulsione (Centres for the identification and 
expulsion) (Programma Integra 2008). 
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Law 15 July 2009 no. 9 (so 
called pacchetto sicurezza) 
2009 
The pacchetto sicurezza (security package) introduced the 
reato di clandestinità (crime of illegality) according to which 
the illegal migrant has to pay between 5000 and 10000 Euros. 
It also introduced the so-called ronde that is groups of non-
armed citizens who patrol the streets and may signal security 
issues. Finally, it provided for an extension of the stay in the 
centri di identificazione ed espulsione (Altalex 2009). 
Law 28 June 2012 no. 92 (so 
called Riforma Fornero) 
2012 
This law reformed the Testo Unico by doubling the residence 
permit from six to twelve months for those who have lost their 



































ORIGINAL QUOTATIONS CHAPTER 1 
 
(1.1) criterio di omogeneità culturale 
(1.2) particolare attenzione sia riservata a quei cittadini che provengono da paesi che hanno più 
















































ORIGINAL QUOTATIONS CHAPTER 5 
 
(5.1) in Cina non c'e' la liberta' di stampa. La liberta' di stampa e' uno degli elementi della nostra 
Costituzione. Chiaramente, qualsiasi cinese che veniva in Italia e diceva "io li non posso farmi il 
mio giornale" doveva essere, in base all'art. 10 della Costituzione, considerato rifugiato politico. 
E questo non era ... pensabile. 
 
(5.2) indicare l’Italia come un pase ... di ricovero , di accoglienza 
 
(5.3) aprire le porte a tutti 
 
(5.4) il fenomeno della crescita di nuovi arrivi 
 
(5.5) una proposta alternativa 
 
(5.6) una normativa gia' dal '98 zoppicante in quanto all'immigrazione si e invece all'asilo no 
 
(5.7) nonostante fosse il governo Prodi di sx, non aveva ascoltato minimamente le associazioni 
 
(5.8) qualcuno ha fatto fuori il governo Prodi e la cosa e' decaduta 
 
(5.9) La disumanità dell'ideologia della società multirazziale 
 
(5.10) I casi in cui è possibile trattenere il richiedente asilo, nonché la possibilità di 
allontanamento dopo il primo grado concessa dalla procedura accelerata 
 
(5.11) Grande innovazione 
 
(5.12) Taglia e incolla 
 
(5.13) Non una legge con il proprio pensiero 
 
(5.14) Costituzionalmente censurabile 
 
(5.15) Sostanziale sollievo a fronte della scarsa corrispondenza tra i contenuti del disegno di 
legge e quelli della usuale propaganda di alcuni dei partiti di maggioranza 
 
(5.16) un meccanismo a tutela della legalità e anche a garanzia degli immigrati 
 
(5.17) uno strumento anti straniero 
 
(5.18) In tutte le ipotesi di ingresso clandestino 
 
(5.19) Regolare, irregolare ... o altro 
 
(5.20) Il novanta per cento [dei presentatori di queste domande strumentali] facevano poi 
perdere le loro tracce 
 
(5.21) In uno stesso provvedimento, norme con obiettivi così diversi 
 




(5.23) Invece paradossalmente la B-F strutturo' il PNA e lo trasformo' in un sistema prevedendo 
anche dei fondi stabili per quanto insufficienti 
 
(5.24) Registrato ... notevoli ritardi nell'attuazione di molti strumenti previsti, non è stata 
oggetto di un adeguato monitoraggio ma, soprattutto e fondamentalmente, non è stata in grado 
di fronteggiare le emergenze 
 
(5.25) quello che gli italiani vogliono sentirsi dire 
 
(5.26) Per far fronte ad alcune necessita ... una popolazione di sette milioni di abitanti perché 
































ORIGINAL QUOTATIONS CHAPTER 7 
 
(7.1) sistema molto politico ma molto apartitico 
 
(7.2) ...se la spinta fosse venuta solo da sindaci di centro-sx  probabilmente sarebbe andata 
[male] 
 
(7.3) principio ... e ideologia 
 
(7.4) perdere il controllo della cabina di regia 
 
(7.5) emanazione storica del Partito Comunista Italiano 
 
(7.6) per quanto riguarda il lavoro di lobby si può sintetizzare in niente 
 
(7.7) una legge molto colorata sul piano politico 
 
(7.8) Nel 2001 se si pronunciava la parola asilo si pensava alla scuola materna ... gia' sembrava 
un miracolo trovare una persona sensibile 
 




(7.11) grande gioco delle parti dove io mi alleo 
 
(7.12) l'obiettivo era cercare di convergere verso ... condivise 
 
(7.13) fasi dove avevamo ...  fora ... piu' strutturati 
 
(7.14) tutto nasceva allora, tutto piu' o meno nello stessom momento, non c'erano momenti di 
coordinamento, non c'erano tavoli, non c'era esperienza, non c'era abitudine a discutere, non 
c'era abitudine da parte dell'ACNUR a coordinare le ONG. ... magmatico 
 
(7.15) in coda alla Conferenza XY, al Convegno Z, al Seminario X ... in Italia avviene sempre 
in maniera abbastanza disordinata 
 
(7.16) Periodi più caldi 
 
(7.17) Sarebbe ingenuo 
 
(7.18) un percorso ... piu' ripiegato su se stesso 
 
(7.19) chiarire i rispettivi mandati 
 
(7.20) voi chiedete solo per alcuni e non chiedete per gli altri 
 
(7.21) troppo di profilo modesto rispetto all'importanza del tema 
 
(7.22) con la attuale maggioranza governativa, assai poco disponibile ad ascoltare le istanze 
umanitarie o garantiste 
 




(7.24) dal paleolitico al neolitico 
 
(7.25)  interlocutore principe 
 
(7.26) pressioni dell'ACNUR checche' ne pensino le altre organizzazioni 
 
(7.27) organismo accreditato presso il Ministero degli Affari Esteri 
 
(7.28) tavolo trasversale da Rifondazione Comunista sino al Papa 
 
(7.29) Prima del termine previsto per la presentazione degli emendamenti in Aula 
 
(7.30) Dilagato fra tutti i componenti dell'opposizione 
 
(7.31) Dopo una seduta della Commissione affari costituzionali durata fino alle 3 di notte ...  
non consentirà al Ddl di vedere un voto finale 
 
(7.32) Pervicaci bolscevichi 
 
(7.33) Frutto di audizioni 
 
(7.34) Sulla base di intese con gli enti locali e l'ACNUR 
 
(7.35) Fase intermedia 
 
(7.36) insicurezza perchè l’immigrato la cui Permanenza è legata al bisogno dell’imprenditore 




(7.38) Utile solo se e fino a quando produce ricchezza … riducendo l’immigrazione a una 
questione di ordine pubblico 
 
(7.39) Rinunciato alla loro identità 
 
(7.40) .. fare una legge ... sia per gli italiani ... per gli europei ... e per quegli immigrati che 
entrano in Italia in modo regolare e in Italia rispettano le leggi e lavorano onestamente 
 
(7.41) Funzionale al meccanismo della produzione, e viene "smaltito" ...  non appena questa 
utilità viene a cessare 
 
(7.42) differenza sostanziale ... sanatorie del passato [si limitavano a prendere in 
considerazione] la presenza ... [d]i disoccupati, garantendo loro soltanto le iscrizioni alle liste di 
collocamento. La regolarizzazione ... ha richiesto un rapporto di lavoro reale ... formalizzato in 
un contratto di lavoro con un salario regolare 
 
(7.43) Ipotesi e scenari che per ragioni obiettive non lasciavano tranquilli 
 
(7.44) Esposti al rischio di lavoro illegale 
 
(7.45) Nozione rudimentale della nostra lingua e del nostro diritto 
 




(7.47) Impone ... a carico dei soli datori di lavoro la soluzione del problema ... di assicurare una 
sistemazione decorosa ai lavoratori extra-comunitari, problema che, invece dovrebbe essere, 
affrontato con il concorso delle parti sociali e delle comunità locali 
 
(7.48) È giusto ... sapere con chi si ha a che fare 
 
(7.49) stranieri sono tutti potenzialmente criminali o, comunque, soggetti da tenere sotto 
controllo 
 
(7.50) hanno percepito con l'avvio di un sistema pubblico di accoglienza basato sui comuni 
come una sorta di concorrenza ... tradendo in questo modo una impostazione tipica italiana .. le 
misure si supporto ... non debbano essere gestite dallo stato ma gestite da enti privati ... la nostra 











































ORIGINAL QUOTATIONS CHAPTER 8 
 
(8.1) di commentare o di intervenire 
(8.2) non c'erano tavoli, non c'era esperienza, non c'era abitudine a discutere, non c'era abitudine 
da parte dell'ACNUR a coordinare le ONG 
(8.3) l'avvio di un sistema pubblico di accoglienza ... come una sorta di concorrenza 
(8.4) Una fetta della torta nuziale 
(8.5) era l'ente di punta ad avere rapporti con noi, con il legislatore e anche con il governo. Era 
quella piu' attiva, era anche quella piu' identificabile, la piu' riconosciuta. Aveva una serie di 
qualificazioni che la rendevano affidabile, piu' affidabile di altre 
(8.6) un ascolto totale 
(8.7) un contributo estensivo ... è stata un legge che ha coinvolto molta gente intesa come 
società civile  
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